If Greenland were digitally disconnected tomorrow, how much of its public sector could still operate?

If Greenland were digitally cut off tomorrow, how much of its public sector would still function? The uncomfortable answer: very little. The truth is that not only would the public sector break down, but society as a whole would likely also break down the longer a digital isolation would be in effect. This article outlines why it does not necessarily have to be this way and suggests that some remedies and actions can be taken to minimize the impact of an event where Greenland would be digitally isolated from the rest of the internet for an extended period (e.g., weeks to months).

We may like, or feel tempted, to think of digital infrastructure as neutral plumbing. But as I wrote earlier, “digital infrastructure is no longer just about connectivity, but about sovereignty and resilience.” Greenland today has neither.

A recent Sermitsiaq article on Greenland’s “Digital Afhængighed af Udlandet” by Poul Krarup, which describes research work done by the Tænketanken Digital Infrastruktur, laid it bare and crystal clear: the backbone of Greenland’s administration, email, payments, and even municipal services, runs on servers and platforms that are located mainly outside Greenland (and Denmark). Global giants in Europe and the US hold the keys. Greenland doesn’t. My own research reveals just how dramatic this dependency is. The numbers from my own study of 315 Greenlandic public-sector domains make it painfully clear: over 70% of web/IP hosting is concentrated among just three foreign providers, including Microsoft, Google, and Cloudflare. For email exchanges (MX), it’s even worse: the majority of MX records sit entirely outside Greenland’s control.

So imagine the cable is cut, the satellite links fail, or access to those platforms is revoked. Schools, hospitals, courts, and municipalities. How many could still function? How many could even switch on a computer?

This isn’t a thought experiment. It’s a wake-up call.

In my earlier work on Greenland’s critical communications infrastructure, “Greenland: Navigating Security and Critical Infrastructure in the Arctic – A Technology Introduction”, I have pointed out both the resilience and the fragility of what exists today. Tusass has built and maintained a transport network that keeps the country connected under some of the harshest Arctic conditions. That achievement is remarkable, but it is also costly and economically challenging without external subsidies and long-term public investment. With a population of just 57,000 people, Greenland faces challenges in sustaining this infrastructure on market terms alone.

DIGITAL SOVEREIGNTY.

What do we mean when we use phrases like “the digital sovereignty of Greenland is at stake”? Let’s break down the complex language (for techies like myself). Sovereignty in the classical sense is about control over land, people, and institutions. Digital sovereignty extends this to the virtual space. It is primarily about controlling data, infrastructure, and digital services. As societies digitalize, critical aspects of sovereignty move into the digital sphere, such as,

  • Infrastructure as territory: Submarine cables, satellites, data centers, and cloud platforms are the digital equivalents of ports, roads, and airports. If you don’t own or control them, you depend on others to move your “digital goods.”
  • Data as a resource: Just as natural resources are vital to economic sovereignty, data has become the strategic resource of the digital age. Those who store, process, and govern data hold significant power over decision-making and value creation.
  • Platforms as institutions: Social media, SaaS, and search engines act like global “public squares” and administrative tools. If controlled abroad, they may undermine local political, cultural, or economic authority.

The excellent book by Anu Bradford, “Digital Empires: The Global Battle to Regulate Technology,” describes how the digital world is no longer a neutral, borderless space but is increasingly shaped by the competing influence of three distinct “empires.” The American model is built around the dominance of private platforms, such as Google, Amazon, and Meta, where innovation and market power drive the agenda. The scale and ubiquity of Silicon Valley firms have enabled them to achieve a global reach. In contrast, the Chinese model fuses technological development with state control. Here, digital platforms are integrated into the political system, used not only for economic growth but also for surveillance, censorship, and the consolidation of authority. Between these two poles lies the European model, which has little homegrown platform power but exerts influence through regulation. By setting strict rules on privacy, competition, and online content, Europe has managed to project its legal standards globally, a phenomenon Bradford refers to as the “Brussels effect” (which is used here in a positive sense). Bradford’s analysis highlights the core dilemma for Greenland. Digital sovereignty cannot be achieved in isolation. Instead, it requires navigating between these global forces while ensuring that Greenland retains the capacity to keep its critical systems functioning, its data governed under its own laws, and its society connected even when global infrastructures falter. The question is not which empire to join, but how to engage with them in a way that strengthens Greenland’s ability to determine its own digital future.

In practice, this means that Greenland’s strategy cannot be about copying one of the three empires, but rather about carving out a space of resilience within their shadow. Building a national Internet Exchange Point ensures that local traffic continues to circulate on the island rather than being routed abroad, even when external links fail. Establishing a sovereign GovCloud provides government, healthcare, and emergency services with a secure foundation that is not dependent on distant data centers or foreign jurisdictions. Local caching of software updates, video libraries, and news platforms enables communities to operate in a “local mode” during disruptions, preserving continuity even when global connections are disrupted. These measures do not create independence from the digital empires. Still, they give Greenland the ability to negotiate with them from a position of greater strength, ensuring that participation in the global digital order does not come at the expense of local control or security.

FROM DAILY RESILIENCE TO STRATEGIC FRAGILITY.

I have argued that integrity, robustness, and availability must be the guiding principles for Greenland’s digital backbone, both now and in the future.

  • Integrity means protecting against foreign influence and cyber threats through stronger cybersecurity, AI support, and autonomous monitoring.
  • Robustness requires diversifying the backbone with new submarine cables, satellite systems, and dual-use assets that can serve both civil and defense needs.
  • Availability depends on automation and AI-driven monitoring, combined with autonomous platforms such as UAVs, UUVs, IoT sensors, and distributed acoustic sensing on submarine cables, to keep services running across vast and remote geographies with limited human resources.

The conclusion I drew in my previous work remains applicable today. Greenland must develop local expertise and autonomy so that critical communications are not left vulnerable to outside actors in times of crisis. Dual-use investments are not only about defense; they also bring better services, jobs, and innovation.

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Source: Tusass Annual Report 2023 with some additions and minor edits.

The Figure above illustrates the infrastructure of the Greenlandic sole telecommunications provider, Tusass. Note that Tusass is the incumbent and only telecom provider in Greenland. Currently, five hydropower plants (shown above, location only indicative) provide more than 80% of Greenland’s electricity demand. Greenland is entering a period of significant infrastructure transformation, with several large projects already underway and others on the horizon. The most visible change is in aviation. Following the opening of the new international airport in Nuuk in 2024, with its 2,200-meter runway capable of receiving direct flights from Europe and North America, attention has turned to Ilulissat, on the Northwestern Coast of Greenland, and Qaqortoq. Ilulissat is being upgraded with its own 2,200-meter runway, a new terminal, and a control tower, while the old 845-meter strip is being converted into an access road. In southern Greenland, a new airport is being built in Qaqortoq, with a 1,500-meter runway scheduled to open around 2026. Once completed, these three airports, Nuuk, Ilulissat, and Qaqortoq, the largest town in South Greenland, will together handle roughly 80 percent of Greenland’s passenger traffic, reshaping both tourism and domestic connectivity. Smaller projects, such as the planned airport at Ittoqqortoormiit and changes to heliport infrastructure in East Greenland, are also part of this shift, although on a longer horizon.

Beyond air travel, the next decade is likely to bring new developments in maritime infrastructure. There is growing interest in constructing deep-water ports, both to support commercial shipping and to enable the export of minerals from Greenland’s interior. Denmark has already committed around DKK 1.6 billion (approximately USD 250 million) between 2026 and 2029 for a deep-sea port and related coastal infrastructure, with several proposals directly linked to mining ventures. In southern Greenland, for example, the Tanbreez multi-element rare earth project lies within reach of Qaqortoq, and the new airport’s specifications were chosen with freight requirements in mind. Other mineral prospects, ranging from rare earths to nickel and zinc, will require their own supporting infrastructure, roads, power, and port facilities, if the project transitions from exploration to production. The timelines for these mining and port projects are less certain than for the airports, since they depend on market conditions, environmental approvals, and financing. Yet it is clear that the 2025–2035 period will be decisive for Greenland’s economic and strategic trajectory. The combination of new airports, potential deep-water harbors, and the possible opening of significant mining operations would amount to the largest coordinated build-out of Greenlandic infrastructure in decades. Moreover, several submarine cable projects have been mentioned that would strengthen international connectivity to Greenland, as well as strengthen the redundancy and robustness of settlement connectivity, in addition to the existing long-haul microwave network connecting all settlements along the west coast from North to South.

And this is precisely why the question of a sudden digital cut-off matters so much. Without integrity, robustness, and availability built into the communications infrastructure, Greenland’s public sector and its critical infrastructure remain dangerously exposed. What looks resilient in daily operation could unravel overnight if the links to the outside world were severed or internal connectivity were compromised. In particular, the dependency on Nuuk is a critical risk.

GREENLAND’s DIGITAL INFRASTRUCTURE BY LAYER.

Let’s peel the digital onion layer by layer of Greenland’s digital infrastructure.

Is Greenland’s digital infrastructure broken down by the layers upon which society’s continuous functioning depends? This illustration shows how applications, transport, routing, and interconnect all depend on the external connectivity.

Greenland’s digital infrastructure can be understood as a stack of interdependent layers, each of which reveals a set of vulnerabilities. This is illustrated by the Figure above. At the top of the stack lie the applications and services that citizens, businesses, and government rely on every day. These include health IT systems, banking platforms, municipal services, and cloud-based applications. The critical issue is that most of these services are hosted abroad and have no local “island mode.” In practice, this means that if Greenland is digitally cut off, domestic apps and services will fail to function because there is no mechanism to run them independently within the country.

Beneath this sits the physical transport layer, which is the actual hardware that moves data. Greenland is connected internationally by just two subsea cables, routed via Iceland and Canada. A few settlements, such as Tasiilaq, remain entirely dependent on satellite links, while microwave radio chains connect long stretches of the west coast. At the local level, there is some fiber deployment, but it is limited to individual settlements rather than forming part of a national backbone. This creates a transport infrastructure that, while impressive given Greenland’s geography, is inherently fragile. Two cables and a scattering of satellites do not amount to genuine redundancy for a nation. The next layer is IP/TCP transport, where routing comes into play. Here, too, the system is basic. Greenland relies on a limited set of upstream providers with little true diversity or multi-homing. As a result, if one of the subsea cables is cut, large parts of the country’s connectivity collapse, because traffic cannot be seamlessly rerouted through alternative pathways. The resilience that is taken for granted in larger markets is largely absent here.

Finally, at the base of the stack, interconnect and routing expose the structural dependency most clearly. Greenland operates under a single Autonomous System Number (ASN). An ASN is a unique identifier assigned to a network operator (like Tusass) that controls its own routing on the Internet. It allows the network to exchange traffic and routing information with other networks using the Border Gateway Protocol (BGP). In Greenland, there is no domestic internet exchange point (IXP) or peering between local networks. All traffic must be routed abroad first, whether it is destined for Greenland or beyond. International transit flows through Iceland and Canada via the subsea cables, and via geostationary GreenSat satellite connectivity through Grand Canaria as a limited (in capacity) fallback that connected via the submarine network back to Greenland. There is no sovereign government cloud, almost no local caching for global platforms, and only a handful of small data centers (being generous with the definition here). The absence of scaled redundancy and local hosting means that virtually all of Greenland’s digital life depends on international connections.

GREENLAND’s DIGITAL LIFE ON A SINGLE THREAD.

Considering the many layers described above, a striking picture emerges: applications, transport, routing, and interconnect are all structured in ways that assume continuous external connectivity. What appears robust on a day-to-day basis can unravel quickly. A single cable cut, upstream outage, or local transmission fault in Greenland does not just slow down the internet. It can also disrupt it. It can paralyze everyday life across almost every sector, as much of the country’s digital backbone relies on external connectivity and fragile local transport. For the government, the reliance on cloud-hosted systems abroad means that email, document storage, case management, and health IT systems would go dark. Hospitals and clinics could lose access to patient records, lab results, and telemedicine services. Schools would be cut off from digital learning platforms and exam systems that are hosted internationally. Municipalities, which already lean on remote data centers for payroll, social services, and citizen portals, would struggle to process even routine administrative tasks. In finance, the impact would be immediate. Greenland’s card payment and clearing systems are routed abroad; without connectivity, credit and debit card transactions could no longer be authorized. ATMs would stop functioning. Shops, fuel stations, and essential suppliers would be forced into cash-only operations at best, and even that would depend on whether their local systems can operate in isolation. The private sector would be equally disrupted. Airlines, shipping companies, and logistics providers all rely on real-time reservation and cargo systems hosted outside Greenland. Tourism, one of the fastest-growing industries, is almost entirely dependent on digital bookings and payments. Mining operations under development would be unable to transmit critical data to foreign partners or markets. Even at the household level, the effects could be highly disruptive. Messaging apps, social media, and streaming platforms all require constant external connections; they would stop working instantly. Online banking and digital ID services would be unreachable, leaving people unable to pay bills, transfer money, or authenticate themselves for government services. As there are so few local caches or hosting facilities in Greenland, even “local” digital life evaporates once the cables are cut. So we will be back to reading books and paper magazines again.

This means that an outage can cascade well beyond the loss of entertainment or simple inconvenience. It undermines health care, government administration, financial stability, commerce, and basic communication. In practice, the disruption would touch every citizen and every institution almost immediately, with few alternatives in place to keep essential civil services running.

GREENLAND’s DIGITAL INFRASTRUCTURE EXPOSURE: ABOUT THE DATA.

In this inquiry, I have primarily analyzed two pillars of Greenland’s digital presence: web/IP hosting, as well as MX (mail exchange) hosting. These may sound technical, but they are fundamental to understanding. Web/IP hosting determines where Greenland’s websites and online services physically reside, whether inside Greenland’s own infrastructure or abroad in foreign data centers. MX hosting determines where email is routed and processed, and is crucial for the operation of government, business, and everyday communication. Together, these layers form the backbone of a country’s digital sovereignty.

What the data shows is sobering. For example, the Government’s own portal nanoq.gl is hosted locally by Tele Greenland (i.e., Tusass GL), but its email is routed through Amazon’s infrastructure abroad. The national airline, airgreenland.gl, also relies on Microsoft’s mail servers in the US and UK. These are not isolated cases. They illustrate the broader pattern of dependence. If hosting and mail flows are predominantly external, then Greenland’s resilience, control, and even lawful access are effectively in the hands of others.

The data from the Greenlandic .gl domain space paints a clear and rather bleak picture of dependency and reliance on the outside world. My inquiry covered 315 domains, resolving more than a thousand hosts and IPs and uncovering 548 mail exchangers, which together form a dependency network of 1,359 nodes and 2,237 edges. What emerges is not a story of local sovereignty but of heavy reliance on external, that is, outside Greenland, hosting.

When broken down, it becomes clear how much of the Greenlandic namespace is not even in use. Of the 315 domains, only 190 could be resolved to a functioning web or IP host, leaving 125 domains, or about 40 percent, with no active service. For mail exchange, the numbers are even more striking: only 98 domains have MX records, while 217 domains, it would appear, cannot be used for email, representing nearly seventy percent of the total. In other words, the universe of domains we can actually analyze shrinks considerably once you separate the inactive or unused domains from those that carry real digital services.

It is within this smaller, active subset that the pattern of dependency becomes obvious. The majority of the web/IP hosting we can analyze is located outside Greenland, primarily on infrastructure controlled by American companies such as Cloudflare, Microsoft, Google, and Amazon, or through Danish and European resellers. For email, the reliance is even more complete: virtually all MX hosting that exists is foreign, with only two domains fully hosted in Greenland. This means that both Greenland’s web presence and its email flows are overwhelmingly dependent on servers and policies beyond its own borders. The geographic spread of dependencies is extensive, spanning the US, UK, Ireland, Denmark, and the Netherlands, with some entries extending as far afield as China and Panama. This breadth raises uncomfortable questions about oversight, control, and the exposure of critical services to foreign jurisdictions.

Security practices add another layer of concern. Many domains lack the most basic forms of email protection. The Sender Policy Framework (SPF), which instructs mail servers on which IP addresses are authorized to send on behalf of a domain, is inconsistently applied. DomainKeys Identified Mail (DKIM), which uses cryptographic signatures to verify that an email originates from the claimed sender, is also patchy. Most concerning is that Domain-based Message Authentication, Reporting, and Conformance (DMARC), a policy that allows a domain to instruct receiving mail servers on how to handle suspicious emails (for example, reject or quarantine them), is either missing or set to “none” for many critical domains. Without SPF, DKIM, and DMARC properly configured, Greenlandic organizations are wide open to spoofing and phishing, including within government and municipal domains.

Taken together, the picture is clear. Greenland’s digital backbone is not in Greenland. Its critical web and mail infrastructure lives elsewhere, often in the hands of hyperscalers far beyond Nuuk’s control. The question practically asks itself: if those external links were cut tomorrow, how much of Greenland’s public sector could still function?

GREENLAND’s DIGITAL INFRASTRUCTURE EXPOSURE: SOME KEY DATA OUT OF A VERY RICH DATASET.

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The Figure shows the distribution of Greenlandic (.gl) web/IP domains hosted on a given country’s infrastructure. Note that domains are frequently hosted in multiple countries. However, very few (2!) have an overlap with Greenland.

The chart of Greenland (.gl) Web/IP Infrastructure Hosting by Supporting Country reveals the true geography of Greenland’s digital presence. The data covers 315 Greenlandic domains, of which 190 could be resolved to active web or IP hosts. From these, I built a dependency map showing where in the world these domains are actually served.

The headline finding is stark: 57% of Greenlandic domains depend on infrastructure in the United States. This reflects the dominance of American companies such as Cloudflare, Microsoft, Google, and Amazon, whose services sit in front of or fully host Greenlandic websites. In contrast, only 26% of domains are hosted on infrastructure inside Greenland itself (primarily through Tele Greenland/Tusass). Denmark (19%), the UK (14%), and Ireland (13%) appear as the next layers of dependency, reflecting the role of regional resellers, like One.com/Simply, as well as Microsoft and Google’s European data centers. Germany, France, Canada, and a long tail of other countries contribute smaller shares.

It is worth noting that the validity of this analysis hinges on how the data are treated. Each domain is counted once per country where it has active infrastructure. This means a domain like nanoq.gl (the Greenland Government portal) is counted for both Greenland and its foreign dependency through Amazon’s mail services. However, double-counting with Greenland is extremely rare. Out of the 190 resolvable domains, 73 (38%) are exclusively Greenlandic, 114 (60%) are solely foreign, and only 2 (~1%) domains are hybrids, split between Greenland and another country. Those two are Nanoq.gl and airgreenland.gl, both of which combine a Greenland presence with foreign infrastructure. This is why the Figure above shows percentages that add up to more than 100%. They represent the dependency footprint. The share of Greenlandic domains that touch each country. They do not represent a pie chart of mutually exclusive categories. What is most important to note, however, is that the overlap with Greenland is vanishingly small. In practice, Greenlandic domains are either entirely local or entirely foreign. Very few straddle the boundary.

The conclusion is sobering. Greenland’s web presence is deeply externalized. With only a quarter of domains hosted locally, and more than half relying on US-controlled infrastructure, the country’s digital backbone is anchored outside its borders. This is not simply a matter of physical location. It is about sovereignty, resilience, and control. The dominance of US, Danish, and UK providers means that Greenland’s citizens, municipalities, and even government services are reliant on infrastructure they do not own and cannot fully control.

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Figure shows the distribution of Greenlandic (.gl) domains by the supporting country for the MX (mail exchange) infrastructure. It shows that nearly all email services are routed through foreign providers.

The Figure above of the MX (mail exchange) infrastructure by supporting country reveals an even more pronounced pattern of external reliance compared to the above case for web hosting. From the 315 Greenlandic domains examined, only 98 domains had active MX records. These are the domains that can be analyzed for mail routing and that have been used in the analysis below.

Among them, 19% of all Greenlandic domains send their mail through US-controlled infrastructure, primarily Microsoft’s Outlook/Exchange services and Google’s Gmail. The United Kingdom (12%), Ireland (9%), and Denmark (8%) follow, reflecting the presence of Microsoft and Google’s European data centers and Danish resellers. France and Australia appear with smaller shares at 2%, and beyond that, the contributions of other countries are negligible. Greenland itself barely registers. Only two domains, accounting for 1% of the total, utilize MX infrastructure hosted within Greenland. The rest rely on servers beyond its borders. This result is consistent with our sovereignty breakdown: almost all Greenlandic email is foreign-hosted, with just two domains entirely local and one hybrid combining Greenlandic and foreign providers.

Again, the validity of this analysis rests on the same method as the web/IP chart. Each domain is counted once per country where its MX servers are located. Percentages do not add up to 100% because domains may span multiple countries; however, crucially, as with web hosting, double-counting with Greenland is vanishingly rare. In fact, virtually no Greenlandic domains combine local and foreign MX; they are either foreign-only or, in just two cases, local-only.

The story is clear and compelling: Greenland’s email infrastructure is overwhelmingly externalized. Where web hosting still accounts for a quarter of domains within the country, email sovereignty is almost nonexistent. Nearly all communication flows through servers controlled by US, UK, Ireland, or Denmark. The implication is sobering. In the event of disruption, policy disputes, or surveillance demands, Greenland has little autonomous control over its most basic digital communications.

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A sector-level view of how Greenland’s web/IP domains are hosted, local vs externally (outside Greenland).

This chart provides a sector-level view of how Greenlandic domains are hosted, distinguishing between those resolved locally in Greenland and those hosted outside of Greenland. It is based on the subset of 190 domains for which sufficient web/IP hosting information was available. Importantly, the categorization relies on individual domains, not on companies as entities. A single company or institution may own and operate multiple domains, which are counted separately for the purpose of this analysis. There is also some uncertainty in sector assignment, as many domains have ambiguous names and were categorized using best-fit rules.

The distribution highlights the uneven exercise of digital sovereignty across sectors. In education and finance, the dependency is absolute: 100 percent of domains are hosted externally, with no Greenland-based presence at all. It should not come as a big surprise that ninety percent of government domains are hosted in Greenland, while only 10 percent are hosted outside. From a Digital Government sovereignty perspective, this would obviously be what should be expected. Transportation shows a split, with about two-thirds of domains hosted locally and one-third abroad, reflecting a mix of Tele Greenland-hosted (Tusass GL) domains alongside foreign-hosted services, such as airgreenland.gl. According to the available data, Energy infrastructure is hosted entirely abroad, underscoring possibly one of the most critical vulnerabilities in the dataset. By contrast, telecom domains, unsurprisingly, given Tele Greenland’s role, are entirely local, making it the only sector with 100 percent internal hosting. Municipalities present a more positive picture, with three-quarters of domains hosted locally and one-quarter abroad, although this still represents a partial external dependency. Finally, the large and diverse “Other” category, which contains a mix of companies, organizations, and services, is skewed towards foreign hosting (67 percent external, 33 percent local).

Taken together, the results underscore three important points. First, sector-level sovereignty is highly uneven. While telecom, municipal, and Governmental web services retain more local control, most finance, education, and energy domains are overwhelmingly external. We should keep in mind that when a Greenlandic domain resolves to local infrastructure, it indicates that the frontend web hosting, the visible entry point that users connect to, is located within Greenland, typically through Tele Greenland (i.e., Tusass GL). However, this does not automatically mean that the entire service stack is local. Critical back-end components such as databases, authentication services, payment platforms, or integrated cloud applications may still reside abroad. In practice, a locally hosted domain therefore guarantees only that the web interface is served from Greenland, while deeper layers of the service may remain dependent on foreign infrastructure. This distinction is crucial when evaluating genuine digital sovereignty and resilience. However, the overall pattern is unmistakable. Greenland’s digital presence remains heavily reliant on foreign hosting, with only pockets of local sovereignty.

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A sector-level view of the share of locally versus externally (i.e., outside Greenland) MX (mail exchange) hosted Greenlandic domains (.gl).

The Figure above provides a sector-level view of how Greenlandic domains handle their MX (mail exchange) infrastructure, distinguishing between those hosted locally and those that rely on foreign providers. The analysis is based on the subset of 94 domains (out of 315 total) where MX hosting could be clearly resolved. In other words, these are the domains for which sufficient DNS information was available to identify the location of their mail servers. As with the web/IP analysis, it is important to note two caveats: sector classification involves a degree of interpretation, and the results represent individual domains, not individual companies. A single organization may operate multiple domains, some of which are local and others external.

The results are striking. For most sectors, such as education, finance, transport, energy, telecom, and municipalities, the dependence on foreign MX hosting is total. 100 percent of identified domains rely on external providers for email infrastructure. Even critical sectors such as energy and telecom, where one might expect a more substantial local presence, are fully externalized. The government sector presents a mixed picture. Half of the government domains examined utilize local MX hosting, while the other half are tied to foreign providers. This partial local footprint is significant, as it shows that while some government email flows are retained within Greenland, an equally large share is routed through servers abroad. The “other” sector, which includes businesses, NGOs, and various organizations, shows a small local footprint of about 3 percent, with 97 percent hosted externally. Taken together, the Figure paints a more severe picture of dependency than the web/IP hosting analysis.

While web hosting still retained about a quarter of domains locally, in the case of email, nearly everything is external. Even in government, where one might expect strong sovereignty, half of the domains are dependent on foreign MX servers. This distinction is critical. Email is the backbone of communication for both public and private institutions, and the routing of Greenland’s email infrastructure almost entirely abroad highlights a deep vulnerability. Local MX records guarantee only that the entry point for mail handling is in Greenland. They do not necessarily mean that mail storage or filtering remains local, as many services rely on external processing even when the MX server is domestic.

The broader conclusion is clear. Greenland’s sovereignty in digital communications is weakest in email. Across nearly all sectors, external providers control the infrastructure through which communication must pass, leaving Greenland reliant on systems located far outside its borders. Irrespective of how the picture painted here may appear severe in terms of digital sovereignty, it is not altogether surprising. The almost complete externalization of Greenlandic email infrastructure is not surprising, given that most global email services are provided by U.S.-based hyperscalers such as Microsoft and Google. This reliance on Big Tech is the norm worldwide, but it carries particular implications for Greenland, where dependence on foreign-controlled communication channels further limits digital sovereignty and resilience.

The analysis of the 94 MX hosting entries shows a striking concentration of Greenlandic email infrastructure in the hands of a few large players. Microsoft dominates the picture with 38 entries, accounting for just over 40 percent of all records, while Amazon follows with 20 entries, or around 21 percent. Google, including both Gmail and Google Cloud Platform services, contributes an additional 8 entries, representing approximately 9% of the total. Together, these three U.S. hyperscalers control nearly 70 percent of all Greenlandic MX infrastructure. By contrast, Tele Greenland (Tusass GL) appears in only three cases, equivalent to just 3 percent of the total, highlighting the minimal local footprint. The remaining quarter of the dataset is distributed across a long tail of smaller European and global providers such as Team Blue in Denmark, Hetzner in Germany, OVH and O2Switch in France, Contabo, Telenor, and others. The distribution, however you want to cut it, underscores the near-total reliance on U.S. Big Tech for Greenland’s email services, with only a token share remaining under national control.

Out of 179 total country mentions across the dataset, the United States is by far the most dominant hosting location, appearing in 61 cases, or approximately 34 percent of all country references. The United Kingdom follows with 38 entries (21 percent), Ireland with 28 entries (16 percent), and Denmark with 25 entries (14 percent). France (4 percent) and Australia (3 percent) form a smaller second tier, while Greenland itself appears only three times (2 percent). Germany also accounts for three entries, and all other countries (Austria, Norway, Spain, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Poland, Canada, and Singapore) occur only once each, making them statistically marginal. Examining the structure of services across locations, approximately 30 percent of providers are tied to a single country, while 51 percent span two countries (for example, UK–US or DK–IE). A further 18 percent are spread across three countries, and a single case involved four countries simultaneously. This pattern reflects the use of distributed or redundant MX services across multiple geographies, a characteristic often found in large cloud providers like Microsoft and Amazon.

The key point is that, regardless of whether domains are linked to one, two, or three countries, the United States is present in the overwhelming majority of cases, either alone or in combination with other countries. This confirms that U.S.-based infrastructure underpins the backbone of Greenlandic email hosting, with European locations such as the UK, Ireland, and Denmark acting primarily as secondary anchors rather than true alternatives.

WHAT DOES IT ALL MEAN?

Greenland’s public digital life overwhelmingly runs on infrastructure it does not control. Of 315 .gl domains, only 190 even have active web/IP hosting, and just 98 have resolvable MX (email) records. Within that smaller, “real” subset, most web front-ends are hosted abroad and virtually all email rides on foreign platforms. The dependency is concentrated, with U.S. hyperscalers—Microsoft, Amazon, and Google—accounting for nearly 70% of MX services. The U.S. is also represented in more than a third of all MX hosting locations (often alongside the UK, Ireland, or Denmark). Local email hosting is almost non-existent (two entirely local domains; a few Tele Greenland/Tusass appearances), and even for websites, a Greenlandic front end does not guarantee local back-end data or apps.

That architecture has direct implications for sovereignty and security. If submarine cables, satellites, or upstream policies fail or are restricted, most government, municipal, health, financial, educational, and transportation services would degrade or cease, because their applications, identity systems, storage, payments, and mail are anchored off-island. Daily resilience can mask strategic fragility: the moment international connectivity is severely compromised, Greenland lacks the local “island mode” to sustain critical digital workflows.

This is not surprising. U.S. Big Tech dominates email and cloud apps worldwide. Still, it may pose a uniquely high risk for Greenland, given its small population, sparse infrastructure, and renewed U.S. strategic interest in the region. Dependence on platforms governed by foreign law and policy erodes national leverage in crisis, incident response, and lawful access. It exposes citizens to outages or unilateral changes that are far beyond Nuuk’s control.

The path forward is clear: treat digital sovereignty as critical infrastructure. Prioritize local capabilities where impact is highest (government/municipal core apps, identity, payments, health), build island-mode fallbacks for essential services, expand diversified transport (additional cables, resilient satellite), and mandate basic email security (SPF/DKIM/DMARC) alongside measurable locality targets for hosting and data. Only then can Greenland credibly assure that, even if cut off from the world, it can still serve its people.

CONNECTIVITY AND RESILIENCE: GREENLAND VERSUS OTHER SOVEREIGN ISLANDS.

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Sources: Submarine cable counts from TeleGeography/SubmarineNetworks.com; IXPs and ASNs from Internet Society Pulse/Peering DB and RIR data; GDP and Population from IMF/Worldband (2023/2024); Internet penetration from ITU and National Statistics.

The comparative table shown above highlights Greenland’s position among other sovereign and autonomous islands in terms of digital infrastructure. With two international submarine cables, Greenland shares the same level of cable redundancy as the Faroe Islands, Malta, the Maldives, Seychelles, Cuba, and Fiji. This places it in the middle tier of island connectivity: above small states like Comoros, which rely on a single cable, but far behind island nations such as Cyprus, Ireland, or Singapore, which have built themselves into regional hubs with multiple independent international connections.

Where Greenland diverges is in the absence of an Internet Exchange Point (IXP) and its very limited number of Autonomous Systems (ASNs). Unlike Iceland, which couples four cables with three IXPs and over ninety ASNs, Greenland remains a network periphery. Even smaller states such as Malta, Seychelles, or Mauritius operate IXPs and host more ASNs, giving them greater routing autonomy and resilience.

In terms of internet penetration, Greenland fares relatively well, with a rate of over 90 percent, comparable to other advanced island economies. Yet the country’s GDP base is extremely limited, comparable to the Faroe Islands and Seychelles, which constrains its ability to finance major independent infrastructure projects. This means that resilience is not simply a matter of demand or penetration, but rather a question of policy choices, prioritization, and regional partnerships.

Seen from a helicopter’s perspective, Greenland is neither in the worst nor the best position. It has more resilience than single-cable states such as Comoros or small Pacific nations. Still, it lags far behind peer islands that have deliberately developed multi-cable redundancy, local IXPs, and digital sovereignty strategies. For policymakers, this raises a fundamental challenge: whether to continue relying on the relative stability of existing links, or to actively pursue diversification measures such as a national IXP, additional cable investments, or regional peering agreements. In short, Greenland’s digital sovereignty depends less on raw penetration figures and more on whether its infrastructure choices can elevate it from a peripheral to a more autonomous position in the global network.

HOW TO ELEVATE SOUTH GREENLAND TO A PREFERRED TO A PREFFERED DIGITAL HOST FOR THE WORLD … JUST SAYING, WHY NOT!

At first glance, South Greenland and Iceland share many of the same natural conditions that make Iceland an attractive hub for data centers. Both enjoy a cool North Atlantic climate that allows year-round free cooling, reducing the need for energy-intensive artificial systems. In terms of pure geography and temperature, towns such as Qaqortoq and Narsaq in South Greenland are not markedly different from Reykjavík or Akureyri. From a climatic standpoint, there is no inherent reason why Greenland should not also be a viable location for large-scale hosting facilities.

The divergence begins not with climate but with energy and connectivity. Iceland spent decades developing a robust mix of hydropower and geothermal plants, creating a surplus of cheap renewable electricity that could be marketed to international hyperscale operators. Greenland, while rich in hydropower potential, has only a handful of plants tied to local demand centers, with no national grid and limited surplus capacity. Without investment in larger-scale, interconnected generation, it cannot guarantee the continuous, high-volume power supply that international data centers demand. Connectivity is the other decisive factor. Iceland today is connected to four separate submarine cable systems, linking it to Europe and North America, which gives operators confidence in redundancy and low-latency routes across the Atlantic. South Greenland, by contrast, depends on two branches of the Greenland Connect system, which, while providing diversity to Iceland and Canada, does not offer the same level of route choice or resilience. The result is that Iceland functions as a transatlantic bridge, while Greenland remains an endpoint.

For South Greenland to move closer to Iceland’s position, several changes would be necessary. The most important would be a deliberate policy push to develop surplus renewable energy capacity and make it available for export into data center operations. Parallel to this, Greenland would need to pursue further international submarine cables to break its dependence on a single system and create genuine redundancy. Finally, it would need to build up the local digital ecosystem by fostering an Internet Exchange Point and encouraging more networks to establish Autonomous Systems on the island, ensuring that Greenland is not just a transit point but a place where traffic is exchanged and hosted, and, importantly, making money on its own Digital Infrastructure and Sovereignty. South Greenland already shares the climate advantage that underpins Iceland’s success, but climate alone is insufficient. Energy scale, cable diversity, and deliberate policy have been the ingredients that have allowed Iceland to transform itself into a digital hub. Without similar moves, Greenland risks remaining a peripheral node rather than evolving into a sovereign center of digital resilience.

A PRACTICAL BLUEPRINT FOR GREENLAND TOWARDS OWNING ITS DIGITAL SOVEREIGNTY.

No single measure eliminates Greenland’s dependency on external infrastructure, banking, global SaaS, and international transit, which are irreducible. But taken together, these steps described below maximize continuity of essential functions during cable cuts or satellite disruption, improve digital sovereignty, and strengthen bargaining power with global vendors. The trade-off is cost, complexity, and skill requirements, which means Greenland must prioritize where full sovereignty is truly mission-critical (health, emergency, governance) and accept graceful degradation elsewhere (social media, entertainment, SaaS ERP).

A. Keep local traffic local (routing & exchange).

Proposal: Create or strengthen a national IXP in Nuuk, with a secondary node (e.g., Sisimiut or Qaqortoq). Require ISPs, mobile operators, government, and major content/CDNs to peer locally. Add route-server policies with “island-mode” communities to ensure that intra-Greenland routes stay reachable even if upstream transit is lost. Deploy anycasted recursive DNS and host authoritative DNS for .gl domains on-island, with secondaries abroad.

Pros:

  • Dramatically reduces the latency, cost, and fragility of local traffic.
  • Ensures Greenland continues to “see itself” even if cut off internationally.
  • DNS split-horizon prevents sensitive internal queries from leaking off-island.

Cons:

  • Needs policy push. Voluntary peering is often insufficient in small markets.
  • Running redundant IXPs is a fixed cost for a small economy.
  • CDNs may resist deploying nodes without incentives (e.g., free rack and power).

A natural and technically well-founded reaction, especially given Greenland’s monopolistic structure under Tusass, is that an IXP or multiple ASNs might seem redundant. Both content and users reside on the same Tusass network, and intra-Greenland traffic already remains local at Layer 3. Adding an IXP would not change that in practice. Without underlying physical or organizational diversity, an exchange point cannot create redundancy on its own.

However, over the longer term, an IXP can still serve several strategic purposes. It provides a neutral routing and governance layer that enables future decentralization (e.g., government, education, or sectoral ASNs), strengthens “island-mode” resilience by isolating internal routes during disconnection from the global Internet, and supports more flexible traffic management and security policies. Notably, an IXP also offers a trust and independence layer that many third-party providers, such as hyperscalers, CDNs, and data-center networks, typically require before deploying local nodes. Few global operators are willing to peer inside the demarcation of a single national carrier’s network. A neutral IXP provides them with a technical and commercial interface independent of Tusass’s internal routing domain, thereby making on-island caching or edge deployments more feasible in the future. In that sense, this accurately reflects today’s technical reality. The IXP concept anticipates tomorrow’s structural and sovereignty needs, bridging the gap between a functioning monopoly network and a future, more open digital ecosystem.

In practice (and in my opinion), Tusass is the only entity in Greenland with the infrastructure, staff, and technical capacity to operate an IXP. While this challenges the ideal of neutrality, it need not invalidate the concept if the exchange is run on behalf of Naalakkersuisut (the Greenlandic self-governing body) or under a transparent, multi-stakeholder governance model. The key issue is not who operates the IXP, but how it is governed. Suppose Tusass provides the platform while access, routing, and peering policies are openly managed and non-discriminatory. In that case, the IXP can still deliver genuine benefits: local routing continuity, “island-mode” resilience, and a neutral interface that encourages future participation by hyperscalers, CDNs, and sectoral networks.

B. Host public-sector workloads on-island.

Proposal: Stand up a sovereign GovCloud GL in Nuuk (failover in another town, possible West-East redundancy), operated by a Greenlandic entity or tightly contracted partner. Prioritize email, collaboration, case handling, health IT, and emergency comms. Keep critical apps, archives, and MX/journaling on-island even if big SaaS (like M365) is still used abroad.

Pros:

  • Keeps essential government operations functional in an isolation event.
  • Reduces legal exposure to extraterritorial laws, such as the U.S. CLOUD Act.
  • Provides a training ground for local IT and cloud talent.

Cons:

  • High CapEx + ongoing OpEx; cloud isn’t a one-off investment.
  • Scarcity of local skills; risk of over-reliance on a few engineers.
  • Difficult to replicate the breadth of SaaS (ERP, HR, etc.) locally; selective hosting is realistic, full stack is not.

C. Make email & messaging “cable- and satellite-outage proof”.

Proposal: Host primary MX and mailboxes in GovCloud GL with local antispam, journaling, and security. Use off-island secondaries only for queuing. Deploy internal chat/voice/video systems (such as Matrix, XMPP, or local Teams/Zoom gateways) to ensure that intra-Greenland traffic never routes outside the country. Define an “emergency federation mode” to isolate traffic during outages.

Pros:

  • Ensures communication between government, hospitals, and municipalities continues during outages.
  • Local queues prevent message loss even if foreign relays are unreachable.
  • Pre-tested emergency federation builds institutional muscle memory.

Cons:

  • Operating robust mail and collaboration platforms locally is a resource-intensive endeavor.
  • Risk of user pushback if local platforms feel less polished than global SaaS.
  • The emergency “mode switch” adds operational complexity and must be tested regularly.

D. Put the content edge in Greenland.

Proposal: Require or incentivize CDN caches (Akamai, Cloudflare, Netflix, OS mirrors, software update repos, map tiles) to be hosted inside Greenland’s IXP(s).

Pros:

  • Improves day-to-day performance and cuts transit bills.
  • Reduces dependency on subsea cables for routine updates and content.
  • Keeps basic digital life (video, software, education platforms) usable in isolation.

Cons:

  • CDNs deploy based on scale; Greenland’s market may be marginal without a subsidy.
  • Hosting costs (power, cooling, rackspace) must be borne locally.
  • Only covers cached/static content; dynamic services (banking, SaaS) still break without external connectivity.

E. Implement into law & contracts.

Proposal: Mandate data residency for public-sector data; require “island-mode” design in procurement. Systems must demonstrate the ability to authenticate locally, operate offline, maintain usable data, and retain keys under Greenlandic custody. Impose peering obligations for ISPs and major SaaS/CDNs.

Pros:

  • Creates a predictable baseline for sovereignty across all agencies.
  • Prevents future procurement lock-in to non-resilient foreign SaaS.
  • Gives legal backing to technical requirements (IXP, residency, key custody).

Cons:

  • May raise the costs of IT projects (compliance overhead).
  • Without a strong enforcement, rules risk becoming “checkbox” exercises.
  • Possible trade friction if foreign vendors see it as protectionist.

F. Strengthen physical resilience

Proposal: Maintain and upgrade subsea cable capacity (Greenland Connect and Connect North), add diversity (spur/loop and new landings), and maintain long-haul microwave/satellite as a tertiary backup. Pre-engineer quality of service downgrades for graceful degradation.

Pros:

  • Adds true redundancy. Nothing replaces a working subsea cable.
  • Tertiary paths (satellite, microwave) keep critical services alive during failures.
  • Clear QoS downgrades make service loss more predictable and manageable.

Cons:

  • High (possibly very high) CapEx. New cable segments cost tens to hundreds of millions of euros.
  • Satellite/microwave backup cannot match the throughput of subsea cables.
  • International partners may be needed for funding and landing rights.

Security & trust

Proposal: Deploy local PKI and HSMs for the government. Enforce end-to-end encryption. Require local custody of cryptographic keys. Audit vendor remote access and include kill switches.

Pros:

  • Prevents data exposure via foreign subpoenas (without Greenland’s knowledge).
  • Local trust anchors give confidence in sovereignty claims.
  • Kill switches and audit trails enhance vendor accountability.

Cons:

  • PKI and HSM management requires very specialized skills.
  • Adds operational overhead (key lifecycle, audits, incident response).
  • Without strong governance, there is a risk of “security theatre” rather than absolute security.

On-island first as default. A key step for Greenland is to make on-island first the norm so that local-to-local traffic stays local even if Atlantic cables fail. Concretely, stand up a national IXP in Nuuk to keep domestic traffic on the island and anchor CDN caches; build a Greenlandic “GovCloud” to host government email, identity, records, and core apps; and require all public-sector systems to operate in “island mode” (continue basic services offline from the rest of the world). Pair this with local MX, authoritative DNS, secure chat/collaboration, and CDN caches, so essential content and services remain available during outages. Back it with clear procurement rules on data residency and key custody to reduce both outage risk and exposure to foreign laws (e.g., CLOUD Act), acknowledging today’s heavy—if unsurprising—reliance on U.S. hyperscalers (Microsoft, Amazon, Google).

What this changes, and what it doesn’t. These measures don’t aim to sever external ties. They should rebalance them. The goal is graceful degradation that keeps government services, domestic payments, email, DNS, and health communications running on-island, while accepting that global SaaS and card rails will go dark during isolation. Finally, it’s also worth remembering that local caching is only a bridge, not a substitute for global connectivity. In the first days of an outage, caches would keep websites, software updates, and even video libraries available, allowing local email and collaboration tools to continue running smoothly. But as the weeks pass, those caches would inevitably grow stale. News sites, app stores, and streaming platforms would stop refreshing, while critical security updates, certificates, and antivirus definitions would no longer be available, leaving systems exposed to risk. If isolation lasted for months, the impact would be much more profound. Banking and card clearing would be suspended, SaaS-driven ERP systems would break down, and Greenland would slide into a “local only” economy, relying on cash and manual processes. Over time, the social impact would also be felt, with the population cut off from global news, communication, and social platforms. Caching, therefore, buys time, but not independence. It can make an outage manageable in the short term, yet in the long run, Greenland’s economy, security, and society depend on reconnecting to the outside world.

The Bottom line. Full sovereignty is unrealistic for a sparse, widely distributed country, and I don’t think it makes sense to strive for that. It just appears impractical. In my opinion, partial sovereignty is both achievable and valuable. Make on-island first the default, keep essential public services and domestic comms running during cuts, and interoperate seamlessly when subsea links and satellites are up. This shifts Greenland from its current state of strategic fragility to one of managed resilience, without overlooking the rest of the internet.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT.

I want to acknowledge my wife, Eva Varadi, for her unwavering support, patience, and understanding throughout the creative process of writing this article. I would also like to thank Dr. Signe Ravn-Højgaard, from “Tænketanken Digital Infrastruktur”, and the Sermitsiaq article “Digital afhængighed af udlandet” (“Digital dependency on foreign countries”) by Paul Krarup, for inspiring this work, which is also a continuation of my previous research and article titled “Greenland: Navigating Security and Critical Infrastructure in the Arctic – A Technology Introduction”. I would like to thank Lasse Jarlskov for his insightful comments and constructive feedback on this article. His observations regarding routing, OSI layering, and the practical realities of Greenland’s network architecture were both valid and valuable, helping refine several technical arguments and improve the overall clarity of the analysis.

CODE AND DATASETS.

The Python code and datasets used in the analysis are available on my public GitHub: https://github.com/drkklarsen/greenland_digital_infrastructure_mapping (the code is still work in progress, but it is functional and will generate similar data as analyzed in this article).

ABBREVIATION LIST.

ASN — Autonomous System Number: A unique identifier assigned to a network operator that controls its own routing on the Internet, enabling the exchange of traffic with other networks using the Border Gateway Protocol (BGP).

BGP — Border Gateway Protocol: The primary routing protocol of the Internet, used by Autonomous Systems to exchange information about which paths data should take across networks.

CDN — Content Delivery Network: A system of distributed servers that cache and deliver content (such as videos, software updates, or websites) closer to users, reducing latency and dependency on international links.

CLOUD Act — Clarifying Lawful Overseas Use of Data Act: A U.S. law that allows American authorities to demand access to data stored abroad by U.S.-based cloud providers, raising sovereignty and privacy concerns for other countries.

DMARC — Domain-based Message Authentication, Reporting and Conformance: An email security protocol that tells receiving servers how to handle messages that fail authentication checks, protecting against spoofing and phishing.

DKIM — DomainKeys Identified Mail: An email authentication method that uses cryptographic signatures to verify that a message has not been altered and truly comes from the claimed sender.

DNS — Domain Name System: The hierarchical system that translates human-readable domain names (like example.gl) into IP addresses that computers use to locate servers.

ERP — Enterprise Resource Planning A type of integrated software system that organizations use to manage business processes such as finance, supply chain, HR, and operations.

GL — Greenland (country code top-level domain, .gl) The internet country code for Greenland, used for local domain names such as nanoq.gl.

GovCloud — Government Cloud: A sovereign or dedicated cloud infrastructure designed for hosting public-sector applications and data within national jurisdiction.

HSM — Hardware Security Module: A secure physical device that manages cryptographic keys and operations, used to protect sensitive data and digital transactions.

IoT — Internet of Things: A network of physical devices (sensors, appliances, vehicles, etc.) connected to the internet, capable of collecting and exchanging data.

IP — Internet Protocol: The fundamental addressing system of the Internet, enabling data packets to be sent from one computer to another.

ISP — Internet Service Provider: A company or entity that provides customers with access to the internet and related services.

IXP — Internet Exchange Point: A physical infrastructure where networks interconnect directly to exchange internet traffic locally rather than through international transit links.

MX — Mail Exchange (Record): A type of DNS record that specifies the mail servers responsible for receiving email on behalf of a domain.

PKI — Public Key Infrastructure: A framework for managing encryption keys and digital certificates, ensuring secure electronic communications and authentication.

SaaS — Software as a Service: Cloud-based applications delivered over the internet, such as Microsoft 365 or Google Workspace, are usually hosted on servers outside the country.

SPF — Sender Policy Framework: An email authentication protocol that defines which mail servers are authorized to send email on behalf of a domain, reducing the risk of forgery.

Tusass is the national telecommunications provider of Greenland, formerly Tele Greenland, responsible for submarine cables, satellite links, and domestic connectivity.

UAV — Unmanned Aerial Vehicle: An aircraft without a human pilot on board, often used for surveillance, monitoring, or communications relay.

UUV — Unmanned Underwater Vehicle: A robotic submarine used for monitoring, surveying, or securing undersea infrastructure such as cables.

The Nature of Telecom Capex – a 2024 Update.

Part of this blog has also been published in Telecom Analysis, titled “Navigating the Future of Telecom Capex: Western Europe’s Telecom Investment 2024 to 2030.” and some of the material has been updated to reflect the latest available data in some areas (e.g., fiber deployment in Western Europe).

Over the last three years, I have extensively covered the details of the Western European telecom sector’s capital expense levels and the drivers behind telecom companies’ capital investments. These accounts can be found in “The Nature of Telecom Capex—a 2023 Update” from 2023 and my initial article from 2022. This new version of “The Nature of Telecom Capex – a 2024 Update” is also different compared to the issues of 2022 and 2023 in that it focuses on the near future Capex demands from 2024 to 2030 and what we may expect from our Industry capital spending over the next 7 years.

For Western Europe, Capex levels in 2023 were lower than in 2022, a relatively rare but not unique occurrence that led many industry analysts to conclude the “End of Capex” and that from now on, “Capex will surely decline.” The compelling and logical explanations were also evident, pointing out that “data traffic (growth) is in decline”, “overproduction of bandwidth”, “5G is not what it was heralded to be”, “No interest in 6G”, “Capital is too expensive” and so forth. These “End to Capex” conclusions were often made on either aggregated data or selected data, depending on the availability of data.

Having worked on Capex planning and budgeting since the early 2000s for one of the biggest telecom companies in Europe, Deutsche Telecom AG, building what has been described as best-practice Capex models, my outlook is slightly less “optimistic” about the decline and “End” of Capex spending by the Industry. Indeed, for those expecting that a Telco’s capital planning is only impacted by hyper-rational insights glued to real-world tangibles and driven by clear strategic business objectives, I beg you to modify that belief somewhat.

Figure 1 illustrates the actual telecom Capex development for Western Europe between 2017 and 2023, with projected growth from 2024 (with the first two quarters’ actual Capex levels) to 2026, represented by the orange-colored dashed lines. The light dashed line illustrates the annual baseline Capex level before 5G and fiber deployment acceleration. The light solid line shows the corresponding Telco Capex to Revenue development, including an assessment for 2024 to 2026, with an annual increase of ca. 500 million euros. Source: New Street Research European Quarterly Review, covering 15 Western European countries (see references at the end of the blog) and 56+ telcos from 2017 to 2024, with 2024 covering the year’s first two quarters.

Western Europe’s telecommunications Capex fell between 2022 and 2023 for the first time in some years, from the peak of 51 billion euros in 2022. The overall development from 2017 to 2023 is illustrated below, including a projected Capex development covering 2024 to 2026 using each Telco’s revenue projections as a simple driver for the expected Capex level (i.e., inherently assuming that the planned Capex level is correlated to the anticipated, or targeted, revenue of the subsequent year).

The reduction in Capex between 2022 and 2023 comes from 29 out of 56 Telcos reducing their Capex level in 2023 compared to 2022. In 8 out of 15 countries, the Telco Capex levels were decreased by ca. 2.3 billion euros compared to their 2022 Capex levels. Likewise, 7 countries spent approximately 650 million euros more than their 2022 levels together. If we compared the 1st and 2nd half of 2023 with 2022, there was an unprecedented Capex reduction in the 2nd half of 2023 compared to any other year from 2017 to 2023. It really gives the impression that many ( at least 36 out of 56) Telcos put their feet on the break in 2023. 29 Telcos out of the 36 broke their spending in the last half of 2023 and ended the year with an overall lower spending than in 2022. Of the 8 countries with a lower Capex spend in 2023, the UK, France, Italy, and Spain make up more than 80%. Of the countries with a higher Capex in 2023, Germany, Netherlands, Belgium, and Austria make up more than 80%.

For a few of the countries with lower Capex levels in 2023, one could argue that they more or less finished their 5G rollout and have so high fiber-to-the-home penetration levels that more fiber is on account of overbuilt and of a substantially smaller scale than in the past (e.g., France, Norway, Spain, Portugal, Denmark, and Sweden). For other countries with a lower investment level than the previous year, such as the UK, Italy, and Greece, 2022 and 2023 saw substantial consolidation activity in the markets (e.g., Vodafone UK & C.K. Hutchinson 3, Wind Hellas rounded up in Nova Greece, …). In fact, Spain (e.g., Masmovil), Norway (e.g., Ice Group), and Denmark (e.g., Telia DK) also experienced consolidation activities that will generally lower companies’ spending levels initially. One would expect, as to some extent visible in the first half of 2024, that countries that spend less due to consolidation activities would increase their Capex levels in the next two to three years after an initial replanning period.

WESTERN EUROPE – THE BIG CAPEX OVERVIEW.

Figure 2 Shows on a country-level the 5-year average Capex spend (over the period 2019 to 2023) and the Capex in 2023. Source: New Street Research European Quarterly Review 2017 to 2024 (Q2).

When attempting to understand Telco Capex, or any Capex with a “built-in” cyclicity, one really should look at more than one or two years. Figure 2 above provides the comparison with the average Capex spend over the period 2019 to 2023 and the Capex spend in 2023. The five year Capex average captures the initial stages of 5G deployment in Europe, 5G deployment in general, COVID capacity investments (in fixed networks), the acceleration of Fiber rollout in many countries in Europe (e.g., Germany, UK, Netherlands, …), the financial (inflationary) crisis of increasing costly capital, and so forth. In my opinion 2023 is a reflection of the 2021-2022 financial crisis and that most of the 5G has been deployed to cover current market needs. As we have seen before, Telco investments are often 12 to 18 month out of synch with financial crisis years, and thus it is from that perspective also not surprising that 2023 might be a lower Capex year than in the past. Although, as is also evident from Figure 2, only 5 countries had a lower Capex level in 2023 than the previous 5 years average level.

Figure 3 Illustrates the Capex development over the last 5 years from 2019 to 2023 with the color Green showing years where the subsequent year had a higher Capex level, and color Red that the subsequent year had a lower Capex level. From a Western Europe perspective only 2023 had a lower Capex level than the previous year (compared to the last 5 years). Source: New Street Research European Quarterly Review 2017 to 2024 (Q2).

Using Capex to Revenue ratios of the Telco industry are prone to some uncertainty. This is particular the case when individual Telcos are compared. In general, I recommend to make comparisons over a given period of time, like 3 or 5 year periods, as it averages out some of the natural variation between Telcos and countries (e.g., one country or Telco may have started its 5G deployment earlier than others). Even that approach has to be taken with some caution as some Telcos may fully incur Capex for fiber deployments and others may make wholesale agreements with open Fiberco’s (for example) and only incur last-mile access or connection Capex. Although, of smaller relative Capex scale nowadays, Telcos increasingly have Towercos managing and building their passive infrastructure for their cell site demand. Some may still fully build their own cell sites, incurring proportionally higher Capex per new site deployed, which of course may lead to structural Capex differences between such Telcos. Having these cautionary remarks in mind, I believe that Capex to Revenue ratios does provide a means of comparing Countries or Telcos and it does give provide a picture of the capital investment intensity compared to the market performance. A country comparison of the 5-year (period: 2019 to 2023) average Capex to Revenue ratio is illustrated in Figure 3 below for the 15 markets considered in this blog.

Figure 4 Shows on a country-level the 5-year average Capex to Revenue ratios over the period 2019 to 2023. Source: New Street Research European Quarterly Review 2017 to 2024 (Q2).

Comparing Capex per capita and Capex as a percentage of GDP may offer insights into how capital investments are prioritized in relation to population size and economic output. These two metrics could highlight different aspects of investment strategies, providing a more comprehensive understanding of national economic priorities and critical infrastructure development levels. Such a comparison is show in Figure 15 below.

Capex per capita, shown in Figure 5 left hand side, measures the average amount of investment allocated to each person within a country. This metric is particularly useful for understanding the intensity of investment relative to the population, indicating how much infrastructure, technology, or other capital resources are being made available on a per-person basis. A higher Capex per capita suggests significant investment in areas like public services, infrastructure, or economic development, which could improve quality of life or boost productivity. Comparing this measure across countries helps identify disparities in investment levels, revealing which nations are placing greater emphasis on infrastructure development or economic expansion. For example, a country with a high Capex per capita likely prioritizes public goods such as transportation, energy, or digital infrastructure, potentially leading to better economic outcomes and higher living standards over time. The 5-year average Capex level does show a strong positive linear relationship with the Country population (R² = 0.9318, chart not shown), suggesting that ca. 93% of the variation in Capex can be explained by the variation in population. The trend implies that as the population increases, Capex also tends to increase, likely reflecting higher investment needs to accommodate larger populations. It should be noted that that a countries surface area is not a significant factor influencing Capex. While some countries with larger land areas might exhibit a higher Capex level, the overall trend is not strong.

Capex as a percentage of GDP, shown in Figure 5 right hand side, measures the proportion of a country’s economic output devoted to capital investment. This ratio provides context for understanding investment levels relative to the size of the economy, showing how much emphasis is placed on growth and development. A higher Capex-to-GDP ratio can indicate an aggressive investment strategy, commonly seen in developing economies or countries undergoing significant infrastructure expansion. Conversely, a lower ratio might suggest efficient capital allocation or, in some cases, underinvestment that could constrain future economic growth. This metric helps assess the sustainability of investment levels and reflects economic priorities. For instance, a high Capex-to-GDP ratio in a developed country could indicate a focus on upgrading existing infrastructure, whereas in a developing economy, it may signify efforts to close infrastructure gaps, modernization efforts (e.g., optical fiber replacing copper infrastructure per fixed broadband transformation) and accelerating growth. The 5-year average Capex level does show a strong positive linear relationship with the Country GDP (R² = 0.9389, chart not shown), suggesting that ca. 94% of the variation in Capex can be explained by the variation in the country GDP. While a few data points show some deviation from this trend, the overall fit is very strong, reinforcing the notion that larger economies generally allocate more resources to capital investments.

The insights gained from both Capex per capita and Capex as a percentage of GDP are complementary, providing a fuller picture of a country’s investment strategy. While Capex per capita reflects individual investment levels, Capex as a percentage of GDP reveals the scale of investment in relation to the overall economy. For example, a country with high Capex per capita but a low Capex-to-GDP ratio (e.g., Denmark, Norway, …) may have a wealthy population where individual investment levels are significant, but the size of the economy is such that these investments constitute a relatively small portion of total economic activity. Conversely, a country with a high Capex-to-GDP ratio but low Capex per capita (e.g., Greece) may be dedicating a substantial portion of its economic resources to infrastructure in an effort to drive growth, even if the per-person investment remains modest.

Figure 5 Illustrates two charts that compare the average capital expenditures over a 5-year period from 2019 to 2023. The left chart shows Capex per capita in euros, with Switzerland leading at 230 euros, while Spain has the lowest at 75 euros. The right chart depicts Capex as a percentage of GDP, where Greece tops the list at 0.47%, and Sweden is at the bottom with 0.16%. These metrics provide insights into how different countries allocate investments relative to their population size and economic output, revealing varying levels of investment intensity and economic priorities. It should be noted that Capex levels are strongly correlated with both the size of the population and the size of the economy as measured by the GDP. Source: New Street Research European Quarterly Review 2017 to 2024 (Q2).

FORWARD TO THE PAST.

Almost 15 years ago, I gave a presentation at the “4G World China” conference in Beijing titled “Economics of 4G Introduction in Growth Markets”. The idea was that a mobile operator’s capital demand would cycle between 8% (minimum) and 13% (maximum), usually with one replacement cycle before migrating to the next-generation radio access technology. This insight was backed up by best-practice capital demand models considering market strategy and growth Capex drivers. It involved also involved the insights of many expert discussions.

Figure 6 illustrates my expectations of how Capex would relate before, during, and after LTE deployment in Western Europe. Source: “Economics of 4G Introduction in Growth Markets” at “4G World China”, 2011.

For the careful observer, you will see that I expected, back in 2011, the typical Capex maintenance cycle in Western European markets between infrastructure and technology modernization periods to be no more than 8% and that Capex in the maintenance years would be 30% lower than required in the peak periods. I have yet to see a mobile operation with such a low capital intensity unless they effectively share their radio access network and/or by cost-structure “magic” (i.e., cost transformation), move typical mobile Capex items to Opex (by sourcing or optimizing the cost structure between fixed and mobile business units).

I retrospectively underestimated the industry’s willingness to continue increasing capital investments in existing networks, often ignoring the obvious optimization possibilities between their fixed and mobile broadband networks (due to organizational politics) and, of course, what has and still is a major industrial contagious infliction: “Metus Crescendi Exponentialis” (i.e., the fear of the exponential growth aka the opportunity to spend increasingly lots of Capex). From 2000 to today, the Western European Capex to Revenue ratio has been approximately between 11% and 21%, although it has been growing since around 2012 (see details in “The Nature of Telecom Capex—a 2023 Update”).

CAPEX DEVELOPMENT FROM 2024 TO 2026.

From the above Figure 1, it should be no surprise that I do not expect Capex to continue to decline substantially over the next couple of years, as we saw between 2022 and 2023. In fact, I anticipate that 2024 will be around the level of 2023, after which we will experience modest annual increases of 600 to 700 million euros. Countries with high 5G and Fiber-to-the-Home (FTTH) coverage (e.g., France, Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Portugal, Denmark, and Sweden) will keep their Capex levels possible with some modest declines with single-digit percentage points. Countries such as Germany, the UK, Austria, Belgium, and Greece are still European laggards in terms of FTTH coverage, being far below the 80+% of other Western European countries such as France, Spain, Portugal, Netherlands, Denmark, Sweden, and Norway. Such countries may be expected to continue to increase their Capex as they close the FTTH coverage gap. Here, it is worth remembering that several fiber acquisition strategies aiming at connecting homes with fiber result in a lower Capex than if a Telco aims to build all the required fiber infrastructure.

Consolidation Capex.

Telecom companies tend to scale back Capex during consolidation due to uncertainty, the desire to avoid redundancy, and the need to preserve cash. However, after regulatory approval and the deal’s closing, Capex typically rises as the company embarks on network integration, system migration, and infrastructure upgrades necessary to realize the merger’s benefits. This post-merger increase in Capex is crucial for achieving operational synergies, enhancing network performance, and maintaining a competitive edge in the telecom market.

If we look at the period 2021 to 2024, we have had the following consolidation and acquisition examples:

  • UK: In May 2021, Virgin Media and the O2 (Telefonica) UK merger was approved. They announced the intention to consolidate on May 7th, 2020.
  • UK: Vodafone UK and Three UK announced their intention to merge in June 2023. The final decision is expected by the end of 2024.
  • Spain: Orange and MasMovil announced their intent to consolidate in July 2023. Merger approval was given in February 2024. Conditions were imposed on the deal for MasMovil to divestitures its frequency spectrum.
  • Italy: The potential merger between Telecom Italia (TIM) and Open Fiber was first discussed in 2020 when the idea emerged to create a national fiber network in Italy by merging TIM’s fixed access unit, FiberCop, with Open Fiber. a Memorandum of Understanding was signed in May 2022.
  • Greece: Wind Hellas acquisition by United Group (Nova) was announced in August 2021 and finalized in January 2022 (with EU approval in December 2021).
  • Denmark: Norlys’s acquisition of Telia Denmark was first announced on April 25, 2023, and approved by the Danish competition authority in February 2024.

Thus, we should also expect that the bigger in-market consolidations may, in the short term (next 2+ years), lead to increased Capex spending during the consolidation phase, after which Capex (& Opex) synergies hopefully kick in. Typically, 2 budgetary cycles minimum before this would be expected to be observed. Consolidation Capex usually amounts to a couple of percentage points of total consolidated revenue, with some other bigger items being postponed to the tail end of a consolidation unless it is synergetic with the required integration.

The High-risk Suppler Challenge to Western Europe’s Telcos.

When assessing whether Capex will increase or decrease over the next few years (e.g., up to 2030), we cannot ignore the substantial Capex amounts associated with replacing high-risk suppliers (e.g., Huawei, ZTE) from Western European telecom networks. Today, the impact is mainly on mobile critical infrastructure, which is “limited” to core networks and 5G radio access networks (although some EU member states may have extended the reach beyond purely 5G). Particularly if (or when?) the current European Commission’s 5G Toolbox (legal) Framework (i.e., “The EU Toolbox for 5G Security”) is extended to all broadband network infrastructure (e.g., optical and IP transport network infrastructure, non-mobile backend networking & IT systems) and possibly beyond to also address Optical Network Terminal (ONT) and Customer Premise Equipment (note: ONT’s can be integrated in the CPE or alternatively separated from the CPE but installed at the customers premise). To an extent, it is thought-provoking that the EU emphasis has only been on 5G-associated critical infrastructure rather than the vast and ongoing investment of fiber-optical, next-generation fixed broadband networks across all European Union member states (and beyond). In particular, this may appear puzzling when the European Union has subsidized these new fiber-optical networks by up to 50%. Considering that the fixed-broadband traffic is 8 to 10 times that of the mobile traffic, and all mobile (and wireless) traffic passes through the fixed broadband network and associated local as well as global internet critical infrastructure.

As far back as 2013, the European Parliament raised some concerns about the degree of involvement (market share) of Chinese companies in the EU’s telecommunications sector. It should be remembered that in 2013, Europe’s sentiment was generally positive and optimistic toward collaboration with China, as evidenced by the European Commission’s report “EU-China 2020 Strategic Agenda for Cooperation” (2013). Historically, the development of the EU’s 5G Toolbox for Security was the result of a series of events from about 2008 (after the financial crisis) to 2019 (and to today), characterized by growing awareness in Europe of China’s strategic ambitions, the expansion of the BRI (Belt and Road Initiative, 2013), DSR (Digital Silk Road, an important part of BRI 2.0, 2015), and China’s National Intelligence Law (2017) requiring Chinese companies to cooperate with the Chinese Government on intelligence matters, as well as several high-profile cybersecurity incidents (e.g., APT, Operation Cloud Hopper, …), and increased scrutiny of Chinese technology providers and their influence on critical communications infrastructure across pretty much the whole of Europe. These factors collectively drove the EU to adopt a more cautious and coordinated approach to addressing security risks in the context of 5G and beyond.

Figure 7 illustrates Western society, including Western Europe, ‘s concern about Chinese technology presence in its digital infrastructure. A substantial “hidden” capital expense (security debt) is tied to Western Telco’s telecom infrastructures, mobile and fixed.

The European Commission’s 2023 second report on the implementation of the EU 5G cybersecurity toolbox offers an in-depth examination of the risks posed by high-risk suppliers, focusing on Chinese-origin infrastructure, such as equipment from Huawei and ZTE. The report outlines the various stages of implementation across EU Member States and provides recommendations on how to mitigate risks associated with Chinese infrastructure. It considers 5G and fixed broadband networks, including Customer Premise Equipment (CPE) devices like modems and routers placed at customer sites.

The EU Commission defines a high-risk supplier in the context of 5G cybersecurity based on several objective criteria to reduce security threats in telecom networks. A supplier may be classified as high-risk if it originates from a non-EU country with strong governmental ties or interference, particularly if its legal and political systems lack democratic safeguards, security protections, or data protection agreements with the EU. Suppliers susceptible to governmental control in such countries pose a higher risk.

A supplier’s ability to maintain a reliable and uninterrupted supply chain is also critical. A supplier may be considered high-risk if it is deemed vulnerable in delivering essential telecom components or ensuring consistent service. Corporate governance is another important aspect. Suppliers with opaque ownership structures or unclear separation from state influence are more likely to be classified as high-risk due to the increased potential for external control or lack of transparency.

A supplier’s cybersecurity practices also play a significant role. If the quality of the supplier’s products and its ability to implement security measures across operations are considered inadequate, this may raise concerns. In some cases, country-specific factors, such as intelligence assessments from national security agencies or evidence of offensive cyber capabilities, might heighten the risk associated with a particular supplier.

Furthermore, suppliers linked to criminal activities or intelligence-gathering operations undermining the EU’s security interests may also be considered high-risk.

To summarize what may make a telecom supplier a high-risk supplier:

  • Of non-EU origin.
  • Strong governmental ties.
  • The country of origin lacks democratic safeguards.
  • The country of origin lacks security protection or data protection agreements with the EU.
  • Associated supply chain risks of interruption.
  • Opaque ownership structure.
  • Unclear separation from state influence.
  • Ability to independently implement security measures shielding infrastructure from interference (e.g., sabotage, espionage, …).

These criteria are applied to ensure that telecom operators, and eventually any business with critical infrastructure, become independent of a single supplier, especially those that pose a higher risk to the security and stability of critical infrastructure.

Figure 8 above summarizes the current European legislative framework addressing high-risk suppliers in critical infrastructure, with an initial focus on 5G infrastructure and networks.

Regarding 5G infrastructure, the EU report reiterates the urgency for EU Member States to immediately implement restrictions on high-risk suppliers. The EU policy highlights the risks of state interference and cybersecurity vulnerabilities posed by the close ties between Chinese companies like Huawei and ZTE and the Chinese government. Following groundwork dating back to the 2008s EU Directive on Critical Infrastructure Protection (EPCIP), The EU’s Digital Single Market Strategy (2015), the (first) Network and Information Security (NIS) directive (2016), and early European concern about 5G societal impact and exposure to cybersecurity (2015 – 2017), the EU toolbox published in January 2020 is designed to address these risks by urging Member States to adopt a coordinated approach. As of 2023, a second EU report was published on the member state’s progress in implementing the EU Toolbox for 5G Cybersecurity. While many Member States have established legal frameworks that give national authorities the power to assess supplier risks, only 10 have fully imposed restrictions on high-risk suppliers in their 5G networks. The report criticizes the slow pace of action in some countries, which increases the EU’s collective exposure to security threats.

Germany, having one of the largest, in absolute numbers, Chinese RAN deployments in Western Europe, has been singled out for its apparent reluctance to address the high-risk supplier challenge in the last couple of years (see also notes in “Further Readings” at the back of this blog). Germany introduced its regulation on Chinese high-risk suppliers in July 2024 with a combination of their Telekommunikationsgesetz (TKG) and IT-Sicherheitsgesetz 2.0. The German government announced that starting in 2026, it will ban critical components from Huawei and ZTE in its 5G networks due to national security concerns. This decision aligns Germany with other European countries working to limit reliance on high-risk suppliers. Germany has been slower in implementing such measures than others in the EU, but the regulation marks a significant step towards strengthening its telecom infrastructure security. Light Reading has estimated that a German Huawei ban would cost €2.5B and take years for German telcos. This estimate seems very optimistic and certainly would require very substantial discounts from the supplier that would be chosen to replace, for example, their Huawei installations with, e.g., for Telekom Deutschland that would be ca. 50+% of their ca. 38+ thousand sites, and it is difficult for me to believe that that kind of economy would apply to all telcos in Western Europe with high-risk suppliers. I also believe it ignores de-commissioning costs and changes to the backend O&M systems. I expect telco operators will try to push the timeline for replacement until most of their high-risk supplier infrastructure is written off and ripe for modernization, which for Germany would most likely happen after 2026. One way or another, we should expect an increase in mobile Capex spending towards the end of the decade as the German operators are swapping out their Chinese RAN suppliers (which may only be a small part of their Capital spend if the ban is extended beyond 5G).

The European Commission recommends that restrictions cover critical and highly sensitive assets, such as the Radio Access Network (RAN) and core network functions, and urges member states to define transition periods to phase out existing equipment from high-risk suppliers. The transition periods, however, must be short enough to avoid prolonging dependency on these suppliers. Notably, the report calls for an immediate halt to installing new equipment from high-risk vendors, ensuring that ongoing deployment does not undermine EU security.

When it comes to fixed broadband services, the report extends its concerns beyond 5G. It stresses that many Member States are also taking steps to ensure that the fixed network infrastructure is not reliant on high-risk suppliers. Fourteen (14) member states have either implemented or plan to restrict Chinese-origin equipment in their fixed networks. Furthermore, nine (9) countries have adopted technology-neutral legislation, meaning the restrictions apply across all types of networks, not just 5G. This implies that Chinese-origin infrastructure, including transport network components, will eventually face the same scrutiny and restrictions as 5G networks. While the report does not explicitly call for a total ban on all Chinese-origin equipment, it stresses the need for detailed assessments of supplier risks and restrictions where necessary based on these assessments.

While the EU’s “5G Security Toolbox” focuses on 5G networks, Denmark’s approach, the “Danish Investment Screening Act,” which took effect on the 1st of July 2021, goes much further by addressing the security of fixed broadband, 4G, and transport networks. This broad regulatory focus helps Denmark ensure the security of its entire communications ecosystem, recognizing that vulnerabilities in older or supporting networks could still pose serious risks. A clear example of Denmark’s comprehensive approach to telecommunications security beyond 5G is when the Danish Center for Cybersikkerhed (CFCS) required TDC Net to remove Chinese DWDM equipment from its optical transport network. TDC Net claimed that the consequence of the CFCS requirement would result in substantial costs to TDC Net that they had not considered in their budgets. CFCS has regulatory and legal authority within Denmark, particularly in relation to national cybersecurity. CFCS is part of the Danish Defense Intelligence Service, which places it under the Ministry of Defense. Denmark’s regulatory framework is not only one of the sharpest implementations of the EU’s 5G Toolkit but also one of the most extensive in protecting its national telecom infrastructure across multiple layers and generations of technology. The Danish approach could be a strong candidate to serve as a blueprint for expanded EU regulation beyond 5G high-risk suppliers and thus become applicable to fixed broadband and transport networks, resulting in substantial additional Capex towards the end of the decade.

While not singled out as a unique risk category, customer premises equipment (CPE) from high-risk suppliers is mentioned in the context of broader network security measures. Some Member States have indicated plans to ensure that CPE is subject to strict procurement standards, potentially using EU-wide certification schemes to vet the security of such devices. CPE may be included in future security measures if it presents a significant risk to the network. Many CPEs have been integrated with the optical network terminal, or ONT, which is architecturally a part of the fixed broadband infrastructure, serving as a demarcation point between the fiber optic network and the customer’s internal network. Thus, ONT is highly likely to be considered and included in any high-risk supplier limitations that may come soon. Any CPE replacement program would likely be associated on its own with considerable Capex and cost for operators and their customers in general. The CPE quantum for the European Union (including the UK, cheeky, I know) is between 200 and 250 million CPEs, including various types of CPE devices, such as routers, modems, ONTs, and other network equipment deployed for residential and commercial users. It is estimated that 30% to 40% of these CPEs may be linked to high-risk Chinese suppliers. The financial impact of a systematic CPE replacement program in the EU (including the UK) could be between 5 to 8 billion euros in capital expenses, ignoring the huge operational costs of executing such a replacement program.

The Data Growth Slow Down – An Opportunities for Lower Capex?

How do we identify whether a growth dynamics, such as data growth, is exponential or self-limiting?

Exponential growth dynamics have the same (percentage) growth rate indefinitely. Self-limiting growth dynamics, or s-curve behavior, will have a declining growth rate. Natural systems are generally self-limiting, although they might exhibit exponential growth over a short term, typically in the initial growth phase. So, if you are in doubt (which you should not be), calculate the growth rate of your growth dynamics from the beginning until now. If that growth rate is constant (over several time intervals), your dynamics are exponential in nature (at least over the period you looked at); if not … well, your growth process is most likely self-limiting.

Telco Capex increases, and Telco Capex decreases. Capex is, in nature, cyclic, although increasing over time. Most European markets will have access to 550 to 650 MHz downlink spectrum depending on SDL deployment levels below 4 GHz. Assuming 4 (1) Mbps per DL (UL) MHz per sector effective spectral efficiency, 10 traffic hours per day, and ca. 350 to 400 thousand mobile sites (3 sectors each) across Western Europe, the carrying mobile capacity in Bytes is in the order of 140 Exa Bytes (EB) per Month (note: if I had chosen 2 and 0.5 Mbps per MHz per sector, carrying capacity would be ca. 70 EB/Month). It is clear that this carrying capacity limit will continue to increase with software releases, innovation, advanced antenna deployment with higher order MiMo, and migration from older radio access technologies to the newest (increasing the effective spectral efficiency).

According to Ericsson Mobility Visualizer, Western Europe saw a mobile data demand per month of 11 EB in 2023 (see Figure below). The demand for mobile data in 2023 was almost 10 times lower than the (conservatively) estimated carrying capacity of the underlying mobile networks.

Figure 9 illustrates the actual demanded data volume in EB per month. I have often observed that when planners estimate their budgetary demand for capacity expansions, they use the current YoY growth rate and apply it to the future (assuming their growth dynamics are geometrical). I call this the “Naive Expectations” assumption (fallacy) that obviously leads to the overprovision of network capacity and less efficient use of Capex, as opposed to the “Informed Expectations” approach based on the more realistic S-Curve dynamic growth dynamics. I have rarely seen the “Naive Expectations” fallacy challenged by CFOs or non-technical leadership responsible for the Telco budgets and economic health. Although not a transparent approach, it is a “great” way to add a “bit” of Capex cushion for other Capex uncertainties.

It should be noted that the Ericsson data treats traffic generated by fixed wireless access (FWA) separately (which, by the way, makes sense). Thus, the 11 EB for 2023 does not include FWA traffic. Ericsson only has a global forecast for FWA traffic starting from 2023 (note: it is not clear whether 2023 is actual FWA traffic or estimated). To get an impression of the long-term impact of FWA traffic, we can apply the same S-curve approach as the one used for mobile data traffic above, according to what I call the “Informed expectations” approach. Even with the FWA traffic, it is difficult to see a situation that, on average (at least), would pose any challenge to existing mobile networks. Particularly, the carrying capacity can easily be increased by deploying more advanced antennas (e.g., higher order MiMo), and, in general, it is expected to improve with each new software release forthcoming.

Figure 10 above uses Ericsson’s Mobile Visualizer data for Western Europe’s mobile and fixed wireless access (FWA) traffic. It gives us an idea of the total traffic expectations if the current usage dynamics continue. Ericsson only provides a global FWA forecast from 2023 to 2029. I have assumed WEU takes its proportional mobile share of the FWA traffic. Note: For the period up to and including 2023, it seems a bit rich in its FWA expectations, imo.

So, by all means, the latest and greatest mobile networks are, without much doubt, in most places, over-dimensioned from the perspective of their carrying bytes potential, the volumetric capacity, and what is demanded in terms of data volume. They also appear to remain so for a very long time unless the current demand dynamics fundamentally change (which is, of course, always a possibility, as we have seen historically).

However, that our customers get their volumetric demand satisfied is generally a reflection of the quality in terms of bits per second (a much more fundamental unit than volume) satisfied. Thus, the throughput, or speed, should be good enough for the customer to unhindered enjoy their consumption, which, as a consequence, generates the Bytes that most Telco executives have told themselves they understand and like to base their pricing on (and I would argue judging by my experience outside Europe more often than not maybe really don’t get). It is not uncommon that operators with complex volumetric pricing become more obsessed with data volume rather than optimum quality (that might, in fact, generate even more volume). The figure below is a snapshot from August 2024 of the median speeds customers enjoy in mobile as well as fixed broadband networks in Western Europe. In most cases in Europe, customers today enjoy substantially faster fixed-broadband services than they would get in mobile networks. One should expect that this would change how Telcos (at least integrated Telcos) would design and plan their mobile networks and, consequently, maybe dramatically reduce the amount of Mobile Capex we spend. There is little evidence that this is happening yet. However, I do anticipate, most likely naively, that the Telco industry would revise how mobile networks are architected, designed, and built with 6G.

Figure 11 shows that apart from one Western European country (Greece, also a fixed broadband laggard), all other markets have superior fixed broadband downlink speeds compared to what mobile networks can deliver. Note that the speed measurement data is based on the median statistic. Source: Speedtest Global Index, August 2024.

A Crisis of Too Much of a “Good” Thing?

Analysys Mason recently (July 2024) published a report titled “A Crisis of Overproduction in Bandwidth Means that Telecoms Capex Will Inevitably Fall.” The report explores the evolving dynamics of capital expenditure (Capex) in the telecom industry, highlighting that the industry is facing a turning point. The report argues that the telecom sector has reached a phase of bandwidth overproduction, where the infrastructure built to deliver data has far exceeded demand, leading to a natural decline in Capex over the coming years.

According to the Analysys Mason report, global Capex in the telecom sector has already peaked, with two significant investment surges behind it: the rollout of 5G networks in mobile infrastructure and substantial investments in fiber-to-the-premises (FTTP) networks. Both of these infrastructure developments were seen as essential for future-proofing networks, but now that the peaks in these investments have passed, Capex is expected to fall. The report predicts that by 2030, the Capex intensity (the proportion of revenue spent on capital investments) will drop from around 20% to 12%. This reduction is due to the shift from building new infrastructure to optimizing and maintaining existing networks.

The main messages that I take away from the Analysys Mason report are the following:

  • Overproduction of bandwidth: Telecom operators have invested heavily in building their networks. However, demand for data and bandwidth is no longer growing at the exponential rates seen in previous years.
  • Shifting Capex Trends: The telecom industry is experiencing two peaks: one in mobile spending due to the initial 5G coverage rollout and another in fixed broadband due to fiber deployments. Now that these peaks have passed, Capex is expected to decline.
  • Impact of lower data growth: The stagnation in mobile and fixed data demand, combined with the overproduction of mobile and fixed bandwidth, makes further large-scale investment in network expansion unnecessary.

My take on Analysys Mason’s conclusions is that with the cyclic nature of Telco investments, it is natural to expect that Capex will go up and down. That Capex will cycle between 20% (peak deployment phase) and 12% (maintenance phase) seems very agreeable. However, I would expect that the maintenance level would continue to increase as time goes by unless we fundamentally change how we approach mobile investments.

That network capacity is built up at the beginning of a new technology cycle (e.g., 5G NR, GPON, XGPON, XSGPON-based FTTH), it is also not surprising that the amount of available capacity will appear substantial. I would not call it a bandwidth overproduction crisis (although I agree that the overhead of provisioned carrying capacity compared to demand expectations seems historically high); it manifests the technologies we have developed and deployed today. For 5G NR real-world conditions, users could see peak DL speeds ranging from 200 Mbps to 1 Gbps with median 5G DL speeds of 100+ Mbps. The lower end of this range applies in areas with fewer available resources (e.g., less spectrum, fewer MIMO streams). In comparison, the higher end reflects better conditions, such as when a user is close to the cell tower with optimal signal conditions. The quality of fiber-connected households at current GPON and XGPON technology would be sustainable at 1 to 10 Gbps downstream to the in-home ONT/CPE. However, the in-home quality experienced over WiFi would depend a lot on how the WiFi network has been deployed and how many concurrent users there are at any given time. As backhaul and backbone transmission solutions to mobile and fixed access will be modern and fiber-based, there is no reason to believe that user demand should be limited in any way (anytime soon), given a well-optimized, modern fiber-optic network should be able to reach up to 100 Tbps (e.g., 10 EB per month with 10 traffic hours per day).

Germany, the UK, Belgium, and a few smaller Western countries will continue their fiber deployment for some years to bring their fiber coverage up to the level of countries such as France, Spain, Portugal, and the Netherlands. It is difficult to believe that these countries would not continue to invest substantial money to raise their fiber coverage from their current low levels. Countries with less than 60% fiber-to-the-home coverage have a share of 50+ % of the overall Western European Capex level.

The fact that the Telco industry would eventually experience lower growth rates should not surprise anyone. That has been in the cards since growth began. The figure below takes actual mobile data from Ericsson’s Mobile Visualizer. It applies a simple S-curve growth model dynamics to those data that actually do a very good job of accounting for the behavior. A geometrical growth model (or exponential growth dynamics), while possibly accounting for the early stages of technology adaptation and the resulting data growth, is not a reasonable model to apply here and is not supported by the actual data.

Figure 12 provides the actual Exa Bytes (EB) monthly with a fitted S-Curve extrapolated beyond 2023. The S-Curve is described by the Data Demand Limit (Ls), Growth Rate (k), and the Inflection Year (T0), where growth transitions from acceleration to deceleration. Source: Ericsson Mobile Visualizer resource.

The growth dynamic, applied to the data we extract from the markets shown in the above Figure, indicates that in Western Europe and the CEE (Central Eastern Europe), the inflection point should be expected around 2025. This is the year when the growth rates begin to decline. In Western Europe (and CEE), we would expect the growth rate to become less than 10% by 2030, assuming that no fundamental changes to the growth dynamic occur. The inflection point for the North American markets (i.e., The USA and Canada) is around 2033; this is expected to happen a bit earlier (2030) for Asia. Based on the current growth dynamics, North America will experience growth rates below 10% by 2036. For Asia, this event is expected to take place around 2033. How could FWA traffic growth change these results? The overall behavior would not change. The inflection point may happen later, thus the onset of slower growth rates, and the time when we would expect a growth rate lower than 10% would be a couple of years after the inflection year.

Let us just for fun (usually the best reason) construct a counterfactual situation. Let us assume that data growth continues to follow geometric (exponential) growth indefinitely without reaching a saturation point or encountering any constraints (e.g., resource limits, user behavior limitations). The premise is that user demand for mobile and fixed-line data will continue to grow at a constant, accelerating rate. For mobile data growth, we use the 27% YoY growth of 2023 and use this growth rate for our geometrical growth model. Thus, every ca. 3 years, the demand would double.

If telecom data usage continued to grow geometrically, the implications would (obviously) be profound:

  • Exponential network demand: Operators would face exponentially increasing demand on their networks, requiring constant and massive investments in capacity to handle growing traffic. Once we reach the limits of the carrying capacity of the network, we have three years (with a CAGR of 27%) until demand has doubled. Obviously, any spectrum position would quickly become insufficient, resulting in massive investments in new infrastructure (sites in mobile and more fiber) would be needed. Capacity would become the growth limiting factor.
  • Costs: The capital expenditures (Capex) required to keep pace with geometric growth would skyrocket. Operators must continually upgrade or replace network equipment, expand physical infrastructure, and acquire additional spectrum to support the growing data loads. This would lead to unsustainable business models unless prices for services rose dramatically, making such growth scenarios unaffordable for consumers but long before that for the operators themselves.
  • Environmental and Physical Limits: The physical infrastructure necessary to support geometric growth (cell towers, fiber optic cables, data centers) would also have environmental consequences, such as increased energy consumption and carbon emissions. Additionally, telecom providers would face the law of diminishing returns as building out and maintaining these networks becomes less economically feasible over time.
  • Consumer Experience: The geometric growth model assumes that user behavior will continue to change dramatically. Consumers would need to find new ways to utilize vast amounts of bandwidth beyond streaming and current data-heavy applications. Continuous innovation in data-hungry applications would be necessary to keep up with the increased data usage.

The counterfactual argument shows that geometric growth, while useful for the early stages of data expansion, becomes unrealistic as it leads to unsustainable economic, physical, and environmental demands. The observed S-curve growth is more appropriate for describing mobile data demand because it accounts for saturation, the limits of user behavior, and the constraints of telecom infrastructure investment.

Back to Analysys Mason’s expected, and quite reasonable, consequence of the (progressively) lower data growth: large-scale investment would become unnecessary.

While the assertion is reasonable, as said, mobile obsolescence hits the industry every 5 to 7 years, regardless of whether there is a new radio access technology (RAT) to take over. I don’t think this will change, or maybe the Industry will spend much more on software annually than previously and less on hardware modernization during obsolescence transformations. Though I suspect that the software would impose increasingly harder requirements on the underlying hardware (whether on-prem or in the cloud), modernization investments into the hardware part would continue to be substantial. This is not even considering the euphoria that may come around the next generation RAT (e.g., 6G).

The fixed broadband fiber infrastructure’s economical and useful life is much longer than that of the mobile infrastructure. The optical transmission equipment is likewise used for access, aggregation, and backbone (although not as long as the optical fiber itself). Additionally, fiber-based fixed broadband networks are operationally (much) more efficient than their mobile counterparts, alluding to the need to re-architect and redesign how they are being built as they are no longer needed inside customer dwellings. Overall, it is not unreasonable to expect that fixed broadband modernization investments will occur less frequently than for mobile networks.

Is Enough Customer Bandwidth a Thing?

Is there an optimum level of bandwidth in bits per second at which a customer is fully (optimized) served? Beyond that, whether the network could provide far more speed or quality does not matter.

For example. for most mobile devices, phones, and tablets, much more than 10 Mbps for streaming would not make much of a viewing difference for the typical customer. Given the assumptions about eyesight and typical viewing distances, more than 90% of people would not notice an improvement in viewing experience on a mobile phone or tablet beyond 1080p resolution. Increasing the resolution beyond that point—such as to 1440p (Quad HD) or 4K would likely not provide a noticeably better experience for most users, as their visual acuity limits their ability to discern finer details on small screens. This means the focus for improving mobile and tablet displays shifts from resolution to other factors like color accuracy, brightness, and contrast rather than chasing higher pixel counts. An optimization strategy that should not necessarily result in higher bandwidth requirements, although moving to higher color depth or more brightness / dynamic range (e.g., HDR vs SDR) would lead to a moderate increase in the required data ranges.

A throughput between 50 and 100 Mbps for fixed broadband TV streaming currently provides an optimum viewing experience. Of course, a fixed broadband household may have many concurrent bandwidth demands that would justify a 1 Gbps fiber to the home or maybe even 10 Gbps downstream to serve the whole household at an optimum experience at any time.

Figure 13 provides the data rate ranges for a streaming format, device type, and typical screen size. The data rate required for streaming video content is determined by various factors, including video resolution, frame rate, compression, and screen size. The data rate calculation (in Mbps) for different streaming formats follows a process that involves estimating the amount of data required to encode each frame and multiplying by the frame rate and compression efficiency. The methodology can be found in many places. See also my blog “5G Economics – An Introduction (Chapter 1)” from Dec. 2016.

Let’s move into high-end and fully immersive virtual reality experiences. The user bandwidth requirement may exceed 100 Mbps and possibly even require a Gbps sustainable bandwidth delivered to the user device to provide an optimum experience. However, jitter and latency performance may not make such full immersion or high-end VR experiences fully optimal over mobile or fixed networks with long distances to the supporting (edge) data centers and cloud servers where the related application may reside. In my opinion, this kind of ultra-high-end specialized service might be better run exclusively on location.

Size Matter.

I once had a CFO who was adamant that an organization’s size on its own would drive a certain amount of Capex. I would, at times, argue that an organization’s size should depend on the number of activities required to support customers (or, more generally, the number of revenue-generating units (RGUs), your given company has or expects to have) and the revenue those generate. In my logic, at the time, the larger a country in terms of surface area, population, and households, the more capex-related activities would be required, thus also resulting in the need for a bigger organization. If you have more RGU, it might also not be too surprising that the organization would be bigger.

Since then, I have scratched my head many times when I look at country characteristics, the RGUs, and Revenues, asking how that can justify a given size of Telco organizations, knowing that there are other Telcos out there that spend the same or more Capex with a substantially smaller organization (also after considering the difference in sourcing strategies). I have never been with an organization that irrespective of its size did not feel pressured work-wise and believed it was too lightly staffed to operate, irrespective of the Capex and activities under management.

Figure 14 illustrates the correlation between the Capex and the number of FTEs in a Telco organization. It should be noted that the upper right point results in a very good correlation of 0.75. Without this point, the correlation would be around 0.25. Note that sourcing does have a minor effect on the correlation.

The above figure illustrates a strong correlation between Capex and the number of people in a Telco organization. However, the correlation would be weaker without the upper right data point. In the data shown here, you will find no correlation between FTEs and a country’s size, such as population or surface area, which is also the case for Capex. There is a weak correlation between FTEs and RGU and a stronger correlation with Revenues. Capex, in general, is very strongly correlated with Revenues. The best multi-linear regression model, chosen by p-value, is a model where Capex relates to FTEs and RGUs. For a Telco with 1000 employees and 1 million RGUs, approximately 50% of the Capex could be explained by the number of FTEs. Of course, in the analysis above, we must remember that correlation does not imply causation. You will have telcos that, in most Capex driver aspects, should be reasonably similar in their investment profiles over time, except the telco with the largest organization will consistently invest more in Capex. While I think this is, in particular, an incumbent vs challenger issue, it is a much broader issue in our industry.

Having spent most of my 20+ year career in Telecom being involved in Capex planning and budgeting, it is clear that the size of an organization plays a role in the size of a Capex budget. Intuitively, it should not be too surprising. Suppose the Capex is lower than the capacity of your organization. In that case, you may have to lay off people with the risk you might be short of resources in the future as you may cycle through modernization or a new technology introduction. On the other hand, if the Capex needs are substantially larger than the organization can cope with, including any sourcing agreements in place, it may not make too much sense to ask for more than what can be managed with the resources available (apart from it being sub-optimal for cash flow optimization).

Telco companies that have fixed and mobile broadband infrastructure in their portfolio with organizations that are poorly optimized and with strict demarcation lines between people working on fixed broadband and mobile broadband will, in general, have much worse Capex efficiencies compared to fully fixed-mobile converged organizations (not to mention suffering from poorer operational efficiencies and work practices compared to integrated organizations). Here, the size of, for example, a mobile organization will drive behavior that rather would spend above and beyond Capex in their Radio Access Network infrastructure than use more clever and proven solutions (e.g., Opanga’s RAIN) to optimize quality and capacity needs across their mobile networks.

In general, the resistance to utilize smarter solutions and clever ideas that may save Capex (and/or Opex) is manifesting in a many-fold of behaviors that I have observed over my 25+ year career (and some I might even have adapted on occasion … but shhhh;-).

Budget heuristics:

  • 𝗦𝗶𝘇𝗲 𝗱𝗼𝗲𝘀𝗻𝘁 𝗺𝗮𝘁𝘁𝗲𝗿 𝗽𝗮𝗿𝗮𝗱𝗶𝗴𝗺 Irrespective of size, my organization will always be busy and understaffed.
  • 𝗧𝗵𝗲 𝗚𝗼𝗹𝗱𝗶𝗹𝗼𝗰𝗸𝘀 𝗙𝗮𝗹𝗹𝗮𝗰𝘆 My organization’s size and structure will determine its optimum Capex spending profile, allowing it to stay busy (and understaffed).
  • 𝗧𝗮𝗻𝗴𝗶𝗯𝗹𝗲 𝗕𝗶𝗮𝘀 A hardware (infrastructure-based) solution is better and more visible than a software solution. I feel more comfortable with my organization being busy with hardware.
  • 𝗧𝗵𝗲 𝗦𝘂𝗻𝗸 𝗖𝗼𝘀𝘁 𝗙𝗮𝗹𝗹𝗮𝗰𝘆 I don’t trust (allegedly) clever software solutions that may lower or postpone my Capex needs and, by that, reduce the need for people in my organization.
  • 𝗕𝘂𝗱𝗴𝗲𝘁 𝗠𝗮𝘅𝗶𝗺𝗶𝘇𝗮𝘁𝗶𝗼𝗻 𝗧𝗲𝗻𝗱𝗲𝗻𝗰𝘆 My organization’s importance and my self-importance are measured by how much Capex I have in my budget. I will resist giving part of my budget away to others.
  • 𝗦𝘁𝗮𝘁𝘂𝘀 𝗤𝘂𝗼 𝗕𝗶𝗮𝘀 I will resist innovation that may reduce my Capex budget, even if it may also help reduce my Opex.
  • 𝗝𝗼𝗯 𝗣𝗿𝗼𝘁𝗲𝗰𝘁𝗶𝗼𝗻𝗶𝘀𝗺 I resist innovation that may result in a more effective organization, i.e., fewer FTEs.
  • 𝗖𝗮𝗽𝗮𝗰𝗶𝘁𝘆 𝗖𝗼𝗺𝗳𝗼𝗿𝘁 𝗦𝘆𝗻𝗱𝗿𝗼𝗺𝗲: The more physical capacity I build into my network, the more we can relax. Our goal is a “Zero Worry Network.”
  • 𝗧𝗵𝗲 𝗙𝗲𝗮𝗿 𝗙𝗮𝗰𝘁𝗼𝗿: The leadership is “easy to scare” when arguing for more capacity Capex opposed to the “if-not”-consequences. (e.g., losing best network awards, poorer customer experience, …).
  • 𝗧𝗵𝗲 𝗕𝘂𝗱𝗴𝗲𝘁 𝗜𝗻𝗲𝗿𝘁𝗶𝗮 Return on Investment (ROI) prioritization is rarely considered (rigorously), particularly after a budget has been released.

𝗔 𝘄𝗮𝗿𝗻𝗶𝗻𝗴: although each is observable in the live, the reader should be aware that there is also a fair amount of deliberate ironic provocation in the above heuristics.

We should never underestimate that within companies, two things make you important (including self-important and self-worthy) … It is: (1) The size of your organization and (2) the amount of money, your budget size, you have for your organization to be busy with.

Any innovation that may lower an organization’s size and budget will be met with resistance from that organization.

The Balancing Act of Capex to Opex Transformations.

Telco cost structures and Capex have evolved significantly due to accounting changes, valuation strategies, technological advancements, and economic pressures. While shifts like IFRS (International Financial Reporting Standards), issued by the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB), have altered how costs are reported and managed, changes in business strategies, such as cell site spin-offs, cloud migrations, and the transition to software-defined networks, have reshaped Capex allocations somewhat. At the same time, economic crises and competitive pressures have influenced Telcos to continually reassess their capital investments, balancing the need to optimize value, innovation, and growth with financial diligence.

One of the most significant drivers of change has been the shift in accounting standards, particularly with the introduction of IFRS16, which replaced the older GAAP-based approaches. Under IFRS16, nearly all leases are now recognized on the balance sheet as right-of-use assets and corresponding liabilities. This change has particularly impacted Telcos, which often engage in long-term leases for cell sites, network infrastructure, and equipment. Previously, under GAAP (Generally Accepted Accounting Principles), many leases were treated as operating leases, keeping them off the balance sheet, and their associated costs were considered operational expenditures (Opex). Now, under IFRS16, these leases are capitalized, leading to an increase in reported Capex as assets and liabilities grow to reflect the leased infrastructure. This shift has redefined how Telcos manage and report their Capex, as what was previously categorized as leasing costs now appears as capital investments, altering key financial metrics like EBITDA and debt ratios that would appear stronger post-IFRS16.

Simultaneously, valuation strategies and financial priorities have driven significant shifts in Telco Capex. Telecom companies have increasingly focused on enhancing metrics such as EBITDA and capital efficiency, leading them to adopt strategies to reduce heavy capital investments. One such strategy is the cell site spin-off, where Telcos sell off their tower and infrastructure assets to specialized independent companies or create separate entities that manage these assets. These spin-offs have allowed Telcos to reduce the Capex tied to maintaining physical assets, replacing it with leasing arrangements, which shift costs towards operational expenses. As a result, Capex related to infrastructure declines, freeing up resources for investments in other areas such as technology upgrades, customer services, and digital transformation. The spun-off infrastructures often result in significant cash inflows from sales. The telcos can then use this cash to improve their balance sheets by reducing debt, reinvesting in new technologies, or distributing higher dividends to shareholders. However, this shift may also reduce control over critical network infrastructure and create long-term lease obligations, resulting in substantial operational expenses as telcos will have to pay the rental costs on the spun-off infrastructure, increasing Opex pressure. I regularly see analysts using the tower spin-off as an argument for why Capex requirements of telcos are no longer wholly trustworthy and, in particular, in comparison with the past capital spending as the passive part of the cell site built used to be a substantial share mobile site Capex of up to 50% to 60% for a standard site built and beyond that for special sites. I believe that as not many new cell sites are being built any longer, and certainly not as many as in the 90s and 2000s, this effect is very minor on the overall Capex. Most new sites are built at a maintenance level, covering new residential or white spot areas.

When considering mobile network evolution and the impact of higher frequencies, it is important not to default to the assumption that more cell sites will always be necessary. If all things are equal, the coverage cell range of a high carrier frequency would be shorter (often much shorter) than the coverage range at a lower frequency. However, all things are not equal. This misconception arises from a classical coverage approach, where the frequency spectrum is radiated evenly across the entire cell area. However, modern cellular networks employ advanced technologies such as beamforming, which allows for more precise and efficient distribution of radio energy. Beamforming concentrates signal power in specific directions rather than thinly spreading it across a wide area, effectively increasing reach and signal quality without additional sites. Furthermore, the support for asymmetric downlink (higher) and uplink (lower) carrier frequencies allows for high-quality service downlink and uplink in situations where the uplink might be challenged at higher frequencies.

Moreover, many mobile networks today have already been densified to accommodate coverage needs and capacity demands. This densification often occurred when spectrum resources were scarce, and the solution was to add more sites for improved performance rather than simply increasing coverage. As newer frequency bands become available, networks can leverage beamforming and existing densification efforts to meet coverage and capacity requirements without necessarily expanding the number of cell sites. Thus, the focus should be optimizing the deployment of advanced technologies like beamforming and Massive MIMO rather than increasing the site count by default. In many cases, densified networks are already equipped to handle higher frequencies, making additional sites unnecessary for coverage alone.

The migration to public cloud solutions from, for example, Amazon’s AWS or Microsoft Azure is another factor influencing the Capex of Telcos. Historically, telecom companies relied on significant upfront Capex to build and maintain their own data centers or switching locations (as they were once called, as these were occupied mainly by the big legacy telecom proprietary telco switching infrastructure), network operations centers, and IT (monolithic) infrastructure. However, with the rise of cloud computing, Telcos are increasingly migrating to cloud-based solutions, reducing the need for large-scale physical infrastructure investments. This shift from hardware to cloud services changes the composition of Capex as the need for extensive data center investments declines, and more flexible, subscription-based cloud services are adopted. Although Capex for physical infrastructure decreases, there is a shift towards Opex as Telcos pay for cloud services on a usage basis.

Further, the transition to software-defined networks (SDNs) and software-centric telecom solutions has transformed the nature of Telco Capex. In the past, Telcos heavily depended on proprietary hardware for network management, which required substantial Capex to purchase and maintain physical equipment. However, with the advancement of virtualization and SDNs, telcos have shifted away from hardware-intensive solutions to more software-driven architectures. This transition reduces the need for continuous Capex on physical assets like routers, switches, and servers and increases investment in software development, licensing, and cloud-based platforms. The software-centric model allows, in theory, Telcos to innovate faster and reduce long-term infrastructure costs.

The Role of Capex in Financial Statements.

Capital expenditures play a critical role in shaping a telecommunications company’s financial health, influencing its income statement, balance sheet, and cash flow statements in various ways. At the same time, Telcos establish financial guardrails to manage the impact of Capex spending on dividends, liquidity, and future cash needs.

In the income statement (see Figure 15 below), Capex does not appear directly as an expense when it is incurred. Instead, it is capitalized on the balance sheet and then expensed over time through depreciation (for tangible assets) or amortization (for intangible assets). This gradual recognition of the Capex expenditure leads to higher depreciation or amortization charges over future periods, reducing the company’s net income. While the immediate impact of Capex is not seen on the income statement, the long-term effects can improve revenue when investments enhance capacity and quality, as with technological upgrades like 5G infrastructure. However, these benefits are offset by the fact that depreciation lowers profitability in the short term (as the net profit is lowered). The last couple of radio access technology (RAT) generations have, in general, caused an increase in telcos’ operational expenses (i.e., Opex) as more cell sites are required, heavier site configurations are implemented (e.g., multi-band antennas, massive MiMo antennas), and energy consumption has increased in absolute terms. Despite every new generation having become relatively more energy efficient in terms of the kWh/GB, in absolute terms, this is not the case, and that matters for the income statement and the incurred operational expenses.

Figure 15 illustrates the typical income statement one may find in a telco’s annual report or official financial statements. The purpose here is to show where Capex may have an influence although Capex will not be directly stated in the Income Statement. Note: the numbers in the above financial statement are for illustration only representing a Telco with 35% EBITDA margin, 20% Capex to Revenue Ratio and a Tax rate of 22%.

On the balance sheet (see Figure 16 below), Capex increases the value of a company’s fixed assets, typically recorded as property, plant, and equipment (PP&E). As new assets are added, the company’s overall asset base grows. However, this is balanced by the accumulation of depreciation, which gradually reduces the book value of these assets over time. How Capex is financed also affects the company’s liabilities or equity. If debt is used to finance Capex, the company’s liabilities increase; if equity financing is used, shareholders’ equity increases. The Balance Sheet together with the Depreciation & Amortization (D&A), typically given in the income statement, can help us estimate the amount of Capex a Telco has spend. The capital expense, typically not directly reported in a companies financial statements, can be estimated by adding the changes between subsequent years of PP&E and Intangible Assets to the D&A.

Figure 16 illustrates the balance sheet one may find in a telco’s annual report or official financial statements. The purpose here is to show where Capex may have an influence. Knowing the Depreciation & Amortization (D&A) typically shown in the Income Statement, the change in PP&E and Intangible Assets (between two subsequent years) will provide an estimate of the Capex of the current year. Note: the numbers in the above financial statement are for illustration only representing a Telco with 35% EBITDA margin, 20% Capex to Revenue Ratio and a Tax rate of 22%.

In the cash flow statement, Capex appears as an outflow under the category of cash flows from investing activities, representing the company’s spending on long-term assets. In the short term, this creates a significant reduction in cash. However, well-planned Capex to enhance infrastructure or expand capacity can lead to higher operating cash flows in the future. If Capex is funded through debt or equity issuance, the inflow of funds will be reflected under cash flows from financing activities.

Figure 17 illustrates the Cash Flow Statements one may find in a telco’s annual report or official financial statements (might have a bit more details than what usually would be provided). We would typically get a 70+% impression of a Telco’s Capex level by looking at the “Net Cash Flow Used in Investing Activities”, unless we are offered Purchases of Tangible and Intangible Assets. Note: the numbers in the above financial statement are for illustration only representing a Telco with 35% EBITDA margin, 20% Capex to Revenue Ratio and a Tax rate of 22%.

To ensure Capex does not overly strain the company’s financial health or limit returns to shareholders, Telcos put in place financial guardrails. Regarding dividends, many companies set specific dividend payout ratios, ensuring that a portion of earnings or free cash flow is consistently returned to shareholders. This practice balances returning value to shareholders while retaining sufficient earnings to fund operations and investments. It is also not unusual that Telco’s commit a given dividend level to shareholders, that as a consequence may place a limit on Capex spending or result in Capex tasking within a given planning period, as management must balance cash outflows between shareholder returns and strategic investments. This may lead to prioritizing essential projects, delaying less critical investments, or seeking alternative financing to maintain both Capex and dividend commitments. Additionally, Telcos often use dividend coverage ratios to ensure they can sustain dividend payouts even during periods of heavy capital expenditure.

Some telcos have chosen not to commit dividends to shareholders in order to maximize Capex investments, aiming to reinvest profits into the business to drive long-term growth and create higher shareholder value. This strategy prioritizes network expansion, technological upgrades, and new market opportunities over immediate cash returns, allowing the company to maintain financial flexibility and pursue strategic objectives more aggressively. When a telco decides to start paying dividends, it may indicate that management believes there are fewer high-value investment opportunities that can deliver returns above the company’s cost of capital. The decision to pay dividends often reflects the view that shareholders may derive greater value from the cash than the company could generate by reinvesting it. Often it signals a shift to a higher degree of maturity (e.g., corporate or market wise) from having been a growth focused company (i.e., the Telco has past the inflection point of growth). An example of maturity, and maybe less about growth opportunities, is the case of T-Mobile USA which in 2024 announced that it would start to pay dividend for the first time in its history targeting a 10 percent annually per share (note: Deutsche Telekom AG gained ownership in 2001, the company was founded in 1994).

Liquidity management is another consideration. Companies monitor their liquidity through current or quick ratios to ensure they can meet short-term obligations without cutting dividends or pausing important Capex projects. To provide an additional safety net, Telcos often maintain cash reserves or access to credit lines to handle immediate financial needs without disrupting long-term investment plans.

Regarding debt management, Telcos must carefully balance using debt to finance Capex. Companies often track their debt-to-equity ratio to avoid over-leveraging, which can lead to higher interest expenses and reduced financial flexibility. Another common metric is net debt to EBITDA, which ensures that debt levels remain manageable concerning the company’s earnings. To avoid breaching agreements with lenders, Telcos often operate under covenants that limit the amount they can spend on Capex without negatively affecting their ability to service debt or pay dividends.

Telcos also plan long-term cash flow to ensure Capex investments align with future financial needs. Many companies establish a capital allocation framework that prioritizes projects with the highest returns, ensuring that investments in infrastructure or technology do not jeopardize future cash flow. Free cash flow (FCF) is a particularly important metric in this context, as it represents the amount of cash available after covering operating expenses and Capex. A positive FCF ensures the company can meet future cash needs while returning value to shareholders through dividends or share buybacks.

Capex budgeting and prioritization are also essential tools for managing large investments. Companies assess the expected return on investment (ROI) and the payback period for Capex projects, ensuring that capital is allocated efficiently. Projects with assumed high strategic value, such as 5G infrastructure upgrades, household fiber coverage, or strategic fiber overbuilt, are often prioritized for their potential to drive long-term revenue growth. Monitoring the Capex-to-sales ratio helps ensure that capital investments are aligned with revenue growth, preventing over-investment in infrastructure that may not yield sufficient returns.

CAPEX EXPECTATIONS 2024 to 2026.

Considering all of the 54 telcos, ignoring MasMovil and WindHellas that are in the process of being integrated, in the pool of New Street Research Quarterly review each with their individual as well as country “peculiarities” (e.g., state of 5G deployment, fiber-optical coverage, fiber uptake, merger-resulting integration Capex, general revenue trends, …), it is possible to get a directional idea of how Capex will develop for each individual telco as well as the overall trend. This is illustrated in the Figure below on a Western European level.

I expect that we will not see a Capex reduction in 2024, supported by how Capex in the third and fourth quarters usually behave compared to the first two quarters, and due to integration and transformation Capex that will carry from 2023 into 2024 and possibly with a tail-end in 2024. I expect most telcos will cut back on new mobile investments, even if some might start ripping out radio access infrastructure from Chinese suppliers. However, I also believe that telcos will try to delay replacement to 2026 to 2028, when the first round of 5G modernization activities would be expected (and even overdue for some countries).

While 5G networks have made significant advancements, the rollout of 5G SA remains limited. By the end of 2023, only five of 39 markets analyzed by GSMA have reached near-complete adoption of 5G SA networks. 17 markets had yet to launch 5G SA at all. One of the primary barriers is the high cost of investment required to build the necessary infrastructure. The expansion and densification of 5G networks, such as installing more base stations, are essential to support 5G SA. According to GSMA, many operators are facing financial hurdles, as returns in many markets have been flat, and any increase is mainly due to inflationary price corrections rather than incremental or new usage occurring. I suspect that telcos may also be more conservative (and even more realistic, maybe) in assessing the real economic potential of the features being enabled by migrating to 5G SA, e.g., advanced network slicing, ultra-low latency, and massive IoT capabilities in comparison with the capital investments and efforts that they would need to incur. I should point out that any core network investments supporting 5G SA would not be expected to have a visible impact on telcos Capex budgets as this would be expected to be less than 10% of the mobile capex.

Figure 18 shows the 2022 status of homes covered by fiber in 16 Western European countries, as well as the number of households remaining. It should be noted that a 100% coverage level may be unlikely, and this data does not consider fiber overbuilt (i.e., multiple companies covering the same households with their individual fiber deployments). Fiber overbuilt becomes increasingly likely as the coverage exceeds 80% (on a geographical regional/city basis). The percentages (yellow color) above the chart show the share of Total 2022 Western European Capex for the country, e.g., Germany’s share of the 2022 Capex was 18% and had ca. 19% of all German households covered with fiber. Source: based on Omdia & Point Topic’s “Broadband Coverage in Europe 2013-2022” (EU Commission Report).

In 2022, a bit more than 50% of all Western European households were covered by fiber (see Figure 18 above), which amounts to approximately 85 million households with fiber coverage. This also leaves approximately 80 million households without fiber reach. Almost 60% of households without fiber coverage are in Germany (38%) and the UK (21%). Both Germany and the UK contributed about 40% of the total Western European Capex spend in 2022.

Moreover, I expect there are still Western European markets where the Capex priority is increasing the fiber-optic household coverage. In 2022, there was a peak in new households covered by fiber in Western Europe (see Figure 15 below), with 13+ million households covered according to the European Commission’s report “Broadband Coverage in Europe 2013-2022“. Germany (a fiber laggard) and the UK, which account for more than 35% of the Western European Capex, are expected to continue to invest substantially in fiber coverage until the end of the decade. As Figure 19 below illustrates, there is still a substantial amount of Capex required to close the fixed broadband coverage gap some Western European countries have.

Figure 19 illustrates the number of households covered by fiber (homes passed) and the number of millions of new households covered in a year. The period from 2017 to 2022 is based on actuals. The period from 2023 to 2026 is forecasted for new households covered based on the last 5-year average deployment or the maximum speed over the last 5 years (Urban: e.g., DE, IT, NL, UK,…) with deceleration as coverage reaches 95% for urban areas and 80% for rural (note: may be optimistic for some countries). The fiber deployment model differentiates between Urban and Rural areas. Source: based on Omdia & Point Topic’s “Broadband Coverage in Europe 2013-2022” (EU Commission Report).

I should point out that I am not assuming that telcos would be required over the next couple of years to swap out Chinese suppliers outside the scope of the European Commission “The EU 5G Toolkit for Security” framework that mainly focuses on 5G mobile networks eventually including the radio access network. It should be kept in mind that there is a relatively big share of high-risk suppliers within the Western European (actually in most European Union member states) fixed broadband networks (e.g., core routers & switches, SBCs, OLT/ONTs, MSAPs) that if subjected to “5G Toolkit for Security”-like regulation, such as in effect in Denmark (i.e., “The Danish Investment Screening Act”), would result in substantial increase in telcos fixed capital spend. We may see that some Western European telcos will commence replacement programs as equipment becomes obsolete (or near obsolete), and I would expect that the fixed broadband Capex will remain relatively high for telcos in Western Europe even beyond 2026.

Thus, overall, I think it is not unrealistic to anticipate a decrease in Capex over the next 3 years. Contrary to some analysts’ expectations, I do not see the lower Capex level being persistent but rather what to expect due to the reasons given above in this blog.

Figure 20 illustrates the pace and financial requirements for fiber-to-the-premises (FTTP) deployment across the EU, emphasizing the significant challenges ahead. Germany needs the highest number of households passed per week and the largest investments at €32.9 billion to reach 80% household coverage by 2031. The total investment required to reach 80% household fiber coverage by 2031 is estimated at over €110 billion, with most of this funding allocated to urban areas. Despite progress, more than 57% of Western European households still lack fiber coverage as of 2022. Achieving this goal will require maintaining the current pace of deployment and overcoming historical performance limitations. Source: based on Omdia & Point Topic’s “Broadband Coverage in Europe 2013-2022” (EU Commission Report).

CAPEX EXPECTATIONS TOWARDS 2030.

Taking the above Capex forecasting approach, based on the individual 54 Western European telcos in the New Street Research Quarterly review, it is relatively straightforward, but not per se very accurate, to extend to 2030, as shown in the figure below.

It is worth mentioning that predicting Capex’s reliability over such a relatively long period of ten years is prone to a high degree of uncertainty and can actually only be done with relatively high reliability if very detailed information is available on each telco’s long-term, short-term and strategy as well as their economic outlook. In my experience from working with very detailed bottom-up Capex models covering a five and beyond-year horizon (which is not the approach I have used here simply for lack of information required for such an exercise not to be futile), it is already prone to a relatively high degree of uncertainty even with all the information, solid strategic outlook, and reasonable assumptions up front.

Figure 21 illustrates Western Europe’s projected capital expenditure (Capex) development from 2020 to 2030. The slight increase in Capex towards 2030 is primarily driven by the modernization of 5G radio access networks (RAN), which could potentially incorporate 6G capabilities and further deploy 5G Standalone (SA) networks. Additionally, there is a focus on swapping out high-risk suppliers in the mobile domain and completing heavy fiber household coverage in the remaining laggard countries. Suppose the European Commission’s 5G Security Toolkit should be extended to fixed broadband networks, focusing on excluding high-risk suppliers in the 5G mobile domain. In that case, this scenario has not been factored into the current model represented here. The percentages on the chart represent the overall Capex to Total Revenue ratio development over the period.

The capital expenditure trends in Western Europe from 2020 to 2030, with projections indicating a steady investment curve (remember that this is the aggregation of 54 Western European telcos Capex development over the period).

A noticeable rise in Capex towards 2030 can be attributed to several key factors, primarily the modernization of 5G Radio Access Networks (RAN). This modernization effort will likely include upgrades to the current 5G infrastructure and potential integration of 6G (or renamed 5G SA) capabilities as Europe prepares for the next generation of mobile technology, which I still believe is an unavoidable direction. Additionally, deploying or expanding 5G Standalone (SA) networks, which offer more advanced features such as network slicing and ultra-low latency, will further drive investments.

Another significant factor contributing to the increased Capex is the planned replacement of high-risk suppliers in the mobile domain. Countries across Western Europe are expected to phase out network equipment from suppliers deemed risky for national security, aligning with broader EU efforts to ensure a secure telecommunications infrastructure. I expect a very strong push from some member state regulators and the European Commission to finish the replacement by 2027/2028. I also expect impacted telcos (of a certain size) to push back and attempt to time a high-risk supplier swap out with their regular mobile infrastructure obsolescence program and introduction of 6G in their networks towards and after 2030.

Figure 22 shows the projections for 2023 and 2030 for the number of homes covered by fiber in Western European countries and the number of households remaining. It should be noted that a 100% coverage level may be unlikely, and this data does not consider fiber overbuilt (i.e., multiple companies covering the same households with their individual fiber deployments). Fiber overbuilt becomes increasingly likely as the coverage exceeds 80% (on a geographical regional/city basis). Source: based on Omdia & Point Topic’s “Broadband Coverage in Europe 2013-2022” (EU Commission Report).

Simultaneously, Western Europe is expected to complete the extensive rollout of fiber-to-the-home (FTTH) networks, as illustrated by Figure 20 above, particularly in countries lagging behind in fiber deployment, such as Germany, the UK, Belgium, Austria, and Greece. These EU member states will likely have finished covering the majority of households (80+%) with high-speed fiber by the end of the decade. On this topic, we should remember that telcos are using various fiber deployment models that minimize (and optimize) their capital investment levels. By 2030 I would expect that almost 80% of all Western European households will be covered with fiber and thus most consumers and businesses will have easy access to gigabit services to their homes by then (and for most countries long before 2030). Germany is still expected to be the Western European fiber laggard by 20230, with an increased share of 50+% of German households not being covered by fiber (note: in 2022, this was 38%). Most other countries will have reached and exceeded 80% fiber household coverage.

It is also important to note that my Capex model does not assume the extension of the European Commission’s 5G Security Toolkit, which focuses on excluding high-risk suppliers in the 5G domain to fixed broadband networks. If the legal framework were to be applied to the fixed broadband sector as well, an event that I see to be very likely, forcing the removal of high-risk suppliers from fiber broadband networks, Capex requirements would likely increase significantly beyond the projections represented in my assessment with the last years of the decade focused on high-risk supplier replacement in Western European Telcos fixed broadband transport and IP networks. While it is I don’t see a (medium-high) risk that all CPEs would be included in a high-risk supplier ban. However, I do believe that CPEs with the ONT integrated may be required to replace their installed CPE base. If a high-risk supplier ban were to include the ONT, there would be several implications.

Any CPEs that use components from the banned supplier would need to be replaced or retrofitted to ensure compliance. This would require swapping the integrated CPE/ONT units for separate CPE and ONT devices from approved suppliers, which could add to installation costs and increase deployment time. Service providers would also need to reassess their network equipment supply chain, ensuring that new ONTs and CPEs meet regulatory standards for security and compliance. Moreover, replacing equipment could potentially disrupt existing service, necessitating careful planning to manage the transition without major outages for customers. This situation would likely also require updates to the network configuration, as replacing an integrated CPE/ONT device could involve reconfiguring customer devices to work seamlessly with the new setup. I believe it is very likely that telcos eventually will offer fixed broadband service, including CPEs and home gateways, that are free of high-risk suppliers end-2-end (e.g., for B2B and public institutions, e.g., defense and other critically sensitive areas). This may extend to requirements that employees working in or with sensitive areas will need a certificate of high-risk supplier-free end-2-end fixed broadband connection to be allowed to work from home or receive any job-related information (this could extend to mobile devices as well). Again, substantial Capex (and maybe a fair amount of time as well) would be required to reach such a high-risk supplier reduction.

AN ALTERNATE REALITY.

I am unsure whether William Webb’s idea of “The End of Telecoms History” (I really recommend you get his book) will have the same profound impact as Francis Fukuyama’s marvelously thought-provoking book “The End of History and the Last Man or be more “right” than Fukuyama’s book. However, I think it may be an oversimplification of his ideas to say that he has been proven wrong. The world of Man may have proven more resistant to “boredom” than the book assumed (as Fukuyama conceded in subsequent writing). Nevertheless, I do not believe history can be over unless the history makers and writers are all gone (which may happen sooner rather than later). History may have long and “boring” periods where little new and disruptive things happen. Still, historically, something so far has always disrupted the hiatus of history, followed by a quieter period (e.g., Pax Romana, European Feudalism, Ming Dynasty, 19th century’s European balance of power, …). The nature of history is cyclic. Stability and disruption are not opposing forces but part of an ongoing dynamic. I don’t think telecommunication would be that different. Parts of what we define as telecom may reach a natural end and settle until it is disrupted again; for example, the fixed telephony services on copper lines were disrupted by emerging mobile technologies driven by radio access technology innovation back in the 90s and until today. Or, like circuit-switched voice-centric technologies, which have been replaced by data-centric packet-switched technologies, putting an “end” to the classical voice-based business model of the incumbent telecommunication corporations.

At some point in the not-so-distant future (2030-2040), all Western European households will be covered by optical fiber and have a fiber-optic access connection with indoor services being served by ultra-WiFi coverage (remember approx. 80% of mobile consumption happens indoors). Mobile broadband networks have by then been redesigned to mainly provide outdoor coverage in urban and suburban areas. These are being modernized at minimum 10-year cycles as the need for innovation is relatively minor and more focused on energy efficiency and CO2 footprint reductions. Direct-to-cell (D2C) LEO satellite or stratospheric drone constellations utilizing a cellular spectrum above 1800 MHz serve outdoor coverage of rural regions, as opposed to the current D2C use of low-frequency bands such as 600 – 800 MHz (as higher frequency bands are occupied terrestrially and difficult to coordinate with LEO Satellite D2C providers). Let’s dream that the telco IT landscape, Core, transport, and routing networks will be fully converged (i.e., no fixed silo, no mobile silo) and autonomous network operations deal with most technical issues, including planning and optimization.

In this alternate reality, you pay for and get a broadband service enabled by a fully integrated broadband network. Not a mobile service served by a mobile broadband network (including own mobile backhaul, mobile aggregation, mobile backbone, and mobile core), and, not a fixed service served by a fixed broadband network different from the mobile infrastructure.

Given the Western European countries addressed in this report (i.e., see details in Further Reading #1), we would need to cover a surface area of 3.6 million square kilometers. To ensure outdoor coverage in urban areas and road networks, we may not need more than about 50,000 cell sites compared to today’s 300 – 400 thousand. If the cellular infrastructure is shared, the effective number of sites that are paid in full would be substantially lower than that.

The required mobile Capex ballpark estimate would be a fifth (including its share of related fixed support investment, e.g., IT, Core, Transport, Switching, Routing, Product development, etc.) of what it otherwise would be if we continue “The Mobile History” as it has been running up to today.

In this “Alternate Reality” ” instead of having a mobile Capex level of about 10% of the total fixed and mobile revenue (~15+% of mobile service revenues), we would be down to between 2% and 3% of the total telecom revenues (assuming it remains reasonably flat at a 2023 level. The fixed investment level would be relatively low, household coverage would be finished, and most households would be connected. If we use numbers of fixed broadband Capex without substantial fiber deployment, that level should not be much higher than 5% of the total revenue. Thus, instead of today’s persistent level of 18% – 20% of the total telecom revenues, in our “Alternate Reality,” it would not exceed 10%. And just imagine what such a change would do to the operational cost structure.

Obviously, this fictive (and speculative) reality would be “The End of Mobile History.”

It would be an “End to Big Capex” and a stop to spending mobile Capex like there is no (better fixed broadband) tomorrow.

This is an end-reflection of where the current mobile network development may be heading unless the industry gets better at optimizing and prioritizing between mobile and fixed broadband. Re-architecting the fundamental design paradigms of mobile network design, plan, and build is required, including an urgent reset of current 6G thinking.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT.

I greatly acknowledge my wife, Eva Varadi, for her support, patience, and understanding during the creative process of writing this Blog. There should be no doubt that without the support of Russell Waller (New Street Research), this blog would not have been possible. Thank you so much for providing the financial telco data for Western Europe that lays the ground for much of the Capex analysis in this article. This blog has also been published in telecomanalysis.net with some minor changes and updates.

FURTHER READING.

  1. New Street Research covers the following countries in their Quarterly report: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom. Across those 15 countries, ca. 56 telcos are covered.
  2. Kim Kyllesbech Larsen, “Navigating the Future of Telecom Capex: Western Europe’s Telecom Investment 2024 to 2030,” telecomanalysis.net, (October 2024).
  3. Kim Kyllesbech Larsen, “The Nature of Telecom Capex – a 2023 Update”, techneconomyblog.com, (July 2023).
  4. Kim Kyllesbech Larsen, “The Nature of Telecom Capex,” techneconomyblog.com, (July 2022).
  5. Rupert Wood, “A crisis of overproduction in bandwidth means that telecoms capex will inevitably fall,” Analysys Mason (July 2024). A rather costly (for mortals & their budgets, at least) report called “The end of big capex: new strategic options for the telecoms industry” allegedly demonstrates the crisis.
  6. European Commission, “Cybersecurity of 5G networks – EU Toolbox of risk mitigating measures”, (January 2020).
  7. European Commission, “The EU Toolbox for 5G Security”, (2020).
  8. European Commission, “5G security: Member States report on progress on implementing the EU toolbox and strengthening safety measures”, (July 2020). It also includes a link to the actual Member States progress report on 5G Security.
  9. European Commission, “Second report on the implementation of the EU 5G cybersecurity toolbox”, (June 2023).
  10. Danish Investment Screening Act, “Particularly sensitive sectors and activities,” Danish Business Authority, (July 2021). Note that the “Danish Investment Screening Act” is closely aligned with broader European Union (EU) frameworks and initiatives to safeguard critical infrastructure from high-risk foreign suppliers. The Act reflects Denmark’s effort to implement national and EU-level policies to protect sensitive sectors from foreign investments that could pose security risks, particularly in critical infrastructure such as telecommunications, energy, and defense.
  11. Cynthia Kroet, “Eleven EU countries took 5G security measures to ban Huawei, ZTE”, Euro News, (August 2024).
  12. Michael Stenvei, “Historisk indgreb: TDC tvinges til at droppe Huawei-aftale”, Finans.dk, (May 2023).
  13. Mathieu Pollet, “Time to cut back on Huawei, German minister tells telecoms giants,” Politico (August 2023).
  14. German press on high-risk suppliers in German telecommunications networks: “Zeit für den Abschied von Huawei, sagt Innenministerin Faeser” (Handelsblatt, August 18, 2023), “Deutsche Telekom und Huawei: Warum die Abhängigkeit bleibt” (Die Welt, September 7, 2023), “Telekom-Netz: Kritik an schleppendem Rückzug von Huawei-Komponenten” (Der Spiegel, September 20, 2023), “Faeser verschiebt Huawei-Bann und stößt auf heftige Kritik” (Handelsblatt, July 18, 2024), “Huawei-Verbot in 5G-Netzen: Deutschland verschärft, aber langsam” (Tagesschau, July 15, 2024), and “Langsame Fortschritte: Deutschland und das Huawei-Dilemma” (Der Spiegel, September 21, 2024) and many many others.
  15. Iain Morris, “German Huawei ban to cost €2.5B and take years, no thanks to EU”, Light Reading (May 2023).
  16. Alexander Martin, “EU states told to restrict Huawei and ZTE from 5G networks ‘without delay’”, The Record, (June 2023).
  17. Strand Consult, “Understanding the Market for 4G RAN in Europe: Share of Chinese and Non-Chinese Vendors – in 102 Mobile Networks”, (2020).
  18. Strand Consult, “The Market for 5G RAN in Europe: Share of Chinese and Non-Chinese Vendors in 31 European Countries”, (2023).
  19. William Web, “The End of Telecoms History,” Kindle, (June 2024).
  20. GSMA, “The State of 5G 2024 – Introducing the GSMA Intelligence 5G Connectivity Index”, (February 2024).
  21. Speedtest.com, “Speedtest Global Index”, (August 2024).
  22. Ericsson Mobility Visualizer – Mobile Data Traffic.
  23. Kim Kyllesbech Larsen, “5G Economics – An Introduction (Chapter 1)”, techneconomyblog.com, (December 2016).
  24. Kim Kyllesbech Larsen, “Capacity planning in mobile data networks experiencing exponential growth in demand” (April 2012). See slide 5, showing that 50% of all data traffic is generated in 1 cell, 80% of data traffic is carried in up to 3 cells, and only 20% of traffic can be regarded as truly mobile. The presentation has been viewed more than 19 thousand times.
  25. Tom Copeland, Tim Koller, Jack Murrin, “Valuation – Measuring and Managing the Valuation of Companies,” John Wiley & Sons, (3rd edition, 2000). There are newer editions on Amazon.com today (e.g., 7th by now).
  26. Dean Bubley, “The 6G vision needs a Reset” (October 2024).
  27. Geoff Hollingworth, “Why 6G Reset and why I support”, (October 2024).
  28. Opanga, “The RAIN AI Platform”, provides a cognitive AI-based solution that addresses (1) Network Optimization lowering Capex demand and increasing the Customer Experience, (2) Energy Reduction above and beyond existing supplier solutions leading to further Opex efficiencies, and (3) Network Intelligence using AI to better manage your network data at a much higher resolution than is possible with classical dashboard applied to technology-driven data lakes.

Greenland: Navigating Security and Critical Infrastructure in the Arctic – A Technology Introduction.

The securitization of the Arctic involves key players such as Greenland (The Polar Bear), Denmark, the USA (The Eagle), Russia (The Brown Bear), and China (The Red Dragon), each with strategic interests in the region. Greenland’s location and resources make it central to geopolitical competition, with Denmark ensuring its sovereignty and security. Greenland’s primary allies are Denmark, the USA, and NATO member countries, which support its security and sovereignty. Unfriendly actors assessed to be potential threats include Russia, due to its military expansion in the Arctic, and China, due to its strategic economic ambitions and influence in the region. The primary threats to Greenland include military tensions, sovereignty challenges, environmental risks, resource exploitation, and economic dependence. Addressing these threats requires a balanced, cooperative approach to ensure regional stability and sustainability.

Cold winds cut like knives, Mountains rise in solitude, Life persists in ice. (Aqqaluk Lynge, “Harsh Embrace” ).

I have been designing, planning, building, and operating telecommunications networks across diverse environmental conditions, ranging from varied geographies to extreme climates. I sort of told myself that I most likely had seen it all. However (and luckily), the more I consider the complexities involved in establishing robust and highly reliable communication networks in Greenland, the more I realize the uniqueness and often extreme challenges involved with building & maintaining communications infrastructures there. The Greenlandic telecommunications incumbent Tusass has successfully built a resilient and dependable transport network that connects nearly every settlement in Greenland, no matter how small. They manage and maintain this network amidst some of the most severe environmental conditions on the planet. The staff of Tusass is fully committed to ensuring connectivity for these remote communities, recognizing that any service disruption can have severe repercussions for those living there.

As an independent board member of Tusass Greenland since 2022, I have witnessed Tusass’s dedication, passion, and understanding of the importance of improving and maintaining their network and connections for the well-being of all Greenlandic communities. To be clear, the opinions I express in this post are solely my own and do not necessarily reflect the views or opinions of Tusass. I believe that my opinions have been shaped by my Tusass and Greenlandic experience, by working closely with Tusass as an independent board member, and by a deep respect for Tusass and its employees. All information that I am using in this post is publicly available through annual reports (of Tusass) or, in general, publicly available on the internet.

Figure 1 Illustrating a coastal telecommunications site supporting the microwave long-haul transport network of Tusass up along the Greenlandic west coast. Courtesy: Tusass A/S (Greenland).

Greenland’s strategic location, its natural resources, environmental significance, and broader geopolitical context make it geopolitically a critical country. Thus, protecting and investing in Greenland’s critical infrastructure is obviously important. Not only from a national and geopolitical security perspective but also with respect to the economic development and stability of Greenland and the Arctic region. If a butterfly’s movements can cause a hurricane, imagine what an angry “polar bear” will do to the global weather and climate. The melting ice caps are enabling new shipping routes and making natural resources much more accessible, and they may also raise the stakes for regional security. For example, with China’s Polar Silk Road initiative where, China seeks to establish (or at least claim) a foothold in the Arctic in order to increase its trade routes and access to resources. This is also reflected in their 2018 declaration stating that China sees itself as a “Near-Arctic State” and concludes that China is one of the continental states that are closest to the Arctic Circle. Russia, which is a real neighboring country to the Arctic region and Circle, has also increased its military presence and economic activities in the Arctic. Recently, Russia has made claims in the Arctic to areas that overlap with what Denmark and Canada see as their natural territories, aiming to secure its northern borders and exploit the region’s resources. Russia has also added new military bases and has conducted large-scale maneuvers along its own Arctic coastline. The potential threats from increased Russian and Chinese Arctic activities pose significant security concerns. Identifying and articulating possible threat scenarios to the Arctic region involving potential hostile actors may indeed justify extraordinary measures and also highlight the need for urgent and substantial investments in and attention to Greenland’s critical infrastructure.

In this article, I focus very much on what key technologies should be considered, why specific technologies should be considered, and how those technologies could be implemented in a larger overarching security and defense architecture driving towards enhancing the safety and security of Greenland:

  • Leapfrog Quality of Critical Infrastructure: Strengthening the existing critical communications infrastructure should be a priority. With Tusass, this is the case in terms of increasing the existing transport network’s reliability and availability by adding new submarine cables and satellite backbone services and the associated satellite infrastructure. However, the backbone of the Tusass economy is a population of 57 thousand. The investments required to quantum leap the robustness of the existing critical infrastructure, as well as deploying many of the technologies discussed in this post, will not have a positive business case or a reasonable return on investment within a short period (e.g., a couple of years) if approached in the way that is the standard practice for most private corporations around the worlds. External subsidies will be required. The benefit evaluation would need to be considered over the long term, more in line with big public infrastructure projects. Most of these critical infrastructure and technology investments discussed are based on particular geopolitical assumptions and serve as risk-mitigating measures with substantial civil upside if we maintain a dual-use philosophy as a boundary condition for those investments. Overall I believe that a positive case might be made from the perspective of the possible loss of not making them rather than a typical gain or growth case expected if an investment is made.
  • Smart Infrastructure Development: Focus on building smart infrastructure, integrating sensor networks (e.g., DAS on submarine cables), and AI-driven automation for critical systems like communication networks, transportation, and energy management to improve resilience and operational efficiency. As discussed in this post, Tusass already has a strong communications network that should underpin any work on enhancing the Greenlandic defense architecture. Moreover, Tusass are experts in building and operating critical communications infrastructures in the Arctic. This is critical know-how that should be heavily relied upon in what has to come.
  • Automated Surveillance and Monitoring Systems: Invest in advanced automated surveillance technologies, such as aquatic and aerial drones, satellite-based monitoring (SIGINT and IMINT), and IoT sensors, to enhance real-time monitoring and protection of Greenland.
  • Autonomous Defense Systems: Deploy autonomous systems, including unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and unmanned underwater vehicles (UUVs), to strengthen defense capabilities and ensure rapid response to potential threats in the Arctic region. These systems should be the backbone of ad-hoc private network deployments serving both defense and civilian use cases.
  • Cybersecurity and AI Integration: Implement robust cybersecurity measures and integrate artificial intelligence to protect critical infrastructure and ensure secure, reliable communication networks supporting both military and civilian applications in Greenland.
  • Dual-Use Infrastructure: Prioritize investments in infrastructure solutions that can serve both military and civilian purposes, such as communication networks and transportation facilities, to maximize benefits and resilience.
  • Local Economic and Social Benefits: Ensure that defense investments support local economic development by creating new job opportunities and improving essential services in Greenland.

I believe that Greenland needs to build a solid Greenlandic-centered know-how on a foundational level around autonomous and automated systems. In order to get there Greenland will need close and strong alliances that is aligned with the aim of achieving a greater degree of independence through clever use of the latest technologies available. Such local expertise will be essential in order to reduce the dependency on external support (e.g., from Denmark and Allies) and ensure that they can maintain operational capabilities independently, particularly during a security crisis. Automation, enabled by digitization and AI-enabled system architectures, would be key to managing and monitoring Greenland’s remote and inaccessible geography and resources efficiently and securely, minimizing the need for extensive human intervention. Leveraging autonomous defense and surveillance technologies and stepping up in digital maturity is an important path to compensating for Greenland’s small population. Additionally, implementing robust, with respect to hardware AND software, automated systems will allow Greenland to protect and maintain its critical infrastructure and services, mitigating the risks associated with (too much) reliance on Denmark or allies during a time of crisis where such resources may be scarce or impractical to timely move to Greenland.

Figure 2 A view from Tusass HQ over Nuuk, Greenland. Courtesy: Tusass A/S (Greenland).

GREENLAND – A CONCISE INTRODUCTION.

Greenland, or Kalaallit Nunaat as it is called in Greenlandic, has a surface area of about 2.2 million square kilometers with ca. 80% covered by ice and is the world’s largest island. It is an autonomous territory of Denmark with a population of approximately 57 thousand. Its surface area is comparable to that of Alaska (1.7 million km2) or Saudi Arabia (2.2 million km2). It is predominantly covered by ice, with a population scattered in smaller settlements along the western coastlines where the climate is milder and more hospitable. Greenland’s extensive coastline measures ca. 44 thousand kilometers and is one of the most remote and sparsely populated coastlines in the world. This remoteness contrasts with more densely populated and developed coastlines like the United States. The remoteness of Greenland’s coastline is further emphasized by a lack of civil infrastructure. There are no connecting roads between settlements, and most (if not all) travel between communities relies on maritime or air transport.

Greenland’s coastline presents several unique security challenges due to its particularities, such as its vast length, rugged terrain, harsh climate, and limited population. These factors make Greenland challenging to monitor and protect effectively, which is critical for several reasons:

  • The vast and inaccessible terrain.
  • Harsh climate and weather conditions.
  • Sparse population and limited infrastructure.
  • Maritime and resource security challenges.
  • Communications technology challenges.
  • Geopolitical significance.

The capital and largest city is Nuuk, located on the southwestern coast. With a population of approximately 18+ thousand or 30+% of the total, Nuuk is Greenland’s administrative and economic center, offering modern amenities and serving as the hub for the island’s limited transportation network. Sisimiut, north of Nuuk on the western coast. It is the second-largest town in Greenland, with a population of around 5,500+. Sisimiut is known for its fishing industry and serves as a base for much of the Greenlandic tourism and outdoor activities.

On the remote and inhospitable eastern coast, Tasiilaq is the largest town in the Ammassalik area, with a population of little less than 2,000. It is relatively isolated compared to the western settlements and is known for its breathtaking natural scenery and opportunities for adventure tourism (check out https://visitgreenland.com/ for much more information). In the far north, on the west coast, we have Qaanaaq (also known as Thule), which is one of the world’s most northern towns, with a population of ca. 600. Located near Qaanaaq, is the so-called Pituffik Space Base which is the United States’ northernmost military base, established in 1951, and a key component of NATO’s early warning and missile defense systems. The USA have had a military presence in Greenland since the early days of the World War II and strengthened during the Cold War. It also plays an important role in monitoring Arctic airspace and supporting the region’s avionics operations.

As of 2023, Greenland has approximately 56 inhabited settlements. I am using the word “settlement” as an all-inclusive covering communities with a population of 10s of thousands (Nuuk) down to 100s or lower. With few exceptions, there are no settlements with connecting roads or any other overland transportation connections with other settlements. All person- and goods transportation between the different settlements is taken by plane or helicopter (provided by Air Greenland) or seaborne transportation (e.g., Royal Artic Line, RAL).

Greenland is rich in natural resources. Apart from water (for hydropower), this includes significant mining, oil, and gas reserves. These natural resources are largely untapped and present substantial opportunities for economic development (and temptation for friendly as well as unfriendly actors). Greenland is believed to have one of the world’s largest deposits of rare earth elements (although by far not comparable to China), extremely valuable as an alternative to the reliance of China and critical for various high-tech applications, including electronics (e.g., your smartphone), renewable energy technologies (e.g., wind turbines and EVs), and defense systems. Graphite and platinum are also present in Greenland and are important in many industrial processes. Some estimates indicate that northeast Greenland’s waters could hold large reserves of (yet) undiscovered oil and gas reserves. Other areas are likewise believed to contain substantial hydrocarbon reserves. However, Greenland’s arctic environment presents severe exploration and extraction challenges, such as extreme cold, ice cover, and remoteness, that so far has made it also very costly and complicated to extraxt its natural resources. With the global warming the economical and practical barrier for exploitation is contineously reducing.

FROM STRATEGIC OUTPOST TO ARCTIC STRONGHOLD: THE EVOLVING SECURITY SIGNIFICANCE OF GREENLAND.

Figure 3 illustrates Greenland’s reliance on and the importance of critical communications infrastructure connecting local communities as well as bridging the rest of the world and the internet. Courtesy: DALL-E.

From a security perspective Greenland has evolved significantly since the Second World War. During World War II, its importance was primarily based on its location as a midway point between North America and Europe serving as a refueling and weather station for allied aircrafts crossing the Atlantic to and from Europe. Additionally, its remote geographical location combined with its harsh climate provided a “safe haven” for monitoring and early warning installations.

During the Cold War era, Greenland’s importance grew (again) due to its proximity to the Soviet Union (and Russia today). Greenland became a key site for early warning radar systems and an integral part of the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) network designed to detect Soviet bombers and missiles heading toward North America. In 1951, the USA-controlled Thule Air Base, today it is called Pituffik Space Base, located in northwest Greenland, was constructed with the purpose of hosting long-range bombers and providing an advanced point (from a USA perspective) for early warning and missile defense systems.

As global tensions eased in the post-Cold War period, Greenland’s strategic status diminished somewhat. However, its status is now changing again due to Russia’s increased aggression in Europe (and geopolitically) and a more assertive China with expressed interest in the Arctic. The arctic ice is melting due to climate change and has resulted in new maritime routes being possible, such as the Northern Sea Route. Also, making Arctic resources more accessible. Thus, we now observe an increased interest from global powers in the Arctic region. And as was the case during the cold-War period (maybe with much higher stakes), Greenland has become strategically critical for monitoring and controlling these emerging routes, and the Arctic in general. Particularly with the observed increased activity and interest from Russia and China.

Greenland’s position in the North Atlantic, bridging the gap between North America and Europe, has become a crucial spot for monitoring and controlling the transatlantic routes. Greenland is part of the so-called Greenland-Iceland-UK (GIUK) Gap. This gap is a critical “chokepoint” for controlling naval and submarine operations, as was evident during the Second World War (e.g., read up on the Battle of the Atlantic). Controlling the Gap increases the security of maritime and air traffic between the continents. Thus, Greenland has again become a key component in defense strategies and threat scenarios envisioned and studied by NATO (and the USA).

GREENLANDS GEOPOLITICAL ROLE.

Greenland’s recent significance in the Arctic should not be underestimated. It arises, in particular, from climate change and, as a result, melting ice caps that have and will enable new shipping routes and potential (easier) access to Greenland’s untapped natural resources.

Greenland hosts critical military and surveillance assets, including early warning radar installations as well as air & naval bases. These defense assets actively contributes to global security and is integral to NATO’s missile defense and early warning systems. They provide data for monitoring potential missile threats and other aerial activities in the North Atlantic and Arctic regions. Greenland’s air and naval bases also support specialized military operations, providing logistical hubs for allied forces operating in the Arctic and North Atlantic.

From a security perspective, Greenland’s control is not only about monitoring and defense. It is also about deterring potential threats from potential hostile actors. It allows for effective monitoring and defense of the Arctic and North Atlantic regions. Enabling the detection and tracking of submarines, ships, and aircraft. Such capabilities enhance situational awareness and operational readiness, but more importantly, it sends a message to potential adversaries (e.g., maybe unaware, as unlikely as it may be, about the deficiencies of Danish Arctic patrol ships). The ability to project power and maintain a military presence in this area is necessary for deterring potential adversaries and protecting he critical communications infrastructure (e.g., submarine cables), maritime routes, and airspace.

The strategic location of Greenland is key to contribute to the global security dynamics. Ensuring Greenland’s security and stability is essential for also maintaining control over critical transatlantic routes, monitoring Arctic activities, and protecting against potential threats from hostile actors. Making Greenland a cornerstone of the defense infrastructure and an essential area for geopolitical strategy in the North Atlantic and Arctic regions.

INFRASTRUCTURE RECOMMENDATIONS.

Recent research has focused on Greenland in the context of Arctic security (see “Greenland in Arctic Security: (De)securitization Dynamics under Climatic Thaw and Geopolitical Freeze” by M. Jacobsen et al.). The work emphasizes the importance of maintaining and enhancing surveillance and early warning systems. Greenland is advised to invest in advanced radar systems and satellite monitoring capabilities. These systems are relevant for detecting potential threats and providing timely information, ensuring national and regional security. I should point to the following traditional academic use of the word “securitization,” particularly from the Copenhagen School, which refers to framing an issue as an existential threat requiring extraordinary measures. Thus, securitization is the process by which topics are framed as matters of security that should be addressed with urgency and exeptional measures.

The research work furthermore underscores the Greenlandic need for additional strategic infrastructure development, such as enhancing or building new airport facilities and the associated infrastructure. This would for example include expanding and upgrading existing airports to improve connectivity within Greenland and with external partners (e.g., as is happening with the new airport in Nuuk). Such developments would also support economic activities, emergency response, and defense operations. Thus, it combines civic and military applications in what could be defined as dual-purpose infrastructure programs.

The above-mentioned research argues for the need to develop advanced communication systems, Signals Intelligence (SIGINT), and Image Intelligence (IMINT) gathering technologies based on satellite- and aerial-based platforms. These wide-area coverage platforms are critical to Greenland due to its vast and remote areas, where traditional communication networks may be insufficient or impractical. Satellite communication systems such as GEO, MEO, and LEO (and combinations thereof), and stratospheric high-altitude platform systems (HAPS) are relevant for maintaining robust surveillance, facilitating rapid emergency response, and ensuring effective coordination of security as well as search & rescue operations.

Expanding broadband internet access across Greenland is also a key recommendation (that is already in progress today). This involves improving the availability and reliability of communications-related connectivity by additional submarine cables and by new satellite internet services, ensuring that even the most remote communities have reliable broadband internet connectivity. All communities need to have access to broadband internet, be connected, enable economic development, improve quality of life in general, and integrate remote areas into the national and global networks. These communication infrastructure improvements are important for civilian and military purposes, ensuring that Greenland can effectively manage its security challenges and leverage new economic opportunities for its communities. It is my personal opinion that most communities or settlements are connected to the wider internet, and the priority should be to improve the redundancy, availability, and reliability of the existing critical communications infrastructure. With that also comes more quality in the form of higher internet speeds.

The applicability of at least some of the specific securitization recommendations for Greenland, as outlined in Marc Jacobsen’s “Greenland in Arctic Security: (De)securitization Dynamics Under Climatic Thaw and Geopolitical Freeze,” may be somewhat impractical given the unique characteristics of Greenland with its vast area and very small population. Quite a few recommendations (in my opinion), even if in place “today or tomorrow,” would require a critical scale of expertise, human, and industrial capital that Greenland does not have available on its own (and also is unlikely to have in the future). Thus, some of the recommendations depend on such resources to be delivered from outside Greenland, posing inherent availability risks to provide in a crisis (assuming that such capacity would even be available under normal circumstances). This dependency on external actors, particularly Danish and International investors, complicates Greenland’s ability to independently implement policies recommended by the securitization framework. It could lead to conflicts between local priorities and the interests of external stakeholders, particularly in a time of a clear and present security crisis (e.g., Russia attempting to expand west above and beyond Ukraine).

Also, as a result of Greenland’s small population there will be a limited pool of available local personnel with the needed skills to draw upon for implementing and maintaining many of the recommendations in “Greenland in Arctic Security: (De)securitization Dynamics under Climatic Thaw and Geopolitical Freeze”. Training and deploying enough high-tech skilled individuals to cover Greenland’s vast territory and technology needs is a very complex challenge given the limited human resources and challenges in getting external high-tech resouces to Greenland.

I believe Greenland should focus on establishing a comprehensive security strategy that minimizes its dependency on its natural allies and external actors in general. The dual-use approach should be integral to such a security strategy, where technology investments serve civil and defense purposes whenever possible. This approach ensures that Greenlandic society benefits directly from investments in building a robust security framework. I will come back to the various technologies that may be relevant in achieving more independence and less reliance on the external actors that are so prevalent in Greenland today.

HOW CRITICAL IS CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE TO GREENLAND

Communications infrastructure is seen as critical in Greenland. It has to provide a reliable and good quality service despite Greenland having some of the most unfavorable environmental conditions in which to build and operate communications networks. Greenland is characterized by vast distances between relatively small, isolated communities. Thus, this makes effective communication essential for bridging those gaps, allowing people to stay connected with each other and as well as the outside world irrespective of weather or geography. The lack of a comprehensive road network and reliance on sea and air travel further emphasize the importance of reliable and available telecommunications services, ensuring timely communication and coordination across the country.

Telecommunications infrastructure is a cornerstone of economic development in Greenland (as it has been elsewhere). It is about efficient internet and telephony services and its role in business operations, e-commerce activities, and international market connections. These aspects are important for the economic growth, education, and diversification of the many Greenlandic communities. The burgeoning tourism industry will also depend on (maybe even demand) robust communication networks to serve those tourists, ensure their safety in remote areas, and promote tourism activities in general. This illustrates very firmly that the communications infrastructure is critical (should there be any doubts).

Telecommunications infrastructure also enables distance learning in education and health services, providing people in remote areas with access to high-quality education that otherwise would not be possible (e.g., Coursera, Udemy Academy, …). Telemedicine has obvious benefits for healthcare services that are often limited in remote regions. It allows residents to receive remote medical consultations and services (e.g., by video conferencing) without the need for long-distance and time-consuming travels that often may aggravate a patient’s condition. Emergency response and public safety are other critical areas in which our communications infrastructure plays a crucial role. Greenland’s harsh and unpredictable weather can lead to severe storms, avalanches, and ice-related incidents. It is therefore important to have a reliable communication network that allows for timely warnings, supporting rescue operations & coordination, and public safety. Moreover, maritime safety also depends on a robust communication infrastructure, enabling reliable communication between ships and coastal stations.

A strong communication network can significantly enhance social connectivity, and help maintaining social ties, such as among families and communities across Greenland. Thus reduce the feeling of isolation. Supporting social cohesion in communities as well as between settlements. Telecommunications can also facilitate sharing and preserving the Greenlandic culture and language through digital media (e.g., Tusass Music), online platforms, and social networks (e.g., Facebook used by ca. 85% of the eligible population, that number is ca. 67% in Denmark).

For a government and its administration, maintaining effective and reliable communication is essential for well-functioning public services and its administration. It should facilitate coordination between different levels of government and remote administration. Additionally, environmental monitoring and research benefit greatly from a reliable and available communication infrastructure. Greenland’s unique environment attracts scientific research, and robust communication networks are essential for supporting data transmission (in general), coordination of research activities, and environmental monitoring. Greenland’s role in global climate change studies should also be supported by communication networks that provide the means of sharing essential climate data collected from remote research stations.

Last but not least. A well-protected (i.e., redundant) and highly available communications infrastructure is a cornerstone of any national defense or emergency situation. If it is well functioning, the critical communications infrastructure will support the seamless operation of military and civilian coordination, protect against cyber threats, and ensure public confidence during a crisis situation (natural or man-made). The importance of investing in and maintaining such a critical infrastructure cannot be underestimated. It plays a critical role in a nation’s overall security and resilience.

TUSASS: THE BACKBONE OF GREENLANDS CRITICAL COMMUNICATIONS INFRASTRUCTURE.

Tusass is the primary telecommunications provider in Greenland. It operates a comprehensive telecom network that includes submarine cables with 5 landing stations in Greenland, very long microwave (MW) radio chains (i.e., long-haul backbone transmission links) with MW backhaul branches to settlements along its way, and broadband satellite connections to deliver telephony, internet, and other communication services across the country. The company is wholly owned by the Government of Greenland (Naalakkersuisut). Positioning Tusass as a critical company responsible for the nation’s communications infrastructure. Tusass faces unique challenges due to the vast, remote, and rugged terrain. Extreme weather conditions make it difficult, often impossible, to work outside for at least 3 – 4 months a year. This complicates the deployment and maintenance of any infrastructure in general and a communications network in particular. The regulatory framework mandates that Tusass fulfills a so-called Public Service Obligation, or PSO. This requires Tusass to provide essential telecommunications services to all of Greenland, even the most isolated communities. This requires Tusass to continue to invest heavily in expanding and enhancing its critical infrastructure, providing reliable and high-quality services to all residents throughout Greenland.

Tusass is the main and, in most areas, the only telecommunications provider in Greenland. The company holds a dominant market position where it provides essential services such as fixed-line telephony, mobile networks, and internet services. The Greenlandic market for internet and data connections was liberalized in 2015. The liberalization allowed private Internet Service Providers (ISPs) to purchase wholesale connections from Tusass and resell them. Despite liberalization, Tusass remains the dominant force in Greenland’s telecommunications sector. Tusass’s market position can be attributed to its extensive communications infrastructure and its government ownership. With a population of 57 thousand and its vast geographical size, it would be highly uneconomical and human-resource wise very chalenging to have duplicate competing physical communications infrastructures and support organizations in Greenland. Not to mention that it would take many years before an alternative telco infrastructure could be up an running matching what is already in place. Thus, while there are smaller niche service providers, Tusass effectively operates as Greenland’s sole telecom provider.

Figure 4 Illustrates one of many of Tusass’s long-haul microwave site along Greenland’s west coast. Accessible only by helicopter. Courtesy: Tusass A/S (Greenland).

CURRENT STATE OF CRITICAL COMMUNICATIONS INFRASTRUCTURE.

The illustration below provides an overview of some of the major and critical infrastructures available in Greenland, with a focus on the communications infrastructure provided by Tusass, such as submarine cables, microwave (MW) radios radio chains, and satellite ground stations, which all connect Greenland and give access to the Internet for all of Greenland.

Figure 5 illustrates the Greenlandic telecommunications provider Tusass infrastructure. Note that Tusass is the incumbent and only telecom provider in Greenland. Currently, five hydropower plants (shown above, location only indicative) provide more than 80% of Greenland’s electricity demand. A new international airport is expected to be operational in Nuuk from November 2024. Source: from Tusass Annual Report 2023 with some additions and minor edits.

From the south of Nanortalik up to above Upernavik on the west coast, Tusass has a 1,700+ km long microwave radio chain connecting all settlements along Greenland’s west coast from the south to the north distributed, supported by 67 microwave (MW) radio sites. Thus, have a microwave radio equipment located for every ca. 25 km ensuring very high performance and availability of connectivity to the many settlements along the West Coast. This setup is called a long-haul microwave chain that uses a series of MW radio relay stations to transmit data over long distances (e.g., up to thousands of kilometers). The harsh climate with heavy rain, snow, and icing makes it very challenging to operate high-frequency, high-bandwidth microwaves (i.e., the short distances between the radio chain sites). The MW radio sites are mainly located on remote peaks in the harsh and unforgiving coastal landscape (ensuring line-of-site), making helicopters the only means of accessing these locations for maintenance and fueling. The field engineers here are pretty much superheroes maintaining the critical communications infrastructure of Greenland and understanding its life-and-death implications for all the remote communities if it breaks down (with the additional danger of meeting a very hungry polar bear and being stuck for several days on a location due to poor weather preventing the helicopter from picking the engineers up again).

Figure 6 illustrates a typical housing for field service staff when on site visits. As the weather can change very rapidly in Greenland it is not uncommon that field service staff have to wait for many days before they can be picked up again by the helicopter. Courtesy: Tusass A/S (Greenland).

Greenland relies on the “Greenland Connect” submarine cable to connect to the rest of the world and the wider internet with a modern-day throughput. The submarine cable connecting Greenland to Canada and Iceland runs from Newfoundland and Labrador in Canada to Nuuk and continues from Qaqortoq in Greenland to land in Iceland (that connects further to Copenhagen and the wider internet). Tusass, furthermore, has deployed submarine cables between 5 of the major Greenlandic settlements, including Nuuk, up the west coast and down to the south (i.e., Qaqortoq). The submarine cables provide some level of redundancies, increased availability, and substantial capacity & quality augmentation to the long-haul MW chain that carries the traffic from surrounding settlements. The submarine cables are critical and essential for the modernization and digitalization of Greenland. However, there are only two main submarine broadband cable connection points, the Canada – Nuuk and Qaqortoq – Iceland submarine connections, to and from Greenland. From a security perspective, this poses substantial and unique risks to Greenland, and its role and impact need to be considered in any work on critical infrastructure strategy. If both international submarine cables were compromised, intentionally or otherwise, it would become challenging, if possible, to sustain today’s communications demand. Most traffic would have to be supported by existing satellite capacity, which is substantially lower than the existing submarine cables can support, leaving the capacity mainly for mission-critical communications. Allowing little spare capacity for consumer and non-critical business communication needs. This said, as long as Greenlandic submarine cables, terrestrial transport, and switching infrastructure are functional, it would be possible to internally to Greenland maintain a resemblance of internet services and communication means between connected settlements using modern day network design thinking.

Moreover, while the submarine cables along the west coast offer redundancy to the land-based long-haul transport solution, there are substantial risks to settlements and their populations where the long-haul MW solution is the only means of supporting remote Greenlandic communities. Given Greenland’s unique geographic and climate challenges it is not only very costly but also time-consuming to reduce the risk of disruption to the existing lesser redundant critical infrastructure already in place (e.g., above Aasiaat north of the Arctic Circle).

Using satellites is an additional dimension, and part of the connectivity toolkit, that can be used to improve the redundancy and availability of the land- and water-based critical communications infrastructures. However, the drawback of satellite systems is that they generally are bandwidth/throughput limited and have longer signal delays (latency and round-trip time) than terrestrial-based communications systems. These issues could pose some limitations on how well some services can be supported or will function and would require a versatile traffic management & prioritization system in case the satellite solution would be the only means of connecting a relatively high-traffic area (e.g., Tasiilaq) used to ground-based support of broadband transport means with substantial more available bandwidth than accessible to the satellite solution. Particular for GEO stationary satellite services, with the satellite located at 36 thousand kilometer altitude, the data traffic flow needs to be carefully optimized in order to function well irrespective of the substantial latency experienced on such connections that at the very best can be 239 milliseconds and in practice might be closer to twice that or more. This poses significant challenges to particular TCP/IP data flows on such response-time-challenged connections and applications sensitivity short round trip times.

Optimizing and stabilizing TCP/IP data flows over GEO satellite connections requires a multi-faceted approach involving enhancements to the TCP protocol (e.g., window scaling, SACK, TCP Hypla, …), the use of hybrid and proxy solutions, application-layer adjustments, error correction mechanisms, Quality of Service (QoS) and traffic shaping, DNS optimizations, and continuous network monitoring. Combining these strategies makes it possible to mitigate some of the inherent challenges of high-latency satellite links and ensure more effective and efficient IP flows and better utilization of the available satellite link bandwidth. Optimizing control signals and latency-sensitive data flows over GEO and LEO satellite connections may also substantially reduce the sensitivity to the prohibitive long delays experienced on GEO connections, using the lower latency LEO connection (RTT < ~ 50 ms @ 500 km altitude), or, if available as a better alternative a long-haul microwave link or submarine connection.

Tusass, in collaboration with the Spanish satellite company Hispasat, make use of the Greenland geostationary satellite, Greensat. Tusass signed an agreement with Hispasat to lease space capacity (800 MHz @ Ku-band) on the Amazonas Nexus satellite until the end of its lifetime (i.e., 2038+/-). Greensat was taken into operation in the last quarter of 2023 (note: it was launched in February 2023), providing services to the satellite-only settlement areas around Qaanaaq, the northernmost settlement on the west coast of Greenland, and Tasiilaq and Ittoqortormiut (north of Tasiilaq), on the remote east coast. All mobile and fixed traffic from a satellite-only area is routed to a satellite ground station that is connected to the geostationary satellite (see the illustration below). The satellite’s primary mission is to provide broadband services to areas that, due to geography & climate and cost, are impractical to connect by submarine cable or long-haul microwave links. The Greensat satellite closes the connection to the rest of the world and the internet via a ground station on Gran Canaria. It also connects to Greenland via submarine cables in Nuuk (via Canada and Qaqortoq).

Figure 7 The image shows a large geostationary satellite ground-station antenna located in Greenland’s cold and remote area. The antenna’s primary purpose is to facilitate communication with geostationary satellites 36 thousand kilometers away, transmitting and receiving data. It may support various services such as Internet, television broadcasting, weather monitoring, and emergency communications. The components are (1) a parabolic reflector (dish), (2) a feed horn and receiver, (3) a mount and support structure, (4) control and monitoring systems, and (5) a radome (not shown on the picture) which is a structural, weatherproof enclosure that protects the antenna from environmental elements without interfering with the electromagnetic signals it transmits and receives. The LEO satellite ground stations are much smaller as the distance between the ground and the low-earth satellite is much smaller, i.e., ca. 350 – 650 km, resulting in less challenging receive and transmit conditions (compared to the connection to a geostationary satellite).

In addition, Tusass also makes use of UK-based OneWeb (Eutelsat) LEO satellite backhaul services at several locations where an area fixed and mobile traffic is routed to a point-of-presence connected to a satellite ground station that connects to a OneWeb satellite that connects to the central switching center in Nuuk (connected to another ground station).

CRITICAL PROPERTIES FOR RELIABLE AND SECURE TRANSPORT NETWORKS.

A physical transport network comprises many tangible components, such as cables, routers, and switches, which form an interconnected system capable of transmitting data. The network is designed and planned according to a given expected coverage, use and level of targeted quality (e.g., speed, latency, priority and security). Moreover, we are also concerned about such a networks availability as well as reliability. We design the physical and logical (i.e., related to higher levels of the OSI stack than the physical) network according to a given target availability, that is how many hours in a year should the network minimum be operational and available to our customers. You will see availability given in percentage of the total hours in a year (e.g., 8,760 hours in a normal year and 8,784 hours in a leap year). So an availability of 99.9% means that we target a minimum operational time of our network of 8,751 hours, or, alternatively, accept a maximum of 9 hours of downtime. The reliability of a network refers to the probability hat the network will continue to function without failure for a given period. For example, say you have a mean time between failures (MTBF) of 8750 hours and you want to figure out what the likelihood is of operating without failure for 4,380 hours (half a year), you find that there is a ca. 60% chance of operating without a failure (or 40% that a failure may occur within the next 6 months). For a critical infrastructure the availability and reliability metrics are very important to consider in any design and planning process.

In contrast to the physical network depiction, a network graph representation abstracts the physical transport network into a mathematical model where graph nodes (or vertexes) represent the network’s many components and edges (or links) represent the physical and logical connections between these network’s many components. Modellizing the physical (and logical) network allows designers and planners to study in detail a networks robustness against many types of disruptions as well as its general functioning and performance.

Suppose we are using a graph approach in our design of a critical communications network. We then need to carefully consider various graph properties critical for the network’s robustness, security, reliability, and efficiency. To achieve this, one must strive for resilience and fault tolerance by designing for increased redundancy and availability involving multiple paths, edges, or connections between nodes, preventing single points of failure (SPoF). This involves creating a network where the number of independent paths between any two nodes is maximized (often subject to economics and feasibility boundary conditions). An optimal average degree of nodes should also be a design criterion. A higher degree of nodes enhances the graph’s, and thus the underlying network’s, resilience, thus avoiding increased vulnerability.

Scalability is a crucial network property. This is best achieved through a hierarchical structure (or topology) that allows for efficient network management as the network expands. The Modularity, which is another graph KPI, ensures that the network can integrate new nodes and edges without major reconfigurations, supporting civilian expansion and military operations or dual-purpose operations. To meet low-latency and high-throughput requirements, the shortest-path routing algorithms should be applied to allow us to minimize the latency or round-trip time (and thus increase throughput). Moreover, bandwidth management should be implemented, allowing the network to handle large data volumes in a prioritized manner (if required). This also ensures that the network can accommodate peak loads and prioritize critical communication when it is compromised.

Security is a paramount property of any communications network. In today’s environment with many real and dangerous cyber threats, it may be one of the most important topics to consider. Each node and link (or edge) in a network requires robust defenses against cyber threats. In our design, we need to think about encryption, authentication, intrusion, and anomaly detection systems. Network segmentation will help isolate critical defense communications from civilian traffic, preventing breaches from compromising the entire network. Survivability is enhanced by minimizing the Network Diameter, a graph property. A low (or lower) network diameter ensures that a network can quickly reroute traffic in case of failures and is an important design element for robustness against targeted attacks and random failures.

Likewise, interoperability is essential for seamless integration between civilian and military communication systems. Flexible protocols and specifications (e.g., Open API) enable different types of traffic and varying security requirements. These frameworks provide the structure, tools, and best practices needed to build and maintain secure communication systems. Thereby protecting against the various cyber threats we have today and expect in the future. Efficiency is achieved through effective load balancing (e.g., on a logical as well as physical level) to distribute traffic evenly across the network, prevent bottlenecks, optimize performance, and design for energy-efficient operations, particularly in remote or harsh environments or in case a part of the network has been compromised.

In order to support both civilian services and defense operations, accessibility and high availability are very important design requirements to consider when having a network with extensive large-scale coverage, including in very remote areas. Incorporating redundant communication links, such as satellite, fiber optic, and wireless, are design choices that allow for high availability even under adverse and disruptive conditions. It makes good sense in an environment such as Greenland to ensure that long-haul microwave links have a given level of redundancy either by satellite backhaul, submarine cable, or additional MW redundancy. While we always strive for our designs to be cost-effective, it may be a challenge if the circumstances dictate that the best redundancy (availability) solution is solved by non-terrestrial means (e.g., by satellite or submarine means). However, efficiency should be addressed by optimizing resource allocation to balance cost with performance, ensuring civil and defense needs are met without excessive expenditure, and sharing infrastructure where feasible to reduce costs while maintaining security through logical separation.

Ultra-secure transport networks are designed to meet stringent reliability, resilience, and security requirements. These type of networks are critical for civil and defense applications, ensuring continuous operation and protection against various threats. The important graph properties that such networks should exhibit include high connectivity, redundancy, low diameter, high node degree, network segmentation, robustness to attacks, scalability, efficient load balancing, geographical diversity, and adaptive routing.

High connectivity ensures multiple independent paths between any pair of nodes in the network, which is crucial for a communication network’s resilience and fault tolerance. This allows the network to maintain functionality even if several nodes or links fail, making it capable of withstanding targeted attacks or random failures without significant performance degradation. Redundancy, which involves having multiple backup paths and nodes, enhances fault tolerance and high availability by providing alternative routes for data transmission if primary paths fail. Redundancy also applies to critical network components such as switches, routers, and communication links, ensuring no or uncritical single point of failure.

A low diameter, the longest-shortest path between any two nodes, ensures data can travel quickly across the network, minimizing latency. This is especially important in time-sensitive applications. High node degree, meaning nodes are connected to many other nodes, increases the network’s robustness and allows for multiple paths for data to traverse, contributing to security and availability. However, it is essential to manage the trade-off between having a high node degree and the complexity of the network.

Network segmentation and compartmentalization will enhance security by limiting the impact of breaches or failures on a small part of the network. This is of particular importance when having a dual-use network design. Network segmentation divides the network into multiple smaller subnetworks. Each segment may have its own security and access control policies. Network compartmentalization involves designing isolated environments where, for example, data and functionalities are separated based on their criticality and sensitivity (this is, in general, a logical separation). Both strategies help contain cyber threats as well as prevent them from spreading across an entire network. Moreover, it also allows for a more granular control over network traffic and access. With this consideration, we should have a network that is robust against various types of attacks, including both physical and cyber attacks, by using secure protocols, encryption, authentication mechanisms, and intrusion detection systems. The aim of the network topology should be to minimize the impact of potential attacks on critical network nodes and links.

In a country such as Greenland, with settlements spread out over a very long distance and supported by very long and exposed transmission links (e.g., long-haul microwave links), geographical diversity is an essential design consideration that allows us to protect the functioning of services against localized disasters or failures. Typically, this involves distributing switching and management nodes, including data centers, across different geographic locations, ensuring that a failure in one area or with a main transport link does not disrupt the major parts of a network. This is particularly important for disaster recovery and business continuity. Finally, the network should support adaptive and dynamic routing protocols that can quickly respond to changes in the network topology, such as node failures or changes in traffic patterns. Such protocols will enhance the network’s resilience by automatically finding the best real-time data transmission paths.

TUSASS NETWORK AS A GRAPH.

Real maps, such as the Greenland map shown below at the left side of Figure 8, provide valuable geographical context and are essential for understanding the physical layout and extent of, for example, a transport network. A graph representation, as shown on the right side of Figure 8, on the other hand, offers a powerful and complementary perspective of the real-world network topology. It can emphasize the structural properties (and qualities) without those disappearing in geographical details that often are not relevant to the network functioning (if designed appropriately). A graph can contain many layers of network information that pretty much describe the network stack if required (e.g., from physical transport up through IP, TCP/IP, and to the application layers). It also supports many types of advanced analysis, design scenarios, and different types of simulations. A graph representation of a communications network is an invaluable tool for network design, planning, troubleshooting, analysis, and management.

Thus, the network graph approach offers several benefits for planning and operations. Firstly, the approach can often visualize the network’s topology better than a geographical map. It facilitates the understanding of various network (and graph) relationships and interconnections between the various network components. Secondly, the graph algorithms can be applied to the network graph and support the analysis of its characteristics, such as availability and redundancy scores, connectivity in general, the shortest paths, and so forth. This kind of analysis helps us identify critical nodes or links that may be sensitive to network and service disruption. It can also help significantly in maintaining and optimizing a network’s operation.

So, analyzing the our communication network’s graph representation makes it possible to identify potential weaknesses in the physical transport network, such as single points of failure (SPoF), bottlenecks, or areas with limited or weak redundancy. These identified weaknesses can then be addressed to enhance the network’s resilience, e.g., improving our network’s redundancy, availability and thus its overall reliability.

Figure 8 The chart above shows on the left side the topology of the (real) transport network of Tusass with the reference point in the Greenlandic settlements it connects. It should be noted that the actual transport network is slightly different as there are more hops between settlements than is shown here. On the right side is a graph representation of the Tusass transport network, shown on the left. The network graph represents the transport network on the west coast north and southbound. There are three main connection categories: (Black dashed line) Microwave (MW), (Orange dashed line) Submarine Cable, and (Blue solid line) Satellite, of which there are a GEO and a LEO arrangement. The size of the node, or settlements, represents the size of the population, which is also why Nuuk has the largest circle. The graph has been drawn consistent with the Kamada-Kawai layout, which is particularly useful for small to medium graphs, providing a reasonable, intuitive visualization of the structural relationship between nodes.

In the following, it is important to understand that due to Greenland’s specific conditions, such as weather and geography, building a robust transport network regarding reliability and redundancy will always be challenging, particularly when relying on the standard toolbox for designing, planning, and creating such networks. With geographical challenges should for example be understood the resulting lack of civil infrastructure connecting settlements … such as the lack of a road network.

The Table below provides key performance indicators (KPIs) for the Greenlandic (Tusass) transport network graph, as illustrated in Figure 8 above. It represents various aspects of the transport network’s structure and connectivity. This graph consists of 93 vertices (e.g., settlements and other connection points, such as long-haul MW radio sites) and 101 edges (transport connections), and it is fully connected, meaning all nodes are reachable within the network. There is only one subgraph, indicating no isolated segments as expected.

The Average Path Length suggests that it takes on average 39 steps to travel between any two nodes. This is a relatively high number, which may indicate a less efficient network. The Diameter of a network is defined as the longest shortest path between any two nodes. It can be shown that the value of the diameter lies between the value of the radius and twice that value (and not higher;-). The diameter is found to be 32, indicating a quite high maximum distance between the most distant nodes. This suggests that the network has a quite extensive reach, as is also obvious from the various illustrations of the transport network above (Figure 8) and below (Figure 11 & 12). Apart from the fact that such a high diameter may indicate potential inefficiencies, a large diameter can also mean that, in the worst-case scenarios, such as a compromised link or connectivity issues in general, communication between some nodes involves many steps (or hops), potentially leading to higher latency and slower data transmission. Related to the Diameter, the network Radius is the minimum eccentricity of any node, which is the shortest path from the most central node to the farthest node. Here, we find the radius to be 16, which means that even the most centrally located node is relatively far from some other nodes in the network. Something that is also very obvious from the various illustrations of the transport network. This emphasizes that the network has nodes that are significantly far apart. Without sufficient redundancy in place, such a transport network may be more sensitive to disruption of the connectivity.

From the perspective of redundancy, a large diameter and radius may imply that the network has fewer alternative paths between distant nodes (i.e., a lower redundancy score). This is, for example, the case between the northern point of Kullorsuaq and Aasiaat. Aasiaat is the first settlement (from the North) to be connected both by microwave and submarine cable and thus has an alternative connectivity solution to the long-haul microwave chain. If a critical node or link fails, the alternative path latency might be considerably longer than the compromised connectivity, such as would be the case with the alternative connectivity being satellite-based, leading to inefficiencies and possible reduced performance. This can also suggest potential capacity bottlenecks where specific paths are heavily relied upon without having enough capacity to act as the sole connectivity for a given transmission path. Thus, the vulnerability of the network to failures increases, resulting in reduced performance for customers in the affected area.

We find a Graph Density, at 0.024. This value indicates a sparse network with relatively few connections compared to the number of possible connections. The Clustering Coefficient is 0.014 and indicates that there are very few tightly-knit groups of nodes (again easily confirmed by visual inspection of the graph itself, see the various figures). The value of the Average Betweenness (ca. 423) measures how often nodes act as bridges along the shortest path between other nodes, indicating a significant central node (i.e., Nuuk).

The Average Closeness of 0.0003 and the Average Eigenvector Centrality of 0.105 provide insights into settlements’ influence and accessibility within the transport network. The Average Closeness measures of how close, on average, nodes are to each other. A high value indicates that nodes (or settlements) are close to each other meaning that the information (e.g., user data, signaling) being transported over the network spreads quickly and efficiently. And not surprisingly the opposite would be the case for a low average value. For our Tusass network the average closeness is very low and suggests that the network may face challenges in accessibility and efficiency, with nodes (settlements) being relatively far from one another. This typically will have an impact on the speed and effectiveness of communication across the network. The Average Eigenvector Centrality measures the overall importance (or influence) of nodes within a network. The term Eigenvector is a mathematical concept from linear algebra that represents the stable state of the network and provides insights into the structure of the graph and thus the network. For our Tusass network the average eigenvector value is (very) low and indicates a distribution of influence across several nodes that may actually prevent reliance on a single point of failure and, in general, such structures are thought to enhance a network’s resilience and redundancy. An Average Degree of ca. 2 means that each node has about 2 connections on average, indicating a hierarchical network structure with fewer direct connections and with a somewhat low level of redundancy, consistent with what can be observed from the various illustrations shown in this post. This do indicate that our network may be more vulnerable to disruption and failures and have a relative high latency (thus, a high round trip time).

Say that for some reason, the connection to Ilulissat, a settlement north of Aasiaat on the west coast with a little under 5 thousand people, is disrupted due to a connectivity issue between Ilulissat and Qasigiannguit, a neighboring settlement to Ilulissat with ca. a thousand people. This would today disconnect ca. 11 thousand people from receiving communications services or ca. 20% of Tusass’s customer base as all settlements north of Ilulissat would likewise be disconnected because of the reliance on the broken connection to also transport their data towards Nuuk and the internet using the submarine cables out of Greenland. In the terminology of the network graph, a broken connection (or edge as it is called in graph theory) that breaks up the network into two (or more) disconnected parts is called a Bridge. Thus, the connection between Ilulissat and Qasigiannguit is a bridge, as if it is broken, disconnecting the northern part of the long-haul microwave network above Ilulissat. Similarly, if Ilulissat were a central switching hub disrupted, it would disconnect the upper northern network from the network south of Ilulissat, and we would call Ilulissat an Articulation Point. For example, a submarine cable between Aasiaat and Ilulissat would provide redundancy for this particular event, mitigating a disruption of the microwave long-haul network between Ilulissat and Aasiaat that would disconnect at least 20% of the population from communications services.

The transport network has 44 Articulation Points and 57 Bridges, highlighting vulnerabilities where node or link failures could significantly disrupt the connectivity between parts of the network, disconnecting major parts of the network and thus disrupting services. A Modularity of 0.65 suggests a moderately high presence of distinct communities, with the network divided into 8 such communities (see Figure below).

Figure 9 In network analysis, a “natural” community (or cluster) is a group of nodes that are more densely connected to each other than to nodes outside the group. Natural communities are denser subgraphs within a larger network. Identifying such communities helps in understanding the structure and function of the network. In the above analysis of how Tusass’s transport network connects to the various settlements illustrates quiet well the various categories of connectivity (e.g., long-haul microwaves only, submarine cable redundancy, satellite redundancy, etc..) in the communications network of Tusass,

A Throughput (or Degree) of 202 indicates a network with an overall capacity for data transmission. The Degree is the average number of connections per node for a network graph. In a transport network, the degree indicates how many direct connections it has to other settlements. A higher degree implies better connectivity and potentially a higher resilience and redundancy. In a fully connected network with 93 nodes, the total degree would be 93 multiplied by 92, which equals 8,556. Therefore, a value of 202 is quite low in comparison, indicating that the network is far from fully connected, which anyway would be unusual for a transport network on this side. Our transport network is relatively sparse and, thus, resulting in a lower total degree, suggesting that fewer direct paths exist between nodes. This may potentially also mean less overall network redundancy. In the case of a node or link failure, there might be fewer alternative routes, which, as a consequence, can impact network reliability and resilience. Lower degree values can also indicate limited capacity for data transmission between nodes, potentially leading to congestion or bottlenecks if certain paths become over-utilized. This can, of course, then affect the efficiency and speed of data transfer within the network as traffic congestion levels increase.

The KPIs, shown in Table 1 below, collectively indicate that our Greenlandic transport network has several critical points and connections that could affect redundancy and availability. Particularly if they become compromised or experience outages. The high number of articulation points and bridges indicates possible design weaknesses, with the low density and average degree suggesting a limited level of redundancy. In fact, Tusass has, over several years, improved its transport network resilience, focusing on increasing the level of redundancy and reducing critical single points of failure. However, the changes and additions are costly and, due to the environmental conditions of Greenland, are also time-consuming, having fewer working days available for outdoor civil work projects.

Table 1 illustrates the most important graph KPIs, also described in the text above and below, that are associated with the graph representation of the Tusass transport network represented by the settlement connectivity (approximating but not one-to-one with the actual transport network).

In graph theory, an articulation point (see Figure 10 below) is a node that, if it is removed from the network, would split the network into disconnected parts. In our story, an articulation point would be one of our Greenlandic settlements. These types of points are thus important in maintaining network connectivity and serve as points in the network where alternative redundancy schemes might serve well. Therefore, creating additional redundancy in the network’s routing paths and implementing alternative connections will mitigate the impact of a failure of an articulation point, ensuring continued operations in case of a disruption. Basically, the more redundancy that a network has, the fewer articulation points the network will have; see also the illustration below.

Figure 10 The figure above illustrates the redundancy and availability of 3 simple undirected graphs with 4 nodes. The first graph is fully connected, with no articulation points or bridges, resulting in a redundancy and availability score of 100%. Thus I can remove a Node or a Connection from the graph and the remainder will remain full connected. The second graph, which is partly connected, has one articulation point and one bridge, leading to a redundancy and availability score of 75%. If I remove the third Node or the connection between Node 3 and Node 4, I would end with a disconnected Node 4 and a graph that has been broken up in 2 (e.g., if Node 3 is removed we have 2 sub-graphs {1,2} and {4}), The third graph, also partly connected, contains two articulation points and three bridges, resulting in a redundancy score of 0% and an availability score of 50%. Articulation points and bridges are highlighted in red to emphasize their critical roles in graph connectivity. Note: An articulation point is a node whose removal disconnects the graph and a bridge is an edge whose removal disconnects the graph.

Careful consideration of articulation points is crucial in preventing network partitioning, where removing a single node can disconnect the overall network into multiple sub-segments of the network. The connectivity between different segments is obviously critical for continuous data flow and service availability. Often, design and planning requirements dictate that if a network is broken into parts due to various disruption scenarios, these parts will remain functional and continue to provide a service that is possible with reduced performance. Network designers would make use of different strategies, such as increasing the physical redundancy of the transmission network as well as making use of routing algorithms on a higher level, such as multipath routing and diverse routing paths. Moreover, optimizing the placement of articulation points and routing paths (i.e., how traffic flows through the communications network) also maximizes resource utilization and may ensure optimal network performance and service availability for an operator’s customers.

Figure 11 illustrates the many articulation points of our Greenlandic settlements, represented as red stars in the graph of the Greenlandic transport network. Removing an articulation point (a critical node) would partition the graph into multiple disconnected components and may lead to severe service interruption.

In graph theory, a bridge is a network connection (or edge) whose removal would split the graph into multiple disconnected components. This type of connection is obviously critical for maintaining connectivity and facilitating communication between different network parts. In real life with real networks, the network designers would, in general, spend considerable time to ensure that such critical connections (i.e., so-called bridges) do not have an over-proportional impact on their network availability by, for example, building alternative connections (i.e., redundant connections) or ensuring that the impact of a compromised bridge would have a minimum impact in terms of the number of customers.

For our transport network in Greenland, the long-haul microwave transport network is overall less sensitive to disruption on a settlement level, as the underlying topology is like a long spine at high capacity and reasonable redundancy built-in with branches of MW radios that connect from the spine to a particular settlement. Thus, in most cases in this analysis, the long-haul MW radio site, in proximity to a given settlement, is the actual articulation point (not the settlement itself). The Nuuk data center, a central switching hub, is, by definition, an articulation point of very high criticality.

As discussed above and shown below (Figure 12), in the context of our transport network, bridges may play a crucial role in network resilience and fault tolerance. In our story, bridges represent the transport connections connecting Greenlandic settlements and the core network back in Nuuk (i.e., the master network node). In our representations, a bridge can, for example, be (1) a Microwave connection, (2) A submarine cable connection, and (3) a satellite connection provided by Tusass’s geo stationary satellite (e.g., Greensat) or by the low-earth orbiting OneWeb satellite. By identifying and managing bridges, network designers can mitigate the impact of link failures and disruptions, ensuring continuous operation and availability of services. Moreover, keeping network bridges in mind and minimizing them when planning a transport network will significantly reduce the risk of customer-affecting outages and keep the impact of transport disruption and the subsequent network partitioning to a minimum.

Figure 12 illustrates the many (edge) bridges and transport connections present in the graph of the Greenlandic transport network. Removing a bridge would split the network (graph) into multiple disconnected components, leading to network fragmentation and parts that may no longer sustain services. The above picture is common for long microwave chains with many hops (the connections themselves). The remedy is to make shorter hops, as Tusass is doing, and ensure that the connection itself is redundant equipment-wise (e.g., if one radio fails, there is another to take over). However, such a network would remain sensitive to any disruption of the MW site location and the large MW dish antenna.

Network designers should deploy redundancy mechanisms that would minimize the risk of the disruptive impact of compromised articulation points and bridges. They have several choices to choose from, such as multipath routing (e.g., ring topologies), link aggregation, and diverse routing paths to enhance redundancy and availability. These mechanisms will help minimize the impact of bridge failures and improve the overall network availability by increasing the level of network redundancy on a physical and logical level. Moreover, optimizing the placement of bridges and routing paths in a transport network will maximize resource utilization and ensure optimal network performance and service availability.

Knowing a given networks Articulation Points and Bridges will allow us to define an Availability and a Redundancy Score that we can use to evaluate and optimize a network’s robustness and reliability. Some examples of these concepts for simpler graphs (i.e., 4 nodes) are also shown in Figure 10 above. In the context of the Greenland transport network used here, these metrics can help us understand how resilient the network is to failures.

The Availability Score measures the proportion of nodes that are not articulation points, which might compromise our network’s overall availability if compromised. This score measures the risk of exposure to service disruption in case of a disconnection. As a reminder, the articulation point, or cut-vertex, is a node that, when removed, increases the number of components of the network and, thus, potentially the amount of disconnecting parts. The formula that is used to calculate the availability score is given by the total number of settlements (e.g., 93) minus the number of articulation points (e.g., 44) divided by the total number of settlements (e.g., 93). In this context, a higher availability score indicates a more robust network where fewer nodes are critical points of failure. Suppose we get a score that is close to one. In that case, this indicates that most nodes are not articulation points, suggesting that the network can sustain multiple node failures without significant loss of connectivity (see Figure 10 for a relatively simple illustration of this).

The Redundancy Score measures the proportion of connections that are not bridges, which could result in severe service disruptions to our customers if compromised. When a bridge is compromised or removed, it increases the number of network parts. The formula for the redundancy score is the total number of transport connections (edges, e.g., 101) minus the number of bridges (e.g., 57) divided by the total number of transport connections (edges, e.g., 101). Thus, in this context of redundancy, a higher redundancy score indicates a more resilient network where fewer edges are critical points of failure. If we get a redundancy score that is close to 100%, it would indicate that most of our (transport) connections cannot be categorized as bridges. This also suggests that our network can sustain multiple connectivity failures without it, resulting in a significant loss of overall connectivity and a severe service interruption.

Having more switching centers, or central hubs, can significantly enhance a communications network’s resilience, availability, and redundancy. It also reduces the consequences and impact of disruption to critical bridges in the network. Moreover, by distributing traffic, isolating failures, and providing multiple paths for data transmission, these central hubs may ensure continuous service to our customers and improve the overall network performance. In my opinion, implementing strategies to support multiple switching centers is essential for maintaining a robust and reliable communications infrastructure capable of withstanding various disruptions and enabling scaling to meet any future demands.

For our Greenlandic transport network shown above, we find an Availability Score of 53% and a Redundancy Score of 44%. While the scores may appear on the low side, we need to keep in mind that we are in Greenland with a population of 57 thousand mainly distributed along the west coast (from south to the north) in about 50+ settlements with 30%+ living in Nuuk. Tusass communications network connects to pretty much all settlements in Greenland, covering approximately 3,500+ km on the west coast (e.g., comparable to the distance from the top of Norway all the way down to the most southern point of Sicily), and irrespective of the number of people living in them. This is also a very clear desire, expectation, and direction that has been given by the Greenlandic administration (i.e., via the universal service obligation imposed on Tusass). The Tusass transport network is not designed with strict financial KPIs in mind and with the financial requirement that a given connection to a settlement would need to have a positive return on investment within a few years (as is the prevalent norm in our Industry). The transport network of Tusass has been designed to connect all communities of Greenland to an adequate level of quality and availability, prioritizing the coverage of the Greenlandic population (and the settlements they live in) rather than whether or not it makes hard financial sense. Tusass’s network is continuously upgraded and expanded as the demand for more advanced broadband services increases (as it does anywhere else in the world).

CRITICAL TECHNOLOGIES RELEVANT TO GREENLAND AND THE WIDER ARCTIC.

Greenland’s strategic location in the Arctic and its untapped natural resources, such as rare earth elements, oil, and gas, has increasingly drawn the attention of major global powers like the United States, Russia, and China. The melting Arctic ice due to climate change is opening new shipping routes and making these resources more accessible, escalating the geopolitical competition in the region.

Greenland must establish a defense and security strategy that minimizes its dependency on its natural allies and external actors to mitigate a situation where such may not be available or have the resources to commit to Greenland. An integral part of such a security strategy should be a dual-use, civil, and defense requirement whenever possible. Ensuring that Greenlandic society gets an immediate and sustainable return on investments in establishing a solid security framework.

5G technology offers significant advancements over previous generations of wireless networks, particularly in terms of private networking, speed, reliability, and latency across a variety of coverage platforms, e.g., (normal fixed) terrestrial antennas, vehicle-based (i.e., Cell on Wheels), balloon-based, drone-based, LEO-satellite based. This makes 5G ideal for setting up ad-hoc mobile coverage areas for military and critical civil applications. One of the key capabilities of 5G that supports these use cases is network slicing, which allows for the creation of dedicated virtual networks optimized for specific requirements.

Telia Norway has conducted trials together with the Norwegian Armed Forces in Norway to demonstrate the use of 5G for military applications (note: I think this is one of the best examples of an operator-defense collaboration on deployment innovation and directly applies to Arctic conditions). These trials included setting up ad-hoc 5G networks to support various military scenarios (including in an Arctic-like climate). The key findings demonstrated the ability to provide high-speed, low-latency communications in challenging environments, supporting real-time situational awareness and secure communications for military personnel. Ericsson has also partnered with the UK Ministry of Defense to trial 5G applications for military use. These trials focused on using 5G to support secure communications, enhance situational awareness, and enable the use of autonomous systems in military operations. NATO has conducted exercises incorporating 5G technology to evaluate its potential for improving command and control, situational awareness, and logistics in multi-national military operations. These exercises have shown the potential of 5G to enhance interoperability and coordination among allied forces. It is a very meaningful dual-use technology.

5G private networks offer a dedicated and secure network environment for specific organizations or use cases, which can be particularly beneficial in the Arctic and Greenland. These private networks can provide reliable communication and data transfer in remote and harsh environments, supporting military and civil applications. For instance, in Greenland, 5G private networks can enhance communication for scientific research stations, ensuring that data from environmental monitoring and climate research is transmitted securely and efficiently. They can also support critical infrastructure, such as power grids and transportation networks, by providing a reliable communication backbone. Moreover, in Greenland, the existing public telecommunications network may be designed in such a way that it essentially could operate as a “private” network in case transmission lines connecting settlements would be compromised (e.g., due to natural or unnatural causes), possibly a “thin” LEO satellite connection out of the settlement.

5G provides ultra-fast data speeds and low latency, enabling (near) real-time communication and data processing. This is crucial for military operations and emergency response scenarios where timely information is vital. Network slicing allows a single physical 5G network to be divided into multiple virtual networks, each tailored to specific applications or user groups. This ensures that critical communications are prioritized and reliable even during network congestion. It should be considered that for Greenland, the transport network (e.g., long-haul microwave network, routing choices, and satellite connections) might be limiting how fast the ultra-fast data speeds can become and may, at least along some transport routes, limit the round trip time performance (e.g., GEO satellite connections).

5G Enhanced Mobile Broadband (eMBB) provides high-speed internet access to support applications such as video streaming, augmented reality (AR), and virtual reality (VR) for situational awareness and training. Massive Machine-Type Communications (mMTC) supports a large number of IoT devices for monitoring and controlling equipment, sensors, and vehicles in both military and civil scenarios. Ultra-Reliable (Low-Latency) Communications (URLLC) ensures dependable and timely communication for critical applications such as command and control systems as well as unmanned and autonomous communication platforms (e.g., terrestrial, aerial, and underwater drones). I should note that designing defense and secure systems for ultra-low latency (< 10 ms) requirements would be a mistake as such cannot be guaranteed under all scenarios. The ultra-reliability (and availability) of transport connectivity is a critical challenge as it ensures that a given system has sufficient autonomy. Ultra-low latency of a given connectivity is much less critical.

For military (defense) applications, 5G can be rapidly deployed in the field using portable base stations to create a mobile (private) network. This is particularly useful in remote or hostile environments where traditional infrastructure is unavailable or has been compromised. Network slicing can create a secure, dedicated network for military operations. This ensures that sensitive data and communications are protected from interception and jamming. The low latency of 5G supports (near) real-time video feeds from drones, body cameras, and other surveillance equipment, enhancing situational awareness and decision-making in combat or reconnaissance missions.

Figure 13 The hierarchical coverage architecture shown above is relevant for military or, for example, search and rescue operations in remote areas like Greenland (or the Arctic in general), integrating multiple technological layers to ensure robust communication and surveillance. LEO satellites provide extensive broadband and SIGINT & IMINT coverage, supported by GEO satellites for stable links and data processing through ground stations. High Altitude Platforms (HAPs) offer 5G, IMINT, and SIGINT coverage at mid-altitudes, enhancing communication reach and resolution. The HAP system offers an extremely mobile and versatile platform for civil and defense scenarios. An ad-hoc private 5G network on the ground ensures secure, real-time communication for tactical operations. This multi-layered architecture is crucial for maintaining connectivity and operational efficiency in Greenland’s harsh and remote environments. The multi-layered communications network integrates IOT networks that may have been deployed in the past or in a specific mission context.

In critical civil applications, 5G can provide reliable communication networks for first responders during natural disasters or large-scale emergencies. Network slicing ensures that emergency services have priority access to the network, enabling efficient coordination and response. 5G can support the rapid deployment of communication networks in disaster-stricken areas, ensuring that affected populations can access critical services and information. Network slicing can allocate dedicated resources for smart city applications, such as traffic management, public safety, and environmental monitoring, ensuring that these services remain operational even during peak usage times. Thus, for Greenland, ensuring 5G availability would be through coastal settlements and possibly coastal coverage (outside settlements) of 5G at a lower frequency range (e.g., 600 – 900 MHz), prioritizing 5G coverage rather than 5G enhanced mobile broadband (i.e., any coverage at a high coverage probability is better than no coverage at certainty).

Besides 5G, what other technologies would otherwise be of importance in a Greenland Technology Strategy as it relates to its security and ensuring its investments and efforts also return beneficially to its society (e.g., a dual-use priority):

  • It would be advisable to increase the number of community networks within the overall network that can continue functioning if cut off from the main communications network. Thus, communications services in smaller and remote settlements depend less on a main or very few central communications control and management hubs. This requires on a local settlement level, or grouping of settlements, self-healing, remote (as opposed to a central hub) management, distributed databases, regional data center (typically a few racks), edge computing, local DNS, CDNs and content hosting, satellite connection, … Most telecom infrastructure manufacturing companies have today network in a box solutions that allow for such designs. Such solutions enable private 5G networks to function isolated from a public PLMN and fixed transport network.
  • It is essential to develop a (very) highly available and redundant digital transport infrastructure leveraging the existing topology strengthened by additional submarine cables (less critical than some of the other means of connectivity), increased transport ring- & higher-redundancy topologies, multi-level satellite connections (GEO, MEO & LEO, supplier redundancy) with more satellite ground gateways on Greenland (e.g., avoiding “off-Greenland” traffic routing). In addition, a remotely controlled stratospheric drone platform could provide additional connectivity redundancy at very high broadband speeds and low latencies.
  • Satellite backhaul solutions, operating, for example, from a Low Earth Orbit (LEO), such as shown in Figure below, are extending internet services to the farthest reaches of the globe. These satellites offer many benefits, as already discussed above, in connecting remote, rural, and previously un- and under-served areas with reliable internet services. Many remote regions lack foundational telecom infrastructure, particularly long-haul transport networks for carrying traffic away from remote populated areas. Satellite backhauls do not only offer a substantially better financial solution for enhancing internet connectivity to remote areas but are often the only viable solution for connectivity. The satellite backhaul solution is an important part of the toolkit to improve on redundancy and availability of particular very long and extensive long-haul microwave transport networks through remote areas (e.g., Greenland’s rugged and frequently hostile harsh coastal areas) where increasing the level of availability and redundancy with terrestrial means may be impractical (due to environmental factors) or incredibly costly.
    – LEO satellites provide several security advantages over GEO satellites when considering resistance to hostile actions to disrupt satellite communications. One significant factor is the altitude at which LEO satellites operate, which is between 500 and 2,000 kilometers, compared to GEO satellites, which are positioned approximately 36,000 kilometers above the equator. The lower altitude makes LEO satellites less vulnerable to long-range anti-satellite (ASAT) missiles.
    – LEO satellite networks are usually composed of large constellations with many satellites, often numbering in the dozens to hundreds. This extensive LEO network constellation provides some redundancy, meaning the network can still function effectively if some satellites are “taken out.” In contrast, GEO satellites are typically much fewer in number, and each satellite covers a much larger area, so losing even one GEO satellite will have a significant impact.
    – Another advantage of LEO satellites is their rapid movement across the sky relative to the Earth’s surface, completing an orbit in about 90 to 120 minutes. This constant movement makes it more challenging for hostile actors to track and target individual satellites for extended periods. In comparison, GEO satellites remain stationary relative to a fixed point on Earth, making them easier to locate and target.
    LEO satellites’ lower altitude also results in lower latency than GEO satellites. This can benefit secure, time-sensitive communications and is less susceptible to interception and jamming due to the reduced time delay. However, any security architecture of the critical transport infrastructure should not only rely on one type of satellite configuration.
    – Both GEO and LEO satellites have their purpose and benefits. Moreover, a hierarchical multi-dimensional topology, including stratospheric drones and even autonomous underwater vehicles, is worth considering when designing critical communications architecture. It is also worth remembering that public satellite networks may offer a much higher degree of communications redundancy and availability than defense-specific constellations. However, for SIGINT & IMINT collection, the defense-specific satellite constellations are likely much more advanced (unfortunately, they are also not as numerous as their civilian “cousins”). This said, a stratospheric aerial platform (e.g., HAP) would be substantially more powerful in IMINT and possibly also for some SIGINT tasks (or/and less costly & versatile) than a defense-specific satellite solution.
Figure 14 illustrates the architecture of a Low Earth Orbit (LEO) satellite backhaul system used by providers like OneWeb as well as StarLink with their so-called “Community Gateway” (i.e., using their Ka-band). It showcases the connectivity between terrestrial internet infrastructure (i.e., Satellite Gateways) and satellites in orbit, enabling high-speed data transmission. The network consists of LEO satellites that communicate with each other (inter-satellite Comms) using the Ku and Ka frequency bands. These satellites connect to ground-based satellite gateways (GW), which interface with Points of Presence (PoP) and Internet Exchange Points (IXP), integrating the space-based network with the terrestrial internet (WWW). Note: The indicated speeds and frequency bands (e.g., Ku: 12–18 GHz, Ka: 28–40 GHz) and data speeds illustrate the network’s capabilities.
Figure 15 illustrates an LEO satellite direct-to-device communication in remote areas without terrestrially-based communications infrastructure. Satellites are the only means of communication by a normal mobile device or classical satellite phone. Courtesy: DALL-E.
  • Establish an unmanned (remotely operated) stratospheric High Altitude Platform System (HAPS) (i.e., an advanced drone-based platform) or Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV) over Greenland (or The Arctic region) with payload agnostic capabilities. This could easily be run out of existing Greenlandic ground-based aviation infrastructure (e.g., Kangerlussuaq, Nuuk, or many other community airports across Greenland). This platform could eventually become autonomous or require little human intervention. The high-altitude platform could support mission-critical ad-hoc networking for civil and defense applications (over Greenland). Such a multi-purpose platform can be used for IMINT and SIGINT (i.e., for both civil & defense) and civil communication means, including establishing connectivity to the ground-based transport network in case of disruptions. Lastly, a HAPS may also permanently offer high-quality and capacity 5G mobile services or act as a private ultra-secure 5G network in an ad-hoc mission-specific scenario. For a detailed account of stratospheric drones and how these compared with low-earth satellites, see my recent article “Stratospheric Drones & Low Earth Satellites: Revolutionizing Terrestrial Rural Broadband from the Skies?”.
    Stratospheric drones, which operate in the stratosphere at altitudes around 20 to 50 kilometers, offer several security advantages over traditional satellite communications and submarine communication cables, especially from a Greenlandic perspective. These drones are less accessible and harder to target due to their altitude, which places them out of reach for most ground-based anti-aircraft systems and well above the range of most manned aircraft. This makes them less vulnerable to hostile actions compared to satellites, which can be targeted by anti-satellite (ASAT) missiles, or submarine cables, which can be physically cut or damaged by underwater operations. The drones would stay over Greenlandic, or NATO, territory while by nature, design, and purpose, submarine communications cables and satellites, in general, are extending far beyond the territory of Greenland.
    – The mobility and flexibility of stratospheric drones allow them to be quickly repositioned as needed, making it difficult for adversaries to consistently target them. Unlike satellites that follow predictable orbits or submarine cables with fixed routes, these drones can change their location dynamically to respond to threats or optimize their coverage. This is particularly advantageous for Greenland, whose vast and harsh environment makes maintaining and protecting fixed communication infrastructure challenging.
    – Deploying a fleet of stratospheric drones provides redundancy and scalability. If one drone is compromised or taken out of service, others can fill the gap, ensuring continuous communication coverage. This distributed approach reduces the risk of a single point of failure, which is more pronounced with individual satellites or single submarine cables. For Greenland, this means a more reliable and resilient communication network that can adapt to disruptions.
    – Stratospheric drones can be rapidly deployed and recovered, making it an easier platform to maintain and upgrade them as needed compared to for example satellite based platforms and even terrestrial deployed networks. This quick deployment capability is crucial for Greenland, where harsh weather conditions can complicate the maintenance and repair of fixed infrastructure. Unlike satellites that require expensive and complex launches or submarine cables that involve extensive underwater laying and maintenance efforts, drones offer a more flexible and manageable solution.
    – Drones can also establish secure, line-of-sight communication links that are less susceptible to interception and jamming. Operating closer to the ground compared to satellites allows the use of higher frequencies narrower beams that are more difficult to jam. Additionally, drones can employ advanced encryption and frequency-hopping techniques to further secure their communications, ensuring that sensitive data remains protected. Stratospheric drones can also be equipped with advanced surveillance and countermeasure technologies to detect and respond to threats. For instance, they can carry sensors to monitor the electromagnetic spectrum for jamming attempts and deploy countermeasures to mitigate these threats. This proactive defense capability enhances their security profile compared to passive communication infrastructure like satellites or cables.
    – From a Greenlandic perspective, stratospheric drones offer significant advantages. They can be deployed over specific areas of interest, providing targeted communication coverage for remote or strategically important regions. This is particularly useful for covering Greenland’s vast and sparsely populated areas. Modern stratospheric drones are designed to support multi-dimensional payloads, or as it might also be called, payload agnostic (e.g., SIGINT & IMINT equipment, 5G base station and advanced antenna, laser communication systems, …) and stay operational for extended periods, ranging from weeks to months, ensuring sustained communication coverage without the need for frequent replacements or maintenance.
    – Last but not least, Greenland may be an ideal safe testing ground due to its vast, remote and thinly populated regions.
Figure 16 illustrates a Non-Terrestrial Network consisting of a stratospheric High Altitude Platform (HAP) drone-based constellation providing terrestrial Cellular broadband services to terrestrial mobile users delivered to their normal 5G terminal equipment that may range from smartphone and tablets to civil and military IOT networks and devices. Each hexagon represents a beam inside the larger coverage area of the stratospheric drone. One could assign three HAPs to cover a given area to deliver very high-availability services to a rural area. The operating altitude of a HAP constellation is between 10 and 50 km, with an optimum of around 20 km. It is assumed that there is inter-HAP connectivity, e.g., via laser links. Of course, it is also possible to contemplate having the gNB (full 5G radio node) in the stratospheric drone entirely, allowing easier integration with LEO satellite backhauls, for example. There might even be applications (e.g., defense, natural & unnatural disaster situations, …) where a standalone 5G SA core is integrated.
  • Unmanned Underwater Vehicles (UUV), also known as Autonomous Underwater Vehicles (AUV), are obvious systems to deploy for underwater surveillance & monitoring that may also have obvious dual-use purposes (e.g., fisheries & resource management, iceberg tracking and navigation, coastal defense and infrastructure protection such as for submarine cables). Depending on the mission parameters and type of AUV, the range is between up to 100 kilometers (e.g., REMUS100) to thousands of kilometers (e.g., SeaBed2030) and an operational time (endurance) from max. 24 hours (e.g., REMUS100, Bluefin-21), to multiple days (e.g., Boing Echo Voyager), to several months (SeaBed2030). A subset of this kind of underwater solution would be swarm-like AUV constellations. See Figure 17 below for an illustration.
  • Increase RD&T (Research, Development & Trials) on Arctic Internet of Things (A-IOT) (note: require some level of coverage, minimum satellite) for civil, defense/military (e.g., Military IOT nor M-IOT) and dual-use applications, such as surveillance & reconnaissance, environmental monitoring, infrastructure security, etc… (note: IOTs are not only for terrestrial use cases but also highly interesting for aquatic applications in combination with AUV/UUVs). Military IoT refers to integrating IoT technologies tailored explicitly for military applications. These devices enhance operational efficiency, improve situational awareness, and support decision-making processes in various military contexts. Military IoT encompasses various connected devices, sensors, and systems that collect, transmit, and analyze data to support defense and security operations. In the vast and remote regions of Greenland and the Arctic, military IoT devices can be deployed for continuous surveillance and reconnaissance. This includes using drones, such as advanced HAPS, equipped with cameras and sensors to monitor borders, track the movements of ships and aircraft, and detect any unauthorized activities. Military IoT sensors can also monitor Arctic environmental conditions, tracking ice thickness changes, weather patterns, and sea levels. Such data is crucial for planning and executing military operations in the challenging Arctic environment but is also of tremendous value for the Greenlandic society. The importance of dual-use cases, civil and defense, cannot be understated; here are some examples:
    Infrastructure Monitoring and Maintenance: (Military Use Case) IoT sensors can be deployed to monitor the structural integrity of military installations, such as bases and airstrips, ensuring they remain operational and safe for use. These sensors can detect stress, wear, and potential damage due to extreme weather conditions. These IoT devices and networks can also be deployed for perimeter defense and monitoring. (Civil Use Case) The same technology can be applied to civilian infrastructure, including roads, bridges, and public buildings. Continuous monitoring can help maintain these civil infrastructures by providing early warnings about potential failures, thus preventing accidents and ensuring public safety.
    Secure Communication NetworksMilitary Use Case: Military IoT devices can establish secure communication networks in remote areas, ensuring that military units can maintain reliable and secure communications even in the Arctic’s harsh conditions. This is critical for coordinating operations and responding to threats. Civil Use Case: In civilian contexts, these communication networks can enhance connectivity in remote Greenlandic communities, providing essential services such as emergency communications, internet access, and telemedicine. This helps bridge the digital divide and improve residents’ quality of life.
    Environmental Monitoring and Maritime SafetyMilitary Use Case: Military IoT devices, such as underwater sensor networks and buoys, can be deployed to monitor sea conditions, ice movements, and potential maritime threats. These devices can provide real-time data critical for naval operations, ensuring safe navigation and strategic planning. Civil Use Case: The same sensors and buoys can be used for civilian purposes, such as ensuring the safety of commercial shipping lanes, fishing operations, and maritime travel. Real-time monitoring of sea conditions and icebergs can prevent maritime accidents and enhance the safety of maritime activities.
    Fisheries Management and SurveillanceMilitary Use Case: IoT devices can monitor and patrol Greenlandic waters for illegal fishing activities and unauthorized maritime incursions. Drones and underwater sensors can track vessel movements, ensuring that military forces can respond to potential security threats. Civil Use Case: These monitoring systems can support fisheries management by tracking fish populations and movements, helping to enforce sustainable fishing practices and prevent overfishing. This data is important for the local economy, which heavily relies on fishing.
  • Implement Distributed Acoustic Sensing (DAS) on submarine cables. DAS utilizes existing fiber-optic cables, such as those used for telecommunications, to detect and monitor acoustic signals in the underwater environment. This innovative technology leverages the sensitivity of fiber-optic cables to vibrations and sound waves, allowing for the detection of various underwater activities. This could also be integrated with the AUV and A-IOTs-based sensor systems. It should be noted that jamming a DAS system is considerably more complex than jamming traditional radio-frequency (RF) or wireless communication systems. DAS’s significant security and defense advantages might justify deploying more submarine cables around Greenland. This investment is compelling because of enhanced surveillance and security, improved connectivity, and strategic and economic benefits. By leveraging DAS technology, Greenland could strengthen its national security, support economic development, and maintain its strategic importance in the Arctic region.
  • Greenland should widely embrace autonomous systems deployment and technologies based on artificial intelligence (AI). AI is a technology that could compensate for the challenges of having a vast geography, a hostile climate, and a small population. This may, by far, be one of the most critical components of a practical security strategy for Greenland. Getting experience with autonomous systems in a Greenlandic and Arctic setting should be prioritized. Collaboration & knowledge exchange with Canadian and American universities should be structurally explored, as well as other larger (friendly) countries with Arctic interests (e.g., Norway, Iceland, …).
  • Last but not least, cybersecurity is an essential, even foundational, component of the securitization of Greenland and the wider Arctic, addressing the protection of critical infrastructure, the integrity of surveillance and monitoring systems, and the defense against geopolitical cyber threats. The present state and level of maturity of cybersecurity and defense (against cyber threats) related to Greenland’s critical infrastructure has to improve substantially. Prioritizing cybersecurity may have to be at the expense of other critical activities due to limited resources with relevant expertise available to businesses in Greenland). Today, international collaboration is essential for Greenland to develop strong cyber defense capabilities, ensure secure communication networks, and implement effective incident response plans. However, it is essential for Greenland’s security that a cybersecurity architecture is tailor-made to the particularities of Greenland and allows Greenland to operate independently should friendly actors and allies not be in a position to provide assistance.
Figure 17 Above illustrates an Unmanned Underwater Vehicle (UUV) near the coast of Greenland inspecting a submarine cable. The UUV is a robotic device that operates underwater without a human onboard, controlled either autonomously or remotely. In and around Greenland’s coastline, UUVs may serve both defense and civilian purposes. For defense, they can patrol for submarines, monitor underwater traffic, and detect potential threats, enhancing maritime security. Civilian applications include search & rescue missions, scientific research, where UUVs map the seabed, study marine life, and monitor environmental changes, crucial for understanding climate change impacts. Additionally, they inspect underwater infrastructure like submarine cables, ensuring their integrity and functionality. UUVs’ versatility makes them invaluable for comprehensive underwater exploration and security along Greenland’s long coast line. Integrated defense architectures may combine the UUV, Distributed Acoustic Sensor (DAS) networks deployed at submarine cables, and cognitive AI-based closed-loop security solutions (e.g., autonomous operation). Courtesy: DALL-E.

How do we frame some of the above recommendations into a context of securitization in the academic sense of the word aligned with the Copenhagen School (as I understand it)? I will structure this as the “Securitizing Actor(s),” “Extraordinary Measures Required,” and the “Geopolitical Implications”:

Example 1: Improving Communications networks as a security priority.

Securitizing Actor(s): Greenland’s government, possibly supported by Denmark and international allies (e.g., The USA’s Pituffik Space Base on Greenland), frames the lack of higher availability and reliable communication networks as an existential threat to national security, economic development, and stability, including the ability to defend Greenland effectively during a global threat or crisis.

Extraordinary Measures Required: Greenland can invest in advanced digital communication technologies to address the threat. This includes upgrading infrastructure such as fiber-optic cables, satellite communication systems, stratospheric high-altitude platform (HAP) with IMINT, SIGINT, and broadband communications payload, and 5G wireless networks to ensure they are reliable and can handle increased data traffic. Implementing advanced cybersecurity measures to protect these networks from cyber threats is also crucial. Additionally, investments in broadband expansion to remote areas ensure comprehensive coverage and connectivity.

Geopolitical Implications: By framing the reliability and availability of digital communications networks as a national security issue, Greenland ensures that significant resources are allocated to upgrade and maintain these critical infrastructures. Greenland may also attract European Union investments to leapfrogging the critical communications infrastructure. This improves Greenland’s day-to-day communication and economic activities and enhances its strategic importance by ensuring secure and efficient information flow. Reliable digital networks are essential for attracting international investments, supporting digital economies, and maintaining social cohesion.

Example 2: Geopolitical Competition in the Arctic

Securitizing Actor(s): The Greenland government, aligned with Danish and international allies’ interests, views the increasing presence of Russian and Chinese activities in the Arctic as a direct threat to Greenland’s sovereignty and security.

Extraordinary Measures Required: In response, Greenland can adopt advanced surveillance and defense technologies, such as Distributed Acoustic Sensing (DAS) systems to monitor underwater activities and Unmanned Aerial & Underwater Vehicles (UAVs & UUVs) for continuous aerial surveillance. Additionally, deploying advanced communication networks, including satellite-based systems, ensures secure and reliable information flow.

Geopolitical Implications: By framing foreign powers’ increased activities as a security threat (e.g., Russia and China), Greenland can attract NATO and European Union investments and support for deploying cutting-edge surveillance and defense technologies. This enhances Greenland’s security infrastructure, deters potential adversaries, and solidifies its strategic importance within the alliance.

Example 3: Cybersecurity as a National Security Priority.

Securitizing Actor(s): Greenland, aligned with its allies, frames the potential for cyber-attacks on critical infrastructure (such as power grids, communication networks, and military installations) as an existential threat to national security.

Extraordinary Measures Required: To address this threat, Greenland can invest in state-of-the-art cybersecurity technologies, including artificial intelligence-driven threat detection systems, encrypted communication channels, and comprehensive incident response frameworks. Establishing partnerships with global cybersecurity firms and participating in international cybersecurity exercises can also be part of the strategy.

Geopolitical Implications: By securitizing cybersecurity, Greenland ensures that significant resources are allocated to protect its digital infrastructure. This safeguards its critical systems and enhances its attractiveness as a secure location for international investments, reinforcing its geopolitical stability and economic growth.

Example 4: Arctic IoT and Dual-Use Military IoT Networks as a Security Priority.

Securitizing Actor(s): Greenland’s government, supported by Denmark and international allies, frames the lack of Arctic IoT and dual-use military IoT networks as an existential threat to national security, economic development, and environmental monitoring.

Extraordinary Measures Required: Greenland can invest in deploying Arctic IoT and dual-use military IoT networks to address the threat. These networks involve a comprehensive system of interconnected sensors, devices, and communication technologies designed to operate in the harsh Arctic environment. This includes deploying sensors for environmental monitoring, enhancing surveillance capabilities, and improving communication and data-sharing across military and civilian applications.

Geopolitical Implications: By framing the lack of Arctic IoT and dual-use military IoT networks as a national security issue, Greenland ensures that significant resources are allocated to develop and maintain these advanced technological infrastructures. This improves situational awareness and operational efficiency and enhances Greenland’s strategic importance by providing real-time data and robust monitoring capabilities. Reliable IoT networks are essential for protecting critical infrastructure, supporting economic activities, and maintaining environmental and national security.

THE DANISH DEFENSE & SECURITY AGREEMENT COVERING THE PERIOD 2024 TO 2033.

Recently, Denmark approved its new defense and security agreement for the period 2024-2033. This strongly emphasizes Denmark’s strategic reorientation in response to the new geopolitical realities. A key element in the Danish commitment to NATO’s goals includes a spending level approaching and possibly superseding the 2% of GDP on defense by 2030. It is not 2% for the sake of 2%. There really is a lot to be done, and as soon as possible. The agreement entails significant financial investments totaling approximately 190 billion DKK (or ca. 25+ billion euros) over the next ten years to quantum leap defense capabilities and critical infrastructure.

The defense agreement emphasizes the importance of enhancing security in the Arctic region, including, of course, Greenland. Thus, Greenland’s strategic significance in the current geopolitical landscape is recognized, particularly in light of Russian activities and Chinese expressed intentions (e.g., re: the “Polar Silk Road”). The agreement aims to strengthen surveillance, sovereignty enforcement, and collaboration with NATO in the Arctic. As such, we should expect investments to improve surveillance capabilities that would strengthen the enforcement of Greenland’s sovereignty. Ensuring that Greenland and Denmark can effectively monitor and protect its Arctic territories (together with its allies). The defense agreement stresses the importance of supporting NATO’s mission in the Arctic region, contributing to collective defense and deterrence efforts.

What I very much like in the new defense agreement is the expressed focus on dual-use infrastructure investments that benefit Greenland’s defense (& military) and civilian sectors. This includes upgrading existing facilities and enhancing operational capabilities in the Arctic that allow a rapid response to security threats. The agreement ensures that defense investments also bring economic and social benefits to Greenlandic society, consistent with a dual-use philosophy. In order for this to become a reality, it will involve a close collaboration with local authorities, businesses, and research institutions to support the local economy and create new job opportunities (as well as ensure that there is a local emphasis on relevant education to ensure that such investments are locally sustainable and not relying on an “army” of Danes and others of non-Greenlandic origin).

The defense agreement unsurprisingly expresses a strong commitment to enhancing cybersecurity measures as well as addressing hybrid threats in Greenland. This reflects the broader security challenges of the new technology introduction required, the present cyber-maturity level, and, of course, the current (and future expected) geopolitical tensions. The architects behind the agreement have also realized that there is a big need to improve recruitment, retention, and appropriate training within the defense forces, ensuring that personnel are well-prepared to operate in the Arctic environment in general and in Greenland in particular.

It is great to see that the Danish “Defense and Security Agreement” for 2024-2033 reflects the principles of securitization by framing Greenland’s security as an existential threat and justifying substantial investments and strategic initiatives in response. The focus of the agreement is on enhancing critical infrastructure, surveillance platforms, and international cooperation while ensuring that the benefits of the local economy align with the concept of securitization. That is to ensure that Greenland is well-prepared to address current and future security challenges and anticipated threats in the Arctic region.

The agreement underscores the importance of advanced surveillance systems, such as, for example, satellite-based monitoring and sophisticated radar systems as mentioned in the agreement. These technologies are deemed important for maintaining situational awareness and ensuring the security of Denmark’s territories, including Greenland and the Arctic region in general. In order to improve response times as well as effectiveness, enhanced surveillance capabilities are essential for detecting and tracking potential threats. Moreover, such capabilities are also important for search and rescue, and many other civilian use cases are consistent with the intention to ensure that applied technologies for defense purposes have dual-use capabilities and can also be used for civilian purposes.

There are more cyber threats than ever before. These threats are getting increasingly sophisticated with the advance of AI and digitization in general. So, it is not surprising that cybersecurity technologies are also an important topic in the agreement. The increasing threat of cyber attacks, particularly against critical infrastructure and often initiated by hostile state actors, necessitates a robust cybersecurity defense in order to protect our critical infrastructure and the sensitive information it typically contains. This includes implementing advanced encryption, intrusion detection systems, and secure communication networks to safeguard against cyber threats.

The defense agreement also highlights the importance of having access to unmanned systems or drones. There are quite a few examples of such systems as discussed in some detail above, and can be found in my more extensive article “Stratospheric Drones & Low Earth Satellites: Revolutionizing Terrestrial Rural Broadband from the Skies?“. There are two categories of drones that may be interesting. One is the unmanned version that typically is remotely controlled in an operations center at a distance from the actual unmanned platform. The other is the autonomous (or semi-autonomous) drone version that is enabled by AI and many integrated sensors to operate independently of direct human control or at least largely without real-time human intervention. Examples such as Unmanned Vehicles (UVs) and Autonomous Vehicles (AVs) are typically associated with underwater (UUV/UAV) or aerial (UAV/AAV) platforms. This kind of technology provides versatile, very flexible surveillance & reconnaissance, and defense platforms that are not reliant on a large staff of experts to operate. They are particularly valuable in the Arctic region, where harsh environmental conditions can limit the effectiveness of manned missions.

The development and deployment of dual-use technologies are also emphasized in the agreement. These technologies, which have both civilian and military applications, are necessary for maximizing the return on investment in defense infrastructure. It may also, at the moment, be easier to find funding if it is defense-related. Technology examples include advancements in satellite communications and broadband networks, enhancing military capabilities, and civilian connectivity, particularly how those various communications technologies can seamlessly integrate with one another is very important.

Furthermore, artificial intelligence (AI) has been identified as a transformative technology for defense and security. While AI is often referred to as a singular technology. However, it is actually an umbrella term that encompasses a broad spectrum of frameworks, tools, and techniques that have a common basis in models that are being trained on large (or very large) sets of data in order to offer various predictive capabilities of increasing sophistication. This leads to the expectation that, for example, AI-driven analytics and decision-making applications will enhance the operational efficiency and, not unimportantly, the quality of real-time decision-making in the field (which may or may not be correct and for sure may be somewhat optimistic expectations at least at a basic level). AI-enabled defense platforms or applications are likely to result in improved threat detection as well as being able to support strategic planning. As long as the risk of false outcomes is acceptable, such a system will enrich the defense systems and provide significant advantages in managing complex and highly dynamic security environments and time-critical threat scenarios.

Lastly, the agreement stresses the need for advanced logistics and supply chain technologies. Efficient logistics are critical for sustaining military operations and ensuring the timely delivery of equipment and supplies. Automation, real-time tracking, and predictive analytics in logistics management can significantly improve the resilience and responsiveness of defense operations.

AT THIS POINT IN MY GREENLANDIC JOURNEY.

In my career, I have designed, planned, built, and operated telecommunications networks in many places under vastly different environmental conditions (e.g., geography and climate). The more I think about building robust and highly reliable communication networks in Greenland, including all the IT & compute enablers required, the more I appreciate how challenging and different it is to do so in Greenland. Tusass has built a robust and reliable transport network connecting nearly all settlements in Greenland down to the smallest size. Tusass operates and maintains this network under some of the harshest environmental conditions in the world, with an incredible dedication to all those settlements that depend on being connected to the outside world and where a compromised connection may have dire consequences for the unconnected community.

Figure 18 Shows a coastal radio site in Greenland. It illustrates one of the frequent issues of the critical infrastructure being covered by ice as well as snow. Courtesy: Tusass A/S (Greenland),

Comparing the capital spending level of Tusass in Greenland with the averages of other Western European countries, we find that Tusass does not invest significantly more of its revenue than the telco industry’s country averages of many other Western European countries. In fact, its 5-year average Capex to Revenue ratio is close to the Western European country average (19% over the period 2019 to 2023). In terms of capital investments compared to the revenue generating units (RGUs), Tusass does have the highest level of 18.7 euros per RGU per month, based on a 5-year average over the period 2019 to 2023, in comparison with the average of several Western European markets, coming out at 6.6 euros per RGU per month, as shown in the chart below. This difference is not surprising when considering the available population in Greenland compared to the populations in the countries considered in the comparison. The variation of capital investments for Tusass also shows a much larger variation than other countries due to substantially less population to bear the burden of financing big capital-intensive projects, such as the deployment of new submarine cables (e.g., typically coming out at 30 to 50 thousand euros per km), new satellite connections (normally 10+ million euros depending on the asset arrangement), RAN modernization (e.g., 5G), and so forth … For example, the average absolute capital spend was 14.0±1.5 million euros between 2019 and 2022, while 2023 was almost 40 million euros (a little less than 4% of the annual defense and security budget of Denmark) due to, according with Tusass annual report, RAN modernization (e.g., 5G), satellite (e.g., Greensat) and submarine cable investments (initial seabed investigation). All these investments bring better quality through higher reliability, integrity, and availability of Greenland’s critical communications infrastructure although there are not a large population (e.g., millions) to spread such these substantial investments over.

Figure 19 In a Western European context, Greenland does not, on average, invest substantially more in telecom infrastructure relative to its revenues and revenue-generating units (i.e., its customer service subscriptions) despite having a very low population of about 57 thousand and an area of 2.2 million square kilometers, the size of Alaska and only 33% smaller than India. The chart shows the country’s average Capex to Revenue ratio and the Capex in euros per RGU per month over the last 5 years (2019 to 2023) for Greenland (e.g., Tusass annual reports) and Western Europe (using data from New Street Research).

The capital investments required to leapfrog Greenland’s communications network availability and redundancy scores beyond 70% (versus 53% and 44%, respectively, in 2023) would be very substantial, requiring both additional microwave connections (including redesigns), submarine cables, and new satellite arrangements, and new ground stations (e.g., to or in settlements with more than a population of 1,000 inhabitants).

Those investments would serve the interests of the Greenlandic society and that of Denmark and NATO in terms of boosting the defense and security of Greenland, which is also consistent with all the relevant parties’ expressed intent of securitization of Greenland. The required capital investments related to further leapfrogging the safety, availability, and reliability, above and beyond the current plans, of the critical communications infrastructure would be far higher than previously capital spend levels by Tusass (and Greenland) and unlikely to be economically viable using conventional business financial metrics (e.g., net present value NPV > 0 and internal rate of return IRR > a given hurdle rate). The investment needs to be seen as geopolitical relevant for the security & safety of Greenland, and with a strong focus on dual-use technologies, also as beneficial to the Greenlandic society.

Even with unlimited funding and financing to enhance Greenland’s safety and security, the challenging weather conditions and limited availability of skilled resources mean that it will take considerable time to successfully complete such an extensive program. Designing, planning and building a solid defense and security architecture meaningful to Greenlandic conditions will take time. Though, I am also convinced that there are already pieces of the puzzle operational today that is important any future work.

Figure 18 An aerial view of one of Tusass’s west coast sites supporting coastal radio as well as hosting one of the many long-haul microwave sites along the west coast of Greenland. Courtesy: Tusass A/S (Greenland).

RECOMMENDATIONS.

A multifaceted approach is essential to ensure that Greenland’s strategic and infrastructure development aligns with its unique geographical and geopolitical context.

Firstly, Greenland should prioritize the development of dual-use critical infrastructure and the supporting architectures that can serve both civilian and defense (& military) purposes. For example expanding and upgrading airport facilities (e.g., as is happening with the new airport in Nuuk), enhancing broadband internet access (e.g., as Tusass is very much focusing on adding more submarine cables and satellite coverage), and developing advanced integrated communication platforms like satellite-based and unmanned aerial systems (UAS), such as payload agnostic stratospheric high altitude platforms (HAPs). Such dual-use infrastructure platforms could bolster the national security. Moreover it could support economic activities that would improve community connectivity, and enhance the quality of life for Greenland’s residents irrespective of where they live in Greenland. There is little doubt that securing funding from international allies (e.g., European Union, NATO, …) and public-private partnerships will be crucial in supporting the financing of these projects. Also ensuring that civil and defense needs are met efficiently and with the right balance.

Additionally, it is important to invest in critical enablers like advanced monitoring and surveillance technologies for the security & safety. Greenland should in particular focus on satellite monitoring, Distributed Acoustic Sensing (DAS) on its submarine cables, and Unmanned Vehicles for Underwater and Aerial applications (e.g., UUVs & UAVs). Such systems will enable a more comprehensive monitoring of activities around and over Greenland. This would allow Greenland to secure its maritime routes, and protecting Greenland’s natural resources (among other things). Enhanced surveillance capabilities will also provide multi-dimensional real-time data for national security, environmental monitoring, and disaster response scenarios. Collaborating with NATO and other international partners should focus on sharing technology know-how, expertise in general, and intelligence that will ensure that Greenland’s surveillance capabilities are on par with global standards.

Tusass’s transport network connecting (almost) all of Greenland’s settlements is an essential and critical asset for Greenland. It should be the backbone for any dual-use enhancement serving civil as well as defense scenarios. Adding additional submarine cables and more satellite connections are important (on-going) parts of those enhancements and will substantially increase both the network availability, resilience and hardening to disruptions natural as well as man-made kinds. However, increasing the communications networks ability to fully, or even partly, function in case of network parts being cut off from a few main switching centers may be something that could be considered. With todays technologies might also be affordable to do and fit well with Tusass’s multi-dimensional connectivity strategy using terrestrial means (e.g., microwave connections), sub-marine cables and satellites.

Last but not least, considering Greenland’s limited human resources, the technologies and advanced platforms implemented must have a large degree of autonomy and self-reliance. This will likely only be achieved with solid partnerships and strong alliances with Denmark and other natural allies, including the Nordic countries in and near the Arctic Circle (e.g., Island, Faroe Island, Norway, Sweden, Finland, The USA, and Canada). In particular, Norway has had recent experience with the dual use of ad-hoc and private 5G networking for defense applications. Joint operation of UUV and UAVs integrated with DAS and satellite constellation could be operated within the Arctic Circle. Developing and implementing advanced AI-based technologies should be a priority. Such collaborations could also make these advanced technologies much more affordable than if only serving one country. These technologies can compensate for the sparse population and vast geographical challenges that Greenland and the larger Arctic Circle pose, providing efficient and effective infrastructure management, surveillance, and economic development solutions. Achieving a very high degree of autonomous operation of the multi-dimensional technology landscape required for leapfrogging the security of Greenland, the Greenlandic Society, and its critical infrastructure would be essential for Greenland to be self-reliant and less dependent on substantial external resources that may be problematic to guaranty in times of crisis.

By focusing on these recommendations, Greenland can enhance its strategic importance, improve its critical infrastructure resilience, and ensure sustainable economic growth while maintaining its unique environmental heritage.

Being a field technician in Greenland poses some occupational hazards that is unknown in most other places. Apart from the harsh weather, remoteness of many of the infrastructure locations, on many occasions field engineers have encountered hungry polar bears in the field. The polar bear is a very dangerous predator that is always on the look out for its next protein-rich meal.

FURTHER READING.

  1. Tusass Annual Reports 2023 (more reports can be found here).
  2. Naalakkersuisut / Government of Greenland Ministry for Statehood and Foreign Affairs, “Greenland in the World — Nothing about us without us: Greenland’s Foreign, Security, and Defense Policy 2024-2033 – an Arctic Strategy.” (February 2024). The Danish title of this Document (also published in Greenlandic as the first language): “Grønland i Verden — Intet om os, uden os: Grønlands udenrigs-, sikkerheds- og forsvarspolitiske strategi for 2024-2033 — en Arktisk Strategi”.
  3. Martin Brum, “Greenland’s first security strategy looks west as the Arctic heats up.” Arctic Business Journal (February 2024).
  4. Marc Jacobsen, Ole Wæver, and Ulrik Pram Gad, “Greenland in Arctic Security: (De)securitization Dynamics under Climatic Thaw and Geopolitical Freeze.” (2024), University of Michigan Press. See also the video associated with the book launch. It’s not the best quality (sound/video), but if you just listen and follow the slides offline, it is actually really interesting.
  5. Michael Paul and Göran Swistek, “Russia in the Arctic: Development Plans, Military Potential, and Conflict Prevention,” SWP (Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik) Research Paper, (February 2022). Some great maps are provided that clearly visualize the Arctic – Russia relationships.
  6. Marc Lanteigne, “The Rise (and Fall?) of the Polar Silk Road.” The Diplomat, (August 2022).
  7. Trym Eiterjord, “What the 14th Five-Year Plan says about China’s Arctic Interests”, The Arctic Institute, (November 2023). The link also includes references to several other articles related to the China-Arctic relationship from the Arctic Institute China Series 2023.
  8. Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver, and Jaap de Wilde, “Security: A New Framework for Analysis”, (1998), Lynne Rienner Publishers Inc..
  9. Kim Kyllesbech Larsen, The Next Frontier: LEO Satellites for Internet Services. | techneconomyblog, (March 2024).
  10. Kim Kyllesbech Larsen, Stratospheric Drones & Low Earth Satellites: Revolutionizing Terrestrial Rural Broadband from the Skies? | techneconomyblog, (January 2024).
  11. Deo, Narsingh. “Graph Theory with Applications to Engineering and Computer Science,” Dover Publications. This book is a reasonably accessible starting point for learning more about graphs. If this is new to you, I recommend going for the following Geeks for Geeks ” Introduction to Graph Data Structure” (April 2024), which provides a quick intro to the world of graphs.
  12. Mike Dano, “Pentagon puts 5G at center of US military’s communications future”, Light Reading (December 2020).
  13. Juan Pedro Tomas, “Telia to develop private 5G for Norway’s Armed Forces”, RCR Wireless (June 2022).
  14. Iain Morris, “Telia is building 5G cell towers for the battlefield”, Light Reading (June 2023).
  15. Saleem Khawaja, “How military uses of the IoT for defense applications are expanding”, Army Technology (March 2023).
  16. Mary Lee, James Dimarogonas, Edward Geist, Shane Manuel, Ryan A. Schwankhart, Bryce Downing, “Opportunities and Risks of 5G Military Use in Europe”, RAND (March 2023).
  17. Mike Dano, “NATO soldiers test new 5G tech“, Light Reading (October 2023).
  18. NATO publication, “5G Technology: Nokia Meets with NATO Allied Command Transformation to Discuss Military Applications”, (May 2024).
  19. Michael Hill, “NATO tests AI’s ability to protect critical infrastructure against cyberattacks” (January 2023).
  20. Forsvarsministeriet, Danmark, “Dansk forsvar og sikkerhed 2024-2033.” (June 2023): Danish Defense & Security Agreement (Part I).
  21. Forsvarsministeriet, Denmark, “Anden delaftale under forsvarsforliget 2024-2033“, (April 2024): Danish Defense & Security Agreement (Part II).
  22. The State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China, “China’s Arctic Policy”, (January 2018).

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT.

I greatly acknowledge my wife, Eva Varadi, for her support, patience, and understanding during the creative process of writing this article. I am incredible thankful to Tusass for providing many great pictures used in the post that illustrates the (good weather!) conditions that Tusass field technicians are faced with in the field working tirelessly on the critical communications infrastructure throughout Greenland. While the pictures shown in this post are really beautiful and breathtaking, the weather is unforgiven frequently stranding field workers for days at some of those remote site locations. Add to this picture the additional dangers of a hungry polar bear that will go to great length getting its weekly protein intake.

The Next Frontier: LEO Satellites for Internet Services.

THE SPACE RACE IS ON.

If all current commercial satellite plans were to be realized within the next decade, we would have more, possibly substantially more, than 65 thousand satellites circling Earth. Today, that number is less than 10 thousand, with more than half that number realized by StarLink’s Low Earth Orbit (LEO) constellation over the last couple of years (i.e., since 2018).

While the “Arms Race” during the Cold War was “a thing” mainly between The USA and the former Soviet Union, the Space Race will, in my opinion, be “battled out” between the commercial interests of the West against the political interest of China (as illustrated in Figure 1 below). The current numbers strongly indicate that Europe, Canada, the Middle East, Africa, and APAC (minus China) will likely and largely be left on the sideline to watch the US and China impose, in theory, a “duopoly” in LEO satellite-based services. However, in practice, it will be a near-monopoly when considering security concerns between the West and the (re-defined) East block.

Figure 1 Illustrates my thesis that we will see a Space Race over the next 10 years between a (or very few) commercial LEO constellation, represented by a Falcon-9 like design (for maybe too obvious reasons), and a Chinese-state owned satellite constellation. (Courtesy: DALL-E).

As of end of 2023, more than 50% of launched and planned commercial LEO satellites are USA-based. Of those, the largest fraction is accounted for by the US-based StarLink constellation (~75%). More than 30% are launched or planned by Chinese companies headed by the state-owned Guo Wang constellation rivaling Elon Musk’s Starlink in ambition and scale. Europe comes in at a distant number 3 with about 8% of the total of fixed internet satellites. Apart from being disappointed, alas, not surprised by the European track record, it is somewhat more baffling that there are so few Indian and African satellite (there are none) constellations given the obvious benefits such satellites could bring to India and the African continent.

India is a leading satellite nation with a proud tradition of innovative satellite designs and manufacturing and a solid track record of satellite launches. However, regarding commercial LEO constellations, India still needs to catch up on some opportunities here. Having previously worked on the economics and operationalizing a satellite ATC (i.e., a satellite service with an ancillary terrestrial component) internet service across India, it is mind-blowing (imo) how much economic opportunity there is to replace by satellite the vast terrestrial cellular infrastructure in rural India. Not to mention a quantum leap in communication broadband services resilience and availability that could be provided. According to the StarLink coverage map, the regulatory approval in India for allowing StarLink (US) services is still pending. In the meantime, Eutelsat’s OneWeb (EU) received regulatory approval in late 2023 for its satellite internet service over India in collaboration with Barthi Enterprises (India), that is also the largest shareholder in the recently formed Eutelsat Group with 21.2%. Moreover, Jio’s JioSpaceFiber satellite internet services were launched in several Indian states at the end of 2023, using the SES (EU) MEO O3b mPower satellite constellation. Despite the clear satellite know-how and capital available, it appears there is little activity for Indian-based LEO satellite development, taking up the competition with international operators.

The African continent is attracting all the major LEO satellite constellations such as StarLink (US), OneWeb (EU), Amazon Kuipers (US), and Telesat Lightspeed (CAN). However, getting regulatory approval for their satellite-based internet services is a complex, time-consuming, and challenging process with Africa’s 54 recognized sovereign countries. I would expect that we will see the Chinese-based satellite constellations (e.g., Guo Wang) taking up here as well due to the strong ties between China and several of the African nations.

This article is not about SpaceX’s StarLink satellite constellation. Although StarLink is mentioned a lot and used as an example. Recently, at the Mobile World Congress 2024 in Barcelona, talking to satellite operators (but not StarLink) providing fixed broadband satellite services, we joked about how long into a meeting we could go before SpaceX and StarLink would be mentioned (~ 5 minutes where the record, I think).

This article is about the key enablers (frequencies, frequency bandwidth, antenna design, …) that make up an LEO satellite service, the LEO satellite itself, the kind of services one should expect from it, and its limitations.

There is no doubt that LEO satellites of today have an essential mission: delivering broadband internet to rural and remote areas with little or no terrestrial cellular or fixed infrastructure to provide internet services. Satellites can offer broadband internet to remote areas with little population density and a population spread out reasonably uniformly over a large area. A LEO satellite constellation is not (in general) a substitute for an existing terrestrial communications infrastructure. Still, it can enhance it by increasing service availability and being an important remedy for business continuity in remote rural areas. Satellite systems are capacity-limited as they serve vast areas, typically with limited spectral resources and capacity per unit area.

In comparison, we have much smaller coverage areas with demand-matched spectral resources in a terrestrial cellular network. It is also easier to increase capacity in a terrestrial cellular system by adding more sectors or increasing the number of sites in an area that requires such investments. Adding more cells, and thus increasing the system capacity, to satellite coverage requires a new generation of satellites with more advanced antenna designs, typically by increasing the number of phased-array beams and more complex modulation and coding mechanisms that boost the spectral efficiency, leading to increased capacity and quality for the services rendered to the ground. Increasing the system capacity of a cellular communications system by increasing the number of cells (i.e., cell splitting) works the same in satellite systems as it does for a terrestrial cellular system.

So, on average, LEO satellite internet services to individual customers (or households), such as those offered by StarLink, are excellent for remote, lowly populated areas with a nicely spread-out population. If we de-average this statement. Clearly, within the satellite coverage area, we may have towns and settlements where, locally, the population density can be fairly large despite being very small over the larger footprint covered by the satellite. As the capacity and quality of the satellite is a shared resource, serving towns and settlements of a certain size may not be the best approach to providing a sustainable and good customer experience as the satellite resources exhaust rapidly in such scenarios. In such scenarios, a hybrid architecture is of much better use as well as providing all customers in a town or settlement with the best service possible leveraging the existing terrestrial communications infrastructure, cellular as well as fixed, with that of a satellite backhaul broadband connection between a satellite ground gateway and the broadband internet satellite. This is offered by several satellite broadband providers (both from GEO, MEO and LEO orbits) and has the beauty of not only being limited to one provider. Unfortunately, this particular finesse, is often overlooked by the awe of massive scale of the StarLink constellation.

AND SO IT STARTS.

When I compared the economics of stratospheric drone-based cellular coverage with that of LEO satellites and terrestrial-based cellular networks in my previous article, “Stratospheric Drones: Revolutionizing Terrestrial Rural Broadband from the Skies?”, it was clear that even if LEO satellites are costly to establish, they provide a substantial cost advantage over cellular coverage in rural and remote areas that are either scarcely covered or not at all. Although the existing LEO satellite constellations have limited capacity compared to a terrestrial cellular network and would perform rather poorly over densely populated areas (e.g., urban and suburban areas), they can offer very decent fixed-wireless-access-like broadband services in rural and remote areas at speeds exceeding even 100 Mbps, such as shown by the Starlink constellation. Even if the provided speed and capacity is likely be substantially lower than what a terrestrial cellular network could offer, it often provides the missing (internet) link. Anything larger than nothing remains infinitely better.

Low Earth Orbit (LEO) satellites represent the next frontier in (novel) communication network architectures, what we in modern lingo would call non-terrestrial networks (NTN), with the ability to combine both mobile and fixed broadband services, enhancing and substituting terrestrial networks. The LEO satellites orbit significantly closer to Earth than their Geostationary Orbit (GEO) counterparts at 36 thousand kilometers, typically at altitudes between 300 to 2,000 kilometers, LEO satellites offer substantially reduced latency, higher bandwidth capabilities, and a more direct line of sight to receivers on the ground. It makes LEO satellites an obvious and integral component of non-terrestrial networks, which aim to extend the reach of existing fixed and mobile broadband services, particularly in rural, un-and under-served, or inaccessible regions as a high-availability element of terrestrial communications networks in the event of natural disasters (flooding, earthquake, …), or military conflict, in which the terrestrial networks are taken out of operation.

Another key advantage of LEO satellite is that the likelihood of a line-of-sight (LoS) to a point on the ground is very high compared to establishing a LoS for terrestrial cellular coverage that, in general, would be very low. In other words, the signal propagation from a LEO satellite closely approximates that of free space. Thus, all the various environmental signal loss factors we must consider for a standard terrestrial-based cellular mobile network do not apply to our satellite with signal propagation largely being determined by the distance between the satellite and the ground (see Figure 2).

Figure 2 illustrates the difference between terrestrial cellular coverage from a cell tower and that of a Low Earth Orbit (LEO) Satellite. The benefit of seeing the world from above is that environmental and physical factors have substantially less impact on signal propagation and quality primarily being impacted by distance as it approximates free space propagation with signal attenuation mainly determined by the Line-of-Sight (LoS) distance from antenna to Earth. This situation is very different for a terrestrial-based cellular tower with its radiated signal being substantially compromised by environmental factors.

Low Earth Orbit (LEO) satellites, compared to GEO and MEO-based higher-altitude satellite systems, in general, have simpler designs and smaller sizes, weights, and volumes. Their design and architecture are not just a function of technological trends but also a manifestation of their operational environment. The (relative) simplicity of LEO satellites also allows for more standardized production, allowing for off-the-shelf components and modular designs that can be manufactured in larger quantities, such as the case with CubeSats standard and SmallSats in general. The lower altitude of LEO satellites translates to a reduced distance from the launch site to the operational orbit, which inherently affects the economics of satellite launches. This proximity to Earth means that the energy required to propel a satellite into LEO is significantly less than needed to reach Geostationary Earth Orbit (GEO), resulting in lower launch costs.

The advent of LEO satellite constellations marks an important shift in how we approach global connectivity. With the potential to provide ubiquitous internet coverage in rural and remote places with little or no terrestrial communications infrastructure, satellites are increasingly being positioned as vital elements in global communication. The LEO satellites, as well as stratospheric drones, have the ability to provide economical internet access, as addressed in my previous article, in remote areas and play a significant role in disaster relief efforts. For example, when terrestrial communication networks may be disrupted after a natural disaster, LEO satellites can quickly re-establish communication links to normal cellular devices or ad-how earth-based satellite systems, enabling efficient coordination of rescue and relief operations. Furthermore, they offer a resilient network backbone that complements terrestrial infrastructure.

The Internet of Things (IoT) benefits from the capabilities of LEO satellites. Particular in areas where there is little or no existing terrestrial communications networks. IoT devices often operate in remote or mobile environments, from sensors in agricultural fields to trackers across shipping routes. LEO satellites provide reliable connectivity to IoT networks, facilitating many applications, such as non- and near real-time monitoring of environmental data, seamless asset tracking over transcontinental journeys, and rapid deployment of smart devices in smart city infrastructures. As an example, let us look at the minimum requirements for establishing a LEO satellite constellation that can gather IoT measurements. At an altitude of 550 km the satellite would take ca. 1.5 hour to return to a given point on its orbit. Earth rotates (see also below) which require us to deploy several orbital planes to ensure that we have continuous coverage throughout the 24 hours of a day (assuming this is required). Depending on the satellite antenna design, the target coverage area, and how often a measurement is required, a satellite constellation to support an IoT business may not require much more than 20 (lower measurement frequency) to 60 (higher measurement frequency, but far from real real-time data collection) LEO satellites (@ 550 km).

For defense purposes, LEO satellite systems present unique advantages. Their lower orbits allow for high-resolution imagery and rapid data collection, which are crucial for surveillance, reconnaissance, and operational awareness. As typically more LEO satellites will be required, compared to a GEO satellite, such systems also offer a higher degree of redundancy in case of anti-satellite (ASAT) warfare scenarios. When integrated with civilian applications, military use cases can leverage the robust commercial infrastructure for communication and geolocation services, enhancing capabilities while distributing the system’s visibility and potential targets.

Standalone military LEO satellites are engineered for specific defense needs. These may include hardened systems for secure communication, resistance to jamming, and interception. For instance, they can be equipped with advanced encryption algorithms to ensure secure transmission of sensitive military data. They also carry tailored payloads for electronic warfare, signal intelligence, and tactical communications. For example, they can host sensors for detecting and locating enemy radar and communication systems, providing a significant advantage in electronic warfare. As the line between civilian and military space applications blurs, dual-use LEO satellite systems are emerging, capable of serving civilian broadband and specialized military requirements. It should be pointed out that there also military applications, such as signal gathering, that may not be compatible with civil communications use cases.

In a military conflict, the distributed architecture and lower altitude of LEO constellations may offer some advantages regarding resilience and targetability compared to GEO and MEO-based satellites. Their more significant numbers (i.e., 10s to 1000s) compared to GEO, and the potential for quicker orbital resupply can make them less susceptible to complete system takedown. However, their lower altitudes could make them accessible to various ASAT technologies, including ground-based missiles or space-based kinetic interceptors.

It is not uncommon to encounter academic researchers and commentators who give the impression that LEO satellites could replace existing terrestrial-based infrastructures and solve all terrestrial communications issues known to man. That is (of course) not the case. Often, such statements appears to be based an incomplete understanding of the capacity limitation of satellite systems. Due to satellites’ excellent coverage with very large terrestrial footprints, the satellite capacity is shared over very large areas. For example, consider an LEO satellite at 550 km altitude. The satellite footprint, or coverage area (aka ground swath), is the area on the Earth’s surface over which the satellite can establish a direct line of sight. The satellite footprint in our example diameter would be ca. five thousand five hundred kilometers. An equivalent area of ca. 23 million square kilometers is more than twice that of the USA (or China or Canada). Before you get too excited, the satellite antenna will typically restrict the surface area the satellite will cover. The extent of the observable world that is seen at any given moment by the satellite antenna is defined as the Field of View (FoV) and can vary from a few degrees (narrow beams, small coverage area) to 40 degrees or higher (wide beams, large coverage areas). At a FoV of 20 degrees, the antenna footprint would be ca. 2 thousand 400 kilometers, equivalent to a coverage area of ca. 5 million square kilometers.

In comparison, for a FoV of 0.8 degrees, the antenna footprint would only be 100 kilometers. If our satellite has a 16-satellite beam capability, it would translate into a coverage diameter of 24 km per beam. For the StarLink system based on the Ku-band (13 GHz) and a cell downlink (Satellite-to-Earth) capacity of ca. 680 Mbps (in 250 MHz) we would have ca. 2 Mbps per km2 unit coverage area. Compared to a terrestrial rural cellular site with 85 MHz (Downlink, Base station antenna to customer terminal), it would deliver 10+ Mbps per km2 unit coverage area.

It is always good to keep in mind that “Satellites mission is not to replace terrestrial communications infrastructures but supplement and enhance them”, and furthermore, “Satellites offer the missing (internet) link in areas where there is no terrestrial communications infrastructure present”. Satellites offer superior coverage to any terrestrial communications infrastructure. Satellites limitations are in providing capacity, and quality, at population scale as well as supporting applications and access technologies requiring very short latencies (e.g., smaller than 10 ms).

In the following, I will focus on terrestrial cellular coverage and services that LEO satellites can provide. At the end of my blog, I hope I have given you (the reader) a reasonable understanding of how terrestrial coverage, capacity, and quality work in a (LEO) satellite system and have given you an impression of key parameters we can add to the satellite to improve those.

EARTH ROTATES, AND SO DO SATELLITES.

Before getting into the details of low earth orbit satellites, let us briefly get a couple of basic topics off the table. Skipping this part may be a good option if you are already into and in the know satellites. Or maybe carry on an get a good laugh of those terra firma cellular folks that forgot about the rotation of Earth 😉

From an altitude and orbit (around Earth) perspective, you may have heard of two types of satellites: The GEO and the LEO satellites. Geostationary (GEO) satellites are positioned in a geostationary orbit at ~36 thousand kilometers above Earth. That the satellite is geostationary means it rotates with the Earth and appears stationary from the ground, requiring only one satellite to maintain constant coverage over an area that can be up to one-third of Earth’s surface. Low Earth Orbit (LEO) satellites are positioned at an altitude between 300 to 2000 kilometers above Earth and move relative to the Earth’s surface at high speeds, requiring a network or constellation to ensure continuous coverage of a particular area.

I have experienced that terrestrial cellular folks (like myself) when first thinking about satellite coverage are having some intuitive issues with satellite coverage. We are not used to our antennas moving away from the targeted coverage area, and our targeted coverage area, too, is moving away from our antenna. The geometry and dynamics of terrestrial cellular coverage are simpler than they are for satellite-based coverage. For LEO satellite network planners, it is not rocket science (pun intended) that the satellites move around in their designated orbit over Earth at orbital speeds of ca. 70 to 80 km per second. Thus, at an altitude of 500 km, a LEO satellite orbits Earth approximately every 1.5 hours. Earth, thankfully, rotates. Compared to its GEO satellite “cousin,” the LEO satellite ” is not “stationary” from the perspective of the ground. Thus, as Earth rotates, the targeted coverage area moves away from the coverage provided by the orbital satellite.

We need several satellites in the same orbit and several orbits (i.e., orbital planes) to provide continuous satellite coverage of a target area. This is very different from terrestrial cellular coverage of a given area (needles to say).

WHAT LEO SATELLITES BRING TO THE GROUND.

Anything is infinitely more than nothing. The Low Earth Orbit satellite brings the possibility of internet connectivity where there previously was nothing, either because too few potential customers spread out over a large area made terrestrial-based services hugely uneconomical or the environment is too hostile to build normal terrestrial networks within reasonable economics.

Figure 3 illustrates a low Earth satellite constellation providing internet to rural and remote areas as a way to solve part of the digital divide challenge in terms of availability. Obviously, the affordability is likely to remain a challenge unless subsidized by customers who can afford satellite services in other places where availability is more of a convenience question. (Courtesy: DALL-E)

The LEO satellites represent a transformative shift in internet connectivity, providing advantages over traditional cellular and fixed broadband networks, particularly for global access, speed, and deployment capabilities. As described in “Stratospheric Drones: Revolutionizing Terrestrial Rural Broadband from the Skies?”, LEO satellite constellations, or networks, may also be significantly more economical than equivalent cellular networks in rural and remote areas where the economics of coverage by satellite, as depicted in the above Figure 3, is by far better than by traditional terrestrial cellular means.

One of the foremost benefits of LEO satellites is their ability to offer global coverage as well as reasonable broadband and latency performance that is difficult to match with GEO and MEO satellites. The GEO stationary satellite obviously also offers global broadband coverage, the unit coverage being much more extensive than for a LEO satellite, but it is not possible to offer very low latency services, and it is more difficult to provide high data rates (in comparison to a LEO satellite). LEO satellites can reach the most remote and rural areas of the world, places where laying cables or setting up cell towers is impractical. This is a crucial step in delivering communications services where none exist today, ensuring that underserved populations and regions gain access to internet connectivity.

Another significant advantage is the reduction in latency that LEO satellites provide. Since they orbit much closer to Earth, typically at an altitude between 350 to 700 km, compared to their geostationary counterparts that are at 36 thousand kilometers altitude, the time it takes for a communications signal to travel between the user and the satellite is significantly reduced. This lower latency is crucial for enhancing the user experience in real-time applications such as video calls and online gaming, making these activities more enjoyable and responsive.

An inherent benefit of satellite constellations is their ability for quick deployment. They can be deployed rapidly in space, offering a quicker solution to achieving widespread internet coverage than the time-consuming and often challenging process of laying cables or erecting terrestrial infrastructure. Moreover, the network can easily be expanded by adding more satellites, allowing it to dynamically meet changing demand without extensive modifications on the ground.

LEO satellite networks are inherently scalable. By launching additional satellites, they can accommodate growing internet usage demands, ensuring that the network remains efficient and capable of serving more users over time without significant changes to ground infrastructure.

Furthermore, these satellite networks offer resilience and reliability. With multiple satellites in orbit, the network can maintain connectivity even if one satellite fails or is obstructed, providing a level of redundancy that makes the network less susceptible to outages. This ensures consistent performance across different geographical areas, unlike terrestrial networks that may suffer from physical damage or maintenance issues.

Another critical advantage is (relative) cost-effectiveness compared to a terrestrial-based cellular network. In remote or hard-to-reach areas, deploying satellites can be more economical than the high expenses associated with extending terrestrial broadband infrastructure. As satellite production and launch costs continue to decrease, the economics of LEO satellite internet become increasingly competitive, potentially reducing the cost for end-users.

LEO satellites offer a promising solution to some of the limitations of traditional connectivity methods. By overcoming geographical, infrastructural, and economic barriers, LEO satellite technology has the potential to not just complement but effectively substitute terrestrial-based cellular and fixed broadband services, especially in areas where such services are inadequate or non-existent.

Figure 4 below provides an overview of LEO satellite coverage with fixed broadband services offered to customers in the Ku band with a Ka backhaul link to ground station GWs that connect to, for example, the internet. Having inter-satellite communications (e.g., via laser links such as those used by Starlink satellites as per satellite version 1.5) allows for substantially less ground-station gateways. Inter-satellite laser links between intra-plane satellites are a distinct advantage in ensuring coverage for rural and remote areas where it might be difficult, very costly, and impractical to have a satellite ground station GW to connect to due to the lack of global internet infrastructure.

Figure 4 In general, a satellite is required to have LoS to its ground station gateway (GW); in other words, the GW needs to be within the coverage footprint of the satellite. For LEO satellites, which are at low altitudes, between 300 and 2000 km, and thus have a much lower footprint than MEO and GEO satellites, this would result in a need for a substantial amount of ground stations. This is depicted in (a) above. With inter-satellite laser links (SLL), e.g., those implemented by Starlink, it is possible to reduce the ground station gateways significantly, which is particularly helpful in rural and very remote areas. These laser links enable direct communication between satellites in orbit, which enhances the network’s performance, reliability, and global reach.

Inter-satellite laser links (ISLLs), or, as it is also called Optical Inter-satellite Links (OISK), are an advanced communication technology utilized by satellite constellations, such as for example Starlink, to facilitate high-speed secure data transmission directly between satellites. Inter-satellite laser links are today (primarily) designed for intra-plane communication within satellite constellations, enabling data transfer between satellites that share the same orbital plane. This is due to the relatively stable geometries and predictable distances between satellites in the same orbit, which facilitate maintaining the line-of-sight connections necessary for laser communications. ISLLs mark a significant departure from traditional reliance on ground stations for inter-satellite communication, and as such the ISL offers many benefits, including the ability to transmit data at speeds comparable to fiber-optic cables. Additionally, ISLLs enable satellite constellations to deliver seamless coverage across the entire planet, including over oceans and polar regions where ground station infrastructure is limited or non-existent. The technology also inherently enhances the security of data transmissions, thanks to the focused nature of laser beams, which are difficult to intercept.

However, the deployment of ISLLs is not without challenges. The technology requires a clear line of sight between satellites, which can be affected by their orbital positions, necessitating precise control mechanisms. Moreover, the theoretical limit to the number of satellites linked in a daisy chain is influenced by several factors, including the satellite’s power capabilities, the network architecture, and the need to maintain clear lines of sight. High-power laser systems also demand considerable energy, impacting the satellite’s power budget and requiring efficient management to balance operational needs. The complexity and cost of developing such sophisticated laser communication systems, combined with very precise pointing mechanisms and sensitive detectors, can be quite challenging and need to be carefully weighted against building satellite ground stations.

Cross-plane ISLL transmission, or the ability to communicate between satellites in different orbital planes, presents additional technical challenges, as it is technically highly challenging to maintain a stable line of sight between satellites moving in different orbital planes. However, the potential for ISLLs to support cross-plane links is recognized as a valuable capability for creating a fully interconnected satellite constellation. The development and incorporation of cross-plane ISLL capabilities into satellites are an area of active research and development. Such capabilities would reduce the reliance on ground stations and significantly increase the resilience of satellite constellations. I see the development as a next-generation topic together with many other important developments as described in the end of this blog. However, the power consumption of the ISLL is a point of concern that needs careful attention as it will impact many other aspects of the satellite operation.

THE DIGITAL DIVIDE.

The digital divide refers to the “internet haves and haves not” or “the gap between individuals who have access to modern information and communication technology (ICT),” such as the internet, computers, and smartphones, and those who do not have access. This divide can be due to various factors, including economic, geographic, age, and educational barriers. Essentially, as illustrated in Figure 5, it’s the difference between the “digitally connected” and the “digitally disconnected.”.

The significance of the digital divide is considerable, impacting billions of people worldwide. It is estimated that a little less than 40% of the world’s population, or roughly 2.9 billion people, had never used the internet (as of 2023). This gap is most pronounced in developing countries, rural areas, and among older populations and economically disadvantaged groups.

The digital divide affects individuals’ ability to access information, education, and job opportunities and impacts their ability to participate in digital economies and the modern social life that the rest of us (i.e., the other side of the divide or the privileged 60%) have become used to. Bridging this divide is crucial for ensuring equitable access to technology and its benefits, fostering social and economic inclusion, and supporting global development goals.

Figure 5 illustrates the digital divide, that is, the gap between individuals with access to modern information and communication technology (ICT), such as the internet, computers, and smartphones, and those who do not have access. (Courtesy: DALL-E)

CHALLENGES WITH LEO SATELLITE SOLUTIONS.

Low-Earth-orbit satellites offer compelling advantages for global internet connectivity, yet they are not without challenges and disadvantages when considered substitutes for cellular and fixed broadband services. These drawbacks underscore the complexities and limitations of deploying LEO satellite technology globally.

The capital investment required and the ongoing costs associated with designing, manufacturing, launching, and maintaining a constellation of LEO satellites are substantial. Despite technological advancements and increased competition driving costs down, the financial barrier to entry remains high. Compared to their geostationary counterparts, the relatively short lifespan of LEO satellites necessitates frequent replacements, further adding to operational expenses.

While LEO satellites offer significantly reduced latency (round trip times, RTT ~ 4 ms) compared to geostationary satellites (RTT ~ 240 ms), they may still face latency and bandwidth limitations, especially as the number of users on the satellite network increases. This can lead to reduced service quality during peak usage times, highlighting the potential for congestion and bandwidth constraints. This is also the reason why the main business model of LEO satellite constellations is primarily to address coverage and needs in rural and remote locations. Alternatively, the LEO satellite business model focuses on low-bandwidth needs such as texting, voice messaging, and low-bandwidth Internet of Things (IoT) services.

Navigating the regulatory and spectrum management landscape presents another challenge for LEO satellite operators. Securing spectrum rights and preventing signal interference requires coordination across multiple jurisdictions, which can complicate deployment efforts and increase the complexity of operations.

The environmental and space traffic concerns associated with deploying large numbers of satellites are significant. The potential for space debris and the sustainability of low Earth orbits are critical issues, with collisions posing risks to other satellites and space missions. Additionally, the environmental impact of frequent rocket launches raises further concerns.

FIXED-WIRELESS ACCESS (FWA) BASED LEO SATELLITE SOLUTIONS.

Using the NewSpace Index database, updated December 2023, there are currently more than 6,463 internet satellites launched, of which 5,650 (~87%) from StarLink, and 40,000+ satellites planned for launch, with SpaceX’s Starlink satellites having 11,908 planned (~30%). More than 45% of the satellites launched and planned support multi-application use cases. Thus internet, together with, for example, IoT (~4%) and/or Direct-2-Device (D2D, ~39%). The D2D share is due to StarLink’s plans to provide services to mobile terminals with their latest satellite constellation. The first six StarLink v2 satellites with direct-to-cellular capability were successfully launched on January 2nd, 2024. Some care should be taken in the share of D2D satellites in the StarLink number as it does not consider the different form factors of the version 2 satellite that do not all include D2D capabilities.

Most LEO satellites, helped by StarLink satellite quantum, operational and planned, support satellite fixed broadband internet services. It is worth noting that the Chinese Guo Wang constellation ranks second in terms of planned LEO satellites, with almost 13,000 planned, rivaling the StarLink constellation. After StarLink and Guo Wang are counted there is only 34% or ca. 16,000 internet satellites left in the planning pool across 30+ satellite companies. While StarLink is privately owned (by Elon Musk), the Guo Wang (國網 ~ “The state network”) constellation is led by China SatNet and created by the SASAC (China’s State-Owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission). SASAC oversees China’s biggest state-owned enterprises. I expect that such an LEO satellite constellation, which would be the second biggest LEO constellation, as planned by Guo Wang and controlled by the Chinese State, would be of considerable concern to the West due to the possibility of dual-use (i.e., civil & military) of such a constellation.

StarLink coverage as of March 2024 (see StarLink’s availability map) does not provide services in Russia, China, Iran, Iraq, Afghanistan, Venezuela, and Cuba (20% of Earth’s total land base surface area). There are still quite a few countries in Africa and South-East Asia, including India, where regulatory approval remains pending.

Figure 6 NewSpace Index data of commercial satellite constellations in terms of total number of launched and planned (top) per company (or constellation name) and (bottom) per country.

While the term FWA, fixed wireless access, is not traditionally used to describe satellite internet services, the broadband services offered by LEO satellites can be considered a form of “wireless access” since they also provide connectivity without cables or fiber. In essence, LEO satellite broadband is a complementary service to traditional FWA, extending wireless broadband access to locations beyond the reach of terrestrial networks. In the following, I will continue to use the term FWA for the fixed broadband LEO satellite services provided to individual customers, including SMEs. As some of the LEO satellite businesses eventually also might provide direct-to-device (D2D) services to normal terrestrial mobile devices, either on their own acquired cellular spectrum or in partnership with terrestrial cellular operators, the LEO satellite operation (or business architecture) becomes much closer to terrestrial cellular operations.

Figure 7 Illustrating a Non-Terrestrial Network consisting of a Low Earth Orbit (LEO) satellite constellation providing fixed broadband services, such as Fixed Wireless Access, to individual terrestrial users (e.g., Starlink, Kuiper, OneWeb,…). Each hexagon represents a satellite beam inside the larger satellite coverage area. Note that, in general, there will be some coverage overlap between individual satellites, ensuring a continuous service. The operating altitude of an LEO satellite constellation is between 300 and 2,000 km, with most aiming to be at 450 to 550 km altitude. It is assumed that the satellites are interconnected, e.g., laser links. The User Terminal antenna (UT) is dynamically orienting itself after the best line-of-sight (in terms of signal quality) to a satellite within UT’s field-of-view (FoV). The FoV has not been shown in the picture above so as not to overcomplicate the illustration.

Low Earth Orbit (LEO) satellite services like Starlink have emerged to provide fixed broadband internet to individual consumers and small to medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) targeting rural and remote areas often where no other broadband solutions are available or with poor legacy copper- or coax-based infrastructure. These services deploy constellations of satellites orbiting close to Earth to offer high-speed internet with the significant advantage of reaching rural and remote areas where traditional ground-based infrastructure is absent or economically unfeasible.

One of the most significant benefits of LEO satellite broadband is the ability to deliver connectivity with lower latency compared to traditional satellite internet delivered by geosynchronous satellites, enhancing the user experience for real-time applications. The rapid deployment capability of these services also means that areas in dire need of internet access can be connected much quicker than waiting for ground infrastructure development. Additionally, satellite broadband’s reliability is less affected by terrestrial challenges, such as natural disasters that can disrupt other forms of connectivity.

The satellite service comes with its challenges. The cost of user equipment, such as satellite dishes, can be a barrier for some users. So, can the installation process be of the terrestrial satellite dish required to establish the connection to the satellite. Moreover, services might be limited by data caps or experience slower speeds after reaching certain usage thresholds, which can be a drawback for users with high data demands. Weather conditions can also impact the signal quality, particularly at the higher frequencies used by the satellite, albeit to a lesser extent than geostationary satellite services. However, the target areas where the fixed broadband satellite service is most suited are rural and remote areas that either have no terrestrial broadband infrastructure (terrestrial cellular broadband or wired broadband such as coax or fiber)

Beyond Starlink, other providers are venturing into the LEO satellite broadband market. OneWeb is actively developing a constellation to offer internet services worldwide, focusing on communities that are currently underserved by broadband. Telesat Lightspeed is also gearing up to provide broadband services, emphasizing the delivery of high-quality internet to the enterprise and government sectors.

Other LEO satellite businesses, such as AST SpaceMobile and Lynk Mobile, are taking a unique approach by aiming to connect standard mobile phones directly to their satellite network, extending cellular coverage beyond the reach of traditional cell towers. More about that in the section below (see “New Kids on the Block – Direct-to-Devices LEO satellites”).

I have been asked why I appear somewhat dismissive of the Amazon’s Project Kuiper in a previous version of article particular compared to StarLink (I guess). The expressed mission is to “provide broadband services to unserved and underserved consumers, businesses in the United States, …” (FCC 20-102). Project Kuiper plans for a broadband constellation of 3,226 microsatellites at 3 altitudes (i.e., orbital shells) around 600 km providing fixed broadband services in the Ka-band (i.e.,~ 17-30 GHz). In its US-based FCC (Federal Communications Commission) filling and in the subsequent FCC authorization it is clear that the Kuiper constellation primarily targets contiguous coverage of the USA (but mentions that services cannot be provided in the majority of Alaska, … funny I thought that was a good definition of a underserved remote and scarcely populated area?). Amazon has committed to launch 50% (1,618 satellites) of their committed satellites constellation before July 2026 (until now 2+ has been launched) and the remaining 50% before July 2029. There is however far less details on the Kuiper satellite design, than for example is available for the various versions of the StarLink satellites. Given the Kuiper will operate in the Ka-band there may be more frequency bandwidth allocated per beam than possible in the StarLink satellites using the Ku-band for customer device connectivity. However, Ka-band is at a higher frequency which may result in a more compromised signal propagation. In my opinion based on the information from the FCC submissions and correspondence, the Kuiper constellation appear less ambitious compared to StarLink vision, mission and tangible commitment in terms of aggressive launches, very high level of innovation and iterative development on their platform and capabilities in general. This may of course change over time and as more information becomes available on the Amazon’s Project Kuiper.

FWA-based LEO satellite solutions – takeaway:

  • LoS-based and free-space-like signal propagation allows high-frequency signals (i.e., high throughput, capacity, and quality) to provide near-ideal performance only impacted by the distance between the antenna and the ground terminal. Something that is, in general, not possible for a terrestrial-based cellular infrastructure.
  • Provides satellite fixed broadband internet connectivity typically using the Ku-band in geographically isolated locations where terrestrial broadband infrastructure is limited or non-existent.
  • Lower latency (and round trip time) compared to MEO and GEO satellite internet solutions.
  • Current systems are designed to provide broadband internet services in scarcely populated areas and underserved (or unserved) regions where traditional terrestrial-based communications infrastructures are highly uneconomical and/or impractical to deploy.
  • As shown in my previous article (i.e., “Stratospheric Drones: Revolutionizing Terrestrial Rural Broadband from the Skies?”), LEO satellite networks may be an economical interesting alternative to terrestrial rural cellular networks in countries with large scarcely populated rural areas requiring tens of thousands of cellular sites to cover. Hybrid models with LEO satellite FWA-like coverage to individuals in rural areas and with satellite backhaul to major settlements and towns should be considered in large geographies.
  • Resilience to terrestrial disruptions is a key advantage. It ensures functionality even when ground-based infrastructure is disrupted, which is an essential element for maintaining the Business Continuity of an operator’s telecommunications services. Particular hierarchical architectures with for example GEO-satellite, LEO satellite and Earth-based transport infrastructure will result in very high reliability network operations (possibly approaching ultra-high availability, although not with service parity).
  • Current systems are inherently capacity-limited due to their vast coverage areas (i.e., lower performance per unit coverage area). In the peak demand period, they will typically perform worse than terrestrial-based cellular networks (e.g., LTE or 5G).
  • In regions where modern terrestrial cellular and fixed broadband services are already established, satellite broadband may face challenges competing with these potentially cheaper, faster, and more reliable services, which are underpinned by the terrestrial communications infrastructure.
  • It is susceptible to weather conditions, such as heavy rain or snow, which can degrade signal quality. This may impact system capacity and quality, resulting in inconsistent customer experience throughout the year.
  • Must navigate complex regulatory environments in each country, which can affect service availability and lead to delays in service rollout.
  • Depending on the altitude, LEO satellites are typically replaced on a 5—to 7-year cycle due to atmospheric drag (which increases as altitude decreases; thus, the lower the altitude, the shorter a satellite’s life). This ultimately means that any improvements in system capacity and quality will take time to be thoroughly enjoyed by all customers.

SATELLITE BACKHAUL SOLUTIONS.

Figure 8 illustrates the architecture of a Low Earth Orbit (LEO) satellite backhaul system used by providers like OneWeb as well as StarLink with their so-called “Community Gateway”. It showcases the connectivity between terrestrial internet infrastructure (i.e., Satellite Gateways) and satellites in orbit, enabling high-speed data transmission. The network consists of LEO satellites that communicate with each other (inter-satellite Comms) using the Ku and Ka frequency bands. These satellites connect to ground-based satellite gateways (GW), which interface with Points of Presence (PoP) and Internet Exchange Points (IXP), integrating the space-based network with the terrestrial internet (WWW). Note: The indicated speeds and frequency bands (e.g., Ku: 12–18 GHz, Ka: 28–40 GHz) and data speeds illustrate the network’s capabilities.

LEO satellites providing backhaul connectivity, such as shown in Figure 8 above, are extending internet services to the farthest reaches of the globe. These satellites offer many benefits, as already discussed above, in connecting remote, rural, and previously un- and under-served areas with reliable internet services. Many remote regions lack foundational telecom infrastructure, particularly long-haul transport networks needed for carrying traffic away from remote populated areas. Satellite backhauls do not only offer a substantially better financial solution for enhancing internet connectivity to remote areas but are often the only viable solution for connectivity.

Take, for example, Greenland. The world’s largest non-continental island, the size of Western Europe, is characterized by its sparse population and distinct unconnected by road settlement patterns mainly along the West Coast (as well as a couple of settlements on the East Coast), influenced mainly by its vast ice sheets and rugged terrain. With a population of around 56+ thousand, primarily concentrated on the west coast, Greenland’s demographic distribution is spread out over ca. 50+ settlements and about 20 towns. Nuuk, the capital, is the island’s most populous city, housing over 18+ thousand residents and serving as the administrative, economic, and cultural hub. Terrestrial cellular networks serve settlements’ and towns’ communication and internet services needs, with the traffic carried back to the central switching centers by long-haul microwave links, sea cables, and satellite broadband connectivity. Several settlements connectivity needs can only be served by satellite backhaul, e.g., settlements on the East Coast (e.g., Tasiilaq with ca. 2,000 inhabitants and Ittoqqotooormiit (an awesome name!) with around 400+ inhabitants). LEO satellite backhaul solutions serving Satellite-only communities, such as those operated and offered by OneWeb (Eutelsat), could provide a backhaul transport solution that would match FWA latency specifications due to better (round trip time) performance than that of a GEO satellite backhaul solution.

It should also be clear that remote satellite-only settlements and towns may have communications service needs and demand that a localized 4G (or 5G) terrestrial cellular network with a satellite backhaul can serve much better than, for example, relying on individual ad-hoc connectivity solution from for example Starlink. When the area’s total bandwidth demand exceeds the capacity of an FWA satellite service, a localized terrestrial network solution with a satellite backhaul is, in general, better.

The LEO satellites should offer significantly reduced latency compared to their geostationary counterparts due to their closer proximity to the Earth. This reduction in delay is essential for a wide range of real-time applications and services, from adhering to modern radio access (e.g., 4G and 5G) requirements, VoIP, and online gaming to critical financial transactions, enhancing the user experience and broadening the scope of possible services and business.

Among the leading LEO satellite constellations providing backhaul solutions today are SpaceX’s Starlink (via their community gateway), aiming to deliver high-speed internet globally with a preference of direct to consumer connectivity; OneWeb, focusing on internet services for businesses and communities in remote areas; Telesat’s Lightspeed, designed to offer secure and reliable connectivity; and Amazon’s Project Kuiper, which plans to deploy thousands of satellites to provide broadband to unserved and underserved communities worldwide.

Satellite backhaul solutions – takeaway:

  • Satellite-backhaul solutions are excellent, cost-effective solution for providing an existing isolated cellular (and fixed access) network with high-bandwidth connectivity to the Internet (such as in remote and deep rural areas).
  • LEO satellites can reduce the need for extensive and very costly ground-based infrastructure by serving as a backhaul solution. For some areas, such as Greenland, the Sahara, or the Brazilian rainforest, it may not be practical or economical to connect by terrestrial-based transmission (e.g., long-haul microwave links or backbone & backhaul fiber) to remote settlements or towns.
  • An LEO-based backhaul solution supports applications and radio access technologies requiring a very low round trip time scale (RTT<50 ms) than is possible with a GEO-based satellite backhaul. However, the optimum RTT will depend on where the LEO satellite ground gateway connects to the internet service provider and how low the RTT can be.
  • The collaborative nature of a satellite-backhaul solution allows the terrestrial operator to focus on and have full control of all its customers’ network experiences, as well as optimize the traffic within its own network infrastructure.
  • LEO satellite backhaul solutions can significantly boost network resilience and availability, providing a secure and reliable connectivity solution.
  • Satellite-backhaul solutions require local ground-based satellite transmission capabilities (e.g., a satellite ground station).
  • The operator should consider that at a certain threshold of low population density, direct-to-consumer satellite services like Starlink might be more economical than constructing a local telecom network that relies on satellite backhaul (see above section on “Fixed Wireless Access (FWA) based LEO satellite solutions”).
  • Satellite backhaul providers require regulatory permits to offer backhaul services. These permits are necessary for several reasons, including the use of radio frequency spectrum, operation of satellite ground stations, and provision of telecommunications services within various jurisdictions.
  • The Satellite life-time in orbit is between 5 to 7 years depending on the LEO altitude. A MEO satellite (2 to 36 thousand km altitude) last between 10 to 20 years (GEO). This also dictates the modernization and upgrade cycle as well as timing of your ROI investment case and refinancing needs.

NEW KIDS ON THE BLOCK – DIRECT-TO-DEVICE LEO SATELLITES.

A recent X-exchange (from March 2nd):

Elon Musk: “SpaceX just achieved peak download speed of 17 Mb/s from a satellite direct to unmodified Samsung Android Phone.” (note: the speed correspond to a spectral efficiency of ~3.4 Mbps/MHz/beam).

Reply from user: “That’s incredible … Fixed wireless networks need to be looking over their shoulders?”

Elon Musk: “No, because this is the current peak speed per beam and the beams are large, so this system is only effective where there is no existing cellular service. This services works in partnership with wireless providers, like what @SpaceX and @TMobile announced.”

Figure 9 illustrating a LEO satellite direct-to-device communication in a remote areas without any terrestrially-based communications infrastructure. Satellite being the only means of communications either by a normal mobile device or by classical satphone. (Courtesy: DALL-E).

Low Earth Orbit (LEO) Satellite Direct-to-Device technology enables direct communication between satellites in orbit and standard mobile devices, such as smartphones and tablets, without requiring additional specialized hardware. This technology promises to extend connectivity to remote, rural, and underserved areas globally, where traditional cellular network infrastructure is absent or economically unfeasible to deploy. The system can offer lower latency communication by leveraging LEO satellites, which orbit closer to Earth than geostationary satellites, making it more practical for everyday use. The round trip time (RTT), the time it takes the for the signal to travel from the satellite to the mobile device and back, is ca. 4 milliseconds for a LEO satellite at 550 km compared to ca. 240 milliseconds for a geosynchronous satellite (at 36 thousand kilometers altitude).

The key advantage of a satellite in low Earth orbit is that the likelihood of a line-of-sight to a point on the ground is very high compared to establishing a line-of-sight for terrestrial cellular coverage that, in general, would be very low. In other words, the cellular signal propagation from a LEO satellite closely approximates that of free space. Thus, all the various environmental signal loss factors we must consider for a standard terrestrial-based mobile network do not apply to our satellite. In other, more simplistic words, the signal propagation directly from the satellite to the mobile device is less compromised than it typically would be from a terrestrial cellular tower to the same mobile device. The difference between free-space propagation, which considers only distance and frequency, and the terrestrial signal propagation models, which quantifies all the gains and losses experienced by a terrestrial cellular signal, is very substantial and in favor of free-space propagation.  As our Earth-bound cellular intuition of signal propagation often gets in the way of understanding the signal propagation from a satellite (or antenna in the sky in general), I recommend writing down the math using the formula of free space propagation loss and comparing this with terrestrial cellular link budget models, such as for example the COST 231-Hata Model (relatively simple) or the more recent 3GPP TR 38.901 Model (complex). In rural and sub-urban areas, depending on the environment, in-door coverage may be marginally worse, fairly similar, or even better than from terrestrial cell tower at a distance. This applies to both the uplink and downlink communications channel between the mobile device and the LEO satellite, and is also the reason why higher frequency (with higher frequency bandwidths available) use on LEO satellites can work better than in a terrestrial cellular network.

However, despite its potential to dramatically expand coverage, after all that is what satellites do, LEO Satellite Direct-to-Device technology is not a replacement for terrestrial cellular services and terrestrial communications infrastructures for several reasons: (a) Although the spectral efficiency can be excellent, the frequency bandwidth (in MHz) and data speeds (in Mbps) available through satellite connections are typically lower than those provided by ground-based cellular networks, limiting its use for high-bandwidth applications. (b) The satellite-based D2D services are, in general, capacity-limited and might not be able to handle higher user density typical for urban areas as efficiently as terrestrial networks, which are designed to accommodate large numbers of users through dense deployment of cell towers. (c) Environmental factors like buildings or bad weather can more significantly impact satellite communications’ reliability and quality than terrestrial services. (d) A satellite D2D service requires regulatory approval (per country), as the D2D frequency typically will be limited to terrestrial cellular services and will have to be coordinated and managed with any terrestrial use to avoid service degradation (or disruption) for customers using terrestrial cellular services also using the frequency. The satellites will have to be able to switch off their D2D service when the satellite covers jurisdictions that have not provided approval or where the relevant frequency/frequencies are in use terrestrially.

Using the NewSpace Index database, updated December 2023, there are current more than 8,000 Direct-to Device (D2D), or Direct-2-Cell (D2C), satellites planned for launch, with SpaceX’s Starlink v2 having 7,500 planned. The rest, 795 satellites, are distributed on 6 other satellite operators (e.g. AST Mobile, Sateliot (Spain), Inmarsat (HEO-orbit), Lynk,…). If we look at satellites designed for IoT connectivity we get in total 5,302, with 4,739 (not including StarLink) still planned, distributed out over 50+ satellite operators. The average IoT satellite constellation including what is currently planned is ~95 satellites with the majority targeted for LEO. The the satellite operators included in the 50+ count have confirmed funding with a minimum amount of US$2 billion (half of the operators have only funding confirmed without an amount). About 2,937 (435 launched) satellites are being planned to only serve IoT markets (note: I think this seems a bit excessive). With Swarm Technologies, a SpaceX subsidiary rank number 1 in terms of both launched and planned satellites. Swarm Technologies having launched at least 189 CubeSats (e.g., both 0.25U and 1U types) and have planned an addition 150. The second ranked IoT-only operator is Orbcomm with 51 satellites launched and an additional 52 planned. The average launched of the remaining IoT specific satellites operators are 5 with on average planning to launch 55 (over 42 constellations).

There are also 3 satellite operators (i.e., Chinese-based Galaxy Space: 1,000 LEO-sats; US-based Mangata Networks: 791 MEO/HEO-sats, and US-based Omnispace: 200 LEO?-sats) that have planned a total of 2,000 satellites to support 5G applications with their satellite solutions and one operator (i.e., Hanwha Systems) has planned 2,000 LEO satellites for 6G.

The emergence of LEO satellite direct-to-device (D2D) services, as depicted in the Figure 10 below, is at the forefront of satellite communication innovations, offering a direct line of connectivity between devices that bypasses the need for traditional cellular-based ground-based network infrastructure (e.g., cell towers). This approach benefits from the relatively short distance of hundreds of kilometers between LEO satellites and the Earth, reducing communication latency and broadening bandwidth capabilities compared to their geostationary counterparts. One of the key advantages of LEO D2D services is their ability to provide global coverage with an extensive number of satellites, i.e., in their 100s to 1000s depending the targeted quality of service, to support the services, ensuring that even the most remote and underserved areas have access to reliable communication channels. They are also critical in disaster resilience, maintaining communications when terrestrial networks fail due to emergencies or natural disasters.

Figure 10 This schematic presents the network architecture for satellite-based direct-to-device (D2D) communication facilitated by Low Earth Orbit (LEO) satellites, exemplified by collaborations like Starlink and T-Mobile US, Lynk Mobile, and AST Space Mobile. It illustrates how satellites in LEO enable direct connectivity between user equipment (UE), such as standard mobile devices and IoT (Internet of Things) devices, using terrestrial cellular frequencies and VHF/UHF bands. The system also shows inter-satellite links operating in the Ka-band for seamless network integration, with satellite gateways (GW) linking the space-based network to ground infrastructure, including Points of Presence (PoP) and Internet Exchange Points (IXP), which connect to the wider internet (WWW). This architecture supports innovative services like Omnispace and Astrocast, offering LEO satellite IoT connectivity. The network could be particularly crucial for defense and special operations in remote and challenging environments, such as the deserts or the Arctic regions of Greenland, where terrestrial networks are unavailable. As an example shown here, using regular terrestrial cellular frequencies in both downlink (~300 MHz to 7 GHz) and uplinks (900 MHz or lower to 2.1 GHz) ensures robust and versatile communication capabilities in diverse operational contexts.

While the majority of the 5,000+ Starlink constellation is 13 GHz (Ku-band), at the beginning of 2024, SpaceX launched a few 2nd generation Starlink satellites that support direct connections from the satellite to a normal cellular device (e.g., smartphone), using 5 MHz of T-Mobile USA’s PCS band (1900 MHz). The targeted consumer service, as expressed by T-Mobile USA, provides texting capabilities across the USA for areas with no or poor existing cellular coverage. This is fairly similar to services at similar cellular coverage areas presently offered by, for example, AST SpaceMobileOmniSpace, and Lynk Global LEO satellite services with reported maximum downlink speed approaching 20 Mbps. The so-called Direct-2-Device, where the device is a normal smartphone without satellite connectivity functionality, is expected to develop rapidly over the next 10 years and continue to increase the supported user speeds (i.e., utilized terrestrial cellular spectrum) and system capacity in terms of smaller coverage areas and higher number of satellite beams.

Table 1 below provides an overview of the top 13 LEO satellite constellations targeting (fixed) internet services (e.g., Ku band), IoT and M2M services, and Direct-to-Device (or Direct-to-Cell, D2C) services. The data has been compiled from the NewSpace Index website, which should be with data as of 31st of December 2023. The Top-satellite constellation rank has been based on the number of launched satellites until the end of 2023. Two additional Direct-2-Cell (D2C or Direct-to-Device, D2D) LEO satellite constellations are planned for 2024-2025. One is SpaceX Starlink 2nd generation, which launched at the beginning of 2024, using T-Mobile USA’s PCS Band to connect (D2D) to normal terrestrial cellular handsets. The other D2D (D2C) service is Inmarsat’s Orchestra satellite constellation based on L-band (for mobile terrestrial services) and Ka for fixed broadband services. One new constellation (Mangata Networks, see also the NewSpace constellation information) targeting 5G services. With two 5G constellations already launched, i.e., Galaxy Space (Yinhe) launched 8 LEO satellites, 1,000 planned using Q- and V-bands (i.e., not a D2D cellular 5G service), and OmniSpace launched two satellites and appear to have planned a total of 200 satellites. Moreover, currently, there is one planned constellation targeting 6G by the South Korean Hanwha Group (a bit premature, but interesting to follow nevertheless) with 2,000 6G (LEO) satellites planned.

Most currently launched and planned satellite constellations offering (or plan to provide) Direct-2-Cell services, including IoT and M2M, are designed for low-frequency bandwidth services that are unlikely to compete with terrestrial cellular networks’ quality of service where reasonable good coverage (or better) exists.

Table 1 An overview of the Top-14 LEO satellite constellations targeting (fixed) internet services (e.g., Ku band), IoT and M2M services, and Direct-to-Device (or direct-to-cell) services. The data has been compiled from the NewSpace Index website, which should be with data as of 31st of December 2023.

The deployment of LEO D2D services also navigates a complicated regulatory landscape, with the need for harmonized spectrum allocation across different regions. Managing interference with terrestrial cellular networks and other satellite operations is another interesting challenge albeit complex aspect, requiring sophisticated solutions to ensure signal integrity. Moreover, despite the cost-effectiveness of LEO satellites in terms of launch and operation, establishing a full-fledged network for D2D services demands substantial initial investment, covering satellite development, launch, and the setup of supporting ground infrastructure.

LEO satellites with D2D-based capabilities – takeaway:

  • Provides lower-bandwidth services (e.g., GPRS/EDGE/HSDPA-like) where no existing terrestrial cellular service is present.
  • (Re-)use on Satellite of the terrestrial cellular spectrum.
  • D2D-based satellite services may become crucial in business continuity scenarios, providing redundancy and increased service availability to existing terrestrial cellular networks. This is particularly essential as a remedy for emergency response personnel in case terrestrial networks are not functional. Limited capacity (due to little assigned frequency bandwidth) over a large coverage area serving rural and remote areas with little or no cellular infrastructure.
  • Securing regulatory approval for satellite services over independent jurisdictions is a complex and critical task for any operator looking to provide global or regional satellite-based communications. The satellite operator may have to switch off transmission over jurisdictions where no permission has been granted.
  • If the spectrum is also deployed on the ground, satellite use of it must be managed and coordinated (due to interference) with the terrestrial cellular networks.
  • Require lowly or non-utilized cellular spectrum in the terrestrial operator’s spectrum portfolio.
  • D2D-based communications require a more complex and sophisticated satellite design, including the satellite antenna resulting in higher manufacturing and launch cost.
  • The IoT-only commercial satellite constellation “space” is crowded with a total of 44 constellations (note: a few operators have several constellations). I assume that many of those plans will eventually not be realized. Note that SpaceX Swarm Technology is leading and in terms of total numbers (available in the NewSpace Index) database will remain a leader from the shear amount of satellites once their plan has been realized. I expect we will see a Chinese constellation in this space as well unless the capability will be built into the Guo Wang constellation.
  • The Satellite life-time in orbit is between 5 to 7 years depending on the altitude. This timeline also dictates the modernization and upgrade cycle as well as timing of your ROI investment and refinancing needs.
  • Today’s D2D satellite systems are frequency-bandwidth limited. However, if so designed, satellites could provide a frequency asymmetric satellite-to-device connection. For instance, the downlink from the satellite to the device could utilize a high frequency (not used in the targeted rural or remote area) and a larger bandwidth, while the uplink communication between the terrestrial device and the LEO satellite could use a sufficiently lower frequency and smaller frequency bandwidth.

MAKERS OF SATELLITES.

In the rapidly evolving space industry, a diverse array of companies specializes in manufacturing satellites for Low Earth Orbit (LEO), ranging from small CubeSats to larger satellites for constellations similar to those used by OneWeb (UK) and Starlink (USA). Among these, smaller companies like NanoAvionics (Lithuania) and Tyvak Nano-Satellite Systems (USA) have carved out niches by focusing on modular and cost-efficient small satellite platforms typically below 25 kg. NanoAvionics is renowned for its flexible mission support, offering everything from design to operation services for CubeSats (e.g., 1U, 3U, 6U) and larger small satellites (100+ kg). Similarly, Tyvak excels in providing custom-made solutions for nano-satellites and CubeSats, catering to specific mission needs with a comprehensive suite of services, including design, manufacturing, and testing.

UK-based Surrey Satellite Technology Limited (SSTL) stands out for its innovative approach to small, cost-effective satellites for various applications, with cost-effectiveness in achieving the desired system’s performance, reliability, and mission objectives at a lower cost than traditional satellite projects that easily runs into USD 100s of million. SSTL’s commitment to delivering satellites that balance performance and budget has made it a popular satellite manufacturer globally.

On the larger end of the spectrum, companies like SpaceX (USA) and Thales Alenia Space (France-Italy) are making significant strides in satellite manufacturing at scale. SpaceX has ventured beyond its foundational launch services to produce thousands of small satellites (250+ kg) for its Starlink broadband constellation, which comprises 5,700+ LEO satellites, showcasing mass satellite production. Thales Alenia Space offers reliable satellite platforms and payload integration services for LEO constellation projects.

With their extensive expertise in aerospace and defense, Lockheed Martin Space (USA) and Northrop Grumman (USA) produce various satellite systems suitable for commercial, military, and scientific missions. Their ability to support large-scale satellite constellation projects from design to launch demonstrates high expertise and reliability. Similarly, aerospace giants Airbus Defense and Space (EU) and Boeing Defense, Space & Security (USA) offer comprehensive satellite solutions, including designing and manufacturing small satellites for LEO. Their involvement in high-profile projects highlights their capacity to deliver advanced satellite systems for a wide range of use cases.

Together, these companies, from smaller specialized firms to global aerospace leaders, play crucial roles in the satellite manufacturing industry. They enable a wide array of LEO missions, catering to the burgeoning demand for satellite services across telecommunications, Earth observation, and beyond, thus facilitating access to space for diverse clients and applications.

ECONOMICS.

Before going into details, let’s spend some time on an example illustrating the basic components required for building a satellite and getting it to launch. Here, I point at a super cool alternative to the above-mentioned companies, the USA-based startup Apex, co-founded by CTO Max Benassi (ex-SpaceX and Astra) and CEO Ian Cinnamon. To get an impression of the macro-components of a satellite system, I recommend checking out the Apex webpage and “playing” with their satellite configurator. The basic package comes at a price tag of USD 3.2 million and a 9-month delivery window. It includes a 100 kg satellite bus platform, a power system, a communication system based on X-band (8 – 12 GHz), and a guidance, navigation, and control package. The basic package does not include a solar array drive assembly (SADA), which plays a critical role in the operation of satellites by ensuring that the satellite’s solar panels are optimally oriented toward the Sun. Adding the SADA brings with it an additional USD 500 thousand. Also, the propulsion mechanism (e.g., chemical or electric; in general, there are more possibilities) is not provided (+ USD 450 thousand), nor are any services included (e.g., payload & launch vehicle integration and testing, USD 575 thousand), including SADAs, propulsion, and services, Apex will have a satellite launch ready for an amount of close to USD 4.8 million.

However, we are not done. The above solution still needs to include the so-called payload, which relates to the equipment or instruments required to perform the LEO satellite mission (e.g., broadband communications services), the actual satellite launch itself, and the operational aspects of a successful post-launch (i.e., ground infrastructure and operation center(s)).

Let’s take SpaceX’s Starlink satellite as an example illustrating mission and payload more clearly. The Starlink satellite’s primary mission is to provide fixed-wireless access broadband internet to an Earth-based fixed antenna using. The Starlink payload primarily consists of advanced broadband internet transmission equipment designed to provide high-speed internet access across the globe. This includes phased-array antennas for communication with user terminals on the ground, high-frequency radio transceivers to facilitate data transmission, and inter-satellite links allowing satellites to communicate in orbit, enhancing network coverage and data throughput.

The economical aspects of launching a Low Earth Orbit (LEO) satellite project span a broad spectrum of costs from the initial concept phase to deployment and operational management. These projects commence with research and development, where significant investments are made in designengineering, and the iterative process of prototyping and testing to ensure the satellite meets its intended performance and reliability standards in harsh space conditions (e.g., vacuum, extreme temperature variations, radiation, solar flares, high-velocity impacts with micrometeoroids and man-made space debris, erosion, …).

Manufacturing the satellite involves additional expenses, including procuring high-quality components that can withstand space conditions and assembling and integrating the satellite bus with its mission-specific payload. Ensuring the highest quality standards throughout this process is crucial to minimizing the risk of in-orbit failure, which can substantially increase project costs. The payload should be seen as the heart of the satellite’s mission. It could be a set of scientific instruments for measuring atmospheric data, optical sensors for imaging, transponders for communication, or any other equipment designed to fulfill the satellite’s specific objectives. The payload will vary greatly depending on the mission, whether for Earth observation, scientific research, navigation, or telecommunications.

Of course, there are many other types and more affordable options for LEO satellites than a Starlink-like one (although we should also not ignore achievements of SpaceX and learn from them as much as possible). As seen from Table 1, we have a range of substantially smaller satellite types or form factors. The 1U (i.e., one unit) CubeSat is a satellite with a form factor of 10x10x11.35 cm3 and weighs no more than 1.33 kilograms. A rough cost range for manufacturing a 1U CubeSat could be from USD 50 to 100+ thousand depending on mission complexity and payload components (e.g., commercial-off-the-shelf or application or mission-specific design). The range includes considering the costs associated with the satellite’s design, components, assembly, testing, and initial integration efforts. The cost range, however, does not include other significant costs associated with satellite missions, such as launch services, ground station operations, mission control, and insurance, which is likely to (significantly) increase the total project cost. Furthermore, we have additional form factors, such as 3U CubeSat (10x10x34.05 cm3, <4 kg), manufacturing cost in the range of USD 100 to 500+ thousand, 6U CubeSat (20x10x34 cm3, <12 kg), that can carry more complex payload solutions than the smaller 1U and 3U, with the manufacturing cost in the range of USD 200 thousand to USD 1+ million and 12U satellites (20x20x34 cm3, <24 kg) that again support complex payload solutions and in general will be significantly more expensive to manufacture.

Securing a launch vehicle is one of the most significant expenditures in a satellite project. This cost not only includes the price of the rocket and launch itself but also encompasses integration, pre-launch services, and satellite transportation to the launch site. Beyond the launch, establishing and maintaining the ground segment infrastructure, such as ground stations and a mission control center, is essential for successful satellite communication and operation. These facilities enable ongoing tracking, telemetry, and command operations, as well as the processing and management of the data collected by the satellite.

The SpaceX Falcon rocket is used extensively by other satellite businesses (see above Table 1) as well as by SpaceX for their own Starlink constellation network. The rocket has a payload capability of ca. 23 thousand kg and a volume handling capacity of approximately 300 cubic meters. SpaceX has launched around 60 Starlink satellites per Falcon 9 mission for the first-generation satellites. The launch cost per 1st generation satellite would then be around USD 1 million per satellite using the previously quoted USD 62 million (2018 figure) for a Falcon 9 launch. The second-generation Starlink satellites are substantially more advanced compared to the 1st generation. They are also heavier, weighing around a thousand kilograms. A Falcon 9 would only be able to launch around 20 generation 2 satellites (only considering the weight limitation), while a Falcon Heavy could lift ca. 60 2nd gen. satellites but also at a higher price point of USD 90 million (2018 figure). Thus the launch cost per satellite would be between USD 1.5 million using Falcon Heavy and USD 3.1 million using Falcon 9. Although the launch cost is based on price figures from 2018, the expected efficiency gained from re-use may have either kept the cost level or reduced it further as expected, particularly with Falcon Heavy.

Satellite businesses looking to launch small volumes of satellites, such as CubeSats, have a variety of strategies at their disposal to manage launch costs effectively. One widely adopted approach is participating in rideshare missions, where the expenses of a single launch vehicle are shared among multiple payloads, substantially reducing the cost for each operator. This method is particularly attractive due to its cost efficiency and the regularity of missions offered by, for example, SpaceX. Prices for rideshare missions can start from as low as a few thousand dollars for very small payloads (like CubeSats) to several hundred thousand dollars for larger small satellites. For example, SpaceX advertises rideshare prices starting at $1 million for payloads up to 200 kg. Alternatively, dedicated small launcher services cater specifically to the needs of small satellite operators, offering more tailored launch options in terms of timing and desired orbit. Companies such as Rocket Lab (USA) and Astra (USA) launch services have emerged, providing flexibility that rideshare missions might not, although at a slightly higher cost. However, these costs remain significantly lower than arranging a dedicated launch on a larger vehicle. For example, Rocket Lab’s Electron rocket, specializing in launching small satellites, offers dedicated launches with prices starting around USD 7 million for the entire launch vehicle carrying up to 300 kg. Astra has reported prices in the range of USD 2.5 million for a dedicated LEO launch with their (discontinued) Rocket 3 with payloads of up to 150 kg. The cost for individual small satellites will depend on their share of the payload mass and the specific mission requirements.

Satellite ground stations, which consist of arrays of phased-array antennas, are critical for managing the satellite constellation, routing internet traffic, and providing users with access to the satellite network. These stations are strategically located to maximize coverage and minimize latency, ensuring that at least one ground station is within the line of sight of satellites as they orbit the Earth. As of mid-2023, Starlink operated around 150 ground stations worldwide (also called Starlink Gateways), with 64 live and an additional 33 planned in the USA. The cost of constructing a ground station would be between USD 300 thousand to half a million not including the physical access point, also called the point-of-presence (PoP), and transport infrastructure connecting the PoP (and gateway) to the internet exchange where we find the internet service providers (ISPs) and the content delivery networks (CDNs). The Pop may add another USD 100 to 200 thousand to the ground infrastructure unit cost. The transport cost from the gateway to the Internet exchange can vary a lot depending on the gateway’s location.

Insurance is a critical component of the financial planning for a satellite project, covering risks associated with both the launch phase and the satellite’s operational period in orbit. These insurances are, in general, running at between 5% to 20% of the total project cost depending on the satellite value, the track record of the launch vehicle, mission complexity, and duration (i.e., typically 5 – 7 years for a LEO satellite at 500 km) and so forth. Insurance could be broken up into launch insurance and insurance covering the satellite once it is in orbit.

Operational costs, the Opex, include the day-to-day expenses of running the satellite, from staffing and technical support to ground station usage fees.

Regulatory and licensing fees, including frequency allocation and orbital slot registration, ensure the satellite operates without interfering with other space assets. Finally, at the end of the satellite’s operational life, costs associated with safely deorbiting the satellite are incurred to comply with space debris mitigation guidelines and ensure a responsible conclusion to the mission.

The total cost of an LEO satellite project can vary widely, influenced by the satellite’s complexity, mission goals, and lifespan. Effective project management and strategic decision-making are crucial to navigating these expenses, optimizing the project’s budget, and achieving mission success.

Figure 11 illustrates an LEO CubeSat orbiting above the Earth, capturing the satellite’s compact design and its role in modern space exploration and technology demonstration. Note that the CubeSat design comes in several standardized dimensions, with the reference design, also called 1U, being almost 1 thousandth of a cubic meter and weighing less than 1.33 kg. More advanced CubeSat satellites would typically be 6U or higher.

CubeSats (e.g., 1U, 3U, 6U, 12U):

  • Manufacturing Cost: Ranges from USD 50,000 for a simple 1U CubeSat to over USD 1 million for a more complex missions supported by 6U (or higher) CubeSat with advanced payloads (and 12U may again amount to several million US dollars).
  • Launch Cost: This can vary significantly depending on the launch provider and the rideshare opportunities, ranging from a few thousand dollars for a 1U CubeSat on a rideshare mission to several million dollars for a dedicated launch of larger CubeSats or small satellites.
  • Operational Costs: Ground station services, mission control, and data handling can add tens to hundreds of thousands of dollars annually, depending on the mission’s complexity and duration.

Small Satellites (25 kg up to 500 kg):

  • Manufacturing Cost: Ranges from USD 500,000 to over 10 million, depending on the satellite’s size, complexity, and payload requirements.
  • Launch Cost: While rideshare missions can reduce costs, dedicated launches for small satellites can range from USD 10 million to 62 million (e.g., Falcon 9) and beyond (e.g., USD 90 million for Falcon Heavy).
  • Operational Costs: These are similar to CubeSats, but potentially higher due to the satellite’s larger size and more complex mission requirements, reaching several hundred thousand to over a million dollars annually.

The range for the total project cost of a LEO satellite:

Given these considerations, the total cost range for a LEO satellite project can vary from as low as a few hundred thousand dollars for a simple CubeSat project utilizing rideshare opportunities and minimal operational requirements to hundreds of millions of dollars for more complex small satellite missions requiring dedicated launches and extensive operational support.

It is important to note that these are rough estimates, and the actual cost can vary based on specific mission requirements, technological advancements, and market conditions.

CAPACITY AND QUALITY

Figure 12 Satellite-based cellular capacity, or quality measured, by the unit or total throughput in Mbps is approximately driven by the amount of spectrum (in MHz) times the effective spectral efficiency (in Mbps/MHz/units) times the number of satellite beams resulting in cells on the ground.

The overall capacity and quality of satellite communication systems, given in Mbps, is on a high level, the product of three key factors: (i) the amount of frequency bandwidth in MHz allocated to the satellite operations multiplied by (ii) the effective spectral efficiency in Mbps per MHz over a unit satellite-beam coverage area multiplied by (iii) the number of satellite beams that provide the resulting terrestrial cell coverage. Thus, in other words:

Satellite Capacity (in Mbps) =
Frequency Bandwidth in MHz ×
Effective Spectral Efficiency in Mbps/MHz/Beam ×
Number of Beams (or Cells)

Consider a satellite system supporting 8 beams (and thus an equivalent of terrestrial coverage cells), each with 250 MHz allocated within the same spectral frequency range, can efficiently support ca. 680 Mbps per beam. This is achieved with an antenna setup that effectively provides a spectral efficiency of ~2.7 Mbps/MHz/cell (or beam) in the downlink (i.e., from the satellite to the ground). Moreover, the satellite typically will have another frequency and antenna configuration that establishes a robust connection to the ground station that connects to the internet via, for example, third-party internet service providers. The 680 Mbps is then shared among users that are within the satellite beam coverage, e.g., if you have 100 customers demanding a service, the speed each would experience on average would be around 7 Mbps. This may not seem very impressive compared to the cellular speeds we are used to getting with an LTE or 5G terrestrial cellular service. However, such speeds are, of course, much better than having no means of connecting to the internet.

Higher frequencies (i.e., in the GHz range) used to provide terrestrial cellular broadband services are in general quiet sensitive to the terrestrial environment and non-LoS propagation. It is a basic principle of physics that signal propagation characteristics, including the range and penetration capabilities of an electromagnetic waves, is inversely related to their frequency. Vegetation and terrain becomes an increasingly critical factor to consider in higher frequency propagation and the resulting quality of coverage. For example trees, forests, and other dense foliage can absorb and scatter radio waves, attenuating signals. The type and density of vegetation, along with seasonal changes like foliage density in summer versus winter, can significantly impact signal strength. Terrains often include varied topographies such as housing, hills, valleys, and flat plains, each affecting signal reach differently. For instance, housing, hilly or mountainous areas may cause signal shadowing and reflection, while flat terrains might offer less obstruction, enabling signals to travel further. Cellular mobile operators tend to like high frequencies (GHz) for cellular broadband services as it is possible to get substantially more system throughput in bits per second available to deliver to our demanding customers than at frequencies in the MHz range. As can be observed in Figure 12 above, we see that the frequency bandwidth is a multiplier for the satellite capacity and quality. Cellular mobile operators tend to “dislike” higher frequencies because of their poorer propagation conditions in their terrestrially based cellular networks resulting in the need for increased site densification at a significant incremental capital expense.

The key advantage of a LEO satellite is that the likelihood of a line-of-sight to a point on the ground is very high compared to establishing a line-of-sight for terrestrial cellular coverage that, in general, would be very low. In other words, the cellular signal propagation from an satellite closely approximates that of free space. Thus, all the various environmental signal loss factors we must consider for a standard terrestrial-based mobile network do not apply to our satellite having only to overcome the distance from the satellite antenna to the ground.

Let us first look at the satellite frequency component of the above satellite capacity, and quality, formula:

FREQUENCY SPECTRUM FOR SATELLITES.

The satellite frequency spectrum encompasses a range of electromagnetic frequencies allocated specifically for satellite communication. These frequencies are divided into bands, commonly known as L-band (e.g., mobile broadband), S-band (e.g., mobile broadband), C-band, X-band (e.g., mainly used by military), Ku-band (e.g., fixed broadband), Ka-band (e.g., fixed broadband), and V-band. Each serves different satellite applications due to its distinct propagation characteristics and capabilities. The spectrum bandwidth used by satellites refers to the width of the frequency range that a satellite system is licensed to use for transmitting and receiving signals.

Careful management of satellite spectrum bandwidth is critical to prevent interference with terrestrial communications systems. Since both satellite and terrestrial systems can operate on similar frequency ranges, there is a potential for crossover interference, which can degrade the performance of both systems. This is particularly important for bands like C-band and Ku-band, which are also used for terrestrial cellular networks and other applications like broadcasting.

Using the same spectrum for both satellite and terrestrial cellular coverage within the same geographical area is challenging due to the risk of interference. Satellites transmit signals over vast areas, and if those signals are on the same frequency as terrestrial cellular systems, they can overpower the local ground-based signals, causing reception issues for users on the ground. Conversely, the uplink signals from terrestrial sources can interfere with the satellite’s ability to receive communications from its service area.

Regulatory bodies such as the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) are crucial in mitigating these interference issues. They coordinate the allocation of frequency bands and establish regulations that govern their use. This includes defining geographical zones where certain frequencies may be used exclusively for either terrestrial or satellite services, as well as setting limits on signal power levels to minimize the chance of interference. Additionally, technology solutions like advanced filtering, beam shaping, and polarization techniques are employed to further isolate satellite communications from terrestrial systems, ensuring that both may coexist and operate effectively without mutual disruption.

The International Telecommunication Union (ITU) has designated several frequency bands for Fixed Satellite Services (FSS) and Mobile Satellite Services (MSS) that can be used by satellites operating in Low Earth Orbit (LEO). The specific bands allocated for satellite services, FSS and MSS, are determined by the ITU’s Radio Regulations, which are periodically updated to reflect global telecommunication’s evolving needs and address emerging technologies. Here are some of the key frequency bands commonly considered for FSS and MSS with LEO satellites:

V-Band 40 GHz to 75 GHz (microwave frequency range).
The V-band is appealing for Low Earth Orbit (LEO) satellite constellations designed to provide global broadband internet access. LEO satellites can benefit from the V-band’s capacity to support high data rates, which is essential for serving densely populated areas and delivering competitive internet speeds. The reduced path loss at lower altitudes, compared to GEO, also makes the V-band a viable option for LEO satellites. Due to the higher frequencies offered by V-band it also is significant more sensitive to atmospheric attenuation, (e.g., oxygen absorption around 60 GHz), including rain fade, which is likely to affect signal integrity. This necessitates the development of advanced technologies for adaptive coding and modulation, power amplification, and beamforming to ensure reliable communication under various weather conditions. Several LEO satellite operators have expressed an interest in operationalizing the V-band in their satellite constellations (e.g., StarLink, OneWeb, Kuiper, Lightspeed). This band should be regarded as an emergent LEO frequency band.

Ka-Band 17.7 GHz to 20.2 GHz (Downlink) & 27.5 GHz to 30.0 GHz (Uplink).
The Ka-band offers higher bandwidths, enabling greater data throughput than lower bands. Not surprising this band is favored by high-throughput satellite solutions. It is widely used by fixed satellite services (FSS). This makes it ideal for high-speed internet services. However, it is more susceptible to absorption and scattering by atmospheric particles, including raindrops and snowflakes. This absorption and scattering effect weakens the signal strength when it reaches the receiver. To mitigate rain fade effects in the Ka-band, satellite, and ground equipment must be designed with higher link margins, incorporating more powerful transmitters and more sensitive receivers. Additionally, adaptive modulation and coding techniques can be employed to adjust the signal dynamically in response to changing weather conditions. Overall, the system is more costly and, therefore, primarily used for satellite-to-earth ground station communications and high-performance satellite backhaul solutions.

For example, Starlink and OneWeb use the Ka-band to connect to satellite Earth gateways and point-of-presence, which connect to Internet Exchange and the wider internet. It is worth noticing that the terrestrial 5 G band n256 (26.5 to 29.5 GHz) falls within the Ka-band’s uplink frequency band. Furthermore, SES’s mPower satellites, operating at Middle Earth Orbit (MEO), operate exclusively in this band, providing internet backhaul services.

Ku-Band 12.75 GHz to 13.25 GHz (Downlink) & 14.0 GHz to 14.5 GHz (Uplink).
The Ku-band is widely used for FSS satellite communications, including fixed satellite services, due to its balance between bandwidth availability and susceptibility to rain fade. It is suitable for broadband services, TV broadcasting, and backhaul connections. For example, Starlink and OneWeb satellites are using this band to provide broadband services to earth-based customer terminals.

X-Band 7.25 GHz to 7.75 GHz (Downlink) & 7.9 GHz to 8.4 GHz (Uplink).
The X-band in satellite applications is governed by international agreements and national regulations to prevent interference between different services and to ensure the efficient use of the spectrum. The X-band is extensively used for secure military satellite communications, offering advantages like high data rates and relative resilience to jamming and eavesdropping. It supports a wide range of military applications, including mobile command, control, communications, computer, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (i.e., C4ISR) operations. Most defense-oriented satellites operate at geostationary orbit, ensuring constant coverage of specific geographic areas (e.g., Airbus Skynet constellations, Spain’s XTAR-EUR, and France’s Syracuse satellites). Most European LEO defense satellites, used primarily for reconnaissance, are fairly old, with more than 15 years since the first launch, and are limited in numbers (i.e., <10). The most recent European LEO satellite system is the French-based Multinational Space-based Imaging System (MUSIS) and Composante Spatiale Optique (CSO), where the first CSO components were launched in 2018. There are few commercial satellites utilizing the X-band.

C-Band 3.7 GHz to 4.2 GHz (Downlink) & 5.925 GHz to 6.425 GHz (Uplink)
C-band is less susceptible to rain fade and is traditionally used for satellite TV broadcasting, maritime, and aviation communications. However, parts of the C-band are also being repurposed for terrestrial 5G networks in some regions, leading to potential conflicts and the need for careful coordination. The C-band is primarily used in geostationary orbit (GEO) rather than Low Earth Orbit (LEO), due to the historical allocation of C-band for fixed satellite services (FSS) and its favorable propagation characteristics. I haven’t really come across any LEO constellation using the C-band. GEO FSS satellite operators using this band extensively are SES (Luxembourg), Intelsat (Luxembourg/USA), Eutelsat (France), Inmarsat (UK), etc..

S-Band 2.0 GHz to 4.0 GHz
S-band is used for various applications, including mobile communications, weather radar, and some types of broadband services. It offers a good compromise between bandwidth and resistance to atmospheric absorption. Both Omnispace (USA) and Globalstar (USA) LEO satellites operate in this band. Omnispace is also interesting as they have expressed intent to have LEO satellites supporting the 5G services in the band n256 (26.5 to 29.5 GHz), which falls within the uplink of the Ka-band.

L-Band 1.0 GHz to 2.0 GHz
L-band is less commonly used for fixed satellite services but is notable for its use in mobile satellite services (MSS), satellite phone communications, and GPS. It provides good coverage and penetration characteristics. Both Lynk Mobile (USA), offering Direct-2-Device, IoT, and M2M services, and Astrocast (Switzerland), with their IoT/M2M services, are examples of LEO satellite businesses operating in this band.

UHF 300 MHz to 3.0 GHz
The UHF band is more widely used for satellite communications, including mobile satellite services (MSS), satellite radio, and some types of broadband data services. It is favored for its relatively good propagation characteristics, including the ability to penetrate buildings and foliage. For example, Fossa Systems LEO pico-satellites (i.e., 1p form-factor) use this frequency for their IoT and M2M communications services.

VHF 30 MHz to 300 MHz

The VHF band is less commonly used in satellite communications for commercial broadband services. Still, it is important for applications such as satellite telemetry, tracking, and control (TT&C) operations and amateur satellite communications. Its use is often limited due to the lower bandwidth available and the higher susceptibility to interference from terrestrial sources. Swarm Technologies (USA and a SpaceX subsidiary) using 137-138 MHz (Downlink) and 148-150 MHz (Uplink). However, it appears that they have stopped taking new devices on their network. Orbcomm (USA) is another example of a satellite service provider using the VHF band for IoT and M2M communications. There is very limited capacity in this band due to many other existing use cases, and LEO satellite companies appear to plan to upgrade to the UHF band or to piggyback on direct-2-cell (or direct-2-device) satellite solutions, enabling LEO satellite communications with 3GPP compatible IoT and M2M devices.

SATELLITE ANTENNAS.

Satellites operating in Geostationary Earth Orbit (GEO), Medium Earth Orbit (MEO), and Low Earth Orbit (LEO) utilize a variety of antenna types tailored to their specific missions, which range from communication and navigation to observation (e.g., signal intelligence). The satellite’s applications influence the selection of an antenna, the characteristics of its orbit, and the coverage area required.

Antenna technology is intrinsically linked to spectral efficiency in satellite communications systems and of course any other wireless systems. Antenna designs influence how effectively a communication system can transmit and receive signals within a given frequency band, which is the essence of spectral efficiency (i.e., how much information per unit time in bits per second can I squeeze through my communications channel).

Thus, advancements in antenna technology are fundamental to improving spectral efficiency, making it a key area of research and development in the quest for more capable and efficient communication systems.

Parabolic dish antennas are prevalent for GEO satellites due to their high gain and narrow beam width, making them ideal for broadcasting and fixed satellite services. These antennas focus a tight beam on specific areas on Earth, enabling strong and direct signals essential for television, internet, and communication services. Horn antennas, while simpler, are sometimes used as feeds for larger parabolic antennas or for telemetry, tracking, and command functions due to their reliability. Additionally, phased array antennas are becoming more common in GEO satellites for their ability to steer beams electronically, offering flexibility in coverage and the capability to handle multiple beams and frequencies simultaneously.

Phased-array antennas are indispensable in for MEO satellites, such as those used in navigation systems like GPS (USA), BeiDou (China), Galileo (European), or GLONASS (Russian). These satellite constellations cover large areas of the Earth’s surface and can adjust beam directions dynamically, a critical feature given the satellites’ movement relative to the Earth. Patch antennas are also widely used in MEO satellites, especially for mobile communication constellations, due to their compact and low-profile design, making them suitable for mobile voice and data communications.

Phased-array antennas are very important for LEO satellites use cases as well, which include broadband communication constellations like Starlink and OneWeb. Their (fast) beam-steering capabilities are essential for maintaining continuous communication with ground stations and user terminals as the satellites quickly traverse the sky. The phased-array antenna also allow for optimizing coverage with both narrow as well as wider field of view (from the perspective of the satellite antenna) that allow the satellite operator to trade-off cell capacity and cell coverage.

Simpler Dipole antennas are employed for more straightforward data relay and telemetry purposes in smaller satellites and CubeSats, where space and power constraints are significant factors. Reflect array antennas, which offer a mix of high gain and beam steering capabilities, are used in specific LEO satellites for communication and observation applications (e.g., for signal intelligence gathering), combining features of both parabolic and phased array antennas.

Mission specific requirements drive the choice of antenna for a satellite. For example, GEO satellites often use high-gain, narrowly focused antennas due to their fixed position relative to the Earth, while MEO and LEO satellites, which move relatively closer to the Earth’s surface, require antennas capable of maintaining stable connections with moving ground terminals or covering large geographical areas.

Advanced antenna technologies such as beamforming, phased-arrays, and Multiple In Multiple Out (MMO) antenna configurations are crucial in managing and utilizing the spectrum more efficiently. They enable precise targeting of radio waves, minimizing interference, and optimizing bandwidth usage. This direct control over the transmission path and signal shape allows more data (bits) to be sent and received within the same spectral space, effectively increasing the communication channel’s capacity. In particular, MIMO antenna configurations and advanced antenna beamforming have enabled terrestrial mobile cellular access technologies (e.g., LTE and 5G) to quantum leap the effective spectral efficiency, broadband speed and capacity orders of magnitude above and beyond older technologies of 2G and 3G. Similar principles are being deployed today in modern advanced communications satellite antennas, providing increased capacity and quality within the satellite cellular coverage area provided by the satellite beam.

Moreover, antenna technology developments like polarization and frequency reuse directly impact a satellite system’s ability to maximize spectral resources. Allowing simultaneous transmissions on the same frequency through different polarizations or spatial separations effectively double the capacity without needing additional spectrum.

WHERE DO WE END UP.

If all current commercial satellite plans were realized, within the next decade, we would have more, possibly substantially more than 65 thousand satellites circling Earth. Today, that number is less than 10 thousand, with more than half that number realized by StarLink’s LEO constellation. Imagine the increase in, and the amount of, space debris circling Earth within the next 10 years. This will likely pose a substantial increase in operational risk for new space missions and will have to be addressed urgently.

Over the next decade, we may have at least 2 major LEO satellite constellations. One from Starlink with an excess of 12 thousand satellites, and one from China, the Guo Wang, the state network, likewise with 12 thousand LEO satellites. One global satellite constellation is from an American-based commercial company; the other is a worldwide satellite constellation representing the Chinese state. It would not be too surprising to see that by 2034, the two satellite constellations will divide Earth in part, being serviced by a commercial satellite constellation (e.g., North America, Europe, parts of the Middle East, some of APAC including India, possibly some parts of Africa). Another part will likely be served by a Chinese-controlled LEO constellation providing satellite broadband service to China, Russia, significant parts of Africa, and parts of APAC.

Over the next decade, satellite services will undergo transformative advancements, reshaping the architecture of global communication infrastructures and significantly impacting various sectors, including broadband internet, global navigation, Earth observation, and beyond. As these services evolve, we should anticipate major leaps in satellite technologies, driven by innovation in propulsion systems, miniaturization of technology, advancements in onboard processing capabilities, increasing use of AI and machine learning leapfrogging satellites operational efficiency and performance, breakthrough in material science reducing weight and increasing packing density, leapfrogs in antenna technology, and last but not least much more efficient use of the radio frequency spectrum. Moreover, we will see the breakthrough innovation that will allow better co-existence and autonomous collaboration of frequency spectrum utilization between non-terrestrial and terrestrial networks reducing the need for much regulatory bureaucracy that might anyway be replaced by decentralized autonomous organizations (DAOs) and smart contracts. This development will be essential as satellite constellations are being integrated into 5G and 6G network architectures as the non-terrestrial network cellular access component. This particular topic, like many in this article, is worth a whole new article on its own.

I expect that over the next 10 years we will see electronically steerable phased-array antennas, as a notable advancement. These would offer increased agility and efficiency in beamforming and signal direction. Their ability to swiftly adjust beams for optimal coverage and connectivity without physical movement makes them perfect for the dynamic nature of Low Earth Orbit (LEO) satellite constellations. This technology will becomes increasingly cost-effective and energy-efficient, enabling widespread deployment across various satellite platforms (not only LEO designs). The advance in phased-array antenna technology will facilitate substantial increase in the satellite system capacity by increasing the number of beams, the variation on beam size (possibly down to a customer ground station level), and support multi-band operations within the same antenna.

Another promising development is the integration of metamaterials in antenna design, which will lead to more compact, flexible, and lightweight antennas. The science of metamaterials is super interesting and relates to manufacturing artificial materials to have properties not found in naturally occurring materials with unique electromagnetic behaviors arising from their internal structure. Metamaterial antennas is going to offer superior performance, including better signal control and reduced interference, which is crucial for maintaining high-quality broadband connections. These materials are also important for substantially reducing the weight of the satellite antenna, while boosting its performance. Thus, the technology will also support bringing the satellite launch cost down dramatically.

Although primarily associated MIMO antennas with terrestrial networks, I would also expect that massive MIMO technology will find applications in satellite broadband systems. Satellite systems, just like ground based cellular networks, can significantly increase their capacity and efficiency by utilizing many antenna elements to simultaneously communicate with multiple ground terminals. This could be particularly transformative for next-generation satellite networks, supporting higher data rates and accommodating more users. The technology will increase the capacity and quality of the satellite system dramatically as it has done on terrestrial cellular networks.

Furthermore, advancements in onboard processing capabilities will allow satellites to perform more complex signal processing tasks directly in space, reducing latency and improving the efficiency of data transmission. Coupled with AI and machine learning algorithms, future satellite antennas could dynamically optimize their operational parameters in real-time, adapting to changes in the network environment and user demand.

Additionally, research into quantum antenna technology may offer breakthroughs in satellite communication, providing unprecedented levels of sensitivity and bandwidth efficiency. Although still early, quantum antennas could revolutionize signal reception and transmission in satellite broadband systems. In the context of LEO satellite systems, I am particularly excited about utilizing the Rydberg Effect to enhance system sensitivity could lead to massive improvements. The heightened sensitivity of Rydberg atoms to electromagnetic fields could be harnessed to develop ultra-sensitive detectors for radio frequency (RF) signals. Such detectors could surpass the performance of traditional semiconductor-based devices in terms of sensitivity and selectivity, enabling satellite systems to detect weaker signals, improve signal-to-noise ratios, and even operate effectively over greater distances or with less power. Furthermore, space could potentially be the near-ideal environment for operationalizing Rydberg antenna and communications systems as space had near-perfect vacuum, very low-temperatures (in Earth shadow at least or with proper thermal management), relatively free of electromagnetic radiation (compared to Earth), as well as its micro-gravity environment that may facilitate long-range “communications” between Rydberg atoms. This particular topic may be further out in the future than “just” a decade from now, although it may also be with satellites we will see the first promising results of this technology.

One key area of development will be the integration of LEO satellite networks with terrestrial 5G and emerging 6G networks, marking a significant step in the evolution of Non-Terrestrial Network (NTN) architectures. This integration promises to deliver seamless, high-speed connectivity across the globe, including in remote and rural areas previously underserved by traditional broadband infrastructure. By complementing terrestrial networks, LEO satellites will help achieve ubiquitous wireless coverage, facilitating a wide range of applications and use cases from high-definition video streaming to real-time IoT data collection.

The convergence of LEO satellite services with 5G and 6G will also spur network management and orchestration innovation. Advanced techniques for managing interference, optimizing handovers between terrestrial and non-terrestrial networks, and efficiently allocating spectral resources will be crucial. It would be odd not to mention it here, so artificial intelligence and machine learning algorithms will, of course, support these efforts, enabling dynamic network adaptation to changing conditions and demands.

Moreover, the next decade will likely see significant improvements in the environmental sustainability of LEO satellite operations. Innovations in satellite design and materials, along with more efficient launch vehicles and end-of-life deorbiting strategies, will help mitigate the challenges of space debris and ensure the long-term viability of LEO satellite constellations.

In the realm of global connectivity, LEO satellites will have bridged the digital divide, offering affordable and accessible internet services to billions of people worldwide unconnected today. In 2023 the estimate is that there are about 3 billion people, almost 40% of all people in the world today, that have never used internet. In the next decade, it must be our ambition that with LEO satellite networks this number is brought down to very near Zero. This will have profound implications for education, healthcare, economic development, and global collaboration.

FURTHER READING.

  1. A. Vanelli-Coralli, N. Chuberre, G. Masini, A. Guidotti, M. El Jaafari, “5G Non-Terrestrial Networks.”, Wiley (2024). A recommended reading for deep diving into NTN networks of satellites, typically the LEO kind, and High-Altitude Platform Systems (HAPS) such as stratospheric drones.
  2. I. del Portillo et al., “A technical comparison of three low earth orbit satellite constellation systems to provide global broadband,” Acta Astronautica, (2019).
  3. Nils Pachler et al., “An Updated Comparison of Four Low Earth Orbit Satellite Constellation Systems to Provide Global Broadband” (2021).
  4. Starlink, “Starlink specifications” (Starlink.com page). The following Wikipedia resource is quite good as well: Starlink.
  5. Quora, “How much does a satellite cost for SpaceX’s Starlink project and what would be the cheapest way to launch it into space?” (June 2023). This link includes a post from Elon Musk commenting on the cost involved in manufacturing the Starlink satellite and the cost of launching SpaceX’s Falcon 9 rocket.
  6. Michael Baylor, “With Block 5, SpaceX to increase launch cadence and lower prices.”, nasaspaceflight.com (May, 2018).
  7. Gwynne Shotwell, TED Talk from May 2018. She quotes here a total of USD 10 billion as a target for the 12,000 satellite network. This is just an amazing visionary talk/discussion about what may happen by 2028 (in 4-5 years ;-).
  8. Juliana Suess, “Guo Wang: China’s Answer to Starlink?”, (May 2023).
  9. Makena Young & Akhil Thadani, “Low Orbit, High Stakes, All-In on the LEO Broadband Competition.”, Center for Strategic & International Studies CSIS, (Dec. 2022).
  10. AST SpaceMobile website: https://ast-science.com/ Constellation Areas: Internet, Direct-to-Cell, Space-Based Cellular Broadband, Satellite-to-Cellphone. 243 LEO satellites planned. 2 launched.
  11. Lynk Global website: https://lynk.world/ (see also FCC Order and Authorization). It should be noted that Lynk can operate within 617 to 960 MHz (Space-to-Earth) and 663 to 915 MHz (Earth-to-Space). However, only outside the USA. Constellation Area: IoT / M2M, Satellite-to-Cellphone, Internet, Direct-to-Cell. 8 LEO satellites out of 10 planned.
  12. Omnispace website: https://omnispace.com/ Constellation Area: IoT / M2M, 5G. Ambition to have the world’s first global 5G non-terrestrial network. Initial support 3GPP-defined Narrow-Band IoT radio interface. Planned 200 LEO and <15 MEO satellites. So far, only 2 satellites have been launched.
  13. NewSpace Index: https://www.newspace.im/ I find this resource to have excellent and up-to-date information on commercial satellite constellations.
  14. R.K. Mailloux, “Phased Array Antenna Handbook, 3rd Edition”, Artech House, (September 2017).
  15. A.K. Singh, M.P. Abegaonkar, and S.K. Koul, “Metamaterials for Antenna Applications”, CRC Press (September 2021).
  16. T.L. Marzetta, E.G. Larsson, H. Yang, and H.Q. Ngo, “Fundamentals of Massive MIMO”, Cambridge University Press, (November 2016).
  17. G.Y. Slepyan, S. Vlasenko, and D. Mogilevtsev, “Quantum Antennas”, arXiv:2206.14065v2, (June 2022).
  18. R. Huntley, “Quantum Rydberg Receiver Shakes Up RF Fundamentals”, EE Times, (January 2022).
  19. Y. Du, N. Cong, X. Wei, X. Zhang, W. Lou, J. He, and R. Yang, “Realization of multiband communications using different Rydberg final states”, AIP Advances, (June 2022). Demonstrating the applicability of the Rydberg effect in digital transceivers in the Ku and Ka bands.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT.

I greatly acknowledge my wife, Eva Varadi, for her support, patience, and understanding during the creative process of writing this article.

Stratospheric Drones & Low Earth Satellites: Revolutionizing Terrestrial Rural Broadband from the Skies?

“From an economic and customer experience standpoint, deploying stratospheric drones may be significantly more cost effective than establishing extra terrestrial infrastructures”.

This article, in a different and somewhat shorter format, has also been published by New Street Research under the title “Stratospheric drones: A game changer for rural networks?”. You will need to register with New Street Research to get access.

As a mobile cellular industry expert and a techno-economist, the first time I was presented with the concept of stratospheric drones, I feel the butterflies in my belly. That tingling feeling that I was seeing something that could be a huge disruptor of how mobile cellular networks are being designed and built. Imagine getting rid of the profitability-challenged rural cellular networks (i.e., the towers, the energy consumption, the capital infrastructure investments), and, at the same time, offering much better quality to customers in rural areas than is possible with the existing cellular network we have deployed there. A technology that could fundamentally change the industry’s mobile cellular cost structure for the better at a quantum leap in quality and, in general, provide economical broadband services to the unconnected at a fraction of the cost of our traditional ways of building terrestrial cellular coverage.

Back in 2015, I got involved with Deutsche Telekom AG Group Technology, under the leadership of Bruno Jacobfeuerborn, in working out the detailed operational plans, deployment strategies, and, of course, the business case as well as general economics of building a stratospheric cellular coverage platform from scratch with the UK-based Stratospheric Platform Ltd [2] in which Deutsche Telekom is an investor. The investment thesis was really in the way we expected the stratospheric high-altitude platform to make a large part of mobile operators’ terrestrial rural cellular networks obsolete and how it might strengthen mobile operator footprints in countries where rural and remote coverage was either very weak or non-existing (e.g., The USA, an important market for Deutsche Telekom AG).

At the time, our thoughts were to have an operational stratospheric coverage platform operationally by 2025, 10 years after kicking off the program, with more than 100 high-altitude platforms covering a major Western European country serving rural areas. As it so often is, reality is unforgiving, as it often is with genuinely disruptive ideas. Getting to a stage of deployment and operation at scale of a high-altitude platform is still some years out due to the lack of maturity of the flight platform, including regulatory approvals for operating a HAP network at scale, increasing the operating window of the flight platform, fueling, technology challenges with the advanced antenna system, being allowed to deployed terrestrial-based cellular spectrum above terra firma, etc. Many of these challenges are progressing well, although slowly.

Globally, various companies are actively working on developing stratospheric drones to enhance cellular coverage. These include aerospace and defense giants like Airbus, advancing its Zephyr drone, and BAE Systems, collaborating with Prismatic for their PHASA-35 UAV. One of the most exciting HAPS companies focusing on developing world-leading high-altitude aircraft that I have come across during my planning work on how to operationalize a Stratospheric cellular coverage platform is the German company Leichtwerk AG, which has their hydrogen-fueled StratoStreamer as well as a solar-powered platform under development with the their StratoStreamer being close to production-ready. Telecom companies like Deutsche Telekom AG and BT Group are experimenting with hydrogen-powered drones in partnership with Stratospheric Platforms Limited. Through its subsidiary HAPSMobile, SoftBank is also a significant player with its Sunglider project. Additionally, entities like China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation and Cambridge Consultants contribute to this field by co-developing enabling technologies (e.g., advanced phased-array antenna, fuel technologies, material science, …) critical for the success and deployability of high-altitude platforms at scale, aiming to improve connectivity in rural, remote, and underserved areas.

The work on integrating High Altitude Platform (HAP) networks with terrestrial cellular systems involves significant coordination with international regulatory bodies like the International Telecommunication Union Radiocommunication Sector (ITU-R) and the World Radiocommunication Conference (WRC). This process is crucial for securing permission to reuse terrestrial cellular spectrum in the stratosphere. Key focus areas include negotiating the allocation and management of frequency bands for HAP systems, ensuring they don’t interfere with terrestrial networks. These efforts are vital for successfully deploying and operating HAP systems, enabling them to provide enhanced connectivity globally, especially in rural areas where terrestrial cellular frequencies are already in use and remote and underserved regions. At the latest WRC-2023 conference, Softbank successfully gained approval within the Asia-Pacific region to use mobile spectrum bands for stratospheric drone-based mobile broadband cellular services.

Most mobile operators have at least 50% of their cellular network infrastructure assets in rural areas. While necessary for providing the coverage that mobile customers have come to expect everywhere, these sites carry only a fraction of the total mobile traffic. Individually, rural sites have poor financial returns due to their proportional operational and capital expenses.

In general, the Opex of the cellular network takes up between 50% and 60% of the Technology Opex, and at least 50% of that can be attributed to maintaining and operating the rural part of the radio access network. Capex is more cyclical than Opex due to, for example, the modernization of radio access technology. Nevertheless, over a typical modernization cycle (5 to 7 years), the rural network demands a little bit less but a similar share of Capex overall as for Opex. Typically, the Opex share of the rural cellular network may be around 10% of the corporate Opex, and its associated total cost is between 12% and 15% of the total expenses.

The global telecom towers market size in 2023 is estimated at ca. 26+ billion euros, ca. 2.5% of total telecom turnover, with a projected growth of CAGR 3.3% from now to 2030. The top 10 Tower management companies manage close to 1 million towers worldwide for mobile CSPs. Although many mobile operators have chosen to spin off their passive site infrastructure, there are still some remaining that may yet to spin off their cellular infrastructure to one of many Tower management companies, captive or independent, such as American Tower (224,019+ towers), Cellnex Telecom (112,737+ towers), Vantage Towers (46,100+ towers), GD Towers (+41,600 towers), etc…

IMAGINE.

Focusing on the low- or no-profitable rural cellular coverage.

Imagine an alternative coverage technology to the normal cellular one all mobile operators are using that would allow them to do without the costly and low-profitable rural cellular network they have today to satisfy their customers’ expectations of high-quality ubiquitous cellular coverage.

For the alternative technology to be attractive, it would need to deliver at least the same quality and capacity as the existing terrestrial-based cellular coverage for substantially better economics.

If a mobile operator with a 40% EBITDA margin did not need its rural cellular network, it could improve its margin by a sustainable 5% and increase its cash generation in relative terms by 50% (i.e., from 0.2×Revenue to 0.3×Revenue), assuming a capex-to-revenue ratio of 20% before implementing the technology being reduced to 15% after due to avoiding modernization and capacity investments in the rural areas.

Imagine that the alternative technology would provide a better cellular quality to the consumer for a quantum leap reduction of the associated cost structure compared to today’s cellular networks.

Such an alternative coverage technology might also impact the global tower companies’ absolute level of sustainable tower revenues, with a substantial proportion of revenue related to rural site infrastructure being at risk.

Figure 1 An example of an unmanned autonomous stratospheric coverage platform. Source: Cambridge Consultants presentation (see reference [2]) based on their work with Stratospheric Platforms Ltd (SPL) and SPL’s innovative high-altitude coverage platform.

TERRESTRIAL CELLULAR RURAL COVERAGE – A MATTER OF POOR ECONOMICS.

When considering the quality we experience in a terrestrial cellular network, a comprehensive understanding of various environmental and physical factors is crucial to predicting the signal quality accurately. All these factors generally work against cellular signal propagation regarding how far the signal can reach from the transmitting cellular tower and the achievable quality (e.g., signal strength) that a customer can experience from a cellular service.

Firstly, the terrain plays a significant role. Rural landscapes often include varied topographies such as hills, valleys, and flat plains, each affecting signal reach differently. For instance, hilly or mountainous areas may cause signal shadowing and reflection, while flat terrains might offer less obstruction, enabling signals to travel further.

At higher frequencies (i.e., above 1 GHz), vegetation becomes an increasingly critical factor to consider. Trees, forests, and other dense foliage can absorb and scatter radio waves, attenuating signals. The type and density of vegetation, along with seasonal changes like foliage density in summer versus winter, can significantly impact signal strength.

The height and placement of transmitting and receiving antennas are also vital considerations. In rural areas, where there are fewer tall buildings, the height of the antenna can have a pronounced effect on the line of sight and, consequently, on the signal coverage and quality. Elevated antennas mitigate the impact of terrain and vegetation to some extent.

Furthermore, the lower density of buildings in rural areas means fewer reflections and less multipath interference than in urban environments. However, larger structures, such as farm buildings or industrial facilities, must be factored in, as they can obstruct or reflect signals.

Finally, the distance between the transmitter and receiver is fundamental to signal propagation. With typically fewer cell towers spread over larger distances, understanding how signal strength diminishes with distance is critical to ensuring reliable coverage at a high quality, such as high cellular throughput, as the mobile customer expects.

The typical way for a cellular operator to mitigate the environmental and physical factors that inevitably result in loss of signal strength and reduced cellular quality (i.e., sub-standard cellular speed) is to build more sites and thus incur increasing Capex and Opex in areas that in general will have poor economical payback associated with any cellular assets. Thus, such investments make an already poor economic situation even worse as the rural cellular network generally would have very low utilization.

Figure 2 Cellular capacity or quality measured by the unit or total throughput is approximately driven by the amount of spectrum (in MHz) times the effective spectral efficiency (in Mbps/MHz/units) times the number of cells or capacity units deployed. When considering the effective spectral efficiency, one needs to consider the possible “boost” that a higher order MiMo or Advanced Antenna System will bring over and above the Single In Single Out (SISO) antenna would result in.

As our alternative technology also would need to provide at least the same quality and capacity it is worth exploring what can be expected in terms of rural terrestrial capacity. In general, we have that the cellular capacity (and quality) can be written as (also shown in Figure 2 above):

Throughput (in Mbps) =
Spectral Bandwidth in MHz ×
Effective Spectral Efficiency in Mbps/MHz/Cell ×
Number of Cells

We need to keep in mind that an additional important factor when considering quality and capacity is that the higher the operational frequency, the lower the radius (all else being equal). Typically, we can improve the radius at higher frequencies by utilizing advanced antenna beam forming, that is, concentrate the radiated power per unit coverage area, which is why you will often hear that the 3.6 GHz downlink coverage radius is similar to that of 1800 MHz (or PCS). This 3.6 GHz vs. 1.8 GHz coverage radius comparison is made when not all else is equal. Comparing a situation where the 1800 MHz (or PCS) radiated power is spread out over the whole coverage area compared to a coverage situation where the 3.6 GHz (or C-band in general) solution makes use of beamforming, where the transmitted energy density is high, allowing to reach the customer at a range that would not be possible if the 3.6 GHz radiated power would have been spread out over the cell like the example of the 1800 MHz.

As an example, take an average Western European rural 5G site with all cellular bands between 700 and 2100 MHz activated. The site will have a total of 85 MHz DL and 75 MHz UL, with a 10 MHz difference between DL and UL due to band 38 Supplementary Downlink SDL) operational on the site. In our example, we will be optimistic and assume that the effective spectral efficiency is 2 Mbps per MHz per cell (average over all bands and antenna configurations), which would indicate a fair amount of 4×4 and 8×8 MiMo antenna systems deployed. Thus, the unit throughput we would expect to be supplied by the terrestrial rural cell would be 170 Mbps (i.e., 85 MHz × 2.0 Mbps/MHz/Cell). With a rural cell coverage radius between 2 and 3 km, we then have an average throughput per square kilometer of 9 Mbps/km2. Due to the low demand and high-frequency bandwidth per active customer, DL speeds exceeding 100+ Mbps should be relatively easy to sustain with 5G standalone, with uplink speeds being more compromised due to larger coverage areas. Obviously, the rural quality can be improved further by deploying advanced antenna systems and increasing the share of higher-order MiMo antennas in general, as well as increasing the rural site density. However, as already pointed out, this would not be an economically reasonable approach.

THE ADVANTAGE OF SEEING FROM ABOVE.

Figure 3 illustrates the difference between terrestrial cellular coverage from a cell tower and that of a stratospheric drone or high-altitude platform (“Antenna-in-the-Sky”). The benefit of seeing the world from above is that environmental and physical factors have substantially less impact on signal propagation and quality primarily being impacted by distance as it approximates free space propagation. This situation is very different for a terrestrial-based cellular tower with its radiated signal being substantially impacted by the environment as well as physical factors.

It may sound silly to talk about an alternative coverage technology that could replace the need for the cellular tower infrastructure that today is critical for providing mobile broadband coverage to, for example, rural areas. What alternative coverage technologies should we consider?

If, instead of relying on terrestrial-based tower infrastructure, we could move the cellular antenna and possibly the radio node itself to the sky, we would have a situation where most points of the ground would be in the line of sight to the “antenna-in-the-sky.” The antenna in the sky idea is a game changer in terms of coverage itself compared to conventional terrestrial cellular coverage, where environmental and physical factors dramatically reduce signal propagation and signal quality.

The key advantage of an antenna in the sky (AIS) is that the likelihood of a line-of-sight to a point on the ground is very high compared to establishing a line-of-sight for terrestrial cellular coverage that, in general, would be very low. In other words, the cellular signal propagation from an AIS closely approximates that of free space. Thus, all the various environmental signal loss factors we must consider for a standard terrestrial-based mobile network do not apply to our antenna in the sky.

Over the last ten years, we have gotten several technology candidates for our antenna-in-the-sky solution, aiming to provide terrestrial broadband services as a substitute, or enhancement, for terrestrial mobile and fixed broadband services. In the following, I will describe two distinct types of antenna-in-the-sky solutions: (a) Low Earth Orbit (LEO) satellites, operating between 500 to 2000 km above Earth, that provide terrestrial broadband services such as we know from Starlink (SpaceX), OneWeb (Eutelsat Group), and Kuiper (Amazon), and (b) So-called, High Altitude Platforms (HAPS), operating at altitudes between 15 to 30 km (i.e., in the stratosphere). Such platforms are still in the research and trial stages but are very promising technologies to substitute or enhance rural network broadband services. The HAP is supposed to be unmanned, highly autonomous, and ultimately operational in the stratosphere for an extended period (weeks to months), fueled by green hydrogen and possibly solar. The high-altitude platform is thus also an unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV), although I will use the term stratospheric drone and HAP interchangeably in the following.

Low Earth Orbit (LEO) satellites and High Altitude Platforms (HAPs) represent two distinct approaches to providing high-altitude communication and observation services. LEO satellites, operating between 500 km and 2,000 km above the Earth, orbit the planet, offering broad global coverage. The LEO satellite platform is ideal for applications like satellite broadband internet, Earth observation, and global positioning systems. However, deploying and maintaining these satellites involves complex, costly space missions and sophisticated ground control. Although, as SpaceX has demonstrated with the Starlink LEO satellite fixed broadband platform, the unitary economics of their satellites significantly improve by scale when the launch cost is also considered (i.e., number of satellites).

Figure 4 illustrates a non-terrestrial network architecture consisting of a Low Earth Orbit (LEO) satellite constellation providing fixed broadband services to terrestrial users. Each hexagon represents a satellite beam inside the larger satellite coverage area. Note that, in general, there will be some coverage overlap between individual satellites, ensuring a continuous service including interconnected satellites. The user terminal (UT) dynamically aligns itself, aiming at the best quality connection provided by the satellites within the UT field of vision.

Figure 4 Illustrating a Non-Terrestrial Network consisting of a Low Earth Orbit (LEO) satellite constellation providing fixed broadband services to terrestrial users (e.g., Starlink, Kuiper, OneWeb,…). Each hexagon represents a satellite beam inside the larger satellite coverage area. Note that, in general, there will be some coverage overlap between individual satellites, ensuring a continuous service. The operating altitude of a LEO satellite constellation is between 300 and 2,000 km. It is assumed that the satellites are interconnected, e.g., laser links. The User Terminal antenna (UT) is dynamically orienting itself after the best line-of-sight (in terms of signal quality) to a satellite within UT’s field-of-view (FoV). The FoV has not been shown in the picture above so as not to overcomplicate the illustration. It should be noted just like with the drone it is possible to integrate the complete gNB on the LEO satellite. There might even be applications (e.g., defense, natural & unnatural disaster situations, …) where a standalone 5G SA core is integrated.

On the other hand, HAPs, such as unmanned (autonomous) stratospheric drones, operate at altitudes of approximately 15 km to 30 km in the stratosphere. Unlike LEO satellites, the stratospheric drone can hover or move slowly over specific areas, often geostationary relative to the Earth’s surface. This characteristic makes them more suitable for localized coverage tasks like regional broadband, surveillance, and environmental monitoring. The deployment and maintenance of the stratospheric drones are managed from the Earth’s surface and do not require space launch capabilities. Furthermore, enhancing and upgrading the HAPs is straightforward, as they will regularly be on the ground for fueling and maintenance. Upgrades are not possible with an operational LEO satellite solution where any upgrade would have to wait on a subsequent generation and new launch.

Figure 5 illustrates the high-level network architecture of an unmanned autonomous stratospheric drone-based constellation providing terrestrial cellular broadband services to terrestrial mobile users delivered to their normal 5G terminal equipment. Each hexagon represents a beam arising from the phased-array antenna integrated into the drone’s wingspan. To deliver very high-availability services to a rural area, one could assign three HAPs to cover a given area. The drone-based non-terrestrial network is drawn consistent with the architectural radio access network (RAN) elements from Open RAN, e.g., Radio Unit (RU), Distributed Unit (DU), and Central Unit (CU). It should be noted that the whole 5G gNB (the 5G NodeB), including the CU, could be integrated into the stratospheric drone, and in fact, so could the 5G standalone (SA) packet core, enabling full private mobile 5G networks for defense and disaster scenarios or providing coverage in very remote areas with little possibility of ground-based infrastructure (e.g., the arctic region, or desert and mountainous areas).

Figure 5 illustrates a Non-Terrestrial Network consisting of a stratospheric High Altitude Platform (HAP) drone-based constellation providing terrestrial Cellular broadband services to terrestrial mobile users delivered to their normal 5G terminal equipment. Each hexagon represents a beam inside the larger coverage area of the stratospheric drone. To deliver very high-availability services to a rural area, one could assign three HAPs to cover a given area. The operating altitude of a HAP constellation is between 10 to 50 km with an optimum of around 20 km. It is assumed that there is inter-HAP connectivity, e.g., via laser links. Of course, it is also possible to contemplate having the gNB (full 5G radio node) in the stratospheric drone entirely, which would allow easier integration with LEO satellite backhauls, for example. There might even be applications (e.g., defense, natural & unnatural disaster situations, …) where a standalone 5G SA core is integrated.

The unique advantage of the HAP operating in the stratosphere is (1) The altitude is advantageous for providing wider-area cellular coverage with a near-ideal quality above and beyond what is possible with conventional terrestrial-based cellular coverage because of very high line-of-sight likelihood due to less environment and physical issues that substantially reduces the signal propagation and quality of a terrestrial coverage solution, and (2) More stable atmospheric conditions characterize the stratosphere compared to the troposphere below it. This stability allows the stratospheric drone to maintain a consistent position and altitude with less energy expenditure. The stratosphere offers more consistent and direct sunlight exposure for a solar-powered HAP with less atmospheric attenuation. Moreover, due to the thinner atmosphere at stratospheric altitudes, the stratospheric drone will experience a lower air resistance (drag), increasing the energy efficiency and, therefore, increasing the operational airtime.

Figure 6 illustrates Leichtwerk AG’s StratoStreamer HAP design that is near-production ready. Leichtwerk AG works closely together with AESA towards the type certificate that would make it possible to operationalize a drone constellation in Europe. The StratoStreamer has a wingspan of 65 meter and can carry a payload of 100+ kg. Courtesy: Leichtwerk AG.

Each of these solutions has its unique advantages and limitations. LEO satellites provide extensive coverage but come with higher operational complexities and costs. HAPs offer more focused coverage and are easier to manage, but they need the global reach of LEO satellites. The choice between these two depends on the specific requirements of the intended application, including coverage area, budget, and infrastructure capabilities.

In an era where digital connectivity is indispensable, stratospheric drones could emerge as a game-changing technology. These unmanned (autonomous) drones, operating in the stratosphere, offer unique operational and economic advantages over terrestrial networks and are even seen as competitive alternatives to low earth orbit (LEO) satellite networks like Starlink or OneWeb.

STRATOSPHERIC DRONES VS TERRESTRIAL NETWORKS.

Stratospheric drones positioned much closer to the Earth’s surface than satellites, provide distinct signal strength and latency benefits. The HAP’s vantage point in the stratosphere (around 20 km above the Earth) ensures a high probability of line-of-sight with terrestrial user devices, mitigating the adverse effects of terrain obstacles that frequently challenge ground-based networks. This capability is particularly beneficial in rural areas in general and mountainous or densely forested areas, where conventional cellular towers struggle to provide consistent coverage.

Why the stratosphere? The stratosphere is the layer of Earth’s atmosphere located above the troposphere, which is the layer where weather occurs. The stratosphere is generally characterized by stable, dry conditions with very little water vapor and minimal horizontal winds. It is also home to the ozone layer, which absorbs and filters out most of the Sun’s harmful ultraviolet radiation. It is also above the altitude of commercial air traffic, which typically flies at altitudes ranging from approximately 9 to 12 kilometers (30,000 to 40,000 feet). These conditions (in addition to those mentioned above) make operating a stratospheric platform very advantageous.

Figure 6 illustrates the coverage fundamentals of (a) a terrestrial cellular radio network with the signal strength and quality degrading increasingly as one moves away from the antenna and (b) the terrestrial coverage from a stratospheric drone (antenna in the sky) flying at an altitude of 15 to 30 km. The stratospheric drone, also called a High-Altitude Platform (HAP), provides near-ideal signal strength and quality due to direct line-of-sight (LoS) with the ground, compared to the signal and quality from a terrestrial cellular site that is influenced by its environment and physical factors and the fact that LoS is much less likely in a conventional terrestrial cellular network. It is worth keeping in mind that the coverage scenarios where a stratospheric drone and a low earth satellite may excel in particular are in rural areas and outdoor coverage in more dense urban areas. In urban areas, the clutter, or environmental features and objects, will make line-of-site more challenging, impacting the strength and quality of the radio signals.

Figure 6 The chart above illustrates the coverage fundamentals of (a) a terrestrial cellular radio network with the signal strength and quality degrading increasingly as one moves away from the antenna and (b) the terrestrial coverage from a stratospheric drone (antenna in the sky) flying at an altitude of 15 to 30 km. The stratospheric drone, also called a High Altitude Platform (HAP), provides near-ideal signal strength and quality due to direct line-of-sight (LoS) with the ground, compared to the signal & quality from a terrestrial cellular site that is influenced by its environment and physical factors and the fact that LoS is much less likely in a conventional terrestrial cellular network.

From an economic and customer experience standpoint, deploying stratospheric drones may be significantly more cost-effective than establishing extensive terrestrial infrastructure, especially in remote or rural areas. The setup and operational costs of cellular towers, including land acquisition, construction, and maintenance, are substantially higher compared to the deployment of stratospheric drones. These aerial platforms, once airborne, can cover vast geographical areas, potentially rendering numerous terrestrial towers redundant. At an operating height of 20 km, one would expect a coverage radius ranging from 20 km up to 500 km, depending on the antenna system, application, and business model (e.g., terrestrial broadband services, surveillance, environmental monitoring, …).

The stratospheric drone-based coverage platform, and by platform, I mean the complete infrastructure that will replace the terrestrial cellular network, will consist of unmanned autonomous drones with a considerable wingspan (e.g., 747-like of ca. 69 meters). For example, European (German) Leichtwerk’s StratoStreamer has a wingspan of 65 meters and a wing area of 197 square meters with a payload of 120+ kg (note: in comparison a Boing 747 has ca. 500+ m2 wing area but its payload is obviously much much higher and in the range of 50 to 60 metric tons). Leichtwerk AG work closely together with AESA in order to achieve the European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) type certificate that would allow the HAPS to integrate into civil airspace (see refs. [34] for what that means).

An advanced antenna system is positioned under the wings (or the belly) of the drone. I will assume that the coverage radius provided by a single drone is 50 km, but it can dynamically be made smaller or larger depending on the coverage scenario and use case. The drone-based advanced antenna system breaks up the coverage area (ca. six thousand five hundred plus square kilometers) into 400 patches (i.e., a number that can be increased substantially), averaging approx. 16 km2 per patch and a radius of ca. 2.5 km. Due to its near-ideal cellular link budget, the effective spectral efficiency is expected to be initially around 6 Mbps per MHz per cell. Additionally, the drone does not have the same spectrum limitations as a rural terrestrial site and would be able to support frequency bands in the downlink from ~900 MHz up to 3.9 GHz (and possibly higher, although likely with different antenna designs). Due to the HAP altitude, the Earth-to-HAP uplink signal will be limited to a lower frequency spectrum to ensure good signal quality is being received at the stratospheric antenna. It is prudent to assume a limit of 2.1 GHz to possibly 2.6 GHz. All under the assumption that the stratospheric drone operator has achieved regulatory approval for operating the terrestrial cellular spectrum from their coverage platform. It should be noted that today, cellular frequency spectrum approved for terrestrial use cannot be used at an altitude unless regulatory permission has been given (more on this later).

Let’s look at an example. We would need ca. 46 drones to cover the whole of Germany with the above-assumed specifications. Furthermore, if we take the average spectrum portfolio of the 3 main German operators, this will imply that the stratospheric drone could be functioning with up to 145 MHz in downlink and at least 55 MHz uplink (i.e., limiting UL to include 2.1 GHz). Using the HAP DL spectral efficiency and coverage area we get a throughput density of 70+ Mbps/km2 and an effective rural cell throughput of 870 Mbps. In terrestrial-based cellular coverage, the contribution to quality at higher frequencies is rapidly degrading as a function of the distance to the antenna. This is not the case for HAP-based coverage due to its near-ideal signal propagation.

In comparison, the three incumbent German operators have on average ca. 30±4k sites per operator with an average terrestrial coverage area of 12 km2 and a coverage radius of ca. 2.0 km (i.e., smaller in cities, ~1.3 km, larger in rural areas, ~2.7 km). Assume that the average cost of ownership related only to the passive part of the site is 20+ thousand euros and that 50% of the 30k sites (expect a higher number) would be redundant as the rural coverage would be replaced by stratospheric drones. Such a site reduction quantum conservatively would lead to a minimum gross monetary reduction of 300 million euros annually (not considering the cost of the alternative technology coverage solution).

In our example, the question is whether we can operate a stratospheric drone-based platform covering rural Germany for less than 300 million euros yearly. Let’s examine this question. Say the stratospheric drone price is 1 million euros per piece (similar to the current Starlink satellite price, excluding the launch cost, which would add another 1.1 million euros to the satellite cost). For redundancy and availability purposes, we assume we need 100 stratospheric drones to cover rural Germany, allowing me to decommission in the radius of 15 thousand rural terrestrial sites. The decommissioning cost and economical right timing of tower contract termination need to be considered. Due to the standard long-term contracts may be 5 (optimistic) to 10+ years (realistic) year before the rural network termination could be completed. Many Telecom businesses that have spun out their passive site infrastructure have done so in mutual captivity with the Tower management company and may have committed to very “sticky” contracts that have very little flexibility in terms of site termination at scale (e.g., 2% annually allowed over total portfolio).

We have a capital expense of 100 million for the stratospheric drones.  We also have to establish the support infrastructure (e.g., ground stations, airfield suitability rework, development, …), and consider operational expenses. The ballpark figure for this cost would be around 100 million euros for Capex for establishing the supporting infrastructure and another 30 million euros in annual operational expenses. In terms of steady-state Capex, it should be at most 20 million per year. In our example, the terrestrial rural network would have cost 3 billion euros, mainly Opex, over ten years compared to 700 million euros, a little less than half as Opex, for the stratospheric drone-based platform (not considering inflation).

The economical requirements of a stratospheric unmanned and autonomous drone-based coverage platform should be superior compared to the current cellular terrestrial coverage platform. As the stratospheric coverage platform scales and increasingly more stratospheric drones are deployed, the unit price is also likely to reduce accordingly.

Spectrum usage rights yet another critical piece.

It should be emphasized that the deployment of cellular frequency spectrum in stratospheric and LEO satellite contexts is governed by a combination of technical feasibility, regulatory frameworks, coordination to prevent interference, and operational needs. The ITU, along with national regulatory bodies, plays a central role in deciding the operational possibilities and balancing the needs and concerns of various stakeholders, including satellite operators, terrestrial network providers, and other spectrum users. Today, there are many restrictions and direct regulatory prohibitions in repurposing terrestrially assigned cellular frequencies for non-terrestrial purposes.

The role of the World Radiocommunications Conference (WRC) role is pivotal in managing the global radio-frequency spectrum and satellite orbits. Its decisions directly impact the development and deployment of various radiocommunication services worldwide, ensuring their efficient operation and preventing interference across borders. The WRC’s work is fundamental to the smooth functioning of global communication networks, from television and radio broadcasting to cellular networks and satellite-based services. The WRC is typically held every three to four years, with the latest one, WRC-23, held in Dubai at the end of 2023, reference [13] provides the provisional final acts of WRC-23 (December 2023). In landmark recommendation, WRC-23 relaxed the terrestrial-only conditions for the 698 to 960 MHz and 1,71 to 2.17 GHz, and 2.5 to 2.69 GHz frequency bands to also apply for high-altitude platform stations (HAPS) base stations (“Antennas-in -Sky”). It should be noted that there are slightly different frequency band ranges and conditions, depending on which of the three ITU-R regions (as well as exceptions for particular countries within a region) the system will be deployed in. Also the HAPS systems do not enjoy protection or priority over existing use of those frequency bands terrestrially. It is important to note that the WRC-23 recommendation only apply to coverage platforms (i.e., HAPS) in the range from 20 to 50 km altitude. These WRC-23 frequency-bands relaxation does not apply to satellite operation. With the recognized importance of non-terrestrial networks and the current standardization efforts (e.g., towards 6G), it is expected that the fairly restrictive regime on terrestrial cellular spectrum may be relaxed further to also allow mobile terrestrial spectrum to be used in “Antenna-in-the-Sky” coverage platforms. Nevertheless, HAPS and terrestrial use of cellular frequency spectrum will have to be coordinated to avoid interference and resulting capacity and quality degradation.

SoftBank announced recently (i.e., 28 December 2023 [11]), after deliberations at the WRC-23, that they had successfully gained approval within the Asia-Pacific region (i.e., ITU-R region 3) to use mobile spectrum bands, namely 700-900MHz, 1.7GHz, and 2.5GHz, for stratospheric drone-based mobile broadband cellular services (see also refs. [13]). As a result of this decision, operators in different countries and regions will be able to choose a spectrum with greater flexibility when they introduce HAPS-based mobile broadband communication services, thereby enabling seamless usage with existing smartphones and other devices.

Another example of re-using terrestrial licensed cellular spectrum above ground is SpaceX direct-to-cell capable 2nd generation Starlink satellites.

On January 2nd, 2024, SpaceX launched their new generation of Starlink satellites with direct-to-cell capabilities to close a connection to a regular mobile cellular phone (e.g., smartphone). The new direct-to-cell Starlink satellites use T-Mobile US terrestrial licensed cellular frequency band (i.e., 2×5 MHz Band 25, PCS G-block) and will work, according to T-Mobile US, with most of their existing mobile phones. The initial direct-to-cell commercial plans will only support low-bandwidth text messaging and no voice or more bandwidth-heavy applications (e.g., streaming). Expectations are that the direct-to-cell system would deliver up to 18.3 Mbps (3.66 Mbps/MHz/cell) downlink and up to 7.2 Mbps (1.44 Mbps/MHz/cell) uplink over a channel bandwidth of 5 MHz (maximum).

Given that terrestrial 4G LTE systems struggle with such performance, it will be super interesting to see what the actual performance of the direct-to-cell satellite constellation will be.

COMPARISON WITH LEO SATELLITE BROADBAND NETWORKS.

When juxtaposed with LEO satellite networks such as Starlink (SpaceX), OneWeb (Eutelsat Group), or Kuiper (Amazon), stratospheric drones offer several advantages. Firstly, the proximity to the Earth’s surface (i.e., 300 – 2,000 km) results in lower latency, a critical factor for real-time applications. While LEO satellites, like those used by Starlink, have reduced latency (ca. 3 ms round-trip-time) compared to traditional geostationary satellites (ca. 240 ms round-trip-time), stratospheric drones can provide even quicker response times (one-tenth of an ms in round-trip-time), making the stratospheric drone substantially more beneficial for applications such as emergency services, telemedicine, and high-speed internet services.

A stratospheric platform operating at 20 km altitude and targeting surveillance, all else being equal, would be 25 times better at distinguishing objects apart than an LEO satellite operating at 500 km altitude. The global aerial imaging market is expected to exceed 7 billion euros by 2030, with a CAGR of 14.2% from 2021. The flexibility of the stratospheric drone platform allows for combining cellular broadband services and a wide range of advanced aerial imaging services. Again, it is advantageous that the stratospheric drone regularly returns to Earth for fueling, maintenance, and technology upgrades and enhancements. This is not possible with an LEO satellite platform.

Moreover, the deployment and maintenance of stratospheric drones are, in theory, less complex and costly than launching and maintaining a constellation of satellites. While Starlink and similar projects require significant upfront investment for satellite manufacturing and rocket launches, stratospheric drones can be deployed at a fraction of the cost, making them a more economically viable option for many applications.

The Starlink LEO satellite constellation currently is the most comprehensive satellite (fixed) broadband coverage service. As of November 2023, Starlink had more than 5,000 satellites in low orbit (i.e., ca. 550 km altitude), and an additional 7,000+ are planned to be deployed, with a total target of 12+ thousand satellites. The current generation of Starlink satellites has three downlink phased-array antennas and one uplink phase-array antenna. This specification translates into 48 beams downlink (satellite to ground) and 16 beams uplink (ground to satellite). Each Starlink beam covers approx. 2,800 km2 with a coverage range of ca. 30 km, over which a 250 MHz downlink channel (in the Ku band) has been assigned. According to Portillo et al. [14], the spectral efficiency is estimated to be 2.7 Mbps per MHz, providing a total throughput of a maximum of 675 Mbps in the coverage area or a throughput density of ca. 0.24 Mbps per km2.

According to the latest Q2-2023 Ookla speed test it is found that “among the 27 European countries that were surveyed, Starlink had median download speeds greater than 100 Mbps in 14 countries, greater than 90 Mbps in 20 countries, and greater than 80 in 24 countries, with only three countries failing to reach 70 Mbps” (see reference [18]). Of course, the actual customer experience will depend on the number of concurrent users demanding resources from the LEO satellite as well as weather conditions, proximity of other users, etc. Starlink themselves seem to have set an upper limit of 220 Mbps download speed for their so-called priority service plan or otherwise 100 Mbps (see [19] below). Quite impressive performance if there are no other broadband alternatives available.

According to Elon Musk, SpaceX aims to reduce each Starlink satellite’s cost to less than one million euros. However, according to Elon Musk, the unit price will depend on the design, capabilities, and production volume. The launch cost using the SpaceX Falcon 9 launch vehicle starts at around 57 million euros, and thus, the 50 satellites would add a launch cost of ca. 1.1 million euros per satellite. SpaceX operates, as of September 2023, 150 ground stations (“Starlink Gateways”) globally that continue to connect the satellite network with the internet and ground operations. At Starlink’s operational altitude, the estimated satellite lifetime is between 5 and 7 years due to orbital decay, fuel and propulsion system exhaustion, and component durability. Thus, a LEO satellite business must plan for satellite replacement cycles. This situation differs greatly from the stratospheric drone-based operation, where the vehicles can be continuously maintained and upgraded. Thus, they are significantly more durable, with an expected useful lifetime exceeding ten years and possibly even 20 years of operational use.

Let’s consider our example of Germany and what it would take to provide LEO satellite coverage service targeting rural areas. It is important to understand that a LEO satellite travels at very high speeds (e.g., upwards of 30 thousand km per hour) and thus completes an orbit around Earth in between 90 to 120 minutes (depending on the satellite’s altitude). It is even more important to remember that Earth rotates on its axis (i.e., 24 hours for a full rotation), and the targeted coverage area will have moved compared to a given satellite orbit (this can easily be several hundreds to thousands of kilometers). Thus, to ensure continuous satellite broadband coverage of the same area on Earth, we need a certain number of satellites in a particular orbit and several orbits to ensure continuous coverage at a target area on Earth. We would need at least 210 satellites to provide continuous coverage of Germany. Most of the time, most satellites would not cover Germany, and the operational satellite utilization will be very low unless other areas outside Germany are also being serviced.

Economically, using the Starlink numbers above as a guide, we incur a capital expense of upwards of 450 million euros to realize a satellite constellation that could cover Germany. Let’s also assume that the LEO satellite broadband operator (e.g., Starlink) must build and launch 20 satellites annually to maintain its constellation and thus incur an additional Capex of ca. 40+ million euros annually. This amount does not account for the Capex required to build the ground network and the operations center. Let’s say all the rest requires an additional 10 million euros Capex to realize and for miscellaneous going forward. The technology-related operational expenses should be low, at most 30 million euros annually (this is a guesstimate!) and likely less. So, covering Germany with an LEO broadband satellite platform over ten years would cost ca. 1.3 billion euros. Although substantially more costly than our stratospheric drone platform, it is still less costly than running a rural terrestrial mobile broadband network.

Despite being favorable compared in economic to the terrestrial cellular network, it is highly unlikely to make any operational and economic sense for a single operator to finance such a network, and it would probably only make sense if shared between telecom operators in a country and even more so over multiple countries or states (e.g., European Union, United States, PRC, …).

Despite the implied silliness of a single mobile operator deploying a satellite constellation for a single Western European country (irrespective of it being fairly large), the above example serves two purposes; (1) To illustrates how economically in-efficient rural mobile networks are that a fairly expansive satellite constellation could be more favorable. Keep in mind that most countries have 3 or 4 of them, and (2) It also shows that the for operators to share the economics of a LEO satellite constellation over larger areal footprint may make such a strategy very attractive economically,

Due to the path loss at 550 km (LEO) being substantially higher than at 20 km (stratosphere), all else being equal, the signal quality of the stratospheric broadband drone would be significantly better than that of the LEO satellite. However, designing the LEO satellite with more powerful transmitters and sensitive receivers can compensate for the factor of almost 30 in altitude difference to a certain extent. Clearly, the latency performance of the LEO satellite constellation would be inferior to that of the stratospheric drone-based platform due to the significantly higher operating altitude.

It is, however, the capacity rather than shared cost could be the stumbling block for LEOs: For a rural cellular network or stratospheric drone platform, we see the MNOs effectively having “control” over the capex costs of the network, whether it be the RAN element for a terrestrial network, or the cost of whole drone network (even if it in the future, this might be able to become a shared cost).

However, for the LEO constellation, we think the economics of a single MNO building a LEO constellation even for their own market is almost entirely out of the question (ie multiple €bn capex outlay). Hence, in this situation, the MNOs will rely on a global LEO provider (ie Starlink, or AST Space Mobile) and will “lend” their spectrum to their in their respective geography in order to provide service. Like the HAPs, this will also require further regulatory approvals in order to free up terrestrial spectrum for satellites in rural areas.

We do not yet have the visibility of the payments the LEOs will require, so there is the potential that this could be a lower cost alternative again to rural networks, but as we show below, we think the real limitation for LEOs might not be the shared capacity rental cost, but that there simply won’t be enough capacity available to replicate what a terrestrial network can offer today.

However, the stratospheric drone-based platform provides a near-ideal cellular performance to the consumer, close to the theoretical peak performance of a terrestrial cellular network. It should be emphasized that the theoretical peak cellular performance is typically only experienced, if at all, by consumers if they are very near the terrestrial cellular antenna and in a near free-space propagation environment. This situation is a very rare occurrence for the vast majority of mobile consumers.

Figure 7 summarizes the above comparison between a rural terrestrial cellular network with the non-terrestrial cellular networks such as LEO satellites and Stratospheric drones.

Figure 7 Illustrating a comparison between terrestrial cellular coverage with stratospheric drone-based (“Antenna-in-the-sky”) cellular coverage and Low Earth Orbit (LEO) satellite coverage options.

While the majority of the 5,500+ Starlink constellation is 13 GHz (Ku-band), at the beginning of 2024, Space X launched a few 2nd generation Starlink satellites that support direct connections from the satellite to a normal cellular device (e.g., smartphone), using 5 MHz of T-Mobile USA’s PCS band (1900 MHz). The targeted consumer service, as expressed by T-Mobile USA, is providing texting capabilities over areas with no or poor existing cellular coverage across the USA. This is fairly similar to services at similar cellular coverage areas presently offered by, for example, AST SpaceMobile, OmniSpace, and Lynk Global LEO satellite services with reported maximum speed approaching 20 Mbps. The so-called Direct-2-Device, where the device is a normal smartphone without satellite connectivity functionality, is expected to develop rapidly over the next 10 years and continue to increase the supported user speeds (i.e., utilized terrestrial cellular spectrum) and system capacity in terms of smaller coverage areas and higher number of satellite beams.

Table 1 below provides an overview of the top 10 LEO satellite constellations targeting (fixed) internet services (e.g., Ku band), IoT and M2M services, and Direct-to-Device (or direct-to-cell) services. The data has been compiled from the NewSpace Index website, which should be with data as of 31st of December 2023. The Top-10 satellite constellation rank has been based on the number of launched satellites until the end of 2023. Two additional Direct-2-Cell (D2C or Direct-to-Device, D2D) LEO satellite constellations are planned for 2024-2025. One is SpaceX Starlink 2nd generation, which launched at the beginning of 2024, using T-Mobile USA’s PCS Band to connect (D2D) to normal terrestrial cellular handsets. The other D2D (D2C) service is Inmarsat’s Orchestra satellite constellation based on L-band (for mobile terrestrial services) and Ka for fixed broadband services. One new constellation (Mangata Networks) targeting 5G services. With two 5G constellations already launched, i.e., Galaxy Space (Yinhe) launched 8 LEO satellites, 1,000 planned using Q- and V-bands (i.e., not a D2D cellular 5G service), and OmniSpace launched two satellites and have planned 200 in total. Moreover, currently, there is one planned constellation targeting 6G by the South Korean Hanwha Group (a bit premature, but interesting nevertheless) with 2,000 6G LEO Satellites planned. Most currently launched and planned satellite constellations offering (or plan to provide) Direct-2-Cell services, including IoT and M2M, are designed for low-frequency bandwidth services that are unlikely to compete with terrestrial cellular networks’ quality of service where reasonable good coverage (or better) exists.

In Table 1 below, we then show 5 different services with the key input variables as cell radius, spectral efficiency and downlink spectrum. From this we can derive what the “average” capacity could be per square kilometer of rural coverage.

We focus on this metric as the best measure of capacity available once multiple users are on the service the spectrum available is shared. This is different from “peak” speeds which are only relevant in the case of very few users per cell.

  • We start with terrestrial cellular today for bands up to 2.1GHz and show that assuming a 2.5km cell radius, the average capacity is equivalent to 11Mbps per sq.km.
  • For a LEO service using Ku-band, i.e., with 250MHz to an FWA dish, the capacity could be ca. 2Mbps per sq.km.
  • For a LEO-based D2D device, what is unknown is what the ultimate spectrum allowance could be for satellite services with cellular spectrum bands, and spectral efficiency. Giving the benefit of the doubt on both, but assuming the beam radius is always going to be larger, we can get to an “optimistic” future target of 2Mbps per sq. km, i.e., 1/5th of a rural terrestrial network.
  • Finally, we show for a stratospheric drone, that given similar cell radius to a rural cell today, but with higher downlink available and greater spectral efficiency, we can reach ca. 55Mbps per sq. km, i.e. 5x what a current rural network can offer.

INTEGRATING WITH 5G AND BEYOND.

The advent of 5G, and eventually 6G, technology brings another dimension to the utility of stratospheric drones delivering mobile broadband services. The high-altitude platform’s ability to seamlessly integrate with existing 5G networks makes them an attractive option for expanding coverage and enhancing network capacity at superior economics, particularly in rural areas where the economics for terrestrial-based cellular coverage tend to be poor. Unlike terrestrial networks that require extensive groundwork for 5G rollout, the non-terrestrial network operator (NTNO) can rapidly deploy stratospheric drones to provide immediate 5G coverage over large areas. The high-altitude platform is also incredibly flexible compared to both LEO satellite constellations and conventional rural cellular network flexibility. The platform can easily be upgraded during its ground maintenance window and can be enhanced as the technology evolves. For example, upgrading to and operationalizing 6G would be far more economical with a stratospheric platform than having to visit thousands or more rural sites to modernize or upgrade the installed active infrastructure.

SUMMARY.

Stratospheric drones represent a significant advancement in the realm of wireless communication. Their strategic positioning in the stratosphere offers superior coverage and connectivity compared to terrestrial networks and low-earth satellite solutions. At the same time, their economic efficiency makes them an attractive alternative to ground-based infrastructures and LEO satellite systems. As technology continues to evolve, these high-altitude platforms (HAPs) are poised to play a crucial role in shaping the future of global broadband connectivity and ultra-high availability connectivity solutions, complementing the burgeoning 5G networks and paving the way for next-generation three-dimensional communication solutions. Moving away from today’s flat-earth terrestrial-locked communication platforms.

The strategic as well as the disruptive potential of the unmanned autonomous stratospheric terrestrial coverage platform is enormous, as shown in this article. It has the potential to make most of the rural (at least) cellular infrastructure redundant, resulting in substantial operational and economic benefits to existing mobile operators. At the same time, the HAPs could, in rural areas, provide much better service overall in terms of availability, improved coverage, and near-ideal speeds compared to what is the case in today’s cellular networks. It might also, at scale, become a serious competitive and economical threat to LEO satellite constellations, such as, for example, Starlink and Kuipers, that would struggle to compete on service quality and capacity compared to a stratospheric coverage platform.

Although the strategic, economic, as well as disruptive potential of the unmanned autonomous stratospheric terrestrial coverage platform is enormous, as shown in this article, the flight platform and advanced antenna technology are still in a relatively early development phase. Substantial regulatory work remains in terms of permitting the terrestrial cellular spectrum to be re-used above terra firma at the “Antenna-in-the-Sky. The latest developments out of WRC-23 for Asia Pacific appear very promising, showing that we are moving in the right direction of re-using terrestrial cellular spectrum in high-altitude coverage platforms. Last but not least, operating an unmanned (autonomous) stratospheric platform involves obtaining certifications as well as permissions and complying with various flight regulations at both national and international levels.

Terrestrial Mobile Broadband Network – takeaway:

  • It is the de facto practice for mobile cellular networks to cover nearly 100% geographically. The mobile consumer expects a high-quality, high-availability service everywhere.
  • A terrestrial mobile network has a relatively low area coverage per unit antenna with relatively high capacity and quality.
  • Mobile operators incur high and sustainable infrastructure costs, especially in rural areas with low or no return on that cost.
  • Physical obstructions and terrain limit performance (i.e., non-free space characteristics).
  • Well-established technology with high reliability.
  • The potential for high bandwidth and low latency in urban areas with high demand may become a limiting factor for LEO satellite constellations and stratospheric drone-based platforms. Thus, it is less likely to provide operational and economic benefits covering high-demand, dense urban, and urban areas.

LEO Satellite Network – takeaway:

  • The technology is operational and improving. There is currently some competition (e.g., Starlink, Kuiper, OneWeb, etc.) in this space, primarily targeting fixed broadband and satellite backhaul services. Increasingly, new LEO satellite-based business models are launched providing lower-bandwidth cellular-spectrum based direct-to-device (D2D) text, 4G and 5G services to regular consumer and IoT devices (i.e., Starlink, Lynk Global, AST SpaceMobile, OmniSpace, …).
  • Broader coverage, suitable for global reach. It may only make sense when the business model is viewed from a worldwide reach perspective (e.g., Starlink, OneWeb,…), resulting in much-increased satellite network utilization.
  • An LEO satellite broadband network can cover a vast area per satellite due to its high altitude. However, such systems are in nature capacity-limited, although beam-forming antenna technologies (e.g., phased array antennas) allow better capacity utilization.
  • The LEO satellite solutions are best suited for low-population areas with limited demand, such as rural and largely unpopulated areas (e.g., sea areas, deserts, coastlines, Greenland, polar areas, etc.).
  • Much higher latency compared to terrestrial and drone-based networks. 
  • Less flexible once in orbit. Upgrades and modernization only via replacement.
  • The LEO satellite has a limited useful operational lifetime due to its lower orbital altitude (e.g., 5 to 7 years).
  • Lower infrastructure cost for rural coverage compared to terrestrial networks, but substantially higher than drones when targeting regional areas (e.g., Germany or individual countries in general).
  • Complementary to the existing mobile business model of communications service providers (CSPs) with a substantial business risk to CSPs in low-population areas where little to no capacity limitations may occur.
  • Requires regulatory permission (authorization) to operate terrestrial frequencies on the satellite platform over any given country. This process is overseen by national regulatory bodies in coordination with the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) as well as national regulators (e.g., FCC in the USA). Satellite operators must apply for frequency bands for uplink and downlink communications and coordinate with the ITU to avoid interference with other satellites and terrestrial systems. In recent years, however, there has been a trend towards more flexible spectrum regulations, allowing for innovative uses of the spectrum like integrating terrestrial and satellite services. This flexibility is crucial in accommodating new technologies and service models.
  • Operating a LEO satellite constellation requires a comprehensive set of permissions and certifications that encompass international and national space regulations, frequency allocation, launch authorization, adherence to space debris mitigation guidelines, and various liability and insurance requirements.
  • Both LEO and MEO satellites is likely going to be complementary or supplementary to stratospheric drone-based broadband cellular networks offering high-performing transport solutions and possible even acts as standalone or integrated (with terrestrial networks) 5G core networks or “clouds-in-the-sky”.

Stratospheric Drone-Based Network – takeaway:

  • It is an emerging technology with ongoing research, trials, and proof of concept.
  • A stratospheric drone-based broadband network will have lower deployment costs than terrestrial and LEO satellite broadband networks.
  • In rural areas, the stratospheric drone-based broadband network offers better economics and near-ideal quality than terrestrial mobile networks. In terms of cell size and capacity, it can easily match that of a rural mobile network.
  • The solution offers flexibility and versatility and can be geographically repositioned as needed. The versatility provides a much broader business model than “just” an alternative rural coverage solution (e.g., aerial imaging, surveillance, defense scenarios, disaster area support, etc.).
  • Reduced latency compared to LEO satellites.
  • Also ideal for targeted or temporary coverage needs.
  • Complementary to the existing mobile business model of communications service providers (CSPs) with additional B2B and public services business potential from its application versatility.
  • Potential substantial negative impact on the telecom tower business as the stratospheric drone-based broadband network would make (at least) rural terrestrial towers redundant.
  • May disrupt a substantial part of the LEO satellite business model due to better service quality and capacity leaving the LEO satellite constellations revenue pool to remote areas and specialized use cases.
  • Requires regulatory permission to operate terrestrial frequencies (i.e., frequency authorization) on the stratospheric drone platform (similar to LEO satellites). Big steps have are already been made at the latest WRC-23, where the frequency bands 698 to 960 MHz, 1710 to 2170 MHz, and 2500 to 2690 MHz has been relaxed to allow for use in HAPS operating at 20 to 50 km altitude (i.e., the stratosphere).
  • Operating a stratospheric platform in European airspace involves obtaining certifications as well as permissions and (of course) complying with various regulations at both national and international levels. This includes the European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) type certification and the national civil aviation authorities in Europe.

FURTHER READING.

  1. New Street Research “Stratospheric drones: A game changer for rural networks?” (January 2024).
  2. https://hapsalliance.org/
  3. https://www.stratosphericplatforms.com/, see also “Beaming 5G from the stratosphere” (June, 2023) and “Cambridge Consultants building the world’s largest  commercial airborne antenna” (2021).
  4. Iain Morris, “Deutsche Telekom bets on giant flying antenna”, Light Reading (October 2020).
  5. “Deutsche Telekom and Stratospheric Platforms Limited (SPL) show Cellular communications service from the Stratosphere” (November 2020).
  6. “High Altitude Platform Systems: Towers in the Skies” (June 2021).
  7. “Stratospheric Platforms successfully trials 5G network coverage from HAPS vehicle” (March 2022).
  8. Leichtwerk AG, “High Altitude Platform Stations (HAPS) – A Future Key Element of Broadband Infrastructure” (2023). I recommend to closely follow Leichtwerk AG which is a world champion in making advanced gliding planes. The hydrogen powered StratoStreamer HAP is near-production ready, and they are currently working on a solar-powered platform. Germany is renowned for producing some of the best gliding planes in the world (after WWII Germany was banned from developing and producing aircrafts, military as well as civil. These restrictions was only relaxed in the 60s). Germany has a long and distinguished history in glider development, dating back to the early 20th century. German manufacturers like Schleicher, Schempp-Hirth, and DG Flugzeugbau are among the world’s leading producers of high-quality gliders. These companies are known for their innovative designs, advanced materials, and precision engineering, contributing to Germany’s reputation in this field.
  9. Jerzy Lewandowski, “Airbus Aims to Revolutionize Global Internet Access with Stratospheric Drones” (December 2023).
  10. Utilities One, “An Elevated Approach High Altitude Platforms in Communication Strategies”, (October 2023).
  11. Rajesh Uppal, “Stratospheric drones to provide 5g wireless communications global internet border security and military surveillance”  (May 2023).
  12. Softbank, “SoftBank Corp.-led Proposal to Expand Spectrum Use for HAPS Base Stations Agreed at World Radiocommunication Conference 2023 (WRC-23)”, press release (December 2023).
  13. ITU Publication, World Radiocommunications Conference 2023 (WRC-23), Provisional Final Acts, (December 2023). Note 1: The International Telecommunication Union (ITU) divides the world into three regions for the management of radio frequency spectrum and satellite orbits: Region 1: includes Europe, Africa, the Middle East west of the Persian Gulf including Iraq, the former Soviet Union, and Mongolia, Region 2: covers the Americas, Greenland, and some of the eastern Pacific Islands, and Region 3: encompasses Asia (excl. the former Soviet Union), Australia, the southwest Pacific, and the Indian Ocean’s islands.
  14. Geoff Huston, “Starlink Protocol Performance” (November 2023). Note 2: The recommendations, such as those designated with “ADD” (additional), are typically firm in the sense that they have been agreed upon by the conference participants. However, they are subject to ratification processes in individual countries. The national regulatory authorities in each member state need to implement these recommendations in accordance with their own legal and regulatory frameworks.
  15. Curtis Arnold, “An overview of how Starlink’s Phased Array Antenna “Dishy McFlatface” works.”, LinkedIn (August 2023).
  16. Quora, “How much does a satellite cost for SpaceX’s Starlink project and what would be the cheapest way to launch it into space?” (June 2023).
  17. The Clarus Network Group, “Starlink v OneWeb – A Comprehensive Comparison” (October 2023).
  18. Brian Wang, “SpaceX Launches Starlink Direct to Phone Satellites”, (January 2024).
  19. Sergei Pekhterev, “The Bandwidth Of The StarLink Constellation…and the assessment of its potential subscriber base in the USA.”, SatMagazine, (November 2021).
  20. I. del Portillo et al., “A technical comparison of three low earth orbit satellite constellation systems to provide global broadband,” Acta Astronautica, (2019).
  21. Nils Pachler et al., “An Updated Comparison of Four Low Earth Orbit Satellite Constellation Systems to Provide Global Broadband” (2021).
  22. Shkelzen Cakaj, “The Parameters Comparison of the “Starlink” LEO Satellites Constellation for Different Orbital Shells” (May 2021).
  23. Mike Puchol, “Modeling Starlink capacity” (October 2022).
  24. Mike Dano, “T-Mobile and SpaceX want to connect regular phones to satellites”, Light Reading (August 2022).
  25. Starlink, “SpaceX sends first text message via its newly launched direct to cell satellites” (January 2024).
  26. GSMA.com, “New Speedtest Data Shows Starlink Performance is Mixed — But That’s a Good Thing” (2023).
  27. Starlink, “Starlink specifications” (Starlink.com page).
  28. AST SpaceMobile website: https://ast-science.com/ Constellation Areas: Internet, Direct-to-Cell, Space-Based Cellular Broadband, Satellite-to-Cellphone. 243 LEO satellites planned. 2 launched.
  29. Lynk Global website: https://lynk.world/ (see also FCC Order and Authorization). It should be noted that Lynk can operate within 617 to 960 MHz (Space-to-Earth) and 663 to 915 MHz (Earth-to-Space). However, only outside the USA. Constellation Area: IoT / M2M, Satellite-to-Cellphone, Internet, Direct-to-Cell. 8 LEO satellites out of 10 planned.
  30. Omnispace website: https://omnispace.com/ Constellation Area: IoT / M2M, 5G. World’s first global 5G non terrestrial network. Initial support 3GPP-defined Narrow-Band IoT radio interface. Planned 200 LEO and <15 MEO satellites. So far only 2 satellites launched.
  31. NewSpace Index: https://www.newspace.im/ I find this resource having excellent and up-to date information of commercial satellite constellations.
  32. Wikipedia, “Satellite constellation”.
  33. LEOLABS Space visualization – SpaceX Starlink mapping. (deselect “Debris”, “Beams”, and “Instruments”, and select “Follow Earth”). An alternative visualization service for Starlink & OneWeb satellites is the website Satellitemap.space (you might go to settings and turn on signal Intensity which will give you the satellite coverage hexagons).
  34. European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA). Note that an EASA-type Type Certificate is a critical document in the world of aviation. This certificate is a seal of approval, indicating that a particular type of aircraft, engine, or aviation component meets all the established safety and environmental standards per EASA’s stringent regulations. When an aircraft, engine, or component is awarded an EASA Type Certificate, it signifies a thorough and rigorous evaluation process that it has undergone. This process assesses everything from design and manufacturing to performance and safety aspects. The issuance of the certificate confirms that the product is safe for use in civil aviation and complies with the necessary airworthiness requirements. These requirements are essential to ensure aircraft operating in civil airspace safety and reliability. Beyond the borders of the European Union, an EASA Type Certificate is also highly regarded globally. Many countries recognize or accept these certificates, which facilitate international trade in aviation products and contribute to the global standardization of aviation safety.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT.

I greatly acknowledge my wife, Eva Varadi, for her support, patience, and understanding during the creative process of writing this article.

I also owe a lot of gratitude to James Ratzer, Partner at New Street Research, for editorial suggestions, great discussions and challenges making the paper far better than it otherwise would have been. I would also like to thank Russel Waller, Pan European Telecoms and ESG Equity Analyst at New Street Research, for being supportive and insistent to get something written for NSR.

I also greatly appreciate my past collaboration and the many discussions on the topic of Stratospheric Drones in particular and advanced antenna designs and properties in general that I have had with Dr. Jaroslav Holis, Senior R&D Manager (Group Technology, Deutsche Telekom AG) over the last couple of years. When it comes to my early involvement in Stratospheric Drones activities with Group Technology Deutsche Telekom AG, I have to recognize my friend, mentor, and former boss, Dr. Bruno Jacobfeuerborn, former CTO Deutsche Telekom AG and Telekom Deutschland, for his passion and strong support for this activity since 2015. My friend and former colleague Rachid El Hattachi deserves the credit for “discovering” and believing in the opportunities that a cellular broadband-based stratospheric drone brings to the telecom industry.

Many thanks to CEO Dr. Reiner Kickert of Leichtwerk AG for providing some high resolution pictures of his beautiful StratoStreamer.

Thanks to my friend Amit Keren for suggesting a great quote that starts this article.

Any errors or unclarities are solely due to myself and not the collaborators and colleagues that have done their best to support this piece.