On the early morning of November 17, 2024, the Baltic Sea was shrouded in a dense, oppressive fog that clung to the surface like a spectral veil. The air was thick with moisture, and visibility was severely limited, reducing the horizon to a mere shadowy outline. The sea itself was eerily calm. This haunting stillness set the stage for the unforeseen disruption of the submarine cables. This event would send ripples of concern about hybrid warfare far beyond the misty expanse of the Baltic. The quiet depths of the Baltic Sea have become the stage for a high-tech mystery gripping the world. Two critical submarine cables were severed, disrupting communication in a rare and alarming twist.

As Swedish media outlet SVT Nyheter broke the news, suspicions of sabotage began to surface. Adding fuel to the intrigue, a Chinese vessel became the focus of investigators like the first lantern — the ship of interest, Yi Peng 3, had reportedly been near both breakpoints at the critical moments. While submarine cable damage is not uncommon, the simultaneous failure of two cables, separated by distance but broken within the same maritime zone, is an event of perceived extraordinary rarity that raised the suspicion of foul play and hybrid war actions against Western critical infrastructure.

Against the backdrop of escalating geopolitical tensions, speculation is rife. Could these breaks signal a calculated act of sabotage? As the investigation unfolds, the presence of the Chinese vessel looms large, now laying for anchor in international waters in Danish Kattegat, turning a routine disruption into a high-stakes drama that may be redefining maritime security in our digital age.

Signe Ravn-Højgaard, Director of the Danish Think Tank for Digital Infrastructure, has been at the forefront, with her timely LinkedIn Posts, delivering near real-time updates that have kept experts and observers alike on edge.

Let’s count to ten and look at what we know so far and at the same time revisit some subsea cable fundamentals as well.

WHY DO SUBMARINE CABLES BREAK?

Distinguishing between natural causes, unintended human actions, and deliberate human actions in the context of submarine cable breaks requires analyzing the circumstances and evidence surrounding the incident.

Natural causes generally involve geological or environmental events such as earthquakes, underwater landslides, strong currents, or seabed erosion. In the Arctic, icebergs may scrape the seabed as they drift or ground in shallow waters, potentially dragging and crushing calves in their path. These causes often coincide with measurable natural phenomena like seismic activity, seasonal ice, or extreme weather events in the area of the cable break. According to data from the International Cable Protection Committee (ICPC), ca. 5% of faults are caused by natural phenomena, such as earthquakes, underwater landslides, iceberg drifts, or volcanic activity.

The aging of submarine cables adds to their vulnerability. Wear and tear, corrosion, and material degradation due to long-term exposure to seawater can lead to failures, especially in decades-old cables. In some cases, the damage may also stem from improper installation or manufacturing defects, where weak points in the cable structure result in premature failure.

Unintended human actions are characterized by accidental interference with cables, often linked to maritime activities. Examples include ship anchor dragging, fishing vessel trawling, or accidental damage during underwater construction or maintenance. These incidents typically occur in areas of high maritime traffic or during specific operations and lack any indicators of malicious intent. Approximately 40% of subsea cable faults are caused by anchoring and fishing activities, the most common human-induced risks. Another 45% of faults have unspecified causes, which could include a mix of factors. Upwards of 87% of all faults are a result of human intervention.

While necessary, maintenance and repair operations can also introduce risks. Faulty repairs, crossed cables, or mishandling during maintenance can create new vulnerabilities. Underwater construction activities, such as dredging, pipeline installation, or offshore energy projects, may inadvertently damage cables.

Deliberate human actions, which by all means are the stuff of the most interesting stories, by contrast, involve intentional interference with submarine cables and are usually motivated by sabotage, espionage, or geopolitical strategies. These cases often feature evidence of targeted activity, such as patterns of damage suggesting deliberate cutting or tampering. Unexplained or covert vessel movements near critical cable routes may also indicate intentional actions. A deliberate action may, of course, be disguised as an accidental interference (e.g., anchor dragging or trawling).

Although much focus is on the integrity of the subsea cables themselves, which is natural due to the complexity and time it takes to repair a broken cable, it is wise to remember that landing stations, beach manholes, and associated operational systems are likewise critical components of the submarine cable infrastructure and are vulnerable to deliberate hostile actions as well. Cyber exposure in network management systems, which are often connected to the internet, presents an additional risk, making these systems potential targets for sabotage, espionage, or cyberattacks. Strengthening the physical security of these facilities and enhancing cybersecurity measures are essential to mitigate these risks.

Landing stations and submarine cable cross-connects, or T-junctions, are critical nodes in the global communications infrastructure, making them particularly vulnerable to deliberate attacks. A compromise at a landing station could disrupt multiple cables simultaneously, severing regional or international connectivity. At the same time, an attack on a T-junction could disable critical pathways, bypassing redundancy mechanisms and amplifying the impact of a single failure. These vulnerabilities highlight the need for enhanced physical security, robust monitoring, and advanced cybersecurity measures to safeguard these vital points due to their disproportional impact if compromised.

Although deliberate human actions are increasingly considered a severe risk with the current geopolitical climate, their frequency and impact are not well-documented in the report. Most known subsea cable incidents remain attributed to accidental causes, with sabotage and espionage considered significant but less quantified threats.

Categorizing cable breaks involves gathering data on the context of the incident, including geographic location, timing, activity logs from nearby vessels, and environmental conditions. Combining this information with forensic analysis of the damaged cable helps determine whether the cause was natural, accidental, or deliberate.

WHY ARE SUBMARINE CABLES CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE?

Submarine cables are indispensable to modern society and should be regarded as critical infrastructure because they enable global connectivity and support essential services. These cables carry approximately 95% of international data traffic, forming the backbone of the Internet, financial systems, and communications. Their reliability underpins industries, governments, and economies worldwide, making disruptions highly consequential. For example, the financial sector relies heavily on submarine cables for instantaneous transactions and stock trading, while governments depend on them for secure communications and national security operations. With limited viable alternatives, such as satellites, which lack the bandwidth and speed of submarine cables, these cables are uniquely vital.

Despite their importance, submarine cable networks are designed with significant redundancy and safeguards to ensure resilience. Multiple cable routes exist for most major data pathways, ensuring that a single failure does not result in widespread disruptions. For example, transatlantic communications are supported by numerous parallel cables. Regional systems, such as those in Europe and North America, are highly interconnected, offering alternative routes to reroute traffic during outages. Advanced repair capabilities, including specialized cable-laying and repair ships, ensure timely restoration of damaged cables. Additionally, internet service providers and data centers use sophisticated traffic-routing protocols to minimize the impact of localized disruptions. Ownership and maintenance of these cables are often managed by consortia of telecom and technology companies, enhancing their robustness and shared responsibility for maintenance.

It is worth considering for operators and customers of submarine cables that using multiple parallel submarine cables drastically improves the overall availability of the network. With two cables, downtime is reduced to mere seconds annually (99.9999% and maximum 32 seconds annual downtime), and with three cables, it becomes negligible (99.9999999% and maximum ~0.32 seconds annual downtime). This enhanced reliability ensures that critical services remain uninterrupted even if one cable experiences a failure. Such setups are ideal for organizations or infrastructures that require near-perfect availability. To mitigate the impact of deliberate hostile actions on submarine cable traffic, operators must adopt a geographically strategic approach when designing redundancy and robustness, considering both the physical and logical connectivity and transport.

While the submarine cable network is inherently robust, users of this infrastructure must adopt proactive measures to safeguard their services and traffic. Organizations should distribute data across multiple cables to mitigate risks from localized outages and invest in cloud-based redundancy with geographically dispersed data centers to ensure continuity. Collaborative monitoring efforts between governments and private companies can help prevent accidental or deliberate damage, while security measures for cable landing stations and undersea routes can reduce vulnerabilities. By acknowledging the strategic importance of submarine cables and implementing such safeguards, users can help ensure the continued resilience of this critical global infrastructure.

1-2 KNOCKOUT!

So what happened underneath the Baltic Sea last weekend (between 17 and 18 November)?

In mid-November 2024, two significant submarine cable disruptions occurred in the Baltic Sea, raising concerns over the security of critical infrastructure in the region. The first incident involved the BCS East-West Interlink cable, which connects Lithuania to Sweden. On November 17, at approximately 10:00 AM local time (08:00 UTC), the damage was detected. The cable runs from Sventoji, Lithuania, to Katthammarsvik on the east coast of the Swedish island of Gotland. Telia Lithuania, a telecommunications company, reported that the cable had been “cut,” leading to substantial communication disruptions between Lithuania and Sweden.

The second disruption occurred the following day, on November 18, around midnight (note: exact time seems to be uncertain), involving the C-Lion1 cable connecting Finland to Germany. The damage was identified off the coast of the Swedish island of Öland. Finnish telecommunications company Cinia Oy reported that the cable had been physically interrupted by an unknown force, resulting in a complete outage of services transmitted via this cable.

The reactions from affected nations have highlighted the seriousness of these events. In Germany, Defense Minister Boris Pistorius stated that the damage appeared to be the result of sabotage, emphasizing the unlikelihood of it being accidental. In Finland, Foreign Minister Elina Valtonen expressed deep concern, stressing the importance of protecting such vital infrastructure. Sweden initiated a formal investigation into the disruptions, with the Swedish Prosecution Authority opening a case under suspicion of sabotage.

The timeline of these events begins on November 17, with the detection of damage to the BCS East-West Interlink cable, followed by the discovery of the severed C-Lion1 cable on November 18. Geographically, both incidents occurred in the Baltic Sea, with the East-West Interlink cable between Lithuania and Sweden and the C-Lion1 cable connecting Finland and Germany. The breaks were specifically detected near the Swedish islands of Gotland and Öland.

These disruptions have led to heightened security measures and widespread investigations in the Baltic region as authorities seek to determine the cause and safeguard critical submarine cable infrastructure. Concerns over potential sabotage have intensified discussions among NATO members and their allies, underscoring the geopolitical implications of such vulnerabilities.

THE SITUATION.

The figure below provides a comprehensive overview of submarine cables in the Baltic Sea and Scandinavia. In most media coverage, only the two compromised submarine cables, BSC East-West Interlink (RFS: 1997) and C-Lion1 (RFS: 2016) have been shown, which may create the impression that those two are the only subsea cables in the Baltic. This is not the case, as shown below. This does not diminish the seriousness of the individual submarine cable breaks but illustrates that alternative routes may be present until the compromised cables have been repaired.

The figure also shows the areas of the two submarine cables that appear to have been broken and the approximate timeline for when cable operators notice that the cables were compromised. Compared to the BCS East-West Link, the media coverage of the C-Lion1 break is a bit more unclear about the exact time and location of the break. This is obviously very important information as it can be correlated with the position of the vessel of interest that is currently under investigation for causing the two breaks.

It should be noted that the Baltic Sea area has a considerable amount of individual submarine sea cables. A few of those are very near the two broken ones or would cross the busy shipping routes vessels take through the Baltic Sea.

Using the Marinetraffic tracker (note: there are other alternatives; I like this one), I can get an impression of the maritime traffic around the submarine breaks at the approximate time frames when the breaks were discovered. The Figure below shows the marine traffic around the BCS East-West Link from Gotland (Sweden) to Sventoji (Lithuania) across the Baltic Sea with a cable length of 218 km.

The route between Gotland and the Baltic States, also known as the Central Baltic Sea, is one of the busiest sea routes in the world, with more than 30 thousand vessels passing through annually. Around the BCS West-East Interlink subsea cable break, ca. 10+ maritime vessels were passing around the time of the cable break. The only Chinese ship at the time and location was Yi Peng 3 (Bulk Carrier), also mentioned in the press a couple of hours ago.

Some hours later, between 23:00 and 01:00 UTC, “Yi Peng 3” was crossing the area of the second cable break at a time that seemed to also be the time that the C-Lion1 outage was observed. See the Figure below with the red circle pinpointing the Chinese vessel. Again “Yi Peng 3” is the only Chinese vessel in the area at the possible time of the cable break. It is important, as also shown in the Figure below, that there were many other ships in the area and neighborhood of Chinese vessel and the location of the C-Lion1 submarine cable.

Using the Maritinetraffic website’s historical data, I have mapped out the “Yi Peng 3” route up through the Baltic Sea to the Russian port Ust-Luga and back out of the Baltic Sea, including the path and timing of its presence around the two cable breaks. That coincides with the time of the reported outages.

If one examines the Chinese vessel’s speed relative to the other vessels’ speeds, it would appear that “Yi Peng 3” is the only vessel that matches both break locations and time intervals for the breaks. I would like to emphasize that such an assessment is limited to the data in the Maritinetraffic database (that I am using) and may obviously be a coincidence, irrespective of how one judges the likelihood of that. Also, even if the Chinese vessel of interest should be found to have caused the two submarine cable breaks, it may not have been a deliberate act.

“Yi Peng 3’s current status (2024-11-20 12:41 (UTC+1)) is that it has stopped at anchor in Kattegat in Danish territorial waters (See the Figure below). The “Yi Peng 3” seems to have stopped (in international waters) in Kattegat of their own volition and supposedly not by local authorities.

There are many rumors circulating about the Chinese vessel. It was earlier reported that a Danish pilot was placed on the vessel as of yesterday evening, November 19 (2024). This also agrees with the official event entry and timestamp as recorded by Maritinetraffic. In the media, this event has been misconstrued as Danish maritime authorities have taken control of the Chinese vessel. This, however, appears not to have been the case later.

Danish waters, including the Kattegat, are part of a region where licensed pilotage (by a “los” in Danish) is commonly required or strongly recommended for vessels of specific sizes or types, especially when navigating congested or challenging areas. The presence of a licensed pilot entry in the log reinforces that the vessel’s activities during this phase of its journey align with standard operating procedures.

However, this does not exclude the need for further scrutiny, as other aspects of the vessel’s behavior, such as voluntary stops or deviations from its planned route, should still warrant investigation. If for nothing else, an inquiry should ensure sufficient information is available for an insurance to take effect and compensate the submarine cable owners for the damages and cost of repairing the cables. If “Yi Peng 3” did not stop its journey due to intervention from the Danish marine authority, then it may be at the request of the protection & indemnity insurance company that the owner of “Yi Peng 3” should have in place.

WHAT DOES IT TAKE TO CUT A SUBMARINE CABLE?

To break a submarine cable, a ship typically needs to generate significant force. This is often caused by an anchor’s unintentional or accidental deployment while the ship is underway. The ship’s momentum plays a crucial role, determined by its mass and speed. A large, heavily loaded vessel moving at even moderate speeds, such as 6 knots, generates immense kinetic energy. Suppose an anchor is deployed in such conditions. In that case, the combination of drag, weight, and momentum can create concentrated forces capable of damaging or severing a cable.

The anchor’s characteristics are equally critical. A large, sharp anchor with heavy flukes can snag a cable, especially if the cable is exposed on the seabed or poorly buried. As the ship continues to move forward, the dragging anchor might stretch, lift, or pierce the cable’s protective layers. If the ship is in an area with soft seabed sediment like mud or sand, the anchor has a better chance of digging in and generating the necessary tension to break the cable. On harder or rocky seabed, the anchor might skip, but this can still result in abrasion or localized stress on the cable.

The BCS East-West Interlink cable, the first submarine cable to break, connecting Lithuania and Sweden, is laid at depths ranging from approximately 100 to 150 meters. In these depths, the seabed is predominantly composed of soft sediments, including sand and mud, which can shift over time due to currents and sediment deposition. Such conditions can lead to sections of the cable becoming exposed, increasing their vulnerability to external impacts like anchoring. The C-Lion1 cable, the second subsea cable to break, is situated at shallower depths of about 20 to 40 meters. In these areas, the seabed may consist of a combination of soft sediments and harder materials, such as clay or glacial till. The presence of harder substrates can pose challenges for cable burial and protection, potentially leaving segments of the cable exposed and susceptible to damage from external forces.

The vulnerability of the cable is also a factor. Submarine cables are typically armored and buried under 1–2 meters of sediment near shorelines, but in deeper waters, they are often exposed due to technical challenges in burial. An exposed cable is particularly at risk, especially if it is old or has been previously weakened by sediment movement or other physical interactions.

When a submarine cable break occurs, one would typically analyze maritime vessels in the vicinity of the break. A vessel’s AIS signals can provide telltale signs. AIS transmits a vessel’s speed, position, and heading at regular intervals, which can reveal anomalies in its movement. If a ship accidentally deploys its anchor:

• Speed Changes: The vessel’s speed would begin to decrease unexpectedly as the anchor drags along the seabed, creating resistance. This deceleration might be gradual or abrupt, depending on the seabed type and the tension in the anchor chain. In an extreme case, the speed could drop from cruising speeds (e.g., 6 knots) to near zero as the ship comes to a stop.
• Position Irregularities: If the anchor snags a cable, the AIS track may show deviations from the expected path. The ship might veer slightly off course or experience irregular movement due to the uneven drag caused by the cable interaction.
• Stop or Slow Maneuvers: If the anchor creates substantial resistance, the vessel might halt entirely, leaving a stationary position in the AIS record for a prolonged period.

Additionally, position data from the AIS might reveal whether the ship was operating near known submarine cable routes. This is significant because anchoring is typically restricted in these zones, and any AIS data showing activity or stops within these areas would be a red flag. The figure below provides an illustration of Yi Peng 3‘s AIS signal, using available data from Maritine Traffic, between the 16th of November to 18th of November (2024). It is apparent that there are long time gaps in the AIS transmission on both the 17th as well as on the 18th, while prior to those dates, the AIS was on transmitted approximately every 2 minutes. Apart from the AIS silence at around 8 AM on 17th of November, the AIS silence coincides with significant speed drops over the period indicating that Yi Peng 3 would have been at or near standstill.

Environmental and human factors further compound the situation. Strong currents, storms, or poor visibility might increase the likelihood of accidental anchoring or a missed restriction. Human error, such as improper navigation or ignoring marked cable zones, can also lead to such incidents. Once the anchor catches the cable, the tension forces can grow until the cable either snaps or is pulled from its burial, increasing stopping distances for the ship.

When considering the scenario where the Yi Peng 3, a large bulk carrier with a displacement of approximately 75,169 tons, drops its anchor while traveling at a speed of 6 knots (~3.1 m/s), the stopping dynamics vary significantly depending on whether or not the anchor snags a submarine cable. Using mathematical modeling, we can analyze the expected stopping time and distance in both cases, assuming specific conditions for the ship and the cable. The anchor deployment generates a drag force depending on the seabed conditions (as discussed above) and whether the anchor catches a submarine cable. When no submarine cable is involved, the drag force generated by the anchor is estimated at 1.5 Mega Newton, a typical value for large vessels in soft seabed conditions (e.g., mud or sand). If the ship’s anchor catches a submarine cable, the resistance force effectively doubles to 3 Mega Newton, assuming the cable resists the anchor’s pull consistently until the ship stops or the sea cable eventually breaks (i.e., they usually do as the ship’s kinetic energy is far greater than the energy needed to shear the submarine cable).

When the anchor drags along the seabed without encountering a cable, the stopping time is approximately 2.5 minutes, and the ship travels a distance of ca. 250 meters before coming to a complete stop. This deceleration is driven solely by the drag force of the anchor interacting with the seabed. However, if the anchor catches a submarine cable, the stopping time is reduced to around a minute, and the stopping distance shortens to ca. 100+ meters. This reduction occurs because the resistance force doubles, significantly increasing the rate of deceleration. If the cable breaks, the ship might accelerate slightly as the anchor loses the additional drag from the cable. This would then extend the stopping distance compared to a scenario where the cable holds until the ship stops. The ship might veer slightly off course if the anchor suddenly becomes free. Do to the time scale involved, e.g., 1 to 3 minutes, such an event would be difficult to observe in real-time as the AIS transmit cycle could be longer. However, from standstill back to an operating speed of 6 knots would realistically take up to 40 minutes, including anchor recovery, under normal operating conditions. If their anchor has been entangled in the submarine cable it may take substantially longer to recover the anchor and be able to continue the journey (even if they “forget” to notify the authorities as they would be obliged to do). In “desperation” the vessel may drop their anchor and rely on their other anchor for redundancy (i.e., larger vessels typically have 2 anchors, a port anchor and a starboard anchor).

When a submarine cable breaks during interaction with a ship, it is usually due to excessive tensile forces that exceed the cable’s strength. Conditions such as the ship’s size and speed, the cable’s vulnerability, and the seabed characteristics all contribute to the likelihood of a break. Once the cable snaps, it drastically changes the dynamics of the ship’s deceleration, often leading to increased stopping distances and posing risks to both the cable and the ship’s anchoring equipment. Understanding these dynamics is critical for assessing incidents involving submarine cables and maritime vessels.

If the Yi Peng 3 accidentally dropped its anchor while sailing at 6 knots, it is highly plausible that the anchor could sever the BCS East-West Interlink submarine cable. The ship’s immense kinetic energy (i.e., 350+ Mega Joule), combined with the forces exerted by the dragging anchor, far exceed the energy required to break the cable (i.e., 70+ kilo Joule for a 50 mm thick cable).

ACTUAL TRAFFIC IMPACT OF THE BALTIC SEA CABLE CUTS?

The RIPE NCC conducted an analysis using data from RIPE Atlas, a global network of measurement probes, to assess the impact of these cable cuts. The study focused on latency and packet loss between RIPE Atlas anchors in the countries connected by the damaged cables. Their key findings were:

• BCS East-West Interlink Cut (Sweden-Lithuania): Approximately 20% of the measured paths between Sweden and Lithuania exhibited significant increases in latency following the cable cut. However, no substantial packet loss was detected, indicating that while some routes experienced delays, data transmission remained largely intact.
• C-Lion1 Cut (Finland-Germany): About 30% of the paths between Finland and Germany showed notable latency increases after the incident. Similar to the BCS cut, there was no significant packet loss observed, suggesting that alternative routing effectively maintained data flow despite the increased delays.

The analysis concluded that the internet demonstrated a degree of resilience by rerouting traffic through alternative paths, mitigating the potential impact of the cable disruptions. As discussed in this article the RIPE NCC analysis highlights the importance of maintaining and securing multiple connections to ensure robust internet connectivity. In those considerations it is also clear that technical responsible needs to consider latency in their choices of alternative routes as some customers applications may be critically sensitive to too high latencies (e.g., payment and certain banking applications applications, real-time communications such as Zoom, Teams, Google Meet, financial trading,..).

While media often highlights that security- and intelligence-sensitive information (e.g., diplomatic traffic, defense-related traffic, …) may be compromised in case of a submarine cable cut, it seems to me highly unlikely that such information would rely solely on a single submarine cable connection without backups (e.g., satellites communications, dedicated secure networks, air-gapped systems, route diversity, …) or contingencies. Best practices in network design and operational security prioritize redundancy, especially for sensitive communications.

Anyway, military and diplomatic communications are rarely entrusted solely to submarine cables. High-value networks, like those used by NATO or national defense agencies, integrate (a) high-capacity, low-latency satellite links as failover, (b) secure terrestrial routes, and (c) cross-border fiber agreements with trusted partners.

WHAT IS THE RISK?

Below is a simple example of a risk assessment model, with the rose color illustrating the risk category into which the two sea cables, BCS East-West Interlink and C-Lion1, might fall. This really should be seen as an illustration, and the actual probability ranges may not reflect reality. Luckily, we only have a little data that could be used to build a more rigorous risk assessment or incident probability model. In the illustration below, I differentiate between Baseline Risk, which represents the risk of a subsea cable break due to natural causes, including unintentional human-caused breaks, and Sabotage Risk, which represents the deliberately caused submarine breaks due to actual warfare or hybrid/pseudo warfare.

The annual occurrence of 100 to 200 cable breaks (out of ca. 600) translates to a break rate of approximately 0.017% to 0.033% per kilometer each year. This low percentage underscores the robustness of the submarine cable infrastructure despite the challenges posed by natural events and human activities.

With the table above, one could, in principle, estimate the likelihood of a cable break due to natural causes and the additional probability of cable breaks attributed to deliberate actions. Hereby forming an overall estimate of the risk of a cable break for a particular submarine cable. This might look like this (or a lot more complex than this;-):

$P_{Baseline} \; = \; \beta_0 \; + \; \beta_1 L \; + \; \beta_2 e^{\alpha A} \; + \; \beta_3 F \; + \; \beta_4 S \; + \; \beta_5 \frac{1}{D} \; + \; \beta_6 \frac{1}{C}$ $\\ \;\;\;\;\;\;\;\;\;\;\;\;\;\;\;\; \; + \; \beta_7 I \; = \; \beta_0 \; + \; \sum_{i=1}^{n} \beta_i \cdot P_i$

$P_{Sabotage} \; = \; \gamma_1G \; + \; \gamma_2O$

$P_{Cable \; break} \; + \; P_{Baseline} \; + \; P_{Sabotage}$

For the BCS East-West Interlink break, we can make the following high-level assessment of the Baseline risk of a break. The BCS East-West Interlink submarine cable, connecting Sventoji, Lithuania, and Katthammarsvik, Sweden, spans the Baltic Sea, which is characterized by moderate marine traffic and relatively shallow waters.

The Baseline Probability considerations amounts to

• Cable Length: Shorter cables generally have a lower risk of breaks.
• Marine Traffic Density: The Baltic Sea experiences moderate marine traffic, which can increase the likelihood of accidental damage from anchors or fishing activities.
• Fishing Activity: The area has moderate fishing activity, posing a potential risk to submarine cables.
• Seismic Activity: The Baltic Sea is geologically stable, indicating a low risk from seismic events.
• Iceberg Activity: The likelihood of an iceberg causing a submarine cable break in the Baltic Sea, particularly in the areas where recent disruptions were observed, is virtually nonexistent.
• Depth of Cable: The cable lies in relatively shallow waters, making it more susceptible to human activities.
• Cable Armoring: If the cable is well-armored, it will be more resistant to physical damage.

As an illustration here are the specifics of the Baseline Risk with assumed ß-weights using the midpoint probabilities from the Table above.

• Cable Length (L): 0.1 × 0.15=0.015
• Cable Age (A): 0.15 × 0.10 = 0.015
• Marine Traffic (M): 0.2 × 0.25 = 0.05
• Fishing Activity (F): 0.175 × 0.15 = 0.02625
• Seismic Activity (S): 0.075 × 0.02 = 0.0015
• Iceberg Activity (I): 0 × 0.01 = 0
• Depth (D): 0.375 × 0.02 = 0.0075
• Armoring (C): 0.15 × 0.1 = 0.015

Summing these Baseline contributions:

$P_{Baseline} \; = \; 0.015 \; + \; 0.015 + \; 0.005 + \; 0.02625 + \; 0.0015 + \; 0 + \; 0.0075 + \; 0.015 + \; 0.13$

Or 13% (0.060% per km) baseline probability per year of experiencing a cable break by causes not deliberate.

Estimated Baseline Probability Range:

Considering all the above factors, the baseline probability using minimum and maximum of a break in the BCS East-West Interlink cable is estimated to be in the low to moderate range, approximately 7.35% (0.034% per km) to 18.7% (0.086 per km) per year. This estimation accounts for the moderate marine and fishing activities, shallow depth, and the assumption of standard protective measures. Also, note that this is below the average cable break likelihood of between 17% and 33% (i.e., 100 to 200 out of 600 breaks per year).

Given the geopolitical tensions, the cable’s accessible location, and recent incidents, the likelihood of sabotage for the BCS East-West Interlink is moderate to high. Implementing robust security measures and continuous monitoring is essential to mitigate this risk. The available media information indicates that the monitoring of this sea cable was good. Based on the available information, this may not be said of the C-Lion1 submarine cable, owned by Cinia Oy, although this cable is also substantially longer than the BCS one (1,172 vs. 218 km).

The European Union Agency for Cybersecurity (Enisa) published a report back in 2023 (July) titled “Subsea Cables – What is at Stake?”. The ICPC’s (International Cable Protection Committee) categorization of cable faults shows that approximately 40% of subsea cable faults are caused by anchoring and fishing activities, the most common human-induced risks. Another 45% of faults have unspecified causes, which could include a mix of factors. Around 87% of all faults result from human intervention, either through unintentional actions like fishing and anchoring or deliberate malicious activities. On the other hand, 4% of faults are due to system failures, attributed to technical defects in cables or equipment. Lastly, 5% of faults are caused by natural phenomena, such as earthquakes, underwater landslides, or volcanic activity. These statistics emphasize the predominance of human activities in subsea cable disruptions over natural or technical causes. These insights can calibrate the above risk assessment methodology, although some deconvolution would be necessary to insure that appropriate regionalized and situational data has been correctly considered.

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION.

Details of the ship of interest, and suspect number one: YI PENG 3 (IMO: 9224984) is a Bulk Carrier built in 2001 and sailing under China’s flag. Her carrying capacity is 75,121 tonnes, and her current draught is reported to be 14.5 meters. Her length is 225 meters, and her width is 32.3 meters. A maritime bulk carrier vessel is designed to transport unpackaged bulk goods in large quantities. These goods, such as grain, coal, ore, cement, salt, or other raw materials, are typically loose and not containerized. Bulk carriers are essential in global trade, particularly for industries transporting raw materials efficiently and economically.

The owner of “Yi Peng 3” is Ningbo Yipeng Shipping Co., Ltd. is a maritime company based in Ningbo, Zhejiang Province, China. The company is located at 306, Yanjiang Donglu, Zhenhai District, Ningbo, Zhejiang, 315200, China. Ningbo Yipeng Shipping specializes in domestic and international waterway transportation, offering domestic freight forwarding, ship agency, and the wholesale and retail of mineral products. The company owns and operates bulk carrier vessels, including the “YI PENG” (IMO: 9224996), a bulk carrier with a gross tonnage of 40,622 and a deadweight of 75,169 tons, built in 2001. Another vessel, “YI PENG 3” (IMO: 9224984), is also registered under the company’s ownership. Financially, Ningbo Yipeng Shipping reported a total operating income of approximately 78.18 million yuan, with a net profit of about -9.97 million yuan, indicating a loss for the reporting period.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT.

I greatly acknowledge my wife, Eva Varadi, for her support, patience, and understanding during the creative process of writing this Blog. Many thanks to Signe Ravn-Højgaard for keeping us updated on the developments over the last few days (in November 2024), and for her general engagement around and passion for critical infrastructure.