
If Greenland were digitally cut off tomorrow, how much of its public sector would still function? The uncomfortable answer: very little. The truth is that not only would the public sector break down, but society as a whole would likely also break down the longer a digital isolation would be in effect. This article outlines why it does not necessarily have to be this way and suggests that some remedies and actions can be taken to minimize the impact of an event where Greenland would be digitally isolated from the rest of the internet for an extended period (e.g., weeks to months).
We may like, or feel tempted, to think of digital infrastructure as neutral plumbing. But as I wrote earlier, “digital infrastructure is no longer just about connectivity, but about sovereignty and resilience.” Greenland today has neither.
A recent Sermitsiaq article on Greenland’s “Digital Afhængighed af Udlandet” by Poul Krarup, which describes research work done by the Tænketanken Digital Infrastruktur, laid it bare and crystal clear: the backbone of Greenland’s administration, email, payments, and even municipal services, runs on servers and platforms that are located mainly outside Greenland (and Denmark). Global giants in Europe and the US hold the keys. Greenland doesn’t. My own research reveals just how dramatic this dependency is. The numbers from my own study of 315 Greenlandic public-sector domains make it painfully clear: over 70% of web/IP hosting is concentrated among just three foreign providers, including Microsoft, Google, and Cloudflare. For email exchanges (MX), it’s even worse: the majority of MX records sit entirely outside Greenland’s control.
So imagine the cable is cut, the satellite links fail, or access to those platforms is revoked. Schools, hospitals, courts, and municipalities. How many could still function? How many could even switch on a computer?
This isn’t a thought experiment. It’s a wake-up call.
In my earlier work on Greenland’s critical communications infrastructure, “Greenland: Navigating Security and Critical Infrastructure in the Arctic – A Technology Introduction”, I have pointed out both the resilience and the fragility of what exists today. Tusass has built and maintained a transport network that keeps the country connected under some of the harshest Arctic conditions. That achievement is remarkable, but it is also costly and economically challenging without external subsidies and long-term public investment. With a population of just 57,000 people, Greenland faces challenges in sustaining this infrastructure on market terms alone.
DIGITAL SOVEREIGNTY.
What do we mean when we use phrases like “the digital sovereignty of Greenland is at stake”? Let’s break down the complex language (for techies like myself). Sovereignty in the classical sense is about control over land, people, and institutions. Digital sovereignty extends this to the virtual space. It is primarily about controlling data, infrastructure, and digital services. As societies digitalize, critical aspects of sovereignty move into the digital sphere, such as,
- Infrastructure as territory: Submarine cables, satellites, data centers, and cloud platforms are the digital equivalents of ports, roads, and airports. If you don’t own or control them, you depend on others to move your “digital goods.”
- Data as a resource: Just as natural resources are vital to economic sovereignty, data has become the strategic resource of the digital age. Those who store, process, and govern data hold significant power over decision-making and value creation.
- Platforms as institutions: Social media, SaaS, and search engines act like global “public squares” and administrative tools. If controlled abroad, they may undermine local political, cultural, or economic authority.
The excellent book by Anu Bradford, “Digital Empires: The Global Battle to Regulate Technology,” describes how the digital world is no longer a neutral, borderless space but is increasingly shaped by the competing influence of three distinct “empires.” The American model is built around the dominance of private platforms, such as Google, Amazon, and Meta, where innovation and market power drive the agenda. The scale and ubiquity of Silicon Valley firms have enabled them to achieve a global reach. In contrast, the Chinese model fuses technological development with state control. Here, digital platforms are integrated into the political system, used not only for economic growth but also for surveillance, censorship, and the consolidation of authority. Between these two poles lies the European model, which has little homegrown platform power but exerts influence through regulation. By setting strict rules on privacy, competition, and online content, Europe has managed to project its legal standards globally, a phenomenon Bradford refers to as the “Brussels effect” (which is used here in a positive sense). Bradford’s analysis highlights the core dilemma for Greenland. Digital sovereignty cannot be achieved in isolation. Instead, it requires navigating between these global forces while ensuring that Greenland retains the capacity to keep its critical systems functioning, its data governed under its own laws, and its society connected even when global infrastructures falter. The question is not which empire to join, but how to engage with them in a way that strengthens Greenland’s ability to determine its own digital future.
In practice, this means that Greenland’s strategy cannot be about copying one of the three empires, but rather about carving out a space of resilience within their shadow. Building a national Internet Exchange Point ensures that local traffic continues to circulate on the island rather than being routed abroad, even when external links fail. Establishing a sovereign GovCloud provides government, healthcare, and emergency services with a secure foundation that is not dependent on distant data centers or foreign jurisdictions. Local caching of software updates, video libraries, and news platforms enables communities to operate in a “local mode” during disruptions, preserving continuity even when global connections are disrupted. These measures do not create independence from the digital empires. Still, they give Greenland the ability to negotiate with them from a position of greater strength, ensuring that participation in the global digital order does not come at the expense of local control or security.
FROM DAILY RESILIENCE TO STRATEGIC FRAGILITY.
I have argued that integrity, robustness, and availability must be the guiding principles for Greenland’s digital backbone, both now and in the future.
- Integrity means protecting against foreign influence and cyber threats through stronger cybersecurity, AI support, and autonomous monitoring.
- Robustness requires diversifying the backbone with new submarine cables, satellite systems, and dual-use assets that can serve both civil and defense needs.
- Availability depends on automation and AI-driven monitoring, combined with autonomous platforms such as UAVs, UUVs, IoT sensors, and distributed acoustic sensing on submarine cables, to keep services running across vast and remote geographies with limited human resources.
The conclusion I drew in my previous work remains applicable today. Greenland must develop local expertise and autonomy so that critical communications are not left vulnerable to outside actors in times of crisis. Dual-use investments are not only about defense; they also bring better services, jobs, and innovation.
The Figure above illustrates the infrastructure of the Greenlandic sole telecommunications provider, Tusass. Note that Tusass is the incumbent and only telecom provider in Greenland. Currently, five hydropower plants (shown above, location only indicative) provide more than 80% of Greenland’s electricity demand. Greenland is entering a period of significant infrastructure transformation, with several large projects already underway and others on the horizon. The most visible change is in aviation. Following the opening of the new international airport in Nuuk in 2024, with its 2,200-meter runway capable of receiving direct flights from Europe and North America, attention has turned to Ilulissat, on the Northwestern Coast of Greenland, and Qaqortoq. Ilulissat is being upgraded with its own 2,200-meter runway, a new terminal, and a control tower, while the old 845-meter strip is being converted into an access road. In southern Greenland, a new airport is being built in Qaqortoq, with a 1,500-meter runway scheduled to open around 2026. Once completed, these three airports, Nuuk, Ilulissat, and Qaqortoq, the largest town in South Greenland, will together handle roughly 80 percent of Greenland’s passenger traffic, reshaping both tourism and domestic connectivity. Smaller projects, such as the planned airport at Ittoqqortoormiit and changes to heliport infrastructure in East Greenland, are also part of this shift, although on a longer horizon.
Beyond air travel, the next decade is likely to bring new developments in maritime infrastructure. There is growing interest in constructing deep-water ports, both to support commercial shipping and to enable the export of minerals from Greenland’s interior. Denmark has already committed around DKK 1.6 billion (approximately USD 250 million) between 2026 and 2029 for a deep-sea port and related coastal infrastructure, with several proposals directly linked to mining ventures. In southern Greenland, for example, the Tanbreez multi-element rare earth project lies within reach of Qaqortoq, and the new airport’s specifications were chosen with freight requirements in mind. Other mineral prospects, ranging from rare earths to nickel and zinc, will require their own supporting infrastructure, roads, power, and port facilities, if the project transitions from exploration to production. The timelines for these mining and port projects are less certain than for the airports, since they depend on market conditions, environmental approvals, and financing. Yet it is clear that the 2025–2035 period will be decisive for Greenland’s economic and strategic trajectory. The combination of new airports, potential deep-water harbors, and the possible opening of significant mining operations would amount to the largest coordinated build-out of Greenlandic infrastructure in decades. Moreover, several submarine cable projects have been mentioned that would strengthen international connectivity to Greenland, as well as strengthen the redundancy and robustness of settlement connectivity, in addition to the existing long-haul microwave network connecting all settlements along the west coast from North to South.
And this is precisely why the question of a sudden digital cut-off matters so much. Without integrity, robustness, and availability built into the communications infrastructure, Greenland’s public sector and its critical infrastructure remain dangerously exposed. What looks resilient in daily operation could unravel overnight if the links to the outside world were severed or internal connectivity were compromised. In particular, the dependency on Nuuk is a critical risk.
GREENLAND’s DIGITAL INFRASTRUCTURE BY LAYER.
Let’s peel the digital onion layer by layer of Greenland’s digital infrastructure.

Greenland’s digital infrastructure can be understood as a stack of interdependent layers, each of which reveals a set of vulnerabilities. This is illustrated by the Figure above. At the top of the stack lie the applications and services that citizens, businesses, and government rely on every day. These include health IT systems, banking platforms, municipal services, and cloud-based applications. The critical issue is that most of these services are hosted abroad and have no local “island mode.” In practice, this means that if Greenland is digitally cut off, domestic apps and services will fail to function because there is no mechanism to run them independently within the country.
Beneath this sits the physical transport layer, which is the actual hardware that moves data. Greenland is connected internationally by just two subsea cables, routed via Iceland and Canada. A few settlements, such as Tasiilaq, remain entirely dependent on satellite links, while microwave radio chains connect long stretches of the west coast. At the local level, there is some fiber deployment, but it is limited to individual settlements rather than forming part of a national backbone. This creates a transport infrastructure that, while impressive given Greenland’s geography, is inherently fragile. Two cables and a scattering of satellites do not amount to genuine redundancy for a nation. The next layer is IP/TCP transport, where routing comes into play. Here, too, the system is basic. Greenland relies on a limited set of upstream providers with little true diversity or multi-homing. As a result, if one of the subsea cables is cut, large parts of the country’s connectivity collapse, because traffic cannot be seamlessly rerouted through alternative pathways. The resilience that is taken for granted in larger markets is largely absent here.
Finally, at the base of the stack, interconnect and routing expose the structural dependency most clearly. Greenland operates under a single Autonomous System Number (ASN). An ASN is a unique identifier assigned to a network operator (like Tusass) that controls its own routing on the Internet. It allows the network to exchange traffic and routing information with other networks using the Border Gateway Protocol (BGP). In Greenland, there is no domestic internet exchange point (IXP) or peering between local networks. All traffic must be routed abroad first, whether it is destined for Greenland or beyond. International transit flows through Iceland and Canada via the subsea cables, and via geostationary GreenSat satellite connectivity through Grand Canaria as a limited (in capacity) fallback that connected via the submarine network back to Greenland. There is no sovereign government cloud, almost no local caching for global platforms, and only a handful of small data centers (being generous with the definition here). The absence of scaled redundancy and local hosting means that virtually all of Greenland’s digital life depends on international connections.
GREENLAND’s DIGITAL LIFE ON A SINGLE THREAD.
Considering the many layers described above, a striking picture emerges: applications, transport, routing, and interconnect are all structured in ways that assume continuous external connectivity. What appears robust on a day-to-day basis can unravel quickly. A single cable cut, upstream outage, or local transmission fault in Greenland does not just slow down the internet. It can also disrupt it. It can paralyze everyday life across almost every sector, as much of the country’s digital backbone relies on external connectivity and fragile local transport. For the government, the reliance on cloud-hosted systems abroad means that email, document storage, case management, and health IT systems would go dark. Hospitals and clinics could lose access to patient records, lab results, and telemedicine services. Schools would be cut off from digital learning platforms and exam systems that are hosted internationally. Municipalities, which already lean on remote data centers for payroll, social services, and citizen portals, would struggle to process even routine administrative tasks. In finance, the impact would be immediate. Greenland’s card payment and clearing systems are routed abroad; without connectivity, credit and debit card transactions could no longer be authorized. ATMs would stop functioning. Shops, fuel stations, and essential suppliers would be forced into cash-only operations at best, and even that would depend on whether their local systems can operate in isolation. The private sector would be equally disrupted. Airlines, shipping companies, and logistics providers all rely on real-time reservation and cargo systems hosted outside Greenland. Tourism, one of the fastest-growing industries, is almost entirely dependent on digital bookings and payments. Mining operations under development would be unable to transmit critical data to foreign partners or markets. Even at the household level, the effects could be highly disruptive. Messaging apps, social media, and streaming platforms all require constant external connections; they would stop working instantly. Online banking and digital ID services would be unreachable, leaving people unable to pay bills, transfer money, or authenticate themselves for government services. As there are so few local caches or hosting facilities in Greenland, even “local” digital life evaporates once the cables are cut. So we will be back to reading books and paper magazines again.
This means that an outage can cascade well beyond the loss of entertainment or simple inconvenience. It undermines health care, government administration, financial stability, commerce, and basic communication. In practice, the disruption would touch every citizen and every institution almost immediately, with few alternatives in place to keep essential civil services running.
GREENLAND’s DIGITAL INFRASTRUCTURE EXPOSURE: ABOUT THE DATA.
In this inquiry, I have primarily analyzed two pillars of Greenland’s digital presence: web/IP hosting, as well as MX (mail exchange) hosting. These may sound technical, but they are fundamental to understanding. Web/IP hosting determines where Greenland’s websites and online services physically reside, whether inside Greenland’s own infrastructure or abroad in foreign data centers. MX hosting determines where email is routed and processed, and is crucial for the operation of government, business, and everyday communication. Together, these layers form the backbone of a country’s digital sovereignty.
What the data shows is sobering. For example, the Government’s own portal nanoq.gl is hosted locally by Tele Greenland (i.e., Tusass GL), but its email is routed through Amazon’s infrastructure abroad. The national airline, airgreenland.gl, also relies on Microsoft’s mail servers in the US and UK. These are not isolated cases. They illustrate the broader pattern of dependence. If hosting and mail flows are predominantly external, then Greenland’s resilience, control, and even lawful access are effectively in the hands of others.
The data from the Greenlandic .gl domain space paints a clear and rather bleak picture of dependency and reliance on the outside world. My inquiry covered 315 domains, resolving more than a thousand hosts and IPs and uncovering 548 mail exchangers, which together form a dependency network of 1,359 nodes and 2,237 edges. What emerges is not a story of local sovereignty but of heavy reliance on external, that is, outside Greenland, hosting.
When broken down, it becomes clear how much of the Greenlandic namespace is not even in use. Of the 315 domains, only 190 could be resolved to a functioning web or IP host, leaving 125 domains, or about 40 percent, with no active service. For mail exchange, the numbers are even more striking: only 98 domains have MX records, while 217 domains, it would appear, cannot be used for email, representing nearly seventy percent of the total. In other words, the universe of domains we can actually analyze shrinks considerably once you separate the inactive or unused domains from those that carry real digital services.
It is within this smaller, active subset that the pattern of dependency becomes obvious. The majority of the web/IP hosting we can analyze is located outside Greenland, primarily on infrastructure controlled by American companies such as Cloudflare, Microsoft, Google, and Amazon, or through Danish and European resellers. For email, the reliance is even more complete: virtually all MX hosting that exists is foreign, with only two domains fully hosted in Greenland. This means that both Greenland’s web presence and its email flows are overwhelmingly dependent on servers and policies beyond its own borders. The geographic spread of dependencies is extensive, spanning the US, UK, Ireland, Denmark, and the Netherlands, with some entries extending as far afield as China and Panama. This breadth raises uncomfortable questions about oversight, control, and the exposure of critical services to foreign jurisdictions.
Security practices add another layer of concern. Many domains lack the most basic forms of email protection. The Sender Policy Framework (SPF), which instructs mail servers on which IP addresses are authorized to send on behalf of a domain, is inconsistently applied. DomainKeys Identified Mail (DKIM), which uses cryptographic signatures to verify that an email originates from the claimed sender, is also patchy. Most concerning is that Domain-based Message Authentication, Reporting, and Conformance (DMARC), a policy that allows a domain to instruct receiving mail servers on how to handle suspicious emails (for example, reject or quarantine them), is either missing or set to “none” for many critical domains. Without SPF, DKIM, and DMARC properly configured, Greenlandic organizations are wide open to spoofing and phishing, including within government and municipal domains.
Taken together, the picture is clear. Greenland’s digital backbone is not in Greenland. Its critical web and mail infrastructure lives elsewhere, often in the hands of hyperscalers far beyond Nuuk’s control. The question practically asks itself: if those external links were cut tomorrow, how much of Greenland’s public sector could still function?
GREENLAND’s DIGITAL INFRASTRUCTURE EXPOSURE: SOME KEY DATA OUT OF A VERY RICH DATASET.
The chart of Greenland (.gl) Web/IP Infrastructure Hosting by Supporting Country reveals the true geography of Greenland’s digital presence. The data covers 315 Greenlandic domains, of which 190 could be resolved to active web or IP hosts. From these, I built a dependency map showing where in the world these domains are actually served.
The headline finding is stark: 57% of Greenlandic domains depend on infrastructure in the United States. This reflects the dominance of American companies such as Cloudflare, Microsoft, Google, and Amazon, whose services sit in front of or fully host Greenlandic websites. In contrast, only 26% of domains are hosted on infrastructure inside Greenland itself (primarily through Tele Greenland/Tusass). Denmark (19%), the UK (14%), and Ireland (13%) appear as the next layers of dependency, reflecting the role of regional resellers, like One.com/Simply, as well as Microsoft and Google’s European data centers. Germany, France, Canada, and a long tail of other countries contribute smaller shares.
It is worth noting that the validity of this analysis hinges on how the data are treated. Each domain is counted once per country where it has active infrastructure. This means a domain like nanoq.gl (the Greenland Government portal) is counted for both Greenland and its foreign dependency through Amazon’s mail services. However, double-counting with Greenland is extremely rare. Out of the 190 resolvable domains, 73 (38%) are exclusively Greenlandic, 114 (60%) are solely foreign, and only 2 (~1%) domains are hybrids, split between Greenland and another country. Those two are Nanoq.gl and airgreenland.gl, both of which combine a Greenland presence with foreign infrastructure. This is why the Figure above shows percentages that add up to more than 100%. They represent the dependency footprint. The share of Greenlandic domains that touch each country. They do not represent a pie chart of mutually exclusive categories. What is most important to note, however, is that the overlap with Greenland is vanishingly small. In practice, Greenlandic domains are either entirely local or entirely foreign. Very few straddle the boundary.
The conclusion is sobering. Greenland’s web presence is deeply externalized. With only a quarter of domains hosted locally, and more than half relying on US-controlled infrastructure, the country’s digital backbone is anchored outside its borders. This is not simply a matter of physical location. It is about sovereignty, resilience, and control. The dominance of US, Danish, and UK providers means that Greenland’s citizens, municipalities, and even government services are reliant on infrastructure they do not own and cannot fully control.
The Figure above of the MX (mail exchange) infrastructure by supporting country reveals an even more pronounced pattern of external reliance compared to the above case for web hosting. From the 315 Greenlandic domains examined, only 98 domains had active MX records. These are the domains that can be analyzed for mail routing and that have been used in the analysis below.
Among them, 19% of all Greenlandic domains send their mail through US-controlled infrastructure, primarily Microsoft’s Outlook/Exchange services and Google’s Gmail. The United Kingdom (12%), Ireland (9%), and Denmark (8%) follow, reflecting the presence of Microsoft and Google’s European data centers and Danish resellers. France and Australia appear with smaller shares at 2%, and beyond that, the contributions of other countries are negligible. Greenland itself barely registers. Only two domains, accounting for 1% of the total, utilize MX infrastructure hosted within Greenland. The rest rely on servers beyond its borders. This result is consistent with our sovereignty breakdown: almost all Greenlandic email is foreign-hosted, with just two domains entirely local and one hybrid combining Greenlandic and foreign providers.
Again, the validity of this analysis rests on the same method as the web/IP chart. Each domain is counted once per country where its MX servers are located. Percentages do not add up to 100% because domains may span multiple countries; however, crucially, as with web hosting, double-counting with Greenland is vanishingly rare. In fact, virtually no Greenlandic domains combine local and foreign MX; they are either foreign-only or, in just two cases, local-only.
The story is clear and compelling: Greenland’s email infrastructure is overwhelmingly externalized. Where web hosting still accounts for a quarter of domains within the country, email sovereignty is almost nonexistent. Nearly all communication flows through servers controlled by US, UK, Ireland, or Denmark. The implication is sobering. In the event of disruption, policy disputes, or surveillance demands, Greenland has little autonomous control over its most basic digital communications.
This chart provides a sector-level view of how Greenlandic domains are hosted, distinguishing between those resolved locally in Greenland and those hosted outside of Greenland. It is based on the subset of 190 domains for which sufficient web/IP hosting information was available. Importantly, the categorization relies on individual domains, not on companies as entities. A single company or institution may own and operate multiple domains, which are counted separately for the purpose of this analysis. There is also some uncertainty in sector assignment, as many domains have ambiguous names and were categorized using best-fit rules.
The distribution highlights the uneven exercise of digital sovereignty across sectors. In education and finance, the dependency is absolute: 100 percent of domains are hosted externally, with no Greenland-based presence at all. It should not come as a big surprise that ninety percent of government domains are hosted in Greenland, while only 10 percent are hosted outside. From a Digital Government sovereignty perspective, this would obviously be what should be expected. Transportation shows a split, with about two-thirds of domains hosted locally and one-third abroad, reflecting a mix of Tele Greenland-hosted (Tusass GL) domains alongside foreign-hosted services, such as airgreenland.gl. According to the available data, Energy infrastructure is hosted entirely abroad, underscoring possibly one of the most critical vulnerabilities in the dataset. By contrast, telecom domains, unsurprisingly, given Tele Greenland’s role, are entirely local, making it the only sector with 100 percent internal hosting. Municipalities present a more positive picture, with three-quarters of domains hosted locally and one-quarter abroad, although this still represents a partial external dependency. Finally, the large and diverse “Other” category, which contains a mix of companies, organizations, and services, is skewed towards foreign hosting (67 percent external, 33 percent local).
Taken together, the results underscore three important points. First, sector-level sovereignty is highly uneven. While telecom, municipal, and Governmental web services retain more local control, most finance, education, and energy domains are overwhelmingly external. We should keep in mind that when a Greenlandic domain resolves to local infrastructure, it indicates that the frontend web hosting, the visible entry point that users connect to, is located within Greenland, typically through Tele Greenland (i.e., Tusass GL). However, this does not automatically mean that the entire service stack is local. Critical back-end components such as databases, authentication services, payment platforms, or integrated cloud applications may still reside abroad. In practice, a locally hosted domain therefore guarantees only that the web interface is served from Greenland, while deeper layers of the service may remain dependent on foreign infrastructure. This distinction is crucial when evaluating genuine digital sovereignty and resilience. However, the overall pattern is unmistakable. Greenland’s digital presence remains heavily reliant on foreign hosting, with only pockets of local sovereignty.
The Figure above provides a sector-level view of how Greenlandic domains handle their MX (mail exchange) infrastructure, distinguishing between those hosted locally and those that rely on foreign providers. The analysis is based on the subset of 94 domains (out of 315 total) where MX hosting could be clearly resolved. In other words, these are the domains for which sufficient DNS information was available to identify the location of their mail servers. As with the web/IP analysis, it is important to note two caveats: sector classification involves a degree of interpretation, and the results represent individual domains, not individual companies. A single organization may operate multiple domains, some of which are local and others external.
The results are striking. For most sectors, such as education, finance, transport, energy, telecom, and municipalities, the dependence on foreign MX hosting is total. 100 percent of identified domains rely on external providers for email infrastructure. Even critical sectors such as energy and telecom, where one might expect a more substantial local presence, are fully externalized. The government sector presents a mixed picture. Half of the government domains examined utilize local MX hosting, while the other half are tied to foreign providers. This partial local footprint is significant, as it shows that while some government email flows are retained within Greenland, an equally large share is routed through servers abroad. The “other” sector, which includes businesses, NGOs, and various organizations, shows a small local footprint of about 3 percent, with 97 percent hosted externally. Taken together, the Figure paints a more severe picture of dependency than the web/IP hosting analysis.
While web hosting still retained about a quarter of domains locally, in the case of email, nearly everything is external. Even in government, where one might expect strong sovereignty, half of the domains are dependent on foreign MX servers. This distinction is critical. Email is the backbone of communication for both public and private institutions, and the routing of Greenland’s email infrastructure almost entirely abroad highlights a deep vulnerability. Local MX records guarantee only that the entry point for mail handling is in Greenland. They do not necessarily mean that mail storage or filtering remains local, as many services rely on external processing even when the MX server is domestic.
The broader conclusion is clear. Greenland’s sovereignty in digital communications is weakest in email. Across nearly all sectors, external providers control the infrastructure through which communication must pass, leaving Greenland reliant on systems located far outside its borders. Irrespective of how the picture painted here may appear severe in terms of digital sovereignty, it is not altogether surprising. The almost complete externalization of Greenlandic email infrastructure is not surprising, given that most global email services are provided by U.S.-based hyperscalers such as Microsoft and Google. This reliance on Big Tech is the norm worldwide, but it carries particular implications for Greenland, where dependence on foreign-controlled communication channels further limits digital sovereignty and resilience.
The analysis of the 94 MX hosting entries shows a striking concentration of Greenlandic email infrastructure in the hands of a few large players. Microsoft dominates the picture with 38 entries, accounting for just over 40 percent of all records, while Amazon follows with 20 entries, or around 21 percent. Google, including both Gmail and Google Cloud Platform services, contributes an additional 8 entries, representing approximately 9% of the total. Together, these three U.S. hyperscalers control nearly 70 percent of all Greenlandic MX infrastructure. By contrast, Tele Greenland (Tusass GL) appears in only three cases, equivalent to just 3 percent of the total, highlighting the minimal local footprint. The remaining quarter of the dataset is distributed across a long tail of smaller European and global providers such as Team Blue in Denmark, Hetzner in Germany, OVH and O2Switch in France, Contabo, Telenor, and others. The distribution, however you want to cut it, underscores the near-total reliance on U.S. Big Tech for Greenland’s email services, with only a token share remaining under national control.
Out of 179 total country mentions across the dataset, the United States is by far the most dominant hosting location, appearing in 61 cases, or approximately 34 percent of all country references. The United Kingdom follows with 38 entries (21 percent), Ireland with 28 entries (16 percent), and Denmark with 25 entries (14 percent). France (4 percent) and Australia (3 percent) form a smaller second tier, while Greenland itself appears only three times (2 percent). Germany also accounts for three entries, and all other countries (Austria, Norway, Spain, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Poland, Canada, and Singapore) occur only once each, making them statistically marginal. Examining the structure of services across locations, approximately 30 percent of providers are tied to a single country, while 51 percent span two countries (for example, UK–US or DK–IE). A further 18 percent are spread across three countries, and a single case involved four countries simultaneously. This pattern reflects the use of distributed or redundant MX services across multiple geographies, a characteristic often found in large cloud providers like Microsoft and Amazon.
The key point is that, regardless of whether domains are linked to one, two, or three countries, the United States is present in the overwhelming majority of cases, either alone or in combination with other countries. This confirms that U.S.-based infrastructure underpins the backbone of Greenlandic email hosting, with European locations such as the UK, Ireland, and Denmark acting primarily as secondary anchors rather than true alternatives.
WHAT DOES IT ALL MEAN?
Greenland’s public digital life overwhelmingly runs on infrastructure it does not control. Of 315 .gl domains, only 190 even have active web/IP hosting, and just 98 have resolvable MX (email) records. Within that smaller, “real” subset, most web front-ends are hosted abroad and virtually all email rides on foreign platforms. The dependency is concentrated, with U.S. hyperscalers—Microsoft, Amazon, and Google—accounting for nearly 70% of MX services. The U.S. is also represented in more than a third of all MX hosting locations (often alongside the UK, Ireland, or Denmark). Local email hosting is almost non-existent (two entirely local domains; a few Tele Greenland/Tusass appearances), and even for websites, a Greenlandic front end does not guarantee local back-end data or apps.
That architecture has direct implications for sovereignty and security. If submarine cables, satellites, or upstream policies fail or are restricted, most government, municipal, health, financial, educational, and transportation services would degrade or cease, because their applications, identity systems, storage, payments, and mail are anchored off-island. Daily resilience can mask strategic fragility: the moment international connectivity is severely compromised, Greenland lacks the local “island mode” to sustain critical digital workflows.
This is not surprising. U.S. Big Tech dominates email and cloud apps worldwide. Still, it may pose a uniquely high risk for Greenland, given its small population, sparse infrastructure, and renewed U.S. strategic interest in the region. Dependence on platforms governed by foreign law and policy erodes national leverage in crisis, incident response, and lawful access. It exposes citizens to outages or unilateral changes that are far beyond Nuuk’s control.
The path forward is clear: treat digital sovereignty as critical infrastructure. Prioritize local capabilities where impact is highest (government/municipal core apps, identity, payments, health), build island-mode fallbacks for essential services, expand diversified transport (additional cables, resilient satellite), and mandate basic email security (SPF/DKIM/DMARC) alongside measurable locality targets for hosting and data. Only then can Greenland credibly assure that, even if cut off from the world, it can still serve its people.
CONNECTIVITY AND RESILIENCE: GREENLAND VERSUS OTHER SOVEREIGN ISLANDS.
The comparative table shown above highlights Greenland’s position among other sovereign and autonomous islands in terms of digital infrastructure. With two international submarine cables, Greenland shares the same level of cable redundancy as the Faroe Islands, Malta, the Maldives, Seychelles, Cuba, and Fiji. This places it in the middle tier of island connectivity: above small states like Comoros, which rely on a single cable, but far behind island nations such as Cyprus, Ireland, or Singapore, which have built themselves into regional hubs with multiple independent international connections.
Where Greenland diverges is in the absence of an Internet Exchange Point (IXP) and its very limited number of Autonomous Systems (ASNs). Unlike Iceland, which couples four cables with three IXPs and over ninety ASNs, Greenland remains a network periphery. Even smaller states such as Malta, Seychelles, or Mauritius operate IXPs and host more ASNs, giving them greater routing autonomy and resilience.
In terms of internet penetration, Greenland fares relatively well, with a rate of over 90 percent, comparable to other advanced island economies. Yet the country’s GDP base is extremely limited, comparable to the Faroe Islands and Seychelles, which constrains its ability to finance major independent infrastructure projects. This means that resilience is not simply a matter of demand or penetration, but rather a question of policy choices, prioritization, and regional partnerships.
Seen from a helicopter’s perspective, Greenland is neither in the worst nor the best position. It has more resilience than single-cable states such as Comoros or small Pacific nations. Still, it lags far behind peer islands that have deliberately developed multi-cable redundancy, local IXPs, and digital sovereignty strategies. For policymakers, this raises a fundamental challenge: whether to continue relying on the relative stability of existing links, or to actively pursue diversification measures such as a national IXP, additional cable investments, or regional peering agreements. In short, Greenland’s digital sovereignty depends less on raw penetration figures and more on whether its infrastructure choices can elevate it from a peripheral to a more autonomous position in the global network.
HOW TO ELEVATE SOUTH GREENLAND TO A PREFERRED TO A PREFFERED DIGITAL HOST FOR THE WORLD … JUST SAYING, WHY NOT!
At first glance, South Greenland and Iceland share many of the same natural conditions that make Iceland an attractive hub for data centers. Both enjoy a cool North Atlantic climate that allows year-round free cooling, reducing the need for energy-intensive artificial systems. In terms of pure geography and temperature, towns such as Qaqortoq and Narsaq in South Greenland are not markedly different from Reykjavík or Akureyri. From a climatic standpoint, there is no inherent reason why Greenland should not also be a viable location for large-scale hosting facilities.
The divergence begins not with climate but with energy and connectivity. Iceland spent decades developing a robust mix of hydropower and geothermal plants, creating a surplus of cheap renewable electricity that could be marketed to international hyperscale operators. Greenland, while rich in hydropower potential, has only a handful of plants tied to local demand centers, with no national grid and limited surplus capacity. Without investment in larger-scale, interconnected generation, it cannot guarantee the continuous, high-volume power supply that international data centers demand. Connectivity is the other decisive factor. Iceland today is connected to four separate submarine cable systems, linking it to Europe and North America, which gives operators confidence in redundancy and low-latency routes across the Atlantic. South Greenland, by contrast, depends on two branches of the Greenland Connect system, which, while providing diversity to Iceland and Canada, does not offer the same level of route choice or resilience. The result is that Iceland functions as a transatlantic bridge, while Greenland remains an endpoint.
For South Greenland to move closer to Iceland’s position, several changes would be necessary. The most important would be a deliberate policy push to develop surplus renewable energy capacity and make it available for export into data center operations. Parallel to this, Greenland would need to pursue further international submarine cables to break its dependence on a single system and create genuine redundancy. Finally, it would need to build up the local digital ecosystem by fostering an Internet Exchange Point and encouraging more networks to establish Autonomous Systems on the island, ensuring that Greenland is not just a transit point but a place where traffic is exchanged and hosted, and, importantly, making money on its own Digital Infrastructure and Sovereignty. South Greenland already shares the climate advantage that underpins Iceland’s success, but climate alone is insufficient. Energy scale, cable diversity, and deliberate policy have been the ingredients that have allowed Iceland to transform itself into a digital hub. Without similar moves, Greenland risks remaining a peripheral node rather than evolving into a sovereign center of digital resilience.
A PRACTICAL BLUEPRINT FOR GREENLAND TOWARDS OWNING ITS DIGITAL SOVEREIGNTY.
No single measure eliminates Greenland’s dependency on external infrastructure, banking, global SaaS, and international transit, which are irreducible. But taken together, these steps described below maximize continuity of essential functions during cable cuts or satellite disruption, improve digital sovereignty, and strengthen bargaining power with global vendors. The trade-off is cost, complexity, and skill requirements, which means Greenland must prioritize where full sovereignty is truly mission-critical (health, emergency, governance) and accept graceful degradation elsewhere (social media, entertainment, SaaS ERP).
A. Keep local traffic local (routing & exchange).
Proposal: Create or strengthen a national IXP in Nuuk, with a secondary node (e.g., Sisimiut or Qaqortoq). Require ISPs, mobile operators, government, and major content/CDNs to peer locally. Add route-server policies with “island-mode” communities to ensure that intra-Greenland routes stay reachable even if upstream transit is lost. Deploy anycasted recursive DNS and host authoritative DNS for .gl domains on-island, with secondaries abroad.
Pros:
- Dramatically reduces the latency, cost, and fragility of local traffic.
- Ensures Greenland continues to “see itself” even if cut off internationally.
- DNS split-horizon prevents sensitive internal queries from leaking off-island.
Cons:
- Needs policy push. Voluntary peering is often insufficient in small markets.
- Running redundant IXPs is a fixed cost for a small economy.
- CDNs may resist deploying nodes without incentives (e.g., free rack and power).
A natural and technically well-founded reaction, especially given Greenland’s monopolistic structure under Tusass, is that an IXP or multiple ASNs might seem redundant. Both content and users reside on the same Tusass network, and intra-Greenland traffic already remains local at Layer 3. Adding an IXP would not change that in practice. Without underlying physical or organizational diversity, an exchange point cannot create redundancy on its own.
However, over the longer term, an IXP can still serve several strategic purposes. It provides a neutral routing and governance layer that enables future decentralization (e.g., government, education, or sectoral ASNs), strengthens “island-mode” resilience by isolating internal routes during disconnection from the global Internet, and supports more flexible traffic management and security policies. Notably, an IXP also offers a trust and independence layer that many third-party providers, such as hyperscalers, CDNs, and data-center networks, typically require before deploying local nodes. Few global operators are willing to peer inside the demarcation of a single national carrier’s network. A neutral IXP provides them with a technical and commercial interface independent of Tusass’s internal routing domain, thereby making on-island caching or edge deployments more feasible in the future. In that sense, this accurately reflects today’s technical reality. The IXP concept anticipates tomorrow’s structural and sovereignty needs, bridging the gap between a functioning monopoly network and a future, more open digital ecosystem.
In practice (and in my opinion), Tusass is the only entity in Greenland with the infrastructure, staff, and technical capacity to operate an IXP. While this challenges the ideal of neutrality, it need not invalidate the concept if the exchange is run on behalf of Naalakkersuisut (the Greenlandic self-governing body) or under a transparent, multi-stakeholder governance model. The key issue is not who operates the IXP, but how it is governed. Suppose Tusass provides the platform while access, routing, and peering policies are openly managed and non-discriminatory. In that case, the IXP can still deliver genuine benefits: local routing continuity, “island-mode” resilience, and a neutral interface that encourages future participation by hyperscalers, CDNs, and sectoral networks.
B. Host public-sector workloads on-island.
Proposal: Stand up a sovereign GovCloud GL in Nuuk (failover in another town, possible West-East redundancy), operated by a Greenlandic entity or tightly contracted partner. Prioritize email, collaboration, case handling, health IT, and emergency comms. Keep critical apps, archives, and MX/journaling on-island even if big SaaS (like M365) is still used abroad.
Pros:
- Keeps essential government operations functional in an isolation event.
- Reduces legal exposure to extraterritorial laws, such as the U.S. CLOUD Act.
- Provides a training ground for local IT and cloud talent.
Cons:
- High CapEx + ongoing OpEx; cloud isn’t a one-off investment.
- Scarcity of local skills; risk of over-reliance on a few engineers.
- Difficult to replicate the breadth of SaaS (ERP, HR, etc.) locally; selective hosting is realistic, full stack is not.
C. Make email & messaging “cable- and satellite-outage proof”.
Proposal: Host primary MX and mailboxes in GovCloud GL with local antispam, journaling, and security. Use off-island secondaries only for queuing. Deploy internal chat/voice/video systems (such as Matrix, XMPP, or local Teams/Zoom gateways) to ensure that intra-Greenland traffic never routes outside the country. Define an “emergency federation mode” to isolate traffic during outages.
Pros:
- Ensures communication between government, hospitals, and municipalities continues during outages.
- Local queues prevent message loss even if foreign relays are unreachable.
- Pre-tested emergency federation builds institutional muscle memory.
Cons:
- Operating robust mail and collaboration platforms locally is a resource-intensive endeavor.
- Risk of user pushback if local platforms feel less polished than global SaaS.
- The emergency “mode switch” adds operational complexity and must be tested regularly.
D. Put the content edge in Greenland.
Proposal: Require or incentivize CDN caches (Akamai, Cloudflare, Netflix, OS mirrors, software update repos, map tiles) to be hosted inside Greenland’s IXP(s).
Pros:
- Improves day-to-day performance and cuts transit bills.
- Reduces dependency on subsea cables for routine updates and content.
- Keeps basic digital life (video, software, education platforms) usable in isolation.
Cons:
- CDNs deploy based on scale; Greenland’s market may be marginal without a subsidy.
- Hosting costs (power, cooling, rackspace) must be borne locally.
- Only covers cached/static content; dynamic services (banking, SaaS) still break without external connectivity.
E. Implement into law & contracts.
Proposal: Mandate data residency for public-sector data; require “island-mode” design in procurement. Systems must demonstrate the ability to authenticate locally, operate offline, maintain usable data, and retain keys under Greenlandic custody. Impose peering obligations for ISPs and major SaaS/CDNs.
Pros:
- Creates a predictable baseline for sovereignty across all agencies.
- Prevents future procurement lock-in to non-resilient foreign SaaS.
- Gives legal backing to technical requirements (IXP, residency, key custody).
Cons:
- May raise the costs of IT projects (compliance overhead).
- Without a strong enforcement, rules risk becoming “checkbox” exercises.
- Possible trade friction if foreign vendors see it as protectionist.
F. Strengthen physical resilience
Proposal: Maintain and upgrade subsea cable capacity (Greenland Connect and Connect North), add diversity (spur/loop and new landings), and maintain long-haul microwave/satellite as a tertiary backup. Pre-engineer quality of service downgrades for graceful degradation.
Pros:
- Adds true redundancy. Nothing replaces a working subsea cable.
- Tertiary paths (satellite, microwave) keep critical services alive during failures.
- Clear QoS downgrades make service loss more predictable and manageable.
Cons:
- High (possibly very high) CapEx. New cable segments cost tens to hundreds of millions of euros.
- Satellite/microwave backup cannot match the throughput of subsea cables.
- International partners may be needed for funding and landing rights.
Security & trust
Proposal: Deploy local PKI and HSMs for the government. Enforce end-to-end encryption. Require local custody of cryptographic keys. Audit vendor remote access and include kill switches.
Pros:
- Prevents data exposure via foreign subpoenas (without Greenland’s knowledge).
- Local trust anchors give confidence in sovereignty claims.
- Kill switches and audit trails enhance vendor accountability.
Cons:
- PKI and HSM management requires very specialized skills.
- Adds operational overhead (key lifecycle, audits, incident response).
- Without strong governance, there is a risk of “security theatre” rather than absolute security.
On-island first as default. A key step for Greenland is to make on-island first the norm so that local-to-local traffic stays local even if Atlantic cables fail. Concretely, stand up a national IXP in Nuuk to keep domestic traffic on the island and anchor CDN caches; build a Greenlandic “GovCloud” to host government email, identity, records, and core apps; and require all public-sector systems to operate in “island mode” (continue basic services offline from the rest of the world). Pair this with local MX, authoritative DNS, secure chat/collaboration, and CDN caches, so essential content and services remain available during outages. Back it with clear procurement rules on data residency and key custody to reduce both outage risk and exposure to foreign laws (e.g., CLOUD Act), acknowledging today’s heavy—if unsurprising—reliance on U.S. hyperscalers (Microsoft, Amazon, Google).
What this changes, and what it doesn’t. These measures don’t aim to sever external ties. They should rebalance them. The goal is graceful degradation that keeps government services, domestic payments, email, DNS, and health communications running on-island, while accepting that global SaaS and card rails will go dark during isolation. Finally, it’s also worth remembering that local caching is only a bridge, not a substitute for global connectivity. In the first days of an outage, caches would keep websites, software updates, and even video libraries available, allowing local email and collaboration tools to continue running smoothly. But as the weeks pass, those caches would inevitably grow stale. News sites, app stores, and streaming platforms would stop refreshing, while critical security updates, certificates, and antivirus definitions would no longer be available, leaving systems exposed to risk. If isolation lasted for months, the impact would be much more profound. Banking and card clearing would be suspended, SaaS-driven ERP systems would break down, and Greenland would slide into a “local only” economy, relying on cash and manual processes. Over time, the social impact would also be felt, with the population cut off from global news, communication, and social platforms. Caching, therefore, buys time, but not independence. It can make an outage manageable in the short term, yet in the long run, Greenland’s economy, security, and society depend on reconnecting to the outside world.
The Bottom line. Full sovereignty is unrealistic for a sparse, widely distributed country, and I don’t think it makes sense to strive for that. It just appears impractical. In my opinion, partial sovereignty is both achievable and valuable. Make on-island first the default, keep essential public services and domestic comms running during cuts, and interoperate seamlessly when subsea links and satellites are up. This shifts Greenland from its current state of strategic fragility to one of managed resilience, without overlooking the rest of the internet.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT.
I want to acknowledge my wife, Eva Varadi, for her unwavering support, patience, and understanding throughout the creative process of writing this article. I would also like to thank Dr. Signe Ravn-Højgaard, from “Tænketanken Digital Infrastruktur”, and the Sermitsiaq article “Digital afhængighed af udlandet” (“Digital dependency on foreign countries”) by Paul Krarup, for inspiring this work, which is also a continuation of my previous research and article titled “Greenland: Navigating Security and Critical Infrastructure in the Arctic – A Technology Introduction”. I would like to thank Lasse Jarlskov for his insightful comments and constructive feedback on this article. His observations regarding routing, OSI layering, and the practical realities of Greenland’s network architecture were both valid and valuable, helping refine several technical arguments and improve the overall clarity of the analysis.
CODE AND DATASETS.
The Python code and datasets used in the analysis are available on my public GitHub: https://github.com/drkklarsen/greenland_digital_infrastructure_mapping (the code is still work in progress, but it is functional and will generate similar data as analyzed in this article).
ABBREVIATION LIST.
ASN — Autonomous System Number: A unique identifier assigned to a network operator that controls its own routing on the Internet, enabling the exchange of traffic with other networks using the Border Gateway Protocol (BGP).
BGP — Border Gateway Protocol: The primary routing protocol of the Internet, used by Autonomous Systems to exchange information about which paths data should take across networks.
CDN — Content Delivery Network: A system of distributed servers that cache and deliver content (such as videos, software updates, or websites) closer to users, reducing latency and dependency on international links.
CLOUD Act — Clarifying Lawful Overseas Use of Data Act: A U.S. law that allows American authorities to demand access to data stored abroad by U.S.-based cloud providers, raising sovereignty and privacy concerns for other countries.
DMARC — Domain-based Message Authentication, Reporting and Conformance: An email security protocol that tells receiving servers how to handle messages that fail authentication checks, protecting against spoofing and phishing.
DKIM — DomainKeys Identified Mail: An email authentication method that uses cryptographic signatures to verify that a message has not been altered and truly comes from the claimed sender.
DNS — Domain Name System: The hierarchical system that translates human-readable domain names (like example.gl) into IP addresses that computers use to locate servers.
ERP — Enterprise Resource Planning A type of integrated software system that organizations use to manage business processes such as finance, supply chain, HR, and operations.
GL — Greenland (country code top-level domain, .gl) The internet country code for Greenland, used for local domain names such as nanoq.gl.
GovCloud — Government Cloud: A sovereign or dedicated cloud infrastructure designed for hosting public-sector applications and data within national jurisdiction.
HSM — Hardware Security Module: A secure physical device that manages cryptographic keys and operations, used to protect sensitive data and digital transactions.
IoT — Internet of Things: A network of physical devices (sensors, appliances, vehicles, etc.) connected to the internet, capable of collecting and exchanging data.
IP — Internet Protocol: The fundamental addressing system of the Internet, enabling data packets to be sent from one computer to another.
ISP — Internet Service Provider: A company or entity that provides customers with access to the internet and related services.
IXP — Internet Exchange Point: A physical infrastructure where networks interconnect directly to exchange internet traffic locally rather than through international transit links.
MX — Mail Exchange (Record): A type of DNS record that specifies the mail servers responsible for receiving email on behalf of a domain.
PKI — Public Key Infrastructure: A framework for managing encryption keys and digital certificates, ensuring secure electronic communications and authentication.
SaaS — Software as a Service: Cloud-based applications delivered over the internet, such as Microsoft 365 or Google Workspace, are usually hosted on servers outside the country.
SPF — Sender Policy Framework: An email authentication protocol that defines which mail servers are authorized to send email on behalf of a domain, reducing the risk of forgery.
Tusass is the national telecommunications provider of Greenland, formerly Tele Greenland, responsible for submarine cables, satellite links, and domestic connectivity.
UAV — Unmanned Aerial Vehicle: An aircraft without a human pilot on board, often used for surveillance, monitoring, or communications relay.
UUV — Unmanned Underwater Vehicle: A robotic submarine used for monitoring, surveying, or securing undersea infrastructure such as cables.



































































