Greenland: Navigating Security and Critical Infrastructure in the Arctic – A Technology Introduction.

The securitization of the Arctic involves key players such as Greenland (The Polar Bear), Denmark, the USA (The Eagle), Russia (The Brown Bear), and China (The Red Dragon), each with strategic interests in the region. Greenland’s location and resources make it central to geopolitical competition, with Denmark ensuring its sovereignty and security. Greenland’s primary allies are Denmark, the USA, and NATO member countries, which support its security and sovereignty. Unfriendly actors assessed to be potential threats include Russia, due to its military expansion in the Arctic, and China, due to its strategic economic ambitions and influence in the region. The primary threats to Greenland include military tensions, sovereignty challenges, environmental risks, resource exploitation, and economic dependence. Addressing these threats requires a balanced, cooperative approach to ensure regional stability and sustainability.

Cold winds cut like knives, Mountains rise in solitude, Life persists in ice. (Aqqaluk Lynge, “Harsh Embrace” ).

I have been designing, planning, building, and operating telecommunications networks across diverse environmental conditions, ranging from varied geographies to extreme climates. I sort of told myself that I most likely had seen it all. However (and luckily), the more I consider the complexities involved in establishing robust and highly reliable communication networks in Greenland, the more I realize the uniqueness and often extreme challenges involved with building & maintaining communications infrastructures there. The Greenlandic telecommunications incumbent Tusass has successfully built a resilient and dependable transport network that connects nearly every settlement in Greenland, no matter how small. They manage and maintain this network amidst some of the most severe environmental conditions on the planet. The staff of Tusass is fully committed to ensuring connectivity for these remote communities, recognizing that any service disruption can have severe repercussions for those living there.

As an independent board member of Tusass Greenland since 2022, I have witnessed Tusass’s dedication, passion, and understanding of the importance of improving and maintaining their network and connections for the well-being of all Greenlandic communities. To be clear, the opinions I express in this post are solely my own and do not necessarily reflect the views or opinions of Tusass. I believe that my opinions have been shaped by my Tusass and Greenlandic experience, by working closely with Tusass as an independent board member, and by a deep respect for Tusass and its employees. All information that I am using in this post is publicly available through annual reports (of Tusass) or, in general, publicly available on the internet.

Figure 1 Illustrating a coastal telecommunications site supporting the microwave long-haul transport network of Tusass up along the Greenlandic west coast. Courtesy: Tusass A/S (Greenland).

Greenland’s strategic location, its natural resources, environmental significance, and broader geopolitical context make it geopolitically a critical country. Thus, protecting and investing in Greenland’s critical infrastructure is obviously important. Not only from a national and geopolitical security perspective but also with respect to the economic development and stability of Greenland and the Arctic region. If a butterfly’s movements can cause a hurricane, imagine what an angry “polar bear” will do to the global weather and climate. The melting ice caps are enabling new shipping routes and making natural resources much more accessible, and they may also raise the stakes for regional security. For example, with China’s Polar Silk Road initiative where, China seeks to establish (or at least claim) a foothold in the Arctic in order to increase its trade routes and access to resources. This is also reflected in their 2018 declaration stating that China sees itself as a “Near-Arctic State” and concludes that China is one of the continental states that are closest to the Arctic Circle. Russia, which is a real neighboring country to the Arctic region and Circle, has also increased its military presence and economic activities in the Arctic. Recently, Russia has made claims in the Arctic to areas that overlap with what Denmark and Canada see as their natural territories, aiming to secure its northern borders and exploit the region’s resources. Russia has also added new military bases and has conducted large-scale maneuvers along its own Arctic coastline. The potential threats from increased Russian and Chinese Arctic activities pose significant security concerns. Identifying and articulating possible threat scenarios to the Arctic region involving potential hostile actors may indeed justify extraordinary measures and also highlight the need for urgent and substantial investments in and attention to Greenland’s critical infrastructure.

In this article, I focus very much on what key technologies should be considered, why specific technologies should be considered, and how those technologies could be implemented in a larger overarching security and defense architecture driving towards enhancing the safety and security of Greenland:

  • Leapfrog Quality of Critical Infrastructure: Strengthening the existing critical communications infrastructure should be a priority. With Tusass, this is the case in terms of increasing the existing transport network’s reliability and availability by adding new submarine cables and satellite backbone services and the associated satellite infrastructure. However, the backbone of the Tusass economy is a population of 57 thousand. The investments required to quantum leap the robustness of the existing critical infrastructure, as well as deploying many of the technologies discussed in this post, will not have a positive business case or a reasonable return on investment within a short period (e.g., a couple of years) if approached in the way that is the standard practice for most private corporations around the worlds. External subsidies will be required. The benefit evaluation would need to be considered over the long term, more in line with big public infrastructure projects. Most of these critical infrastructure and technology investments discussed are based on particular geopolitical assumptions and serve as risk-mitigating measures with substantial civil upside if we maintain a dual-use philosophy as a boundary condition for those investments. Overall I believe that a positive case might be made from the perspective of the possible loss of not making them rather than a typical gain or growth case expected if an investment is made.
  • Smart Infrastructure Development: Focus on building smart infrastructure, integrating sensor networks (e.g., DAS on submarine cables), and AI-driven automation for critical systems like communication networks, transportation, and energy management to improve resilience and operational efficiency. As discussed in this post, Tusass already has a strong communications network that should underpin any work on enhancing the Greenlandic defense architecture. Moreover, Tusass are experts in building and operating critical communications infrastructures in the Arctic. This is critical know-how that should be heavily relied upon in what has to come.
  • Automated Surveillance and Monitoring Systems: Invest in advanced automated surveillance technologies, such as aquatic and aerial drones, satellite-based monitoring (SIGINT and IMINT), and IoT sensors, to enhance real-time monitoring and protection of Greenland.
  • Autonomous Defense Systems: Deploy autonomous systems, including unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and unmanned underwater vehicles (UUVs), to strengthen defense capabilities and ensure rapid response to potential threats in the Arctic region. These systems should be the backbone of ad-hoc private network deployments serving both defense and civilian use cases.
  • Cybersecurity and AI Integration: Implement robust cybersecurity measures and integrate artificial intelligence to protect critical infrastructure and ensure secure, reliable communication networks supporting both military and civilian applications in Greenland.
  • Dual-Use Infrastructure: Prioritize investments in infrastructure solutions that can serve both military and civilian purposes, such as communication networks and transportation facilities, to maximize benefits and resilience.
  • Local Economic and Social Benefits: Ensure that defense investments support local economic development by creating new job opportunities and improving essential services in Greenland.

I believe that Greenland needs to build a solid Greenlandic-centered know-how on a foundational level around autonomous and automated systems. In order to get there Greenland will need close and strong alliances that is aligned with the aim of achieving a greater degree of independence through clever use of the latest technologies available. Such local expertise will be essential in order to reduce the dependency on external support (e.g., from Denmark and Allies) and ensure that they can maintain operational capabilities independently, particularly during a security crisis. Automation, enabled by digitization and AI-enabled system architectures, would be key to managing and monitoring Greenland’s remote and inaccessible geography and resources efficiently and securely, minimizing the need for extensive human intervention. Leveraging autonomous defense and surveillance technologies and stepping up in digital maturity is an important path to compensating for Greenland’s small population. Additionally, implementing robust, with respect to hardware AND software, automated systems will allow Greenland to protect and maintain its critical infrastructure and services, mitigating the risks associated with (too much) reliance on Denmark or allies during a time of crisis where such resources may be scarce or impractical to timely move to Greenland.

Figure 2 A view from Tusass HQ over Nuuk, Greenland. Courtesy: Tusass A/S (Greenland).

GREENLAND – A CONCISE INTRODUCTION.

Greenland, or Kalaallit Nunaat as it is called in Greenlandic, has a surface area of about 2.2 million square kilometers with ca. 80% covered by ice and is the world’s largest island. It is an autonomous territory of Denmark with a population of approximately 57 thousand. Its surface area is comparable to that of Alaska (1.7 million km2) or Saudi Arabia (2.2 million km2). It is predominantly covered by ice, with a population scattered in smaller settlements along the western coastlines where the climate is milder and more hospitable. Greenland’s extensive coastline measures ca. 44 thousand kilometers and is one of the most remote and sparsely populated coastlines in the world. This remoteness contrasts with more densely populated and developed coastlines like the United States. The remoteness of Greenland’s coastline is further emphasized by a lack of civil infrastructure. There are no connecting roads between settlements, and most (if not all) travel between communities relies on maritime or air transport.

Greenland’s coastline presents several unique security challenges due to its particularities, such as its vast length, rugged terrain, harsh climate, and limited population. These factors make Greenland challenging to monitor and protect effectively, which is critical for several reasons:

  • The vast and inaccessible terrain.
  • Harsh climate and weather conditions.
  • Sparse population and limited infrastructure.
  • Maritime and resource security challenges.
  • Communications technology challenges.
  • Geopolitical significance.

The capital and largest city is Nuuk, located on the southwestern coast. With a population of approximately 18+ thousand or 30+% of the total, Nuuk is Greenland’s administrative and economic center, offering modern amenities and serving as the hub for the island’s limited transportation network. Sisimiut, north of Nuuk on the western coast. It is the second-largest town in Greenland, with a population of around 5,500+. Sisimiut is known for its fishing industry and serves as a base for much of the Greenlandic tourism and outdoor activities.

On the remote and inhospitable eastern coast, Tasiilaq is the largest town in the Ammassalik area, with a population of little less than 2,000. It is relatively isolated compared to the western settlements and is known for its breathtaking natural scenery and opportunities for adventure tourism (check out https://visitgreenland.com/ for much more information). In the far north, on the west coast, we have Qaanaaq (also known as Thule), which is one of the world’s most northern towns, with a population of ca. 600. Located near Qaanaaq, is the so-called Pituffik Space Base which is the United States’ northernmost military base, established in 1951, and a key component of NATO’s early warning and missile defense systems. The USA have had a military presence in Greenland since the early days of the World War II and strengthened during the Cold War. It also plays an important role in monitoring Arctic airspace and supporting the region’s avionics operations.

As of 2023, Greenland has approximately 56 inhabited settlements. I am using the word “settlement” as an all-inclusive covering communities with a population of 10s of thousands (Nuuk) down to 100s or lower. With few exceptions, there are no settlements with connecting roads or any other overland transportation connections with other settlements. All person- and goods transportation between the different settlements is taken by plane or helicopter (provided by Air Greenland) or seaborne transportation (e.g., Royal Artic Line, RAL).

Greenland is rich in natural resources. Apart from water (for hydropower), this includes significant mining, oil, and gas reserves. These natural resources are largely untapped and present substantial opportunities for economic development (and temptation for friendly as well as unfriendly actors). Greenland is believed to have one of the world’s largest deposits of rare earth elements (although by far not comparable to China), extremely valuable as an alternative to the reliance of China and critical for various high-tech applications, including electronics (e.g., your smartphone), renewable energy technologies (e.g., wind turbines and EVs), and defense systems. Graphite and platinum are also present in Greenland and are important in many industrial processes. Some estimates indicate that northeast Greenland’s waters could hold large reserves of (yet) undiscovered oil and gas reserves. Other areas are likewise believed to contain substantial hydrocarbon reserves. However, Greenland’s arctic environment presents severe exploration and extraction challenges, such as extreme cold, ice cover, and remoteness, that so far has made it also very costly and complicated to extraxt its natural resources. With the global warming the economical and practical barrier for exploitation is contineously reducing.

FROM STRATEGIC OUTPOST TO ARCTIC STRONGHOLD: THE EVOLVING SECURITY SIGNIFICANCE OF GREENLAND.

Figure 3 illustrates Greenland’s reliance on and the importance of critical communications infrastructure connecting local communities as well as bridging the rest of the world and the internet. Courtesy: DALL-E.

From a security perspective Greenland has evolved significantly since the Second World War. During World War II, its importance was primarily based on its location as a midway point between North America and Europe serving as a refueling and weather station for allied aircrafts crossing the Atlantic to and from Europe. Additionally, its remote geographical location combined with its harsh climate provided a “safe haven” for monitoring and early warning installations.

During the Cold War era, Greenland’s importance grew (again) due to its proximity to the Soviet Union (and Russia today). Greenland became a key site for early warning radar systems and an integral part of the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) network designed to detect Soviet bombers and missiles heading toward North America. In 1951, the USA-controlled Thule Air Base, today it is called Pituffik Space Base, located in northwest Greenland, was constructed with the purpose of hosting long-range bombers and providing an advanced point (from a USA perspective) for early warning and missile defense systems.

As global tensions eased in the post-Cold War period, Greenland’s strategic status diminished somewhat. However, its status is now changing again due to Russia’s increased aggression in Europe (and geopolitically) and a more assertive China with expressed interest in the Arctic. The arctic ice is melting due to climate change and has resulted in new maritime routes being possible, such as the Northern Sea Route. Also, making Arctic resources more accessible. Thus, we now observe an increased interest from global powers in the Arctic region. And as was the case during the cold-War period (maybe with much higher stakes), Greenland has become strategically critical for monitoring and controlling these emerging routes, and the Arctic in general. Particularly with the observed increased activity and interest from Russia and China.

Greenland’s position in the North Atlantic, bridging the gap between North America and Europe, has become a crucial spot for monitoring and controlling the transatlantic routes. Greenland is part of the so-called Greenland-Iceland-UK (GIUK) Gap. This gap is a critical “chokepoint” for controlling naval and submarine operations, as was evident during the Second World War (e.g., read up on the Battle of the Atlantic). Controlling the Gap increases the security of maritime and air traffic between the continents. Thus, Greenland has again become a key component in defense strategies and threat scenarios envisioned and studied by NATO (and the USA).

GREENLANDS GEOPOLITICAL ROLE.

Greenland’s recent significance in the Arctic should not be underestimated. It arises, in particular, from climate change and, as a result, melting ice caps that have and will enable new shipping routes and potential (easier) access to Greenland’s untapped natural resources.

Greenland hosts critical military and surveillance assets, including early warning radar installations as well as air & naval bases. These defense assets actively contributes to global security and is integral to NATO’s missile defense and early warning systems. They provide data for monitoring potential missile threats and other aerial activities in the North Atlantic and Arctic regions. Greenland’s air and naval bases also support specialized military operations, providing logistical hubs for allied forces operating in the Arctic and North Atlantic.

From a security perspective, Greenland’s control is not only about monitoring and defense. It is also about deterring potential threats from potential hostile actors. It allows for effective monitoring and defense of the Arctic and North Atlantic regions. Enabling the detection and tracking of submarines, ships, and aircraft. Such capabilities enhance situational awareness and operational readiness, but more importantly, it sends a message to potential adversaries (e.g., maybe unaware, as unlikely as it may be, about the deficiencies of Danish Arctic patrol ships). The ability to project power and maintain a military presence in this area is necessary for deterring potential adversaries and protecting he critical communications infrastructure (e.g., submarine cables), maritime routes, and airspace.

The strategic location of Greenland is key to contribute to the global security dynamics. Ensuring Greenland’s security and stability is essential for also maintaining control over critical transatlantic routes, monitoring Arctic activities, and protecting against potential threats from hostile actors. Making Greenland a cornerstone of the defense infrastructure and an essential area for geopolitical strategy in the North Atlantic and Arctic regions.

INFRASTRUCTURE RECOMMENDATIONS.

Recent research has focused on Greenland in the context of Arctic security (see “Greenland in Arctic Security: (De)securitization Dynamics under Climatic Thaw and Geopolitical Freeze” by M. Jacobsen et al.). The work emphasizes the importance of maintaining and enhancing surveillance and early warning systems. Greenland is advised to invest in advanced radar systems and satellite monitoring capabilities. These systems are relevant for detecting potential threats and providing timely information, ensuring national and regional security. I should point to the following traditional academic use of the word “securitization,” particularly from the Copenhagen School, which refers to framing an issue as an existential threat requiring extraordinary measures. Thus, securitization is the process by which topics are framed as matters of security that should be addressed with urgency and exeptional measures.

The research work furthermore underscores the Greenlandic need for additional strategic infrastructure development, such as enhancing or building new airport facilities and the associated infrastructure. This would for example include expanding and upgrading existing airports to improve connectivity within Greenland and with external partners (e.g., as is happening with the new airport in Nuuk). Such developments would also support economic activities, emergency response, and defense operations. Thus, it combines civic and military applications in what could be defined as dual-purpose infrastructure programs.

The above-mentioned research argues for the need to develop advanced communication systems, Signals Intelligence (SIGINT), and Image Intelligence (IMINT) gathering technologies based on satellite- and aerial-based platforms. These wide-area coverage platforms are critical to Greenland due to its vast and remote areas, where traditional communication networks may be insufficient or impractical. Satellite communication systems such as GEO, MEO, and LEO (and combinations thereof), and stratospheric high-altitude platform systems (HAPS) are relevant for maintaining robust surveillance, facilitating rapid emergency response, and ensuring effective coordination of security as well as search & rescue operations.

Expanding broadband internet access across Greenland is also a key recommendation (that is already in progress today). This involves improving the availability and reliability of communications-related connectivity by additional submarine cables and by new satellite internet services, ensuring that even the most remote communities have reliable broadband internet connectivity. All communities need to have access to broadband internet, be connected, enable economic development, improve quality of life in general, and integrate remote areas into the national and global networks. These communication infrastructure improvements are important for civilian and military purposes, ensuring that Greenland can effectively manage its security challenges and leverage new economic opportunities for its communities. It is my personal opinion that most communities or settlements are connected to the wider internet, and the priority should be to improve the redundancy, availability, and reliability of the existing critical communications infrastructure. With that also comes more quality in the form of higher internet speeds.

The applicability of at least some of the specific securitization recommendations for Greenland, as outlined in Marc Jacobsen’s “Greenland in Arctic Security: (De)securitization Dynamics Under Climatic Thaw and Geopolitical Freeze,” may be somewhat impractical given the unique characteristics of Greenland with its vast area and very small population. Quite a few recommendations (in my opinion), even if in place “today or tomorrow,” would require a critical scale of expertise, human, and industrial capital that Greenland does not have available on its own (and also is unlikely to have in the future). Thus, some of the recommendations depend on such resources to be delivered from outside Greenland, posing inherent availability risks to provide in a crisis (assuming that such capacity would even be available under normal circumstances). This dependency on external actors, particularly Danish and International investors, complicates Greenland’s ability to independently implement policies recommended by the securitization framework. It could lead to conflicts between local priorities and the interests of external stakeholders, particularly in a time of a clear and present security crisis (e.g., Russia attempting to expand west above and beyond Ukraine).

Also, as a result of Greenland’s small population there will be a limited pool of available local personnel with the needed skills to draw upon for implementing and maintaining many of the recommendations in “Greenland in Arctic Security: (De)securitization Dynamics under Climatic Thaw and Geopolitical Freeze”. Training and deploying enough high-tech skilled individuals to cover Greenland’s vast territory and technology needs is a very complex challenge given the limited human resources and challenges in getting external high-tech resouces to Greenland.

I believe Greenland should focus on establishing a comprehensive security strategy that minimizes its dependency on its natural allies and external actors in general. The dual-use approach should be integral to such a security strategy, where technology investments serve civil and defense purposes whenever possible. This approach ensures that Greenlandic society benefits directly from investments in building a robust security framework. I will come back to the various technologies that may be relevant in achieving more independence and less reliance on the external actors that are so prevalent in Greenland today.

HOW CRITICAL IS CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE TO GREENLAND

Communications infrastructure is seen as critical in Greenland. It has to provide a reliable and good quality service despite Greenland having some of the most unfavorable environmental conditions in which to build and operate communications networks. Greenland is characterized by vast distances between relatively small, isolated communities. Thus, this makes effective communication essential for bridging those gaps, allowing people to stay connected with each other and as well as the outside world irrespective of weather or geography. The lack of a comprehensive road network and reliance on sea and air travel further emphasize the importance of reliable and available telecommunications services, ensuring timely communication and coordination across the country.

Telecommunications infrastructure is a cornerstone of economic development in Greenland (as it has been elsewhere). It is about efficient internet and telephony services and its role in business operations, e-commerce activities, and international market connections. These aspects are important for the economic growth, education, and diversification of the many Greenlandic communities. The burgeoning tourism industry will also depend on (maybe even demand) robust communication networks to serve those tourists, ensure their safety in remote areas, and promote tourism activities in general. This illustrates very firmly that the communications infrastructure is critical (should there be any doubts).

Telecommunications infrastructure also enables distance learning in education and health services, providing people in remote areas with access to high-quality education that otherwise would not be possible (e.g., Coursera, Udemy Academy, …). Telemedicine has obvious benefits for healthcare services that are often limited in remote regions. It allows residents to receive remote medical consultations and services (e.g., by video conferencing) without the need for long-distance and time-consuming travels that often may aggravate a patient’s condition. Emergency response and public safety are other critical areas in which our communications infrastructure plays a crucial role. Greenland’s harsh and unpredictable weather can lead to severe storms, avalanches, and ice-related incidents. It is therefore important to have a reliable communication network that allows for timely warnings, supporting rescue operations & coordination, and public safety. Moreover, maritime safety also depends on a robust communication infrastructure, enabling reliable communication between ships and coastal stations.

A strong communication network can significantly enhance social connectivity, and help maintaining social ties, such as among families and communities across Greenland. Thus reduce the feeling of isolation. Supporting social cohesion in communities as well as between settlements. Telecommunications can also facilitate sharing and preserving the Greenlandic culture and language through digital media (e.g., Tusass Music), online platforms, and social networks (e.g., Facebook used by ca. 85% of the eligible population, that number is ca. 67% in Denmark).

For a government and its administration, maintaining effective and reliable communication is essential for well-functioning public services and its administration. It should facilitate coordination between different levels of government and remote administration. Additionally, environmental monitoring and research benefit greatly from a reliable and available communication infrastructure. Greenland’s unique environment attracts scientific research, and robust communication networks are essential for supporting data transmission (in general), coordination of research activities, and environmental monitoring. Greenland’s role in global climate change studies should also be supported by communication networks that provide the means of sharing essential climate data collected from remote research stations.

Last but not least. A well-protected (i.e., redundant) and highly available communications infrastructure is a cornerstone of any national defense or emergency situation. If it is well functioning, the critical communications infrastructure will support the seamless operation of military and civilian coordination, protect against cyber threats, and ensure public confidence during a crisis situation (natural or man-made). The importance of investing in and maintaining such a critical infrastructure cannot be underestimated. It plays a critical role in a nation’s overall security and resilience.

TUSASS: THE BACKBONE OF GREENLANDS CRITICAL COMMUNICATIONS INFRASTRUCTURE.

Tusass is the primary telecommunications provider in Greenland. It operates a comprehensive telecom network that includes submarine cables with 5 landing stations in Greenland, very long microwave (MW) radio chains (i.e., long-haul backbone transmission links) with MW backhaul branches to settlements along its way, and broadband satellite connections to deliver telephony, internet, and other communication services across the country. The company is wholly owned by the Government of Greenland (Naalakkersuisut). Positioning Tusass as a critical company responsible for the nation’s communications infrastructure. Tusass faces unique challenges due to the vast, remote, and rugged terrain. Extreme weather conditions make it difficult, often impossible, to work outside for at least 3 – 4 months a year. This complicates the deployment and maintenance of any infrastructure in general and a communications network in particular. The regulatory framework mandates that Tusass fulfills a so-called Public Service Obligation, or PSO. This requires Tusass to provide essential telecommunications services to all of Greenland, even the most isolated communities. This requires Tusass to continue to invest heavily in expanding and enhancing its critical infrastructure, providing reliable and high-quality services to all residents throughout Greenland.

Tusass is the main and, in most areas, the only telecommunications provider in Greenland. The company holds a dominant market position where it provides essential services such as fixed-line telephony, mobile networks, and internet services. The Greenlandic market for internet and data connections was liberalized in 2015. The liberalization allowed private Internet Service Providers (ISPs) to purchase wholesale connections from Tusass and resell them. Despite liberalization, Tusass remains the dominant force in Greenland’s telecommunications sector. Tusass’s market position can be attributed to its extensive communications infrastructure and its government ownership. With a population of 57 thousand and its vast geographical size, it would be highly uneconomical and human-resource wise very chalenging to have duplicate competing physical communications infrastructures and support organizations in Greenland. Not to mention that it would take many years before an alternative telco infrastructure could be up an running matching what is already in place. Thus, while there are smaller niche service providers, Tusass effectively operates as Greenland’s sole telecom provider.

Figure 4 Illustrates one of many of Tusass’s long-haul microwave site along Greenland’s west coast. Accessible only by helicopter. Courtesy: Tusass A/S (Greenland).

CURRENT STATE OF CRITICAL COMMUNICATIONS INFRASTRUCTURE.

The illustration below provides an overview of some of the major and critical infrastructures available in Greenland, with a focus on the communications infrastructure provided by Tusass, such as submarine cables, microwave (MW) radios radio chains, and satellite ground stations, which all connect Greenland and give access to the Internet for all of Greenland.

Figure 5 illustrates the Greenlandic telecommunications provider Tusass infrastructure. Note that Tusass is the incumbent and only telecom provider in Greenland. Currently, five hydropower plants (shown above, location only indicative) provide more than 80% of Greenland’s electricity demand. A new international airport is expected to be operational in Nuuk from November 2024. Source: from Tusass Annual Report 2023 with some additions and minor edits.

From the south of Nanortalik up to above Upernavik on the west coast, Tusass has a 1,700+ km long microwave radio chain connecting all settlements along Greenland’s west coast from the south to the north distributed, supported by 67 microwave (MW) radio sites. Thus, have a microwave radio equipment located for every ca. 25 km ensuring very high performance and availability of connectivity to the many settlements along the West Coast. This setup is called a long-haul microwave chain that uses a series of MW radio relay stations to transmit data over long distances (e.g., up to thousands of kilometers). The harsh climate with heavy rain, snow, and icing makes it very challenging to operate high-frequency, high-bandwidth microwaves (i.e., the short distances between the radio chain sites). The MW radio sites are mainly located on remote peaks in the harsh and unforgiving coastal landscape (ensuring line-of-site), making helicopters the only means of accessing these locations for maintenance and fueling. The field engineers here are pretty much superheroes maintaining the critical communications infrastructure of Greenland and understanding its life-and-death implications for all the remote communities if it breaks down (with the additional danger of meeting a very hungry polar bear and being stuck for several days on a location due to poor weather preventing the helicopter from picking the engineers up again).

Figure 6 illustrates a typical housing for field service staff when on site visits. As the weather can change very rapidly in Greenland it is not uncommon that field service staff have to wait for many days before they can be picked up again by the helicopter. Courtesy: Tusass A/S (Greenland).

Greenland relies on the “Greenland Connect” submarine cable to connect to the rest of the world and the wider internet with a modern-day throughput. The submarine cable connecting Greenland to Canada and Iceland runs from Newfoundland and Labrador in Canada to Nuuk and continues from Qaqortoq in Greenland to land in Iceland (that connects further to Copenhagen and the wider internet). Tusass, furthermore, has deployed submarine cables between 5 of the major Greenlandic settlements, including Nuuk, up the west coast and down to the south (i.e., Qaqortoq). The submarine cables provide some level of redundancies, increased availability, and substantial capacity & quality augmentation to the long-haul MW chain that carries the traffic from surrounding settlements. The submarine cables are critical and essential for the modernization and digitalization of Greenland. However, there are only two main submarine broadband cable connection points, the Canada – Nuuk and Qaqortoq – Iceland submarine connections, to and from Greenland. From a security perspective, this poses substantial and unique risks to Greenland, and its role and impact need to be considered in any work on critical infrastructure strategy. If both international submarine cables were compromised, intentionally or otherwise, it would become challenging, if possible, to sustain today’s communications demand. Most traffic would have to be supported by existing satellite capacity, which is substantially lower than the existing submarine cables can support, leaving the capacity mainly for mission-critical communications. Allowing little spare capacity for consumer and non-critical business communication needs. This said, as long as Greenlandic submarine cables, terrestrial transport, and switching infrastructure are functional, it would be possible to internally to Greenland maintain a resemblance of internet services and communication means between connected settlements using modern day network design thinking.

Moreover, while the submarine cables along the west coast offer redundancy to the land-based long-haul transport solution, there are substantial risks to settlements and their populations where the long-haul MW solution is the only means of supporting remote Greenlandic communities. Given Greenland’s unique geographic and climate challenges it is not only very costly but also time-consuming to reduce the risk of disruption to the existing lesser redundant critical infrastructure already in place (e.g., above Aasiaat north of the Arctic Circle).

Using satellites is an additional dimension, and part of the connectivity toolkit, that can be used to improve the redundancy and availability of the land- and water-based critical communications infrastructures. However, the drawback of satellite systems is that they generally are bandwidth/throughput limited and have longer signal delays (latency and round-trip time) than terrestrial-based communications systems. These issues could pose some limitations on how well some services can be supported or will function and would require a versatile traffic management & prioritization system in case the satellite solution would be the only means of connecting a relatively high-traffic area (e.g., Tasiilaq) used to ground-based support of broadband transport means with substantial more available bandwidth than accessible to the satellite solution. Particular for GEO stationary satellite services, with the satellite located at 36 thousand kilometer altitude, the data traffic flow needs to be carefully optimized in order to function well irrespective of the substantial latency experienced on such connections that at the very best can be 239 milliseconds and in practice might be closer to twice that or more. This poses significant challenges to particular TCP/IP data flows on such response-time-challenged connections and applications sensitivity short round trip times.

Optimizing and stabilizing TCP/IP data flows over GEO satellite connections requires a multi-faceted approach involving enhancements to the TCP protocol (e.g., window scaling, SACK, TCP Hypla, …), the use of hybrid and proxy solutions, application-layer adjustments, error correction mechanisms, Quality of Service (QoS) and traffic shaping, DNS optimizations, and continuous network monitoring. Combining these strategies makes it possible to mitigate some of the inherent challenges of high-latency satellite links and ensure more effective and efficient IP flows and better utilization of the available satellite link bandwidth. Optimizing control signals and latency-sensitive data flows over GEO and LEO satellite connections may also substantially reduce the sensitivity to the prohibitive long delays experienced on GEO connections, using the lower latency LEO connection (RTT < ~ 50 ms @ 500 km altitude), or, if available as a better alternative a long-haul microwave link or submarine connection.

Tusass, in collaboration with the Spanish satellite company Hispasat, make use of the Greenland geostationary satellite, Greensat. Tusass signed an agreement with Hispasat to lease space capacity (800 MHz @ Ku-band) on the Amazonas Nexus satellite until the end of its lifetime (i.e., 2038+/-). Greensat was taken into operation in the last quarter of 2023 (note: it was launched in February 2023), providing services to the satellite-only settlement areas around Qaanaaq, the northernmost settlement on the west coast of Greenland, and Tasiilaq and Ittoqortormiut (north of Tasiilaq), on the remote east coast. All mobile and fixed traffic from a satellite-only area is routed to a satellite ground station that is connected to the geostationary satellite (see the illustration below). The satellite’s primary mission is to provide broadband services to areas that, due to geography & climate and cost, are impractical to connect by submarine cable or long-haul microwave links. The Greensat satellite closes the connection to the rest of the world and the internet via a ground station on Gran Canaria. It also connects to Greenland via submarine cables in Nuuk (via Canada and Qaqortoq).

Figure 7 The image shows a large geostationary satellite ground-station antenna located in Greenland’s cold and remote area. The antenna’s primary purpose is to facilitate communication with geostationary satellites 36 thousand kilometers away, transmitting and receiving data. It may support various services such as Internet, television broadcasting, weather monitoring, and emergency communications. The components are (1) a parabolic reflector (dish), (2) a feed horn and receiver, (3) a mount and support structure, (4) control and monitoring systems, and (5) a radome (not shown on the picture) which is a structural, weatherproof enclosure that protects the antenna from environmental elements without interfering with the electromagnetic signals it transmits and receives. The LEO satellite ground stations are much smaller as the distance between the ground and the low-earth satellite is much smaller, i.e., ca. 350 – 650 km, resulting in less challenging receive and transmit conditions (compared to the connection to a geostationary satellite).

In addition, Tusass also makes use of UK-based OneWeb (Eutelsat) LEO satellite backhaul services at several locations where an area fixed and mobile traffic is routed to a point-of-presence connected to a satellite ground station that connects to a OneWeb satellite that connects to the central switching center in Nuuk (connected to another ground station).

CRITICAL PROPERTIES FOR RELIABLE AND SECURE TRANSPORT NETWORKS.

A physical transport network comprises many tangible components, such as cables, routers, and switches, which form an interconnected system capable of transmitting data. The network is designed and planned according to a given expected coverage, use and level of targeted quality (e.g., speed, latency, priority and security). Moreover, we are also concerned about such a networks availability as well as reliability. We design the physical and logical (i.e., related to higher levels of the OSI stack than the physical) network according to a given target availability, that is how many hours in a year should the network minimum be operational and available to our customers. You will see availability given in percentage of the total hours in a year (e.g., 8,760 hours in a normal year and 8,784 hours in a leap year). So an availability of 99.9% means that we target a minimum operational time of our network of 8,751 hours, or, alternatively, accept a maximum of 9 hours of downtime. The reliability of a network refers to the probability hat the network will continue to function without failure for a given period. For example, say you have a mean time between failures (MTBF) of 8750 hours and you want to figure out what the likelihood is of operating without failure for 4,380 hours (half a year), you find that there is a ca. 60% chance of operating without a failure (or 40% that a failure may occur within the next 6 months). For a critical infrastructure the availability and reliability metrics are very important to consider in any design and planning process.

In contrast to the physical network depiction, a network graph representation abstracts the physical transport network into a mathematical model where graph nodes (or vertexes) represent the network’s many components and edges (or links) represent the physical and logical connections between these network’s many components. Modellizing the physical (and logical) network allows designers and planners to study in detail a networks robustness against many types of disruptions as well as its general functioning and performance.

Suppose we are using a graph approach in our design of a critical communications network. We then need to carefully consider various graph properties critical for the network’s robustness, security, reliability, and efficiency. To achieve this, one must strive for resilience and fault tolerance by designing for increased redundancy and availability involving multiple paths, edges, or connections between nodes, preventing single points of failure (SPoF). This involves creating a network where the number of independent paths between any two nodes is maximized (often subject to economics and feasibility boundary conditions). An optimal average degree of nodes should also be a design criterion. A higher degree of nodes enhances the graph’s, and thus the underlying network’s, resilience, thus avoiding increased vulnerability.

Scalability is a crucial network property. This is best achieved through a hierarchical structure (or topology) that allows for efficient network management as the network expands. The Modularity, which is another graph KPI, ensures that the network can integrate new nodes and edges without major reconfigurations, supporting civilian expansion and military operations or dual-purpose operations. To meet low-latency and high-throughput requirements, the shortest-path routing algorithms should be applied to allow us to minimize the latency or round-trip time (and thus increase throughput). Moreover, bandwidth management should be implemented, allowing the network to handle large data volumes in a prioritized manner (if required). This also ensures that the network can accommodate peak loads and prioritize critical communication when it is compromised.

Security is a paramount property of any communications network. In today’s environment with many real and dangerous cyber threats, it may be one of the most important topics to consider. Each node and link (or edge) in a network requires robust defenses against cyber threats. In our design, we need to think about encryption, authentication, intrusion, and anomaly detection systems. Network segmentation will help isolate critical defense communications from civilian traffic, preventing breaches from compromising the entire network. Survivability is enhanced by minimizing the Network Diameter, a graph property. A low (or lower) network diameter ensures that a network can quickly reroute traffic in case of failures and is an important design element for robustness against targeted attacks and random failures.

Likewise, interoperability is essential for seamless integration between civilian and military communication systems. Flexible protocols and specifications (e.g., Open API) enable different types of traffic and varying security requirements. These frameworks provide the structure, tools, and best practices needed to build and maintain secure communication systems. Thereby protecting against the various cyber threats we have today and expect in the future. Efficiency is achieved through effective load balancing (e.g., on a logical as well as physical level) to distribute traffic evenly across the network, prevent bottlenecks, optimize performance, and design for energy-efficient operations, particularly in remote or harsh environments or in case a part of the network has been compromised.

In order to support both civilian services and defense operations, accessibility and high availability are very important design requirements to consider when having a network with extensive large-scale coverage, including in very remote areas. Incorporating redundant communication links, such as satellite, fiber optic, and wireless, are design choices that allow for high availability even under adverse and disruptive conditions. It makes good sense in an environment such as Greenland to ensure that long-haul microwave links have a given level of redundancy either by satellite backhaul, submarine cable, or additional MW redundancy. While we always strive for our designs to be cost-effective, it may be a challenge if the circumstances dictate that the best redundancy (availability) solution is solved by non-terrestrial means (e.g., by satellite or submarine means). However, efficiency should be addressed by optimizing resource allocation to balance cost with performance, ensuring civil and defense needs are met without excessive expenditure, and sharing infrastructure where feasible to reduce costs while maintaining security through logical separation.

Ultra-secure transport networks are designed to meet stringent reliability, resilience, and security requirements. These type of networks are critical for civil and defense applications, ensuring continuous operation and protection against various threats. The important graph properties that such networks should exhibit include high connectivity, redundancy, low diameter, high node degree, network segmentation, robustness to attacks, scalability, efficient load balancing, geographical diversity, and adaptive routing.

High connectivity ensures multiple independent paths between any pair of nodes in the network, which is crucial for a communication network’s resilience and fault tolerance. This allows the network to maintain functionality even if several nodes or links fail, making it capable of withstanding targeted attacks or random failures without significant performance degradation. Redundancy, which involves having multiple backup paths and nodes, enhances fault tolerance and high availability by providing alternative routes for data transmission if primary paths fail. Redundancy also applies to critical network components such as switches, routers, and communication links, ensuring no or uncritical single point of failure.

A low diameter, the longest-shortest path between any two nodes, ensures data can travel quickly across the network, minimizing latency. This is especially important in time-sensitive applications. High node degree, meaning nodes are connected to many other nodes, increases the network’s robustness and allows for multiple paths for data to traverse, contributing to security and availability. However, it is essential to manage the trade-off between having a high node degree and the complexity of the network.

Network segmentation and compartmentalization will enhance security by limiting the impact of breaches or failures on a small part of the network. This is of particular importance when having a dual-use network design. Network segmentation divides the network into multiple smaller subnetworks. Each segment may have its own security and access control policies. Network compartmentalization involves designing isolated environments where, for example, data and functionalities are separated based on their criticality and sensitivity (this is, in general, a logical separation). Both strategies help contain cyber threats as well as prevent them from spreading across an entire network. Moreover, it also allows for a more granular control over network traffic and access. With this consideration, we should have a network that is robust against various types of attacks, including both physical and cyber attacks, by using secure protocols, encryption, authentication mechanisms, and intrusion detection systems. The aim of the network topology should be to minimize the impact of potential attacks on critical network nodes and links.

In a country such as Greenland, with settlements spread out over a very long distance and supported by very long and exposed transmission links (e.g., long-haul microwave links), geographical diversity is an essential design consideration that allows us to protect the functioning of services against localized disasters or failures. Typically, this involves distributing switching and management nodes, including data centers, across different geographic locations, ensuring that a failure in one area or with a main transport link does not disrupt the major parts of a network. This is particularly important for disaster recovery and business continuity. Finally, the network should support adaptive and dynamic routing protocols that can quickly respond to changes in the network topology, such as node failures or changes in traffic patterns. Such protocols will enhance the network’s resilience by automatically finding the best real-time data transmission paths.

TUSASS NETWORK AS A GRAPH.

Real maps, such as the Greenland map shown below at the left side of Figure 8, provide valuable geographical context and are essential for understanding the physical layout and extent of, for example, a transport network. A graph representation, as shown on the right side of Figure 8, on the other hand, offers a powerful and complementary perspective of the real-world network topology. It can emphasize the structural properties (and qualities) without those disappearing in geographical details that often are not relevant to the network functioning (if designed appropriately). A graph can contain many layers of network information that pretty much describe the network stack if required (e.g., from physical transport up through IP, TCP/IP, and to the application layers). It also supports many types of advanced analysis, design scenarios, and different types of simulations. A graph representation of a communications network is an invaluable tool for network design, planning, troubleshooting, analysis, and management.

Thus, the network graph approach offers several benefits for planning and operations. Firstly, the approach can often visualize the network’s topology better than a geographical map. It facilitates the understanding of various network (and graph) relationships and interconnections between the various network components. Secondly, the graph algorithms can be applied to the network graph and support the analysis of its characteristics, such as availability and redundancy scores, connectivity in general, the shortest paths, and so forth. This kind of analysis helps us identify critical nodes or links that may be sensitive to network and service disruption. It can also help significantly in maintaining and optimizing a network’s operation.

So, analyzing the our communication network’s graph representation makes it possible to identify potential weaknesses in the physical transport network, such as single points of failure (SPoF), bottlenecks, or areas with limited or weak redundancy. These identified weaknesses can then be addressed to enhance the network’s resilience, e.g., improving our network’s redundancy, availability and thus its overall reliability.

Figure 8 The chart above shows on the left side the topology of the (real) transport network of Tusass with the reference point in the Greenlandic settlements it connects. It should be noted that the actual transport network is slightly different as there are more hops between settlements than is shown here. On the right side is a graph representation of the Tusass transport network, shown on the left. The network graph represents the transport network on the west coast north and southbound. There are three main connection categories: (Black dashed line) Microwave (MW), (Orange dashed line) Submarine Cable, and (Blue solid line) Satellite, of which there are a GEO and a LEO arrangement. The size of the node, or settlements, represents the size of the population, which is also why Nuuk has the largest circle. The graph has been drawn consistent with the Kamada-Kawai layout, which is particularly useful for small to medium graphs, providing a reasonable, intuitive visualization of the structural relationship between nodes.

In the following, it is important to understand that due to Greenland’s specific conditions, such as weather and geography, building a robust transport network regarding reliability and redundancy will always be challenging, particularly when relying on the standard toolbox for designing, planning, and creating such networks. With geographical challenges should for example be understood the resulting lack of civil infrastructure connecting settlements … such as the lack of a road network.

The Table below provides key performance indicators (KPIs) for the Greenlandic (Tusass) transport network graph, as illustrated in Figure 8 above. It represents various aspects of the transport network’s structure and connectivity. This graph consists of 93 vertices (e.g., settlements and other connection points, such as long-haul MW radio sites) and 101 edges (transport connections), and it is fully connected, meaning all nodes are reachable within the network. There is only one subgraph, indicating no isolated segments as expected.

The Average Path Length suggests that it takes on average 39 steps to travel between any two nodes. This is a relatively high number, which may indicate a less efficient network. The Diameter of a network is defined as the longest shortest path between any two nodes. It can be shown that the value of the diameter lies between the value of the radius and twice that value (and not higher;-). The diameter is found to be 32, indicating a quite high maximum distance between the most distant nodes. This suggests that the network has a quite extensive reach, as is also obvious from the various illustrations of the transport network above (Figure 8) and below (Figure 11 & 12). Apart from the fact that such a high diameter may indicate potential inefficiencies, a large diameter can also mean that, in the worst-case scenarios, such as a compromised link or connectivity issues in general, communication between some nodes involves many steps (or hops), potentially leading to higher latency and slower data transmission. Related to the Diameter, the network Radius is the minimum eccentricity of any node, which is the shortest path from the most central node to the farthest node. Here, we find the radius to be 16, which means that even the most centrally located node is relatively far from some other nodes in the network. Something that is also very obvious from the various illustrations of the transport network. This emphasizes that the network has nodes that are significantly far apart. Without sufficient redundancy in place, such a transport network may be more sensitive to disruption of the connectivity.

From the perspective of redundancy, a large diameter and radius may imply that the network has fewer alternative paths between distant nodes (i.e., a lower redundancy score). This is, for example, the case between the northern point of Kullorsuaq and Aasiaat. Aasiaat is the first settlement (from the North) to be connected both by microwave and submarine cable and thus has an alternative connectivity solution to the long-haul microwave chain. If a critical node or link fails, the alternative path latency might be considerably longer than the compromised connectivity, such as would be the case with the alternative connectivity being satellite-based, leading to inefficiencies and possible reduced performance. This can also suggest potential capacity bottlenecks where specific paths are heavily relied upon without having enough capacity to act as the sole connectivity for a given transmission path. Thus, the vulnerability of the network to failures increases, resulting in reduced performance for customers in the affected area.

We find a Graph Density, at 0.024. This value indicates a sparse network with relatively few connections compared to the number of possible connections. The Clustering Coefficient is 0.014 and indicates that there are very few tightly-knit groups of nodes (again easily confirmed by visual inspection of the graph itself, see the various figures). The value of the Average Betweenness (ca. 423) measures how often nodes act as bridges along the shortest path between other nodes, indicating a significant central node (i.e., Nuuk).

The Average Closeness of 0.0003 and the Average Eigenvector Centrality of 0.105 provide insights into settlements’ influence and accessibility within the transport network. The Average Closeness measures of how close, on average, nodes are to each other. A high value indicates that nodes (or settlements) are close to each other meaning that the information (e.g., user data, signaling) being transported over the network spreads quickly and efficiently. And not surprisingly the opposite would be the case for a low average value. For our Tusass network the average closeness is very low and suggests that the network may face challenges in accessibility and efficiency, with nodes (settlements) being relatively far from one another. This typically will have an impact on the speed and effectiveness of communication across the network. The Average Eigenvector Centrality measures the overall importance (or influence) of nodes within a network. The term Eigenvector is a mathematical concept from linear algebra that represents the stable state of the network and provides insights into the structure of the graph and thus the network. For our Tusass network the average eigenvector value is (very) low and indicates a distribution of influence across several nodes that may actually prevent reliance on a single point of failure and, in general, such structures are thought to enhance a network’s resilience and redundancy. An Average Degree of ca. 2 means that each node has about 2 connections on average, indicating a hierarchical network structure with fewer direct connections and with a somewhat low level of redundancy, consistent with what can be observed from the various illustrations shown in this post. This do indicate that our network may be more vulnerable to disruption and failures and have a relative high latency (thus, a high round trip time).

Say that for some reason, the connection to Ilulissat, a settlement north of Aasiaat on the west coast with a little under 5 thousand people, is disrupted due to a connectivity issue between Ilulissat and Qasigiannguit, a neighboring settlement to Ilulissat with ca. a thousand people. This would today disconnect ca. 11 thousand people from receiving communications services or ca. 20% of Tusass’s customer base as all settlements north of Ilulissat would likewise be disconnected because of the reliance on the broken connection to also transport their data towards Nuuk and the internet using the submarine cables out of Greenland. In the terminology of the network graph, a broken connection (or edge as it is called in graph theory) that breaks up the network into two (or more) disconnected parts is called a Bridge. Thus, the connection between Ilulissat and Qasigiannguit is a bridge, as if it is broken, disconnecting the northern part of the long-haul microwave network above Ilulissat. Similarly, if Ilulissat were a central switching hub disrupted, it would disconnect the upper northern network from the network south of Ilulissat, and we would call Ilulissat an Articulation Point. For example, a submarine cable between Aasiaat and Ilulissat would provide redundancy for this particular event, mitigating a disruption of the microwave long-haul network between Ilulissat and Aasiaat that would disconnect at least 20% of the population from communications services.

The transport network has 44 Articulation Points and 57 Bridges, highlighting vulnerabilities where node or link failures could significantly disrupt the connectivity between parts of the network, disconnecting major parts of the network and thus disrupting services. A Modularity of 0.65 suggests a moderately high presence of distinct communities, with the network divided into 8 such communities (see Figure below).

Figure 9 In network analysis, a “natural” community (or cluster) is a group of nodes that are more densely connected to each other than to nodes outside the group. Natural communities are denser subgraphs within a larger network. Identifying such communities helps in understanding the structure and function of the network. In the above analysis of how Tusass’s transport network connects to the various settlements illustrates quiet well the various categories of connectivity (e.g., long-haul microwaves only, submarine cable redundancy, satellite redundancy, etc..) in the communications network of Tusass,

A Throughput (or Degree) of 202 indicates a network with an overall capacity for data transmission. The Degree is the average number of connections per node for a network graph. In a transport network, the degree indicates how many direct connections it has to other settlements. A higher degree implies better connectivity and potentially a higher resilience and redundancy. In a fully connected network with 93 nodes, the total degree would be 93 multiplied by 92, which equals 8,556. Therefore, a value of 202 is quite low in comparison, indicating that the network is far from fully connected, which anyway would be unusual for a transport network on this side. Our transport network is relatively sparse and, thus, resulting in a lower total degree, suggesting that fewer direct paths exist between nodes. This may potentially also mean less overall network redundancy. In the case of a node or link failure, there might be fewer alternative routes, which, as a consequence, can impact network reliability and resilience. Lower degree values can also indicate limited capacity for data transmission between nodes, potentially leading to congestion or bottlenecks if certain paths become over-utilized. This can, of course, then affect the efficiency and speed of data transfer within the network as traffic congestion levels increase.

The KPIs, shown in Table 1 below, collectively indicate that our Greenlandic transport network has several critical points and connections that could affect redundancy and availability. Particularly if they become compromised or experience outages. The high number of articulation points and bridges indicates possible design weaknesses, with the low density and average degree suggesting a limited level of redundancy. In fact, Tusass has, over several years, improved its transport network resilience, focusing on increasing the level of redundancy and reducing critical single points of failure. However, the changes and additions are costly and, due to the environmental conditions of Greenland, are also time-consuming, having fewer working days available for outdoor civil work projects.

Table 1 illustrates the most important graph KPIs, also described in the text above and below, that are associated with the graph representation of the Tusass transport network represented by the settlement connectivity (approximating but not one-to-one with the actual transport network).

In graph theory, an articulation point (see Figure 10 below) is a node that, if it is removed from the network, would split the network into disconnected parts. In our story, an articulation point would be one of our Greenlandic settlements. These types of points are thus important in maintaining network connectivity and serve as points in the network where alternative redundancy schemes might serve well. Therefore, creating additional redundancy in the network’s routing paths and implementing alternative connections will mitigate the impact of a failure of an articulation point, ensuring continued operations in case of a disruption. Basically, the more redundancy that a network has, the fewer articulation points the network will have; see also the illustration below.

Figure 10 The figure above illustrates the redundancy and availability of 3 simple undirected graphs with 4 nodes. The first graph is fully connected, with no articulation points or bridges, resulting in a redundancy and availability score of 100%. Thus I can remove a Node or a Connection from the graph and the remainder will remain full connected. The second graph, which is partly connected, has one articulation point and one bridge, leading to a redundancy and availability score of 75%. If I remove the third Node or the connection between Node 3 and Node 4, I would end with a disconnected Node 4 and a graph that has been broken up in 2 (e.g., if Node 3 is removed we have 2 sub-graphs {1,2} and {4}), The third graph, also partly connected, contains two articulation points and three bridges, resulting in a redundancy score of 0% and an availability score of 50%. Articulation points and bridges are highlighted in red to emphasize their critical roles in graph connectivity. Note: An articulation point is a node whose removal disconnects the graph and a bridge is an edge whose removal disconnects the graph.

Careful consideration of articulation points is crucial in preventing network partitioning, where removing a single node can disconnect the overall network into multiple sub-segments of the network. The connectivity between different segments is obviously critical for continuous data flow and service availability. Often, design and planning requirements dictate that if a network is broken into parts due to various disruption scenarios, these parts will remain functional and continue to provide a service that is possible with reduced performance. Network designers would make use of different strategies, such as increasing the physical redundancy of the transmission network as well as making use of routing algorithms on a higher level, such as multipath routing and diverse routing paths. Moreover, optimizing the placement of articulation points and routing paths (i.e., how traffic flows through the communications network) also maximizes resource utilization and may ensure optimal network performance and service availability for an operator’s customers.

Figure 11 illustrates the many articulation points of our Greenlandic settlements, represented as red stars in the graph of the Greenlandic transport network. Removing an articulation point (a critical node) would partition the graph into multiple disconnected components and may lead to severe service interruption.

In graph theory, a bridge is a network connection (or edge) whose removal would split the graph into multiple disconnected components. This type of connection is obviously critical for maintaining connectivity and facilitating communication between different network parts. In real life with real networks, the network designers would, in general, spend considerable time to ensure that such critical connections (i.e., so-called bridges) do not have an over-proportional impact on their network availability by, for example, building alternative connections (i.e., redundant connections) or ensuring that the impact of a compromised bridge would have a minimum impact in terms of the number of customers.

For our transport network in Greenland, the long-haul microwave transport network is overall less sensitive to disruption on a settlement level, as the underlying topology is like a long spine at high capacity and reasonable redundancy built-in with branches of MW radios that connect from the spine to a particular settlement. Thus, in most cases in this analysis, the long-haul MW radio site, in proximity to a given settlement, is the actual articulation point (not the settlement itself). The Nuuk data center, a central switching hub, is, by definition, an articulation point of very high criticality.

As discussed above and shown below (Figure 12), in the context of our transport network, bridges may play a crucial role in network resilience and fault tolerance. In our story, bridges represent the transport connections connecting Greenlandic settlements and the core network back in Nuuk (i.e., the master network node). In our representations, a bridge can, for example, be (1) a Microwave connection, (2) A submarine cable connection, and (3) a satellite connection provided by Tusass’s geo stationary satellite (e.g., Greensat) or by the low-earth orbiting OneWeb satellite. By identifying and managing bridges, network designers can mitigate the impact of link failures and disruptions, ensuring continuous operation and availability of services. Moreover, keeping network bridges in mind and minimizing them when planning a transport network will significantly reduce the risk of customer-affecting outages and keep the impact of transport disruption and the subsequent network partitioning to a minimum.

Figure 12 illustrates the many (edge) bridges and transport connections present in the graph of the Greenlandic transport network. Removing a bridge would split the network (graph) into multiple disconnected components, leading to network fragmentation and parts that may no longer sustain services. The above picture is common for long microwave chains with many hops (the connections themselves). The remedy is to make shorter hops, as Tusass is doing, and ensure that the connection itself is redundant equipment-wise (e.g., if one radio fails, there is another to take over). However, such a network would remain sensitive to any disruption of the MW site location and the large MW dish antenna.

Network designers should deploy redundancy mechanisms that would minimize the risk of the disruptive impact of compromised articulation points and bridges. They have several choices to choose from, such as multipath routing (e.g., ring topologies), link aggregation, and diverse routing paths to enhance redundancy and availability. These mechanisms will help minimize the impact of bridge failures and improve the overall network availability by increasing the level of network redundancy on a physical and logical level. Moreover, optimizing the placement of bridges and routing paths in a transport network will maximize resource utilization and ensure optimal network performance and service availability.

Knowing a given networks Articulation Points and Bridges will allow us to define an Availability and a Redundancy Score that we can use to evaluate and optimize a network’s robustness and reliability. Some examples of these concepts for simpler graphs (i.e., 4 nodes) are also shown in Figure 10 above. In the context of the Greenland transport network used here, these metrics can help us understand how resilient the network is to failures.

The Availability Score measures the proportion of nodes that are not articulation points, which might compromise our network’s overall availability if compromised. This score measures the risk of exposure to service disruption in case of a disconnection. As a reminder, the articulation point, or cut-vertex, is a node that, when removed, increases the number of components of the network and, thus, potentially the amount of disconnecting parts. The formula that is used to calculate the availability score is given by the total number of settlements (e.g., 93) minus the number of articulation points (e.g., 44) divided by the total number of settlements (e.g., 93). In this context, a higher availability score indicates a more robust network where fewer nodes are critical points of failure. Suppose we get a score that is close to one. In that case, this indicates that most nodes are not articulation points, suggesting that the network can sustain multiple node failures without significant loss of connectivity (see Figure 10 for a relatively simple illustration of this).

The Redundancy Score measures the proportion of connections that are not bridges, which could result in severe service disruptions to our customers if compromised. When a bridge is compromised or removed, it increases the number of network parts. The formula for the redundancy score is the total number of transport connections (edges, e.g., 101) minus the number of bridges (e.g., 57) divided by the total number of transport connections (edges, e.g., 101). Thus, in this context of redundancy, a higher redundancy score indicates a more resilient network where fewer edges are critical points of failure. If we get a redundancy score that is close to 100%, it would indicate that most of our (transport) connections cannot be categorized as bridges. This also suggests that our network can sustain multiple connectivity failures without it, resulting in a significant loss of overall connectivity and a severe service interruption.

Having more switching centers, or central hubs, can significantly enhance a communications network’s resilience, availability, and redundancy. It also reduces the consequences and impact of disruption to critical bridges in the network. Moreover, by distributing traffic, isolating failures, and providing multiple paths for data transmission, these central hubs may ensure continuous service to our customers and improve the overall network performance. In my opinion, implementing strategies to support multiple switching centers is essential for maintaining a robust and reliable communications infrastructure capable of withstanding various disruptions and enabling scaling to meet any future demands.

For our Greenlandic transport network shown above, we find an Availability Score of 53% and a Redundancy Score of 44%. While the scores may appear on the low side, we need to keep in mind that we are in Greenland with a population of 57 thousand mainly distributed along the west coast (from south to the north) in about 50+ settlements with 30%+ living in Nuuk. Tusass communications network connects to pretty much all settlements in Greenland, covering approximately 3,500+ km on the west coast (e.g., comparable to the distance from the top of Norway all the way down to the most southern point of Sicily), and irrespective of the number of people living in them. This is also a very clear desire, expectation, and direction that has been given by the Greenlandic administration (i.e., via the universal service obligation imposed on Tusass). The Tusass transport network is not designed with strict financial KPIs in mind and with the financial requirement that a given connection to a settlement would need to have a positive return on investment within a few years (as is the prevalent norm in our Industry). The transport network of Tusass has been designed to connect all communities of Greenland to an adequate level of quality and availability, prioritizing the coverage of the Greenlandic population (and the settlements they live in) rather than whether or not it makes hard financial sense. Tusass’s network is continuously upgraded and expanded as the demand for more advanced broadband services increases (as it does anywhere else in the world).

CRITICAL TECHNOLOGIES RELEVANT TO GREENLAND AND THE WIDER ARCTIC.

Greenland’s strategic location in the Arctic and its untapped natural resources, such as rare earth elements, oil, and gas, has increasingly drawn the attention of major global powers like the United States, Russia, and China. The melting Arctic ice due to climate change is opening new shipping routes and making these resources more accessible, escalating the geopolitical competition in the region.

Greenland must establish a defense and security strategy that minimizes its dependency on its natural allies and external actors to mitigate a situation where such may not be available or have the resources to commit to Greenland. An integral part of such a security strategy should be a dual-use, civil, and defense requirement whenever possible. Ensuring that Greenlandic society gets an immediate and sustainable return on investments in establishing a solid security framework.

5G technology offers significant advancements over previous generations of wireless networks, particularly in terms of private networking, speed, reliability, and latency across a variety of coverage platforms, e.g., (normal fixed) terrestrial antennas, vehicle-based (i.e., Cell on Wheels), balloon-based, drone-based, LEO-satellite based. This makes 5G ideal for setting up ad-hoc mobile coverage areas for military and critical civil applications. One of the key capabilities of 5G that supports these use cases is network slicing, which allows for the creation of dedicated virtual networks optimized for specific requirements.

Telia Norway has conducted trials together with the Norwegian Armed Forces in Norway to demonstrate the use of 5G for military applications (note: I think this is one of the best examples of an operator-defense collaboration on deployment innovation and directly applies to Arctic conditions). These trials included setting up ad-hoc 5G networks to support various military scenarios (including in an Arctic-like climate). The key findings demonstrated the ability to provide high-speed, low-latency communications in challenging environments, supporting real-time situational awareness and secure communications for military personnel. Ericsson has also partnered with the UK Ministry of Defense to trial 5G applications for military use. These trials focused on using 5G to support secure communications, enhance situational awareness, and enable the use of autonomous systems in military operations. NATO has conducted exercises incorporating 5G technology to evaluate its potential for improving command and control, situational awareness, and logistics in multi-national military operations. These exercises have shown the potential of 5G to enhance interoperability and coordination among allied forces. It is a very meaningful dual-use technology.

5G private networks offer a dedicated and secure network environment for specific organizations or use cases, which can be particularly beneficial in the Arctic and Greenland. These private networks can provide reliable communication and data transfer in remote and harsh environments, supporting military and civil applications. For instance, in Greenland, 5G private networks can enhance communication for scientific research stations, ensuring that data from environmental monitoring and climate research is transmitted securely and efficiently. They can also support critical infrastructure, such as power grids and transportation networks, by providing a reliable communication backbone. Moreover, in Greenland, the existing public telecommunications network may be designed in such a way that it essentially could operate as a “private” network in case transmission lines connecting settlements would be compromised (e.g., due to natural or unnatural causes), possibly a “thin” LEO satellite connection out of the settlement.

5G provides ultra-fast data speeds and low latency, enabling (near) real-time communication and data processing. This is crucial for military operations and emergency response scenarios where timely information is vital. Network slicing allows a single physical 5G network to be divided into multiple virtual networks, each tailored to specific applications or user groups. This ensures that critical communications are prioritized and reliable even during network congestion. It should be considered that for Greenland, the transport network (e.g., long-haul microwave network, routing choices, and satellite connections) might be limiting how fast the ultra-fast data speeds can become and may, at least along some transport routes, limit the round trip time performance (e.g., GEO satellite connections).

5G Enhanced Mobile Broadband (eMBB) provides high-speed internet access to support applications such as video streaming, augmented reality (AR), and virtual reality (VR) for situational awareness and training. Massive Machine-Type Communications (mMTC) supports a large number of IoT devices for monitoring and controlling equipment, sensors, and vehicles in both military and civil scenarios. Ultra-Reliable (Low-Latency) Communications (URLLC) ensures dependable and timely communication for critical applications such as command and control systems as well as unmanned and autonomous communication platforms (e.g., terrestrial, aerial, and underwater drones). I should note that designing defense and secure systems for ultra-low latency (< 10 ms) requirements would be a mistake as such cannot be guaranteed under all scenarios. The ultra-reliability (and availability) of transport connectivity is a critical challenge as it ensures that a given system has sufficient autonomy. Ultra-low latency of a given connectivity is much less critical.

For military (defense) applications, 5G can be rapidly deployed in the field using portable base stations to create a mobile (private) network. This is particularly useful in remote or hostile environments where traditional infrastructure is unavailable or has been compromised. Network slicing can create a secure, dedicated network for military operations. This ensures that sensitive data and communications are protected from interception and jamming. The low latency of 5G supports (near) real-time video feeds from drones, body cameras, and other surveillance equipment, enhancing situational awareness and decision-making in combat or reconnaissance missions.

Figure 13 The hierarchical coverage architecture shown above is relevant for military or, for example, search and rescue operations in remote areas like Greenland (or the Arctic in general), integrating multiple technological layers to ensure robust communication and surveillance. LEO satellites provide extensive broadband and SIGINT & IMINT coverage, supported by GEO satellites for stable links and data processing through ground stations. High Altitude Platforms (HAPs) offer 5G, IMINT, and SIGINT coverage at mid-altitudes, enhancing communication reach and resolution. The HAP system offers an extremely mobile and versatile platform for civil and defense scenarios. An ad-hoc private 5G network on the ground ensures secure, real-time communication for tactical operations. This multi-layered architecture is crucial for maintaining connectivity and operational efficiency in Greenland’s harsh and remote environments. The multi-layered communications network integrates IOT networks that may have been deployed in the past or in a specific mission context.

In critical civil applications, 5G can provide reliable communication networks for first responders during natural disasters or large-scale emergencies. Network slicing ensures that emergency services have priority access to the network, enabling efficient coordination and response. 5G can support the rapid deployment of communication networks in disaster-stricken areas, ensuring that affected populations can access critical services and information. Network slicing can allocate dedicated resources for smart city applications, such as traffic management, public safety, and environmental monitoring, ensuring that these services remain operational even during peak usage times. Thus, for Greenland, ensuring 5G availability would be through coastal settlements and possibly coastal coverage (outside settlements) of 5G at a lower frequency range (e.g., 600 – 900 MHz), prioritizing 5G coverage rather than 5G enhanced mobile broadband (i.e., any coverage at a high coverage probability is better than no coverage at certainty).

Besides 5G, what other technologies would otherwise be of importance in a Greenland Technology Strategy as it relates to its security and ensuring its investments and efforts also return beneficially to its society (e.g., a dual-use priority):

  • It would be advisable to increase the number of community networks within the overall network that can continue functioning if cut off from the main communications network. Thus, communications services in smaller and remote settlements depend less on a main or very few central communications control and management hubs. This requires on a local settlement level, or grouping of settlements, self-healing, remote (as opposed to a central hub) management, distributed databases, regional data center (typically a few racks), edge computing, local DNS, CDNs and content hosting, satellite connection, … Most telecom infrastructure manufacturing companies have today network in a box solutions that allow for such designs. Such solutions enable private 5G networks to function isolated from a public PLMN and fixed transport network.
  • It is essential to develop a (very) highly available and redundant digital transport infrastructure leveraging the existing topology strengthened by additional submarine cables (less critical than some of the other means of connectivity), increased transport ring- & higher-redundancy topologies, multi-level satellite connections (GEO, MEO & LEO, supplier redundancy) with more satellite ground gateways on Greenland (e.g., avoiding “off-Greenland” traffic routing). In addition, a remotely controlled stratospheric drone platform could provide additional connectivity redundancy at very high broadband speeds and low latencies.
  • Satellite backhaul solutions, operating, for example, from a Low Earth Orbit (LEO), such as shown in Figure below, are extending internet services to the farthest reaches of the globe. These satellites offer many benefits, as already discussed above, in connecting remote, rural, and previously un- and under-served areas with reliable internet services. Many remote regions lack foundational telecom infrastructure, particularly long-haul transport networks for carrying traffic away from remote populated areas. Satellite backhauls do not only offer a substantially better financial solution for enhancing internet connectivity to remote areas but are often the only viable solution for connectivity. The satellite backhaul solution is an important part of the toolkit to improve on redundancy and availability of particular very long and extensive long-haul microwave transport networks through remote areas (e.g., Greenland’s rugged and frequently hostile harsh coastal areas) where increasing the level of availability and redundancy with terrestrial means may be impractical (due to environmental factors) or incredibly costly.
    – LEO satellites provide several security advantages over GEO satellites when considering resistance to hostile actions to disrupt satellite communications. One significant factor is the altitude at which LEO satellites operate, which is between 500 and 2,000 kilometers, compared to GEO satellites, which are positioned approximately 36,000 kilometers above the equator. The lower altitude makes LEO satellites less vulnerable to long-range anti-satellite (ASAT) missiles.
    – LEO satellite networks are usually composed of large constellations with many satellites, often numbering in the dozens to hundreds. This extensive LEO network constellation provides some redundancy, meaning the network can still function effectively if some satellites are “taken out.” In contrast, GEO satellites are typically much fewer in number, and each satellite covers a much larger area, so losing even one GEO satellite will have a significant impact.
    – Another advantage of LEO satellites is their rapid movement across the sky relative to the Earth’s surface, completing an orbit in about 90 to 120 minutes. This constant movement makes it more challenging for hostile actors to track and target individual satellites for extended periods. In comparison, GEO satellites remain stationary relative to a fixed point on Earth, making them easier to locate and target.
    LEO satellites’ lower altitude also results in lower latency than GEO satellites. This can benefit secure, time-sensitive communications and is less susceptible to interception and jamming due to the reduced time delay. However, any security architecture of the critical transport infrastructure should not only rely on one type of satellite configuration.
    – Both GEO and LEO satellites have their purpose and benefits. Moreover, a hierarchical multi-dimensional topology, including stratospheric drones and even autonomous underwater vehicles, is worth considering when designing critical communications architecture. It is also worth remembering that public satellite networks may offer a much higher degree of communications redundancy and availability than defense-specific constellations. However, for SIGINT & IMINT collection, the defense-specific satellite constellations are likely much more advanced (unfortunately, they are also not as numerous as their civilian “cousins”). This said, a stratospheric aerial platform (e.g., HAP) would be substantially more powerful in IMINT and possibly also for some SIGINT tasks (or/and less costly & versatile) than a defense-specific satellite solution.
Figure 14 illustrates the architecture of a Low Earth Orbit (LEO) satellite backhaul system used by providers like OneWeb as well as StarLink with their so-called “Community Gateway” (i.e., using their Ka-band). It showcases the connectivity between terrestrial internet infrastructure (i.e., Satellite Gateways) and satellites in orbit, enabling high-speed data transmission. The network consists of LEO satellites that communicate with each other (inter-satellite Comms) using the Ku and Ka frequency bands. These satellites connect to ground-based satellite gateways (GW), which interface with Points of Presence (PoP) and Internet Exchange Points (IXP), integrating the space-based network with the terrestrial internet (WWW). Note: The indicated speeds and frequency bands (e.g., Ku: 12–18 GHz, Ka: 28–40 GHz) and data speeds illustrate the network’s capabilities.
Figure 15 illustrates an LEO satellite direct-to-device communication in remote areas without terrestrially-based communications infrastructure. Satellites are the only means of communication by a normal mobile device or classical satellite phone. Courtesy: DALL-E.
  • Establish an unmanned (remotely operated) stratospheric High Altitude Platform System (HAPS) (i.e., an advanced drone-based platform) or Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV) over Greenland (or The Arctic region) with payload agnostic capabilities. This could easily be run out of existing Greenlandic ground-based aviation infrastructure (e.g., Kangerlussuaq, Nuuk, or many other community airports across Greenland). This platform could eventually become autonomous or require little human intervention. The high-altitude platform could support mission-critical ad-hoc networking for civil and defense applications (over Greenland). Such a multi-purpose platform can be used for IMINT and SIGINT (i.e., for both civil & defense) and civil communication means, including establishing connectivity to the ground-based transport network in case of disruptions. Lastly, a HAPS may also permanently offer high-quality and capacity 5G mobile services or act as a private ultra-secure 5G network in an ad-hoc mission-specific scenario. For a detailed account of stratospheric drones and how these compared with low-earth satellites, see my recent article “Stratospheric Drones & Low Earth Satellites: Revolutionizing Terrestrial Rural Broadband from the Skies?”.
    Stratospheric drones, which operate in the stratosphere at altitudes around 20 to 50 kilometers, offer several security advantages over traditional satellite communications and submarine communication cables, especially from a Greenlandic perspective. These drones are less accessible and harder to target due to their altitude, which places them out of reach for most ground-based anti-aircraft systems and well above the range of most manned aircraft. This makes them less vulnerable to hostile actions compared to satellites, which can be targeted by anti-satellite (ASAT) missiles, or submarine cables, which can be physically cut or damaged by underwater operations. The drones would stay over Greenlandic, or NATO, territory while by nature, design, and purpose, submarine communications cables and satellites, in general, are extending far beyond the territory of Greenland.
    – The mobility and flexibility of stratospheric drones allow them to be quickly repositioned as needed, making it difficult for adversaries to consistently target them. Unlike satellites that follow predictable orbits or submarine cables with fixed routes, these drones can change their location dynamically to respond to threats or optimize their coverage. This is particularly advantageous for Greenland, whose vast and harsh environment makes maintaining and protecting fixed communication infrastructure challenging.
    – Deploying a fleet of stratospheric drones provides redundancy and scalability. If one drone is compromised or taken out of service, others can fill the gap, ensuring continuous communication coverage. This distributed approach reduces the risk of a single point of failure, which is more pronounced with individual satellites or single submarine cables. For Greenland, this means a more reliable and resilient communication network that can adapt to disruptions.
    – Stratospheric drones can be rapidly deployed and recovered, making it an easier platform to maintain and upgrade them as needed compared to for example satellite based platforms and even terrestrial deployed networks. This quick deployment capability is crucial for Greenland, where harsh weather conditions can complicate the maintenance and repair of fixed infrastructure. Unlike satellites that require expensive and complex launches or submarine cables that involve extensive underwater laying and maintenance efforts, drones offer a more flexible and manageable solution.
    – Drones can also establish secure, line-of-sight communication links that are less susceptible to interception and jamming. Operating closer to the ground compared to satellites allows the use of higher frequencies narrower beams that are more difficult to jam. Additionally, drones can employ advanced encryption and frequency-hopping techniques to further secure their communications, ensuring that sensitive data remains protected. Stratospheric drones can also be equipped with advanced surveillance and countermeasure technologies to detect and respond to threats. For instance, they can carry sensors to monitor the electromagnetic spectrum for jamming attempts and deploy countermeasures to mitigate these threats. This proactive defense capability enhances their security profile compared to passive communication infrastructure like satellites or cables.
    – From a Greenlandic perspective, stratospheric drones offer significant advantages. They can be deployed over specific areas of interest, providing targeted communication coverage for remote or strategically important regions. This is particularly useful for covering Greenland’s vast and sparsely populated areas. Modern stratospheric drones are designed to support multi-dimensional payloads, or as it might also be called, payload agnostic (e.g., SIGINT & IMINT equipment, 5G base station and advanced antenna, laser communication systems, …) and stay operational for extended periods, ranging from weeks to months, ensuring sustained communication coverage without the need for frequent replacements or maintenance.
    – Last but not least, Greenland may be an ideal safe testing ground due to its vast, remote and thinly populated regions.
Figure 16 illustrates a Non-Terrestrial Network consisting of a stratospheric High Altitude Platform (HAP) drone-based constellation providing terrestrial Cellular broadband services to terrestrial mobile users delivered to their normal 5G terminal equipment that may range from smartphone and tablets to civil and military IOT networks and devices. Each hexagon represents a beam inside the larger coverage area of the stratospheric drone. One could assign three HAPs to cover a given area to deliver very high-availability services to a rural area. The operating altitude of a HAP constellation is between 10 and 50 km, with an optimum of around 20 km. It is assumed that there is inter-HAP connectivity, e.g., via laser links. Of course, it is also possible to contemplate having the gNB (full 5G radio node) in the stratospheric drone entirely, allowing easier integration with LEO satellite backhauls, for example. There might even be applications (e.g., defense, natural & unnatural disaster situations, …) where a standalone 5G SA core is integrated.
  • Unmanned Underwater Vehicles (UUV), also known as Autonomous Underwater Vehicles (AUV), are obvious systems to deploy for underwater surveillance & monitoring that may also have obvious dual-use purposes (e.g., fisheries & resource management, iceberg tracking and navigation, coastal defense and infrastructure protection such as for submarine cables). Depending on the mission parameters and type of AUV, the range is between up to 100 kilometers (e.g., REMUS100) to thousands of kilometers (e.g., SeaBed2030) and an operational time (endurance) from max. 24 hours (e.g., REMUS100, Bluefin-21), to multiple days (e.g., Boing Echo Voyager), to several months (SeaBed2030). A subset of this kind of underwater solution would be swarm-like AUV constellations. See Figure 17 below for an illustration.
  • Increase RD&T (Research, Development & Trials) on Arctic Internet of Things (A-IOT) (note: require some level of coverage, minimum satellite) for civil, defense/military (e.g., Military IOT nor M-IOT) and dual-use applications, such as surveillance & reconnaissance, environmental monitoring, infrastructure security, etc… (note: IOTs are not only for terrestrial use cases but also highly interesting for aquatic applications in combination with AUV/UUVs). Military IoT refers to integrating IoT technologies tailored explicitly for military applications. These devices enhance operational efficiency, improve situational awareness, and support decision-making processes in various military contexts. Military IoT encompasses various connected devices, sensors, and systems that collect, transmit, and analyze data to support defense and security operations. In the vast and remote regions of Greenland and the Arctic, military IoT devices can be deployed for continuous surveillance and reconnaissance. This includes using drones, such as advanced HAPS, equipped with cameras and sensors to monitor borders, track the movements of ships and aircraft, and detect any unauthorized activities. Military IoT sensors can also monitor Arctic environmental conditions, tracking ice thickness changes, weather patterns, and sea levels. Such data is crucial for planning and executing military operations in the challenging Arctic environment but is also of tremendous value for the Greenlandic society. The importance of dual-use cases, civil and defense, cannot be understated; here are some examples:
    Infrastructure Monitoring and Maintenance: (Military Use Case) IoT sensors can be deployed to monitor the structural integrity of military installations, such as bases and airstrips, ensuring they remain operational and safe for use. These sensors can detect stress, wear, and potential damage due to extreme weather conditions. These IoT devices and networks can also be deployed for perimeter defense and monitoring. (Civil Use Case) The same technology can be applied to civilian infrastructure, including roads, bridges, and public buildings. Continuous monitoring can help maintain these civil infrastructures by providing early warnings about potential failures, thus preventing accidents and ensuring public safety.
    Secure Communication NetworksMilitary Use Case: Military IoT devices can establish secure communication networks in remote areas, ensuring that military units can maintain reliable and secure communications even in the Arctic’s harsh conditions. This is critical for coordinating operations and responding to threats. Civil Use Case: In civilian contexts, these communication networks can enhance connectivity in remote Greenlandic communities, providing essential services such as emergency communications, internet access, and telemedicine. This helps bridge the digital divide and improve residents’ quality of life.
    Environmental Monitoring and Maritime SafetyMilitary Use Case: Military IoT devices, such as underwater sensor networks and buoys, can be deployed to monitor sea conditions, ice movements, and potential maritime threats. These devices can provide real-time data critical for naval operations, ensuring safe navigation and strategic planning. Civil Use Case: The same sensors and buoys can be used for civilian purposes, such as ensuring the safety of commercial shipping lanes, fishing operations, and maritime travel. Real-time monitoring of sea conditions and icebergs can prevent maritime accidents and enhance the safety of maritime activities.
    Fisheries Management and SurveillanceMilitary Use Case: IoT devices can monitor and patrol Greenlandic waters for illegal fishing activities and unauthorized maritime incursions. Drones and underwater sensors can track vessel movements, ensuring that military forces can respond to potential security threats. Civil Use Case: These monitoring systems can support fisheries management by tracking fish populations and movements, helping to enforce sustainable fishing practices and prevent overfishing. This data is important for the local economy, which heavily relies on fishing.
  • Implement Distributed Acoustic Sensing (DAS) on submarine cables. DAS utilizes existing fiber-optic cables, such as those used for telecommunications, to detect and monitor acoustic signals in the underwater environment. This innovative technology leverages the sensitivity of fiber-optic cables to vibrations and sound waves, allowing for the detection of various underwater activities. This could also be integrated with the AUV and A-IOTs-based sensor systems. It should be noted that jamming a DAS system is considerably more complex than jamming traditional radio-frequency (RF) or wireless communication systems. DAS’s significant security and defense advantages might justify deploying more submarine cables around Greenland. This investment is compelling because of enhanced surveillance and security, improved connectivity, and strategic and economic benefits. By leveraging DAS technology, Greenland could strengthen its national security, support economic development, and maintain its strategic importance in the Arctic region.
  • Greenland should widely embrace autonomous systems deployment and technologies based on artificial intelligence (AI). AI is a technology that could compensate for the challenges of having a vast geography, a hostile climate, and a small population. This may, by far, be one of the most critical components of a practical security strategy for Greenland. Getting experience with autonomous systems in a Greenlandic and Arctic setting should be prioritized. Collaboration & knowledge exchange with Canadian and American universities should be structurally explored, as well as other larger (friendly) countries with Arctic interests (e.g., Norway, Iceland, …).
  • Last but not least, cybersecurity is an essential, even foundational, component of the securitization of Greenland and the wider Arctic, addressing the protection of critical infrastructure, the integrity of surveillance and monitoring systems, and the defense against geopolitical cyber threats. The present state and level of maturity of cybersecurity and defense (against cyber threats) related to Greenland’s critical infrastructure has to improve substantially. Prioritizing cybersecurity may have to be at the expense of other critical activities due to limited resources with relevant expertise available to businesses in Greenland). Today, international collaboration is essential for Greenland to develop strong cyber defense capabilities, ensure secure communication networks, and implement effective incident response plans. However, it is essential for Greenland’s security that a cybersecurity architecture is tailor-made to the particularities of Greenland and allows Greenland to operate independently should friendly actors and allies not be in a position to provide assistance.
Figure 17 Above illustrates an Unmanned Underwater Vehicle (UUV) near the coast of Greenland inspecting a submarine cable. The UUV is a robotic device that operates underwater without a human onboard, controlled either autonomously or remotely. In and around Greenland’s coastline, UUVs may serve both defense and civilian purposes. For defense, they can patrol for submarines, monitor underwater traffic, and detect potential threats, enhancing maritime security. Civilian applications include search & rescue missions, scientific research, where UUVs map the seabed, study marine life, and monitor environmental changes, crucial for understanding climate change impacts. Additionally, they inspect underwater infrastructure like submarine cables, ensuring their integrity and functionality. UUVs’ versatility makes them invaluable for comprehensive underwater exploration and security along Greenland’s long coast line. Integrated defense architectures may combine the UUV, Distributed Acoustic Sensor (DAS) networks deployed at submarine cables, and cognitive AI-based closed-loop security solutions (e.g., autonomous operation). Courtesy: DALL-E.

How do we frame some of the above recommendations into a context of securitization in the academic sense of the word aligned with the Copenhagen School (as I understand it)? I will structure this as the “Securitizing Actor(s),” “Extraordinary Measures Required,” and the “Geopolitical Implications”:

Example 1: Improving Communications networks as a security priority.

Securitizing Actor(s): Greenland’s government, possibly supported by Denmark and international allies (e.g., The USA’s Pituffik Space Base on Greenland), frames the lack of higher availability and reliable communication networks as an existential threat to national security, economic development, and stability, including the ability to defend Greenland effectively during a global threat or crisis.

Extraordinary Measures Required: Greenland can invest in advanced digital communication technologies to address the threat. This includes upgrading infrastructure such as fiber-optic cables, satellite communication systems, stratospheric high-altitude platform (HAP) with IMINT, SIGINT, and broadband communications payload, and 5G wireless networks to ensure they are reliable and can handle increased data traffic. Implementing advanced cybersecurity measures to protect these networks from cyber threats is also crucial. Additionally, investments in broadband expansion to remote areas ensure comprehensive coverage and connectivity.

Geopolitical Implications: By framing the reliability and availability of digital communications networks as a national security issue, Greenland ensures that significant resources are allocated to upgrade and maintain these critical infrastructures. Greenland may also attract European Union investments to leapfrogging the critical communications infrastructure. This improves Greenland’s day-to-day communication and economic activities and enhances its strategic importance by ensuring secure and efficient information flow. Reliable digital networks are essential for attracting international investments, supporting digital economies, and maintaining social cohesion.

Example 2: Geopolitical Competition in the Arctic

Securitizing Actor(s): The Greenland government, aligned with Danish and international allies’ interests, views the increasing presence of Russian and Chinese activities in the Arctic as a direct threat to Greenland’s sovereignty and security.

Extraordinary Measures Required: In response, Greenland can adopt advanced surveillance and defense technologies, such as Distributed Acoustic Sensing (DAS) systems to monitor underwater activities and Unmanned Aerial & Underwater Vehicles (UAVs & UUVs) for continuous aerial surveillance. Additionally, deploying advanced communication networks, including satellite-based systems, ensures secure and reliable information flow.

Geopolitical Implications: By framing foreign powers’ increased activities as a security threat (e.g., Russia and China), Greenland can attract NATO and European Union investments and support for deploying cutting-edge surveillance and defense technologies. This enhances Greenland’s security infrastructure, deters potential adversaries, and solidifies its strategic importance within the alliance.

Example 3: Cybersecurity as a National Security Priority.

Securitizing Actor(s): Greenland, aligned with its allies, frames the potential for cyber-attacks on critical infrastructure (such as power grids, communication networks, and military installations) as an existential threat to national security.

Extraordinary Measures Required: To address this threat, Greenland can invest in state-of-the-art cybersecurity technologies, including artificial intelligence-driven threat detection systems, encrypted communication channels, and comprehensive incident response frameworks. Establishing partnerships with global cybersecurity firms and participating in international cybersecurity exercises can also be part of the strategy.

Geopolitical Implications: By securitizing cybersecurity, Greenland ensures that significant resources are allocated to protect its digital infrastructure. This safeguards its critical systems and enhances its attractiveness as a secure location for international investments, reinforcing its geopolitical stability and economic growth.

Example 4: Arctic IoT and Dual-Use Military IoT Networks as a Security Priority.

Securitizing Actor(s): Greenland’s government, supported by Denmark and international allies, frames the lack of Arctic IoT and dual-use military IoT networks as an existential threat to national security, economic development, and environmental monitoring.

Extraordinary Measures Required: Greenland can invest in deploying Arctic IoT and dual-use military IoT networks to address the threat. These networks involve a comprehensive system of interconnected sensors, devices, and communication technologies designed to operate in the harsh Arctic environment. This includes deploying sensors for environmental monitoring, enhancing surveillance capabilities, and improving communication and data-sharing across military and civilian applications.

Geopolitical Implications: By framing the lack of Arctic IoT and dual-use military IoT networks as a national security issue, Greenland ensures that significant resources are allocated to develop and maintain these advanced technological infrastructures. This improves situational awareness and operational efficiency and enhances Greenland’s strategic importance by providing real-time data and robust monitoring capabilities. Reliable IoT networks are essential for protecting critical infrastructure, supporting economic activities, and maintaining environmental and national security.

THE DANISH DEFENSE & SECURITY AGREEMENT COVERING THE PERIOD 2024 TO 2033.

Recently, Denmark approved its new defense and security agreement for the period 2024-2033. This strongly emphasizes Denmark’s strategic reorientation in response to the new geopolitical realities. A key element in the Danish commitment to NATO’s goals includes a spending level approaching and possibly superseding the 2% of GDP on defense by 2030. It is not 2% for the sake of 2%. There really is a lot to be done, and as soon as possible. The agreement entails significant financial investments totaling approximately 190 billion DKK (or ca. 25+ billion euros) over the next ten years to quantum leap defense capabilities and critical infrastructure.

The defense agreement emphasizes the importance of enhancing security in the Arctic region, including, of course, Greenland. Thus, Greenland’s strategic significance in the current geopolitical landscape is recognized, particularly in light of Russian activities and Chinese expressed intentions (e.g., re: the “Polar Silk Road”). The agreement aims to strengthen surveillance, sovereignty enforcement, and collaboration with NATO in the Arctic. As such, we should expect investments to improve surveillance capabilities that would strengthen the enforcement of Greenland’s sovereignty. Ensuring that Greenland and Denmark can effectively monitor and protect its Arctic territories (together with its allies). The defense agreement stresses the importance of supporting NATO’s mission in the Arctic region, contributing to collective defense and deterrence efforts.

What I very much like in the new defense agreement is the expressed focus on dual-use infrastructure investments that benefit Greenland’s defense (& military) and civilian sectors. This includes upgrading existing facilities and enhancing operational capabilities in the Arctic that allow a rapid response to security threats. The agreement ensures that defense investments also bring economic and social benefits to Greenlandic society, consistent with a dual-use philosophy. In order for this to become a reality, it will involve a close collaboration with local authorities, businesses, and research institutions to support the local economy and create new job opportunities (as well as ensure that there is a local emphasis on relevant education to ensure that such investments are locally sustainable and not relying on an “army” of Danes and others of non-Greenlandic origin).

The defense agreement unsurprisingly expresses a strong commitment to enhancing cybersecurity measures as well as addressing hybrid threats in Greenland. This reflects the broader security challenges of the new technology introduction required, the present cyber-maturity level, and, of course, the current (and future expected) geopolitical tensions. The architects behind the agreement have also realized that there is a big need to improve recruitment, retention, and appropriate training within the defense forces, ensuring that personnel are well-prepared to operate in the Arctic environment in general and in Greenland in particular.

It is great to see that the Danish “Defense and Security Agreement” for 2024-2033 reflects the principles of securitization by framing Greenland’s security as an existential threat and justifying substantial investments and strategic initiatives in response. The focus of the agreement is on enhancing critical infrastructure, surveillance platforms, and international cooperation while ensuring that the benefits of the local economy align with the concept of securitization. That is to ensure that Greenland is well-prepared to address current and future security challenges and anticipated threats in the Arctic region.

The agreement underscores the importance of advanced surveillance systems, such as, for example, satellite-based monitoring and sophisticated radar systems as mentioned in the agreement. These technologies are deemed important for maintaining situational awareness and ensuring the security of Denmark’s territories, including Greenland and the Arctic region in general. In order to improve response times as well as effectiveness, enhanced surveillance capabilities are essential for detecting and tracking potential threats. Moreover, such capabilities are also important for search and rescue, and many other civilian use cases are consistent with the intention to ensure that applied technologies for defense purposes have dual-use capabilities and can also be used for civilian purposes.

There are more cyber threats than ever before. These threats are getting increasingly sophisticated with the advance of AI and digitization in general. So, it is not surprising that cybersecurity technologies are also an important topic in the agreement. The increasing threat of cyber attacks, particularly against critical infrastructure and often initiated by hostile state actors, necessitates a robust cybersecurity defense in order to protect our critical infrastructure and the sensitive information it typically contains. This includes implementing advanced encryption, intrusion detection systems, and secure communication networks to safeguard against cyber threats.

The defense agreement also highlights the importance of having access to unmanned systems or drones. There are quite a few examples of such systems as discussed in some detail above, and can be found in my more extensive article “Stratospheric Drones & Low Earth Satellites: Revolutionizing Terrestrial Rural Broadband from the Skies?“. There are two categories of drones that may be interesting. One is the unmanned version that typically is remotely controlled in an operations center at a distance from the actual unmanned platform. The other is the autonomous (or semi-autonomous) drone version that is enabled by AI and many integrated sensors to operate independently of direct human control or at least largely without real-time human intervention. Examples such as Unmanned Vehicles (UVs) and Autonomous Vehicles (AVs) are typically associated with underwater (UUV/UAV) or aerial (UAV/AAV) platforms. This kind of technology provides versatile, very flexible surveillance & reconnaissance, and defense platforms that are not reliant on a large staff of experts to operate. They are particularly valuable in the Arctic region, where harsh environmental conditions can limit the effectiveness of manned missions.

The development and deployment of dual-use technologies are also emphasized in the agreement. These technologies, which have both civilian and military applications, are necessary for maximizing the return on investment in defense infrastructure. It may also, at the moment, be easier to find funding if it is defense-related. Technology examples include advancements in satellite communications and broadband networks, enhancing military capabilities, and civilian connectivity, particularly how those various communications technologies can seamlessly integrate with one another is very important.

Furthermore, artificial intelligence (AI) has been identified as a transformative technology for defense and security. While AI is often referred to as a singular technology. However, it is actually an umbrella term that encompasses a broad spectrum of frameworks, tools, and techniques that have a common basis in models that are being trained on large (or very large) sets of data in order to offer various predictive capabilities of increasing sophistication. This leads to the expectation that, for example, AI-driven analytics and decision-making applications will enhance the operational efficiency and, not unimportantly, the quality of real-time decision-making in the field (which may or may not be correct and for sure may be somewhat optimistic expectations at least at a basic level). AI-enabled defense platforms or applications are likely to result in improved threat detection as well as being able to support strategic planning. As long as the risk of false outcomes is acceptable, such a system will enrich the defense systems and provide significant advantages in managing complex and highly dynamic security environments and time-critical threat scenarios.

Lastly, the agreement stresses the need for advanced logistics and supply chain technologies. Efficient logistics are critical for sustaining military operations and ensuring the timely delivery of equipment and supplies. Automation, real-time tracking, and predictive analytics in logistics management can significantly improve the resilience and responsiveness of defense operations.

AT THIS POINT IN MY GREENLANDIC JOURNEY.

In my career, I have designed, planned, built, and operated telecommunications networks in many places under vastly different environmental conditions (e.g., geography and climate). The more I think about building robust and highly reliable communication networks in Greenland, including all the IT & compute enablers required, the more I appreciate how challenging and different it is to do so in Greenland. Tusass has built a robust and reliable transport network connecting nearly all settlements in Greenland down to the smallest size. Tusass operates and maintains this network under some of the harshest environmental conditions in the world, with an incredible dedication to all those settlements that depend on being connected to the outside world and where a compromised connection may have dire consequences for the unconnected community.

Figure 18 Shows a coastal radio site in Greenland. It illustrates one of the frequent issues of the critical infrastructure being covered by ice as well as snow. Courtesy: Tusass A/S (Greenland),

Comparing the capital spending level of Tusass in Greenland with the averages of other Western European countries, we find that Tusass does not invest significantly more of its revenue than the telco industry’s country averages of many other Western European countries. In fact, its 5-year average Capex to Revenue ratio is close to the Western European country average (19% over the period 2019 to 2023). In terms of capital investments compared to the revenue generating units (RGUs), Tusass does have the highest level of 18.7 euros per RGU per month, based on a 5-year average over the period 2019 to 2023, in comparison with the average of several Western European markets, coming out at 6.6 euros per RGU per month, as shown in the chart below. This difference is not surprising when considering the available population in Greenland compared to the populations in the countries considered in the comparison. The variation of capital investments for Tusass also shows a much larger variation than other countries due to substantially less population to bear the burden of financing big capital-intensive projects, such as the deployment of new submarine cables (e.g., typically coming out at 30 to 50 thousand euros per km), new satellite connections (normally 10+ million euros depending on the asset arrangement), RAN modernization (e.g., 5G), and so forth … For example, the average absolute capital spend was 14.0±1.5 million euros between 2019 and 2022, while 2023 was almost 40 million euros (a little less than 4% of the annual defense and security budget of Denmark) due to, according with Tusass annual report, RAN modernization (e.g., 5G), satellite (e.g., Greensat) and submarine cable investments (initial seabed investigation). All these investments bring better quality through higher reliability, integrity, and availability of Greenland’s critical communications infrastructure although there are not a large population (e.g., millions) to spread such these substantial investments over.

Figure 19 In a Western European context, Greenland does not, on average, invest substantially more in telecom infrastructure relative to its revenues and revenue-generating units (i.e., its customer service subscriptions) despite having a very low population of about 57 thousand and an area of 2.2 million square kilometers, the size of Alaska and only 33% smaller than India. The chart shows the country’s average Capex to Revenue ratio and the Capex in euros per RGU per month over the last 5 years (2019 to 2023) for Greenland (e.g., Tusass annual reports) and Western Europe (using data from New Street Research).

The capital investments required to leapfrog Greenland’s communications network availability and redundancy scores beyond 70% (versus 53% and 44%, respectively, in 2023) would be very substantial, requiring both additional microwave connections (including redesigns), submarine cables, and new satellite arrangements, and new ground stations (e.g., to or in settlements with more than a population of 1,000 inhabitants).

Those investments would serve the interests of the Greenlandic society and that of Denmark and NATO in terms of boosting the defense and security of Greenland, which is also consistent with all the relevant parties’ expressed intent of securitization of Greenland. The required capital investments related to further leapfrogging the safety, availability, and reliability, above and beyond the current plans, of the critical communications infrastructure would be far higher than previously capital spend levels by Tusass (and Greenland) and unlikely to be economically viable using conventional business financial metrics (e.g., net present value NPV > 0 and internal rate of return IRR > a given hurdle rate). The investment needs to be seen as geopolitical relevant for the security & safety of Greenland, and with a strong focus on dual-use technologies, also as beneficial to the Greenlandic society.

Even with unlimited funding and financing to enhance Greenland’s safety and security, the challenging weather conditions and limited availability of skilled resources mean that it will take considerable time to successfully complete such an extensive program. Designing, planning and building a solid defense and security architecture meaningful to Greenlandic conditions will take time. Though, I am also convinced that there are already pieces of the puzzle operational today that is important any future work.

Figure 18 An aerial view of one of Tusass’s west coast sites supporting coastal radio as well as hosting one of the many long-haul microwave sites along the west coast of Greenland. Courtesy: Tusass A/S (Greenland).

RECOMMENDATIONS.

A multifaceted approach is essential to ensure that Greenland’s strategic and infrastructure development aligns with its unique geographical and geopolitical context.

Firstly, Greenland should prioritize the development of dual-use critical infrastructure and the supporting architectures that can serve both civilian and defense (& military) purposes. For example expanding and upgrading airport facilities (e.g., as is happening with the new airport in Nuuk), enhancing broadband internet access (e.g., as Tusass is very much focusing on adding more submarine cables and satellite coverage), and developing advanced integrated communication platforms like satellite-based and unmanned aerial systems (UAS), such as payload agnostic stratospheric high altitude platforms (HAPs). Such dual-use infrastructure platforms could bolster the national security. Moreover it could support economic activities that would improve community connectivity, and enhance the quality of life for Greenland’s residents irrespective of where they live in Greenland. There is little doubt that securing funding from international allies (e.g., European Union, NATO, …) and public-private partnerships will be crucial in supporting the financing of these projects. Also ensuring that civil and defense needs are met efficiently and with the right balance.

Additionally, it is important to invest in critical enablers like advanced monitoring and surveillance technologies for the security & safety. Greenland should in particular focus on satellite monitoring, Distributed Acoustic Sensing (DAS) on its submarine cables, and Unmanned Vehicles for Underwater and Aerial applications (e.g., UUVs & UAVs). Such systems will enable a more comprehensive monitoring of activities around and over Greenland. This would allow Greenland to secure its maritime routes, and protecting Greenland’s natural resources (among other things). Enhanced surveillance capabilities will also provide multi-dimensional real-time data for national security, environmental monitoring, and disaster response scenarios. Collaborating with NATO and other international partners should focus on sharing technology know-how, expertise in general, and intelligence that will ensure that Greenland’s surveillance capabilities are on par with global standards.

Tusass’s transport network connecting (almost) all of Greenland’s settlements is an essential and critical asset for Greenland. It should be the backbone for any dual-use enhancement serving civil as well as defense scenarios. Adding additional submarine cables and more satellite connections are important (on-going) parts of those enhancements and will substantially increase both the network availability, resilience and hardening to disruptions natural as well as man-made kinds. However, increasing the communications networks ability to fully, or even partly, function in case of network parts being cut off from a few main switching centers may be something that could be considered. With todays technologies might also be affordable to do and fit well with Tusass’s multi-dimensional connectivity strategy using terrestrial means (e.g., microwave connections), sub-marine cables and satellites.

Last but not least, considering Greenland’s limited human resources, the technologies and advanced platforms implemented must have a large degree of autonomy and self-reliance. This will likely only be achieved with solid partnerships and strong alliances with Denmark and other natural allies, including the Nordic countries in and near the Arctic Circle (e.g., Island, Faroe Island, Norway, Sweden, Finland, The USA, and Canada). In particular, Norway has had recent experience with the dual use of ad-hoc and private 5G networking for defense applications. Joint operation of UUV and UAVs integrated with DAS and satellite constellation could be operated within the Arctic Circle. Developing and implementing advanced AI-based technologies should be a priority. Such collaborations could also make these advanced technologies much more affordable than if only serving one country. These technologies can compensate for the sparse population and vast geographical challenges that Greenland and the larger Arctic Circle pose, providing efficient and effective infrastructure management, surveillance, and economic development solutions. Achieving a very high degree of autonomous operation of the multi-dimensional technology landscape required for leapfrogging the security of Greenland, the Greenlandic Society, and its critical infrastructure would be essential for Greenland to be self-reliant and less dependent on substantial external resources that may be problematic to guaranty in times of crisis.

By focusing on these recommendations, Greenland can enhance its strategic importance, improve its critical infrastructure resilience, and ensure sustainable economic growth while maintaining its unique environmental heritage.

Being a field technician in Greenland poses some occupational hazards that is unknown in most other places. Apart from the harsh weather, remoteness of many of the infrastructure locations, on many occasions field engineers have encountered hungry polar bears in the field. The polar bear is a very dangerous predator that is always on the look out for its next protein-rich meal.

FURTHER READING.

  1. Tusass Annual Reports 2023 (more reports can be found here).
  2. Naalakkersuisut / Government of Greenland Ministry for Statehood and Foreign Affairs, “Greenland in the World — Nothing about us without us: Greenland’s Foreign, Security, and Defense Policy 2024-2033 – an Arctic Strategy.” (February 2024). The Danish title of this Document (also published in Greenlandic as the first language): “Grønland i Verden — Intet om os, uden os: Grønlands udenrigs-, sikkerheds- og forsvarspolitiske strategi for 2024-2033 — en Arktisk Strategi”.
  3. Martin Brum, “Greenland’s first security strategy looks west as the Arctic heats up.” Arctic Business Journal (February 2024).
  4. Marc Jacobsen, Ole Wæver, and Ulrik Pram Gad, “Greenland in Arctic Security: (De)securitization Dynamics under Climatic Thaw and Geopolitical Freeze.” (2024), University of Michigan Press. See also the video associated with the book launch. It’s not the best quality (sound/video), but if you just listen and follow the slides offline, it is actually really interesting.
  5. Michael Paul and Göran Swistek, “Russia in the Arctic: Development Plans, Military Potential, and Conflict Prevention,” SWP (Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik) Research Paper, (February 2022). Some great maps are provided that clearly visualize the Arctic – Russia relationships.
  6. Marc Lanteigne, “The Rise (and Fall?) of the Polar Silk Road.” The Diplomat, (August 2022).
  7. Trym Eiterjord, “What the 14th Five-Year Plan says about China’s Arctic Interests”, The Arctic Institute, (November 2023). The link also includes references to several other articles related to the China-Arctic relationship from the Arctic Institute China Series 2023.
  8. Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver, and Jaap de Wilde, “Security: A New Framework for Analysis”, (1998), Lynne Rienner Publishers Inc..
  9. Kim Kyllesbech Larsen, The Next Frontier: LEO Satellites for Internet Services. | techneconomyblog, (March 2024).
  10. Kim Kyllesbech Larsen, Stratospheric Drones & Low Earth Satellites: Revolutionizing Terrestrial Rural Broadband from the Skies? | techneconomyblog, (January 2024).
  11. Deo, Narsingh. “Graph Theory with Applications to Engineering and Computer Science,” Dover Publications. This book is a reasonably accessible starting point for learning more about graphs. If this is new to you, I recommend going for the following Geeks for Geeks ” Introduction to Graph Data Structure” (April 2024), which provides a quick intro to the world of graphs.
  12. Mike Dano, “Pentagon puts 5G at center of US military’s communications future”, Light Reading (December 2020).
  13. Juan Pedro Tomas, “Telia to develop private 5G for Norway’s Armed Forces”, RCR Wireless (June 2022).
  14. Iain Morris, “Telia is building 5G cell towers for the battlefield”, Light Reading (June 2023).
  15. Saleem Khawaja, “How military uses of the IoT for defense applications are expanding”, Army Technology (March 2023).
  16. Mary Lee, James Dimarogonas, Edward Geist, Shane Manuel, Ryan A. Schwankhart, Bryce Downing, “Opportunities and Risks of 5G Military Use in Europe”, RAND (March 2023).
  17. Mike Dano, “NATO soldiers test new 5G tech“, Light Reading (October 2023).
  18. NATO publication, “5G Technology: Nokia Meets with NATO Allied Command Transformation to Discuss Military Applications”, (May 2024).
  19. Michael Hill, “NATO tests AI’s ability to protect critical infrastructure against cyberattacks” (January 2023).
  20. Forsvarsministeriet, Danmark, “Dansk forsvar og sikkerhed 2024-2033.” (June 2023): Danish Defense & Security Agreement (Part I).
  21. Forsvarsministeriet, Denmark, “Anden delaftale under forsvarsforliget 2024-2033“, (April 2024): Danish Defense & Security Agreement (Part II).
  22. The State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China, “China’s Arctic Policy”, (January 2018).

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT.

I greatly acknowledge my wife, Eva Varadi, for her support, patience, and understanding during the creative process of writing this article. I am incredible thankful to Tusass for providing many great pictures used in the post that illustrates the (good weather!) conditions that Tusass field technicians are faced with in the field working tirelessly on the critical communications infrastructure throughout Greenland. While the pictures shown in this post are really beautiful and breathtaking, the weather is unforgiven frequently stranding field workers for days at some of those remote site locations. Add to this picture the additional dangers of a hungry polar bear that will go to great length getting its weekly protein intake.

Telco energy consumption – a path to a greener future?

To my friend Rudolf van der Berg this story is not about how volumetric demand (bytes or bits) results in increased energy consumption (W·h). That notion is silly, as we both “violently” agree on ;-). I recommend that readers also check out Rudolf’s wonderful presentation, “Energy Consumption of the Internet (May 2023),” which he delivered at the RIPE86 student event this year in 2023.

Recently, I had the privilege to watch a presentation by a seasoned executive talk about what his telco company is doing for the environment regarding sustainability and CO2 reduction in general. I think the company is doing something innovative beyond compensating shortfalls with buying certificates and (mis)use of green energy resources.

They replace (reasonably) aggressively their copper infrastructure (country stat for 2022: ~90% of HH/~16% subscriptions) with green sustainable fiber (country stat for 2022: ~78%/~60%). This is an obvious strategy that results in a quantum leap in customer experience potential and helps reduce overall energy consumption resulting from operating the ancient copper network.

Missing a bit imo, was the consideration of and the opportunity to phase out the HFC network (country stat for 2022: ~70%/~60%) and reduce the current HFC+Fibre overbuild of 1.45 and, of course, reduce the energy consumption and operational costs (and complexity) of operating two fixed broadband technologies (3 if we include the copper). However, maybe understandably enough, substantial investments have been made in upgrading to Docsis 3.1. An investment that possibly still is somewhat removed from having been written off.

The “wtf-moment” (in an otherwise very pleasantly and agreeable session) came when the speaker alluded that as part of their sustainability and CO2 reduction strategy, the telco was busy migrating from 4G LTE to 5G with the reasoning that 5G is 90% more energy efficient compared to 4G.

Firstly, it is correct that 5G is (in apples-for-apples comparisons!) ca. 90% more efficient in delivering a single bit compared to 4G. The metric we use is Joules-per-bit or Watts-seconds-per-bit. It is also not uncommon at all to experience Telco executives hinting at the relative greenness of 5G (it is, in my opinion, decidedly not a green broadband communications technology … ).

Secondly, so what! Should we really care about relative energy consumption? After all, we pay for absolute energy consumption, not for whatever relativized measure of consumed energy.

I think I know the answer from the CFO and the in-the-know investors.

If the absolute energy consumption of 5G is higher than that of 4G, I will (most likely) have higher operational costs attributed to that increased power consumption with 5G. If I am not in an apples-for-apples situation, which rarely is the case, and I am anyway really not in, the 5G technology requires substantially more power to provide for new requirements and specifications. I will be worse off regarding the associated cost in absolute terms of money. Unless I also have a higher revenue associated with 5G, I am economically worse off than I was with the older technology.

Having higher information-related energy efficiency in cellular communications systems is a feature of the essential requirement of increasingly better spectral efficiency all else being equal. It does not guarantee that, in absolute monetary terms, a Telco will be better off … far from it!

THE ENERGY OF DELIVERING A BIT.

Energy, which I choose to represent in Joules, is equal to the Power (in Watt or W) that I need to consume per time-unit for a given output unit (e.g., a bit) times the unit of time (e.g., a second) it took to provide the unit.

Take a 4G LTE base station that consumes ca. 5.0kW to deliver a maximum throughput of 160 Mbps per sector (@ 80 MHz per sector). The information energy efficiency of the specific 4G LTE base station (e.g., W·s per bit) would be ca. 10 µJ/bit. The 4G LTE base station requires 10 micro (one millionth) Joules to deliver 1 bit (in 1 second).

In the 5G world, we would have a 5G SA base station, using the same frequency bands as 4G and with an additional 10 MHz @ 700MHz and 100 MHz @ 3.5 GHz included. The 3.5 GHz band is supported by an advanced antenna system (AAS) rather than a classical passive antenna system used for the other frequency bands. This configuration consumes 10 kW with ~40% attributed to the 3.5 GHz AAS, supporting ~1 Gbps per sector (@ 190 MHz per sector). This example’s 5G information energy efficiency would be ca. 0.3 µJ/bit.

In this non-apples-for-apples comparison, 5G is about 30 times more efficient in delivering a bit than 4G LTE (in the example above). Regarding what an operator actually pays for, 5G is twice as costly in energy consumption compared to 4G.

It should be noted that the power consumption is not driven by the volumetric demand but by the time that demand exists and the load per unit of time. Also, base stations will have a power consumption even when idle with the degree depending on the intelligence of the energy management system applied.

So, more formalistic, we have

E per bit = P (in W) · time (in sec) per bit, or in the basic units

J / bit = W·s / bit = W / (bit/s) = W / bps = W / [ MHz · Mbps/MHz/unit · unit-quantity ]

E per bit = P (in W) / [ Bandwidth (in MHz) · Spectral Efficiency (in Mbps/MHz/unit) · unit-quantity ]

It is important to remember that this is about the system spec information efficiency and that there is no direct relationship between the Power that you need and the outputted information your system will ultimately support bit-wise.

\frac{E_{4G}}{bit} \; = \; \frac {\; P_{4G} \;} {\; B_{4G} \; \cdot \; \eta_{4G,eff} \; \cdot N \;\;\;} and \;\;\; \frac{E_{5G}}{bit} \; = \; \frac {\; P_{5G} \;} {\; B_{5G} \; \cdot \; \eta_{5G,eff} \; \cdot N \;}

Thus, the relative efficiency between 4G and 5G is

\frac{E_{4G}/bit}{E_{5G}/bit} \; = \; \frac{\; P_{4G} \;}{\; P_{5G}} \; \cdot \; \frac{\; B_{5G} \;}{\; B_{4G}} \; \cdot \; \frac{\; \eta_{5G,eff} \;}{\; \eta_{4G,eff}}

Currently (i.e., 2023), the various components of the above are approximately within the following ranges.

\frac{P_{4G}}{P_{5G}} \; \lesssim \; 1

\frac{B_{5G}}{B_{4G}} \; > \;2

\frac{\; \eta_{5G,eff} \;}{\; \eta_{4G,eff}} \; \approx \; 10

The power consumption of a 5G RAT is higher than that of a 4G RAT. As we add higher frequency spectrum (e.g., C-band, 6GHz, 23GHz,…) to the 5G RAT, increasingly more spectral bandwidth (B) will be available compared to what was deployed for 4G. This will increase the bit-wise energy efficiency of 5G compared to 4G, although the power consumption is also expected to increase as higher frequencies are supported.

If the bandwidth and system power consumption is the same for both radio access technologies (RATs), then we have the relative information energy efficiency is

\frac{E_{4G}/bit}{E_{5G}/bit} \; \approx \; \frac{\; \eta_{5G,eff} \;}{\; \eta_{4G,eff}} \; \gtrsim \; 10

Depending on the relative difference in spectral efficiency. 5G is specified and designed to have at least ten times (10x) the spectral efficiency of 4G. If you do the math (assuming apples-to-apples applies), it is no surprise that 5G is specified to be 90% more efficient in delivering a bit (in a given unit of time) compared to 4G LTE.

And just to emphasize the obvious,

E_{RAT} \; = \; P_{RAT} \; \cdot \; t \; \approx \; E_{idle} \; + \; P_{BB, RAT} \; \cdot \; t \; +\sum_{freq}P_{freq,\; antenna\; type}\; \cdot \; t_{freq} \;

RAT refers to the radio access technology, BB is the baseband, freq the cellular frequencies, and idle to the situation where the system is not being utilized.

Volume in Bytes (or bits) does not directly relate to energy consumption. As frequency bands are added to a sector (of a base station), the overall power consumption will increase. Moreover, the more computing is required in the antenna, such as for advanced antenna systems, including massive MiMo antennas, the more power will be consumed in the base station. The more the frequency bands are being utilized in terms of time, the higher will the power consumption be.

Indirectly, as the cellular system is being used, customers consume bits and bytes (=8·bit) that will depend on the effective spectral efficiency (in bps/Hz), the amount of effective bandwidth (in Hz) experienced by the customers, e.g., many customers will be in a coverage situation where they may not benefit for example from higher frequency bands), and the effective time they make use of the cellular network resources. The observant reader will see that I like the term “effective.” The reason is that customers rarely enjoy the maximum possible spectral efficiency. Likely, not all the frequency spectrum covering customers is necessarily being applied to individual customers, depending on their coverage situation.

In the report “A Comparison of the Energy Consumption of Broadband Data Transfer Technologies (November 2021),” the authors show the energy and volumetric consumption of mobile networks in Finland over the period from 2010 to 2020. To be clear, I do not support the author’s assertion of causation between volumetric demand and energy consumption. As I have shown above, volumetric usage does not directly cause a given power consumption level. Over the 10-year period shown in the report, they observe a 70% increase in absolute power consumption (from 404 to 686 GWh, CAGR ~5.5%) and a factor of ~70 in traffic volume (~60 TB to ~4,000 TB, CAGR ~52%). Caution should be made in resisting the temptation to attribute the increase in energy over the period to be directly related to the data volume increase, however weak it is (i.e., note that the authors did not resist that temptation). Rudolf van der Berg has raised several issues with the approach of the above paper (as well as with many other related works) and indicated that the data and approach of the authors may not be reliable. Unfortunately, in this respect, it appears that systematic, reliable, and consistent data in the Telco industry is hard to come by (even if that data should be available to the individual telcos).

Technology change from 2G/3G to 4G, site densification, and more frequency bands can more than easily explain the increase in energy consumption (and all are far better explanations than data volume). It should be noted that there will also be reasons that decrease power consumption over time, such as more efficient electronics (e.g., via modernization), intelligent power management applications, and, last but not least, switching off of older radio access technologies.

The factors that drive a cell site’s absolute energy consumption is

  • Radio access technology with new technologies generally consumes more energy than older ones (even if the newer technologies have become increasingly more spectrally efficient).
  • The antenna type and configuration, including computing requirements for advanced signal processing and beamforming algorithms (that will improve the spectral efficiency at the expense of increased absolute energy consumption).
  • Equipment efficiency. In general, new generations of electronics and systems designs tend to be more energy-efficient for the same level of performance.
  • Intelligent energy management systems that allow for effective power management strategies will reduce energy consumption compared to what it would have been without such systems.
  • The network optimization goal policy. Is the cellular network planned and optimized for meeting the demands and needs of the customers (i.e., the economic design framework) or for providing the peak performance to as many customers as possible (i.e., the Umlaut/Ookla performance-driven framework)? The Umlaut/Ookla-optimized network, maxing out on base station configuration, will observe substantially higher energy consumption and associated costs.
The absolute cellular energy consumption has continued to rise as new radio access technologies (RAT) have been introduced irrespective of the leapfrog in those RATS spectral (bits per Hz) and information-related (Joules per bit) efficiencies.

WHY 5G IS NOT A GREEN TECHNOLOGY?

Let’s first re-acquaint ourselves with the 2015 vision of the 5G NGMN whitepaper;

“5G should support a 1,000 times traffic increase in the next ten years timeframe, with energy consumption by the whole network of only half that typically consumed by today’s networks. This leads to the requirement of an energy efficiency increase of x2000 in the next ten years timeframe.” (Section 4.2.2 Energy Efficiency, 5G White Paper by NGMN Alliance, February 2015).

The bold emphasis is my own and not in the paper itself. There is no doubt that the authors of the 5G vision paper had the ambition of making 5G a sustainable and greener cellular alternative than historically had been the case.

So, from the above statement, we have two performance figures that illustrate the ambition of 5G relative to 4G. Firstly, we have a requirement that the 5G energy efficiency should be 2000x higher than 4G (as it was back in the beginning of 2015).

\frac{E_{4G}/bit}{E_{5G}/bit} \; = \; \frac{\; P_{4G} \;}{\; P_{5G}} \; \cdot \; \frac{\; B_{5G} \;}{\; B_{4G}} \; \cdot \; \frac{\; \eta_{5G,eff} \;}{\; \eta_{4G,eff}} \; \geq \; 2,000

or

\frac{\; P_{4G} \;}{\; P_{5G}} \; \cdot \; \frac{\; B_{5G} \;}{\; B_{4G}} \; \geq \; 200

if

\frac{\; \eta_{5G,eff} \;}{\; \eta_{4G,eff}} \; \approx \; 10

Getting more spectrum bandwidth is relatively trivial as you go up in frequency and into, for example, the millimeter wave range (and beyond). However, getting 20+ GHz (e.g., 200+x100 MHz @ 4G) of additional practically usable spectrum bandwidth would be rather (=understatement) ambitious.

And that the absolute energy consumption of the whole 5G network should be half of what it was with 4G

\frac{E_{5G}}{E_{4G}} \; = \; \frac{\; P_{5G} \; \cdot \; t\;}{\; P_{4G} \; \cdot \; t}\; \approx \; \frac{\; P_{5G} \;}{\; P_{4G} \; } \; \leq \; \frac{1}{2}

If you think about this for a moment. Halfing the absolute energy consumption is an enormous challenge, even if it would have been with the same RAT. It requires innovation leapfrogs across the RAT electronic architecture, design, and material science underlying all of it. In other words, fundamental changes are required in the RF frontend (e.g., Power amplifiers, transceivers), baseband processing, DSP, DAC, ADC, cooling, control and management systems, algorithms, compute, etc…

But reality eats vision for breakfast … There really is no sign that the super-ambitious goal set by the NGMN Alliance in early 2015 is even remotely achievable even if we would give it another ten years (i.e., 2035). We are more than two orders of magnitude away from the visionary target of NGMN, and we are almost at the 10-year anniversary of the vision paper. We more or less get the benefit of the relative difference in spectral efficiency (x10), but no innovation beyond that has contributed very much to quantum leap cellular energy efficiency bit-wise.

I know many operators who will say that from a sustainability perspective, at least before the energy prices went through the roof, it really does not matter that 5G, in absolute terms, leads to substantial increases in energy consumption. They use green energy to supply the energy demand from 5G and pay off $CO_2$ deficits with certificates.

First of all, unless the increased cost can be recovered with the customers (e.g., price plan increase), it is a doubtful economic venue to pursue (and has a bit of a Titanic feel to it … going down together while the orchestra is playing).

Second, we should ask ourselves whether it is really okay for any industry to greedily consume sustainable and still relatively scarce green resources without being incentivized (or encouraged) to pursue alternatives and optimize across mobile and fixed broadband technologies. Particularly when fixed broadband technologies, such as fiber, are available, that would lead to a very sizable and substantial reduction in energy consumption … as customers increasingly adapt to fiber broadband.

Fiber is the greenest and most sustainable access technology we can deploy compared to cellular broadband technologies.

SO WHAT?

5G is a reality. Telcos are and will continue to invest substantially into 5G as they migrate their customers from 4G LTE to what ultimately will be 5G Standalone. The increase in customer experience and new capabilities or enablers are significant. By now, most Telcos will (i.e., 2023) have a very good idea of the operational expense associated with 5G (if not … you better do the math). Some will have been exploring investing in their own green power plants (e.g., solar, wind, hydrogen, etc.) to mitigate part of the energy surge arising from transitioning to 5G.

I suspect that as Telcos start reflecting on Open RAN as they pivot towards 6G (-> 2030+), above and beyond what 6G, as a RAT, may bring of additional operational expense pain, there will be new energy consumption and sustainability surprises to the cellular part of Telcos P&L. In general, breaking up an electronic system into individual (non-integrated) parts, as opposed to being integrated into a single unit, is likely to result in an increased power consumption. Some of the operational in-efficiencies that occur in breaking up a tightly integrated design can be mitigated by power management strategies. Though in order to get such power management strategies to work at the optimum may force a higher degree of supplier uniformity than the original intent of breaking up the tightly integrated system.

However, only Telcos that consider both their mobile and fixed broadband assets together, rather than two silos apart, will gain in value for customers and shareholders. Fixed-mobile (network) conversion should be taken seriously and may lead to very different considerations and strategies than 10+ years ago.

With increasing coverage of fiber and with Telcos stimulating aggressive uptake, it will allow those to redesign the mobile networks for what they were initially supposed to do … provide convenience and service where there is no fixed network present, such as when being mobile and in areas where the economics of a fixed broadband network makes it least likely to be available (e.g., rural areas) although LEO satellites (i.e., here today), maybe stratospheric drones (i.e., 2030+), may offer solid economic alternatives for those places. Interestingly, further simplifying the cellular networks supporting those areas today.

TAKE AWAY.

Volume in Bytes (or bits) does not directly relate to the energy consumption of the underlying communications networks that enable the usage.

The duration, the time scale, of the customer’s usage (i.e., the use of the network resources) does cause power consumption.

The bit-wise energy efficiency of 5G is superior to that of 4G LTE. It is designed that way via its spectral efficiency. Despite this, a 5G site configuration is likely to consume more energy than a 4G LTE site in the field and, thus, not a like-for-like in terms of number of bands and type of antennas deployed.

The absolute power consumption of a 5G configuration is a function of the number of bands deployed, the type of antennas deployed, intelligent energy management features, and the effective time 5G resources that customers have demanded.

Due to its optical foundation, Fiber is far more energy efficient in both bit-wise relative terms and absolute terms than any other legacy fixed (e.g., xDSL, HFC) or cellular broadband technology (e.g., 4G, 5G).

Looking forward and with the increasing challenges of remaining sustainable and contributing to CO2 reduction, it is paramount to consider an energy-optimized fixed and mobile converged network architecture as opposed to today’s approach of optimizing the fixed network separately from the cellular network. As a society, we should expect that the industry works hard to achieve an overall reduction in energy consumption, relaxing the demand on existing green energy infrastructures.

With 5G as of today, we are orders of magnitude from the original NGMN vision of energy consumption of only half of what was consumed by cellular networks ten years ago (i.e., 2014), requiring an overall energy efficiency increase of x2000.

Be aware that many Telcos and Infrastructure providers will use bit-wise energy efficiency when they report on energy consumption. They will generally report impressive gains over time in the energy that networks consume to deliver bits to their customers. This is the least one should expect.

Last but not least, the telco world is not static and is RAT-wise not very clean, as mobile networks will have several RATs deployed simultaneously (e.g., 2G, 4G, and 5G). As such, we rarely (if ever) have apples-to-apples comparisons on cellular energy consumption.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT.

I greatly acknowledge my wife, Eva Varadi, for her support, patience, and understanding during the creative process of writing this article. I also greatly appreciate the discussion on this topic that I have had with Rudolf van der Berg over the last couple of years. I thank him for pointing out and reminding me (when I forget) of the shortfalls and poor quality of most of the academic work and lobbying activities done in this area.

PS

If you are aiming at a leapfrog in absolute energy reduction of your cellular network, above and beyond what you get with your infrastructure suppliers (e.g., Nokia, Ericsson, Huawei…), I really recommend you take a look at Opanga‘s machine learning-based Joule ML solution. The Joules ML has been proven to reduce RAN energy costs by 20% – 40% on top of what the RAT supplier’s (e.g., Ericsson, Nokia, Huawei, etc.) own energy management solutions may bring.

Disclosure: I am associated with Opanga and on their Industry Advisory Board.

RAN Unleashed … Strategies for being the best (or the worst) cellular network (Part III).

I have been spending my holiday break this year (December 2021) updating my dataset on Western Europe Mobile Operators, comprising 58+ mobile operators in 16 major Western European markets, focusing on spectrum positions, market dynamics, technology diffusion (i.e., customer migration to 5G), advanced antenna strategies, (modeled) investment levels and last but not least answering the question: what makes a cellular network the best in a given market or the world. What are the critical ingredients for an award-winning mobile network?

An award-winning cellular network, the best network, also provides its customers with a superior experience, the best network experience possible in a given market.

I am fascinated by the many reasons and stories we tell ourselves (and others) why this or that cellular network is the best. The story may differ whether you are an operator, a network supplier, or an analyst covering the industry. I have had the privileged to lead a mobile network (T-Mobile Netherlands) that won the Umlaut best mobile network award in The Netherlands since 2016 (5 consecutive times) and even scored the highest amount of points in the world in 2019 and 2020/2021. So, I guess it would make me a sort of “authority” on winning best network awards? (=sarcasm).

In my opinion and experience, a cellular operator has a much better than fair chance at having the best mobile network, compared to its competition, with access to the most extensive active spectrum portfolio, across all relevant cellular bands, implemented on a better (or best) antenna technology (on average) situated on a superior network footprint (e.g., more sites).

For T-Mobile Netherlands, firstly, we have the largest spectrum portfolio (260 MHz) compared to KPN (205 MHz) and Vodafone (215 MHz). The spectrum advantage of T-Mobile, as shown above, is both in low-band (< 1800 MHz) as well as mid-band range (> 1500 MHz). Secondly, as we started out back in 1998, our cell site grid was based on 1800 MHz, requiring a denser cell site grid (thus, more sites required) than the networks based on 900 MHz of the two Dutch incumbent operators, KPN and Vodafone. Therefore, T-Mobile ended up with more cell sites than our competition. We maintained the site advantage even after the industry’s cell grid densification needs of UMTS at 2100 MHz (back in the early 2000s). Our two very successful mergers have also helped our site portfolio, back in 2007 acquiring and merging with Orange NL and in 2019 merging with Tele2 NL.

The number of sites (or cells) matter for coverage, capacity, and overall customer experience. Thirdly, T-Mobile was also first in deploying advanced antenna systems in the Dutch market (e.g., aggressive use of higher-order MiMo antennas) across many of our frequency bands and cell sites. Our antenna strategy has allowed for a high effective spectral efficiency (across our network). Thus, we could (and can) handle more bits per second in our network than our competition.

Moreover, over the last 3 years, T-Mobile has undergone (passive) site modernization that has improved coverage and quality for our customers. This last point is not surprising since the original network was built based on a single 1800 MHz frequency, and since 1998 we have added 7 additional bands (from 700 MHz to 2.5 GHz) that need to be considered in the passive site optimization. Of course, as site modernization is ongoing, an operator (like T-Mobile) also should consider the impact of future bands that may be required (e.g., 3.x GHz). Optimize subject to the past as well as the future spectrum outlook. Last but not least, we at T-Mobile have been blessed with a world-class engineering team that has been instrumental in squeezing out continuous improvements of our cellular network over the last 6 years.

So, suppose you have 25% less spectrum than a competitor. In that case, you either need to compensate by building 25% more cells (very costly & time-consuming), deploying better antennas with a 25% better effective spectral efficiency (limited, costly & relatively easy to copy/match), or a combination of both (expensive & time-consuming). The most challenging driver to copy for network superiority is the amount of spectrum. A competitor only compensates by building more sites, deploying better antenna technology, and over decades to try to equalize spectrum position is subsequent spectrum auctions (e.g., valid for Europe, not so for the USA where acquired spectrum usually is owned in perpetuity).

T-Mobile has consistently won the best mobile network award over the last 6 years (and 5 consecutive times) due to these 3 multiplying core dimensions (i.e., spectrum × antenna technology × sites) and our world-class leading engineering team.

THE MAGIC RECIPE FOR CELLULAR PERFORMANCE.

We can formalize the above network heuristics in the following key (very beautiful IMO) formula for cellular network capacity measured in throughput (bits per second);

It is actually that simple. Cellular capacity is made as simple as possible, dependent on three basic elements, but not more straightforward. Maybe, super clear, though only active spectrum counts. Any spectrum not deployed is an opportunity for a competitor to gain network leadership on you.

If an operator has a superior spectrum position and everything else is equal (i.e., antenna technology & the number of sites), that operator should be unbeatable in its market.

There are some caveats, though. In an overloaded (congested) cellular network, performance would decrease, and superior network performance would be unlikely to be ensured compared to competitors not experiencing such congestion. Furthermore, spectrum superiority must be across the depth of the market-relevant cellular frequencies (i.e., 600 MHz – 3.x GHz and higher). In other words, if a cellular operator “only” has to work with, for example, 100 MHz @ 3.5GHz, it is unlikely that this would guarantee a superior network performance across a market (country) compared to a much better balance spectrum portfolio.

The option space any operator has is to consider the following across the three key network quality dimensions;

Let us look at the hypothetical Western European country Mediana. Mediana, with a population of 25 million, has 3 mobile operators each have 8 cellular frequency bands, incumbent Winky has a total cellular bandwidth of 270 MHz, Dipsy has 220 MHz, and Po has 320 MHz (top their initial weaker spectrum position through acquisitions). Apart from having the most robust spectrum portfolio, Po also has more cell sites than any other in the market (10,000) and keeps winning the best network award. Winky, being the incumbent, is not happy about this situation. No new spectrum opportunities will become available in the next 10 years. Winky’s cellular network, based initially on 900MHz but densified over time, has about 20% fewer sites than Po. Po and Winky’s deployed state of antenna technology is comparable.

What can Winky do to gain network leadership? Winky has assessed that Po has ca. 20% stronger spectrum position than they, state of antenna technology is comparable, and they (Po) have ca. 20% more sites. Using the above formula, Winky estimates that Po’s have 44% more raw cellular network quality available compared to their own capability. Winky’s commenced a network modernization program that adds another 500 new sites and significantly improves their antenna technology. After this modernization program, Winky has decreased its site deficit to having 10% fewer sites than Po and almost 60% better antenna technology capability than Po. Overall, using the above network quality formula, Winky has changed their network position to a lead over Po with ca. 18%. In theory, it should have an excellent chance to capture the best network award.

Of course, Po could simply follow and deploy the same antenna technology as Winky and would easily overtake Winky’s position due to its superior spectrum position (that Winky cannot beat the next 10 to 15 years at least).

In economic terms, it may be tempting to conclude that Winky has avoided 625 Million Euro in spectrum fees by possessing 50 MHz less than Po (i.e., median spectrum fee in Mediana is 0.50 Euro per MHz per pop times the avoided 50 MHz times the population of Mediana 25 Million pops) and that for sure should allow Winky to make a lot of network (and market) investments to gain network leadership. By adding more sites, assuming it is possible to do where they are needed and invest in better antenna technology. However, do the math with realistic prices and costs incurred over a 10 to 15 year period (i.e., until the next spectrum opportunity). You may be more likely to find a higher total cost for Winky than the spectrum fee avoidance. Also, the strategy of Winky is easy to copy and overtake in the next modernization cycle of Po.

Is there any value for operators engaging in such the best network equivalent of a “nuclear arms” race? That interesting question is for another article. Though the answer (spoiler alert) is (maybe) not so black and white as one may think.

An operator can compensate for a weaker spectrum position by adding more cell sites and deploying better antenna technologies.

A superior spectrum portfolio is not an entitlement. Still, an opportunity to become the sustainable best network in a given market (for the duration that spectrum is available to the operator, e.g., 10 – 15 years in Europe at least).

WESTERN EUROPE SPECTRUM POSITIONS.

A cellular operator’s spectrum position is an important prerequisite for superior performance and customer experience. If an operator has the highest amount of spectrum (well balanced over low, mid, and high-frequency bands), it will have a powerful position to become the best network in that given market. Using Spectrum Monitor’s Global Mobile Frequency database (last updated May 2021), I analyzed the spectrum position of a total of 58 cellular operators in 16 Western European markets. The result is shown below as (a) Total spectrum position, (b) Low-band spectrum position covering spectrum below and including 1500 MHz (SDL band), and (c) Mid-band spectrum covering the spectrum above 1500 MHz (SDL band). For clarity, I include the 3.X GHz (C-band) as mid-band and do not include any mmWave (n257 band) positions (anyway would be high band, obviously).

4 operators are in a category by themselves with 400+ MHz of total cellular bandwidth in their spectrum portfolios; A1 (Austria), TDC (Denmark), Cosmote (Greece), and Swisscom (Switzerland). TDC and Swisscom have incredibly strong low-band and mid-band positions compared to their competition. Magenta in Austria has a 20 MHz advantage to A1 in low-band (very good) but trails A1 with 92 MHz in mid-band (not so good). Cosmote slightly follows behind on low-band compared to Vodafone (+10 MHz in their favor), and they head the Greek race with +50 MHz (over Vodafone) in mid-band. All 4 operators should be far ahead of their competitors in network quality. At least if they used their spectrum resources wisely in combination with good (or superior) antenna technologies and a sufficient cellular network footprint. In all else being equal, these 4 operators should be sustainable unbeatable based on their incredible strong spectrum positions. Within Western Europe, I would, over the next few years, expect to see all round best networks with very high best network benchmark scores in Denmark (TDC), Switzerland (Swisscom), Austria (A1), and Greece (Cosmote). Western European countries with relatively more minor surface areas (e.g., <100,000 square km) should outperform much larger countries.

In fact, 3 of the 4 top spectrum-holding operators also have the best cellular networks in their markets. The only exception is A1 in Austria, which lost to Magenta in the most recent Umlaut best network benchmark. Magenta has the best low-band position in the Austrian market, providing for above and beyond cellular indoor-quality coverage that the low-band provides.

There are so many more interesting insights in my collected data. Alas for another article at another time (e.g., topics like the economic value of being the best and winning awards, industry investment levels vs. performance, infrastructure strategies, incumbent vs. later stages operator dynamics, 3.X GHz and mmWave positions in WEU, etc…).

The MNO rank within a country will depend on the relative spectrum position between 1st and 2nd operator. If below 10% (i.e., dark red in chart below), I assess that it will be relative easy for number 2 to match or beat number 1 with improved antenna technology. As the relative strength of the spectrum position of number 1 relative to number 2 is increased, it will become increasingly difficult (assuming number 1 uses an optimal deployment strategy).

The Stars (e.g., #TDCNet / #Nuuday#Swisscom and #EE) have more than a 30% relative spectrum strength compared to the 2nd ranked MNO in a given market. They will have to severely mess up, not to take (or have!) the best cellular network position in their relevant markets. Moreover, network economically, the Stars should have a substantial better Capex position compared to their competitors (although 1 of the Stars seem a “bit” out-of-whack in their sustainable Capex spend, but may be due to fixed broadband focus as well?). As a “cherry on the pie” both Nuuday/TDCNet and Swisscom have some of the strongest spectral overhead positions (i.e., MHz per pop) in Western Europe (relative small populations to very strong spectrum portfolios), which is obviously should enable superior customer experience.

HOW AND HOW NOT TO WIN BEST NETWORK AWARDS.

Out of the 16 cellular operators having the best networks (i.e., rank 1), 12 (75%) also had the strongest (in market) spectrum positions. 3 Operators having the second-best spectrum position ended up taking the best network position, and 1 operator (WindTre, Italy) with the 3rd best spectrum position took the pole network position. The incumbent TIM (Italy) has the strongest spectrum position both in low- (+40 MHz vs. WindTre) and mid-band (+52 MHz vs. WindTre). Clearly, it is not a given that having a superior spectrum position also leads to a superior network position. Though 12 out of 16 operators leverage their spectrum superiority compared to their respective competitors.

For operators with the 2nd largest spectrum position, more variation is observed. 7 out of 16 operators end up with the 2nd position as best network (using Umlaut scoring). 3 ended up as best network, and the rest either in 3rd or 4th position. The reason is that often the difference between 2nd and 3rd spectrum rank position is not per see considerable and therefor, other effects, such as several sites, better antenna technologies, and/or better engineering team, are more likely to be decisive factors.

Nevertheless, the total spectrum is a strong predictor for having the best cellular network and winning the best network award (by Umlaut).

As I have collected quite a rich dataset for mobile operators in Western Europe, it may also be possible to model the expected ranking of operators in a given market. Maybe even reasonably predict an Umlaut score (Hakan, don’t worry, I am not quite there … yet!). This said, while the dataset comprises 58+ operators across 16 markets, more data would be required to increase the confidence in benchmark predictions (if that is what one would like to do). Particular to predict absolute benchmark scores (e.g., voice, data, and crowd) as compiled by Umlaut. Speed benchmarks, ala what Ookla’s provides, are (much) easier to predict with much less sophistication (IMO).

Here I will just show my little toy model using the following rank data (using Jupyter R);

The rank dataset set has 64 rows representing rank data and 5 columns containing (1) performance rank (perf_rank, the response), (2) total spectrum rank (spec_rank, predictor), (3) low-band spectrum rank (lo_spec_rank, predictor), (4) high-band spectrum rank (hi_spec_rank, predictor) and (5) Hz-per-customer rank (hz_cust_rank, predictor).

Concerning the predictor (or feature) Hz-per-customer, I am tracking all cellular operators’ so-called spectrum-overhead, which indicates how much Hz can be assigned to a customer (obviously an over-simplification but nevertheless an indicator). Rank 1 means that there is a significant overhead. That is, we have a lot of spectral capacity per customer. Rank 4 has the opposite meaning: the spectral overhead is small, and we have less spectral capacity per customer. It is good to remember that this particular feature is usually dynamic unless the spectrum situation changes for a given cellular operator (e.g., like traffic and customers may grow).

A (very) simple illustration of the “toy model” is shown below, choosing only low-band and high-band ranks as relevant predictors. Almost 60% of the network-benchmark rank can be explained by the low- and high-band ranks.

The model can, of course, be enriched by including more features, such as effective antenna-capability, Hz-per-Customer, Hz-per-Byte, Coverage KPI, Incident rates, Equipment Aging, Supplier, investment level (over last 2 – 3 years), etc… Given the ongoing debate of the importance of supplier to best networks (and their associated awards), I do not find a particularly strong correlation between RAN (incl. antenna) supplier, network performance, and benchmark rank. The total amount of deployed spectrum is a more important predictor. Of course, given the network performance formula above, if an antenna deployment delivers more effective spectral efficiency (or antenna “boost”) than competitors, it will increase the overall network quality for that operator. However, such an operator would still need to overcompensate the potential lack of spectrum compared to a spectrum-superior competitor.

END THOUGHTS.

Having the best cellular network in a market is something to be very proud of. Winning best network awards is obviously great for an operator and its employees. However, it should really mean that the customers of that best network operator also get the best cellular experience compared to any other operator in that market. A superior customer experience is key.

Firstly, the essential driver (enabler) for best network or network leadership is having a superior spectrum position. In low-band, mid-band, and longer-term also in high-band (e.g., mmWave spectrum). The second is having a good coverage footprint across your market. Compared to competitors, a superior spectrum portfolio could even be with fewer cell sites than a competitor with an inferior spectrum position (forced to densify earlier due to spectral capacity limitations as traffic increases). For a spectrum laggard, building more cell sites is costly (i.e., Capex, Opex, and Time) to attempt to improve or match a superior spectrum competitor. Thirdly, having superior antenna technology deployed is essential. It is also a relatively “easy” way to catch up with a superior competitor, at least in the case of relative minor spectrum position differences. Compared to buying additional spectrum (assuming such is available when you need it) or building out a substantial amount of new cell sites to equalize a cellular performance difference, investing into the best (or better or good-enough-to-win) antenna technology, particular for a spectrum laggard, seems to be the best strategy. Economically, relative to the other two options, and operationally, as time-to-catch-up can be relatively short.

After all, this has been said and done, a superior cellular spectrum portfolio is one of the best predictors for having the best network and even winning the best network award.

Economically, it could imply that a spectrum-superior operator, depending on the spectrum distance to the next-best spectrum position in a given market, may not need to invest in the same level of antenna technology as an inferior operator or could delay such investments to a more opportune moment. This could be important, particularly as advanced antenna development is still at its “toddler” state, and more innovative, powerful (and economical) solutions are expected over the next few years. Though, for operators with relatively minor spectrum differences, the battle will be via the advancement of antenna technology and further cell site sectorization (as opposed to building new sites).

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT.

I greatly acknowledge my wife, Eva Varadi, for her support, patience, and understanding during the creative process of writing this Blog. Also, many of my Deutsche Telekom AG and Industry colleagues, in general, have in countless ways contributed to my thinking and ideas leading to this little Blog. Again, I would like to draw attention to Petr Ledl and his super-competent team in Deutsche Telekom’s Group Research & Trials. Thank you so much for being a constant inspiration and always being available to talk antennas and cellular tech in general.

FURTHER READINGS.

Spectrum Monitoring, “Global Mobile Frequencies Database”, the last update on the database was May 2021. You have a limited amount of free inquiries before you will have to pay an affordable fee for access.

Umlaut, “Umlaut Benchmarking” is an important resources for mobile (and fixed) network benchmarks across the world. The umlaut benchmarking methodology is the de-facto industry standard today and applied in more than 120 countries measuring over 200 mobile networks worldwide. I have also made use of the associated Connect Testlab resouce; www.connect-testlab.com. Most network benchmark data goes back to at least 2017. The Umlaut benchmark is based on in-country drive test for voice and data as well as crowd sourced data. It is by a very big margin The cellular network benchmark to use for ranking cellular operators (imo).

Speedtest (Ookla), “Global Index”, most recent data is Q3, 2021. There are three Western European markets that I have not found any Umlaut (or P3 prior to 2020) benchmarks for; Denmark, France and Norway. For those markets I have (regrettably) had to use Ookla data which is clearly not as rich as Umlaut (at least for public domain data).

Mobile Data-centric Price Plans – An illustration of the De-composed.

How much money would it take for you to give up internet? …for the rest of your life? … and maybe much more important; How much do you want to pay for internet? The following cool video URL “Would you give up the Internet for 1 Million Dollars” hints towards both of those questions and an interesting paradox!

The perception of value is orders of magnitude higher than the willingness to pay, i.e.,

“I would NOT give up Internet for life for a Million+ US Dollars … oh … BUT… I don’t want to pay more than a couple of bucks for it either” (actually for a mature postpaid-rich market the chances are that over your expected life-time you will pay between 30 to 40 thousand US$ for mobile internet & voice & some messaging).

Price plans are fascinating! … Particular the recent data-centric price plans bundling in legacy services such as voice and SMS.

Needles to say that a consumer today often needs an advanced degree in science to really understand the price plans they are being presented. A high degree of trust is involved in choosing a given plan. The consumer usually takes what has been recommended by the shop expert (who most likely doesn’t have an advanced science degree either). This shop expert furthermore might (or might not) get a commission (i.e., a bonus) selling you a particular plan and thus in such a case hardly is the poster child of objectiveness.

How does the pricing experts come to the prices that they offer to the consumer? Are those plans internally consistent … or  maybe not?

It becomes particular interesting to study data-centric price plans that try to re-balance Mobile Voice and SMS.

How is 4G (i.e., in Europe also called LTE) being charged versus “normal” data offerings in the market? Do the mobile consumer pay more for Quality? Or maybe less?

What is the real price of mobile data? … Clearly, it is not the price we pay for a data-centric price plan.

A Data-centric Tale of a Country called United & a Telecom Company called Anything Anywhere!

As an example of mobile data pricing and in particular of data-centric mobile pricing with Voice and SMS included, I looked at a Western European Market (let’s call it United) and a mobile operator called Anything Anywhere. Anything Anywhere (AA) is known for its comprehensive & leading-edge 4G network as well as several innovative product ideas around mobile broadband data.

In my chosen Western European country United, voice revenues have rapidly declined over the last 5 years. Between 2009 to 2014 mobile voice revenues lost more than 36% compared to an overall revenue loss of “only” 14%. This corresponds to a compounded annual growth rate of minus 6.3% over the period. For an in depth analysis of the incredible mobile voice revenue losses the mobile industry have incurred in recent years see my blog “The unbearable lightness of mobile voice”.

Did this market experience a massive uptake in prepaid customers? No! Not at all … The prepaid share of the customer base went from ca. 60% in 2009 to ca. 45% in 2014. So in other words the Postpaid base over the period had grown with 15% and in 2014 was around 55%. This should usually have been a cause for great joy and incredible boost in revenues. United is also a market that has largely managed not to capitalize economically on substantial market consolidation.

As it is with many other mobile markets, engaging & embracing the mobile broadband data journey has been followed by a sharp decline in the overall share of voice revenue from ca. 70% in 2009 to ca. 50% in 2014. An ugly trend when the total mobile revenue declines as well.

The Smartphone penetration in United as of Q1 2014 was ca. 71% with 32% iOS-based devices. Compare this to 2009 where the smartphone penetration was ca. 21% with iOS making out around 75+%.

Our Mobile Operator AA has the following price plan structure (note: all information is taken directly from AA’s web site and can be found back if you guess which company it applies to);

  • Data-centric price plans with unlimited Voice and SMS.
  • Differentiated speed plans, i.e., 4G (average speed advertised to 12 – 15 Mbps) vs. Double Speed 4G (average speed advertised to 24 – 30 Mbps).
  • Offer plans that apply Europe Union-wide.
  • Option to pay less for handsets upfront but more per month (i.e., particular attractive for expensive handsets such as iPhone or Samsung Galaxy top-range models).
  • Default offering is 24 month although a shorter period is possible as well.
  • Offer SIM-only data-centric with unlimited voice & SMS.
  • Offer Data-only SIM-only plans.
  • Further you will get access to extensive “WiFi Underground”. Are allowed tethering and VoIP including Voice-calling over WiFi.

So here is an example of AA’s data-centric pricing for various data allowances. In this illustration I have chosen to add an iPhone 6 Plus (why? well I do love that phone as it largely replaces my iPad outside my home!) with 128GB storage. This choice have no impact on the fixed and variable parts of the respective price plans. For SIM-Only plans in the data below, I have added the (Apple) retail price of the iPhone 6 Plus (light grey bars). This is to make the comparison somewhat more comparable. It should of course be clear that in the SIM-only plans, the consumer is not obliged to buy a new device.

tco 24 month

  • Figure above: illustrates the total consumer cost or total price paid over the period (in local currency) of different data plans for our leading Western European Mobile Operator AA. The first 9 plans shown above includes a iPhone 6 Plus with 128GB memory. The last 5 are SIM only plans with the last 2 being Data-only SIM-only plans. The abbreviations are the following PPM: Pay per Month (but little upfront for terminal), PUF: Pay UpFront (for terminal) and less per month, SIMO: SIM-Only plan, SIMDO: SIM Data-Only plan, xxGB: The xx amount of Giga Bytes offered in Plan, 2x indicates double 4G speed of “normal” and 1x indicates “normal” speed, 1st UL indicates unlimited voice in plan, 2nd UL indicates unlimited SMS in plan, EU indicates that the plan also applies to countries in EU without extra charges. So PPM20GB2xULULEU defines a Pay per Month plan (i.e., the handset is pay over the contract period and thus leads to higher monthly charges) with 20 GB allowance at Double (4G) Speed with Unlimited Voice and Unlimited SMS valid across EU. In this plan you would pay 100 (in local currency) for a iPhone 6 Plus with 128 GB. Note the local Apple Shop retail price of an iPhone 6 Plus with 128 GB is around 789 in local currency (of which ca. 132 is VAT) for this particular country. Note: for the SIM-only plans (i.e., SIMO & SIMDO) I have added the Apple retail price of a iPhone 6 Plus 128GB. It furthermore should be pointed out that the fixed service fee and the data consumption price does not vary with choice of handset.

If I decide that I really want that iPhone 6 Plus and I do not want to pay the high price (even with discounts) that some price plans offers. AA offers me a 20GB 4G data-plan, pay 100 upfront for the iPhone 6 Plus (with 128 GB memory) and for the next 24 month 63.99 (i.e., as this feels much cheaper than paying 64) per month. After 24 month my total cost of the 20 GB would be 1,636. I could thus save 230 over the 24 month if I wanted to pay 470 (+370 compared to previous plan & – 319 compared to Apple retail price) for the iPhone. In this lower cost plan my monthly cost of the 20 GB would be 38.99 or 25 (40%!) less on a monthly basis.

The Analysis show that a “Pay-less-upfront-and-more-per-month” subscriber would end up after the 24 month having paid at least ca. 761 for the iPhone 6 Plus (with 128GB). We will see later, that the total price paid for the iPhone 6 Plus however is likely to be approximately 792 or slightly above today’s retail price (based on Apple’s pricing).

The Price of a Byte and all that Jazz

So how does the above data-price plans look like in terms of Price-per-Giga-Byte?

Although in most cases not be very clear to the consumer, the data-centric price plan is structured around the price of the primary data allowance (i.e., the variable part) and non-data related bundled services included in the plan (i.e., the fixed service part representing non-data items).

There will be a variable price reflecting the data-centric price-plans data allowance and a “Fixed” Service Fee that capture the price of bundled services such as voice and SMS. Based on total price of the data-centric price plan, it will often appear that the higher the allowance the cheaper does your unit-data “consumption” (or allowance) become. Indicating that volume discounts have been factored into the price-plan. In other words, the higher the data allowance the lower the price per GB allowance.

This is often flawed logic and simply an artefact of the bundled non-data related services being priced into the plan. However, to get to that level of understanding requires a bit of analysis that most of us certainly don’t do before a purchase.

price per giga byte

  • Figure above: Illustrates the unit-price of a Giga Byte (GB) versus AA’s various data-centric price plans. Note the price plans can be decomposed into a variable data-usage attributable price (per GB) and a fixed service fee that accounts for non-data services blended into the price. The Data Consumption per GB is the variable data-usage dependable part of the Price Plan and the Total price per GB is the full price normalized to the plans data consumption allowance.

So with the above we have argued that the total data-centric price can be written as a fixed and a variable part;

{P_{Tot}} = {P_{Fixed}} + {P_{Data}}({U_{GB}}) = {P_{Fixed}} + {p_{GB}}U_{GB}^\beta

As will be described in more detail below, the data-centric price {P_{Tot}} is structured in what can be characterized as a “Fixed Service Fee”  {P_{Fixed}} and a variable “Data Consumption Price{P_{Data}} that depends on a given price-plan’s data allowance {U_{GB}} (i.e., GB is Giga Byte). The “Data Consumption Price{P_{Data}} is variable in nature and while it might be a complex (i.e. in terms of complexity) function of data allowance {U_{GB}} it typically be of the form {p_{GB}}U_{GB}^\beta with the exponent \beta (i.e., Beta) being 1 or close to 1. In other words the Data Consumptive price is a linear (or approximately so) function of the data allowance. In case \beta is larger than 1, data pricing gets progressively more expensive with increasing allowance (i.e., penalizing high consumption or as I believe right-costing high consumption). For \beta lower than 1, data gets progressively cheaper with increasing data allowances corresponding to volume discounts with the danger of mismatching the data pricing with the cost of delivering the data.

The “Fixed Service Fee” depends on all the non-data related goodies that are added to the data-centric price plan, such as (a) unlimited voice, (b) unlimited SMS, (c) Price plan applies Europe-wide (i.e., EU-Option), (d) handset subsidy recovery fee, (e) maybe a customer management fee, etc..

For most price data-centric plan, If the data-centric price divided by the allowance would be plotted against the allowance {U_{GB}} in a Log-Log format would result in a fairly straight-line.

examples of power-law behaviour

Nothing really surprising given the pricing math involved! It is instructive to see what actually happens when we take a data-centric price and divide by the corresponding data allowance;

\frac{{{P_{Tot}}}}{{{U_{GB}}}} = \frac{{{P_{Fixed}} + {p_{GB}}U_{GB}^\beta }}{{{U_{GB}}}}  = \limits^{\beta  = 1} {p_{GB}} + {P_{Fixed}}U_{GB}^{ - 1}

For very large data allowances {U_{GB}} the price-centric per GB would asymptotically converge to {p_{GB}}, i.e., the unit cost of a GB. As {p_{GB}} is usually a lot smaller than {P_{Fixed}}, we see that there is another limit, where the allowance {U_{GB}} is relative low, where we would see the data-centric pricing per GB slope (in a Log-Log plot) become linear in the data allowance. Typically for allowances from 0.1 GB up towards 50 GB, non-linear slope of approximately -0.7±0.1 is observed and thus in between the linear and the constant pricing regime.

We can also observe that If the total price, of a data-centric price plan associated with a given data allowance (i.e., GB), is used to derive a price-per-GB, one would conclude that most mobile operators provide the consumer with volume discounts as they adapt higher data allowance plans. The GB gets progressively cheaper for higher usage plans. As most data-centric price plans are in the range where {p_{GB}} is (a lot) smaller than {P_{Fixed}}U_{GB}^{ - 1} , it will appear that the unit price of data declines as the data allowance increases. However in most cases it is likely an artefact of the Fixed Service Fee that reflects non-data related services which unless a data-only bundle can be a very substantial part of the data-centric price plan.

It is clear that data-allowance normalizing the totality of a data-centric price plan, particular when non-data services have been blended into the plan, will not reveal the real price of data. If used for assessing, for example, data profitability or other mobile data related financial KPIs this approach might be of very little use.

data centric price dynamics

  • Figure above: illustrates the basic characteristics of a data-centric price plan normalized by the data allowance. The data for this example reflects the AA’s data-centric price plans 2x4G Speed with bundled unlimited Voice & SMS as well as applying EU-wide. We see that the Beta value corresponds to a Volume Discount (at values lower than 1) or a Volume Penalty (at values higher than 1).

Oh yeah! … The really “funny” part of most data-price plan analysis (including my own past ones!) are they are more likely to reflect the Fixed Service Part (independent of the Data allowance) of the Data-centric price plan than the actual unit price of mobile data.

What to expect from AA’s data-centric price plans?

so in a rational world of data-centric pricing (assuming such exist) what should we expect of Anything Anywhere’s price plans as advertised online;

  • The (embedded) price for unlimited voice would be the same irrespective of the data plan’s allowed data usage (i.e., unlimited Voice does not depend on data plan).
  • The (embedded) price for unlimited SMS would be the same irrespective of the data plan’s allowed data usage (i.e., unlimited SMS does not depend on data plan).
  • You would pay more for having your plan extended to apply across Europe Union compared to not having this option.
  • You would (actually you should) expect to pay more per Mega Byte for the Double Speed option as compared to the Single Speed Option.
  • If you decide to “finance” your handset purchase (i.e., pay less upfront option) within a data plan you should expect to pay more on a monthly basis.
  • Given a data plan has a whole range of associated handsets priced From Free (i.e., included in plan without extra upfront charge) to high-end high-priced Smartphones, such as iPhone 6 Plus 128 GB, you would not expect that handset related cost would have been priced into the data plan. Or if it is, it must be the lowest common denominator for the whole range of offered handsets at a given price plan.
  • Where the discussion becomes really interesting is how your data consumption should be priced; (1) You pay more per unit of data consumption as you consume more data on a monthly basis, (2) You pay the same per unit irrespective of your consumption or (3) You should have a volume discount making your units cheaper the more you consume.

of course the above is if and only if the price plans have been developed in reasonable self-consistent manner.

data price analysis

  • Figure above: Illustrates AA’s various data-centric price plans (taken from their web site). Note that PPM represents low upfront (terminal) cost for the consumer and higher monthly cost and PUF represent paying upfront for the handset and thus having lower monthly costs as a consequence. The Operator AA allows the consumer in the PPM Plan to choose for an iPhone 6 Plus 128GB (priced at 100 to 160) or an IPhone 6 Plus 64GB option (at a lower price of course).

First note that Price Plans (with more than 2 data points) tend to be linear with the Data Usage allowance.

The Fixed Service Fee – The Art of Re-Capture Lost legacy Value?

In the following I define the Fixed Service Fee as the part of the total data-centric price plan that is independent of a given plan’s data allowance. The logic is that this part would contain all non-data related cost such as Unlimited Voice, Unlimited SMS, EU-Option, etc..

From AA’s voice plan (for 250 Minutes @ 10 per Month & 750 Minutes @ 15 per Month) with unlimited SMS (& no data) it can be inferred that

  • Price of Unlimited SMS can be no higher than 7.5. This however is likely also include general customer maintenance cost.

Monthly customer maintenance cost (cost of billing, storage, customer care & systems support, etc.) might be deduced from the SIM-Only Data-Only package and would be

  • Price of Monthly Customer Maintenance could be in the order of 5, which would imply that the Unlimited SMS price would be 2.5. Note the market average Postpaid SMS ARPU in 2014 was ca., 8.40 (based on Pyramid Research data). The market average number of postpaid SMS per month was ca. 273 SMS.

From AA’s SIM-only plan we get that the fixed portion of providing service (i.e., customer maintenance, unlimited Voice & SMS usage) is 14 and thus

  • Price of Unlimited Voice should be approximately 6.5. Note the market average Postpaid Voice ARPU was ca. 12 (based on Pyramid Research data). The market average voice usage per month was ca. 337 minutes. Further from the available limited voice price plans it can be deduced that unlimited voice must be higher than 1,000 Minutes or more than 3 times the national postpaid average.

The fixed part of the data-centric pricing difference between the data-centric SIM-only plan and similar data-centric plan including a handset (i.e., all services are the same except for the addition of the handset) could be regarded as a minimum handset financing cost allowing the operator to recover some of the handset subsidy

  • Equipment subsidy recovery cost of 7 (i.e., over a 24 month period this amounts to 168 which is likely to recover the average handset subsidy). Note is the customer chooses to pay little upfront for the handset, the customer would have to pay 26 extra per month in he fixed service fee. Thus low upfront cost result in another 624 over the 24 month contract period. Interestingly is that with the initial 7 for handset subsidy recovery in the basic fixed service fee a customer would have paid 792 in handset recovery over 24 month period the contract applies to (a bit more than the iPhone 6 Plus 128GB retail price).

The price for allowing the data-centric price-plan to apply Europe Union Wide is

  • The EU-Option (i.e., plan applicable within EU) appears to be priced at ca. 5 (caution: 2x4G vis-a-vis 1x4G could have been priced into this delta as well).

For EU-option price it should be noted here that the two plans that are being compared differs not only in the EU-option. The plan without the EU option is a data plan with “normal” 4G speed, while the EU-option plan supports double 4G speeds. So in theory the additional EU-option charge of 5 could also include a surcharge for the additional speed.

Why an operator would add the double speed to the fixed Service Fee price part is “bit” strange. The 2x4G speed price-plan option clearly is a variable trigger for cost (and value to the customer’s data usage). Thus should be introduced in the the variable part (i.e., the Giga-Byte dependent part) of the data-centric price plan.

It is assumed that indeed the derived difference can be attributed to the EU-option, i.e., the double speed has not been include in the monthly Fixed Service Fee.

In summary we get AA’s data-centric price plan’s monthly Fixed Service Fee de-composition as follows;

fixed part of data-centric pricing

  • Figure above: shows the composition of the monthly fixed service fee as part of AA’s data-centric plans. Of course in a SIM-only scenario the consumer would not have the Handset Recovery Fee inserted in the price plan.

So irrespective of the data allowance a (postpaid) customer would pay between 26 to 52 per month depending on whether handset financing is chosen (i.e., Low upfront payment on the expense of higher monthly cost).

Mobile data usage still has to happen!

The price of Mobile Data Allowance.

The variable data-price in the studied date-centric price plans are summarized in the table below as well as the figure;

Price-plan

4G Speed

Price per GB

Pay Less Upfront More per Month

Double

0.61±0.03

Pay Upfront & Less per Month

Double

0.67±0.05

SIM-Only

Single

1.47±0.08

SIM-Only Data Only

Single

2 (only 2 data points)

variable data price analysis

The first thing that obviously should make you Stop in Wonder is that Single 4G Speed Giga Byte is more than Twice the price of a Double 4G Speed Giga Byte In need for speed … well that will give you a pretty good deal with AA’s price 2x4G plans.

Second thing to notice is that it would appear to be a really bad deal (with respect to the price-per-byte) to be a SIM-Only Data-Only customer.

The Data-Only pays 2 per GB. Almost 3 times more than if you would choose a subscription with a device, double speed, double unlimited and EU-wide applicable price plan.

Agreed! In absolute terms the SIM-only Data-only cost a lot less per month (9 less than the 20GB pay device upfront) and it is possible to run away after 12 months (versus the 24 month plans). One rationale for charging extra per Byte for a SIM-only Data-only plan could be that the SIM card might be used in Tablet or Data-card/Dongle products that typically does consume most if not all of a given plans allowance. For normal devices and high allowance plans on average the consumption can be quiet a lot lower than the actual allowance. Particular over a 24 month period.

You might argue that this is all about how the data-centric price plans have been de-composed in a fixed service fee (supposedly the non-data dependent component) and a data consumptive price. However, even when considering the full price of a given price plan is the Single-4G-Speed more expensive per Byte than Double-4G-Speed.

You may also argue that I am comparing apples and oranges (or even bananas pending taste) as the Double-4G-Speed plans include a devices and a price-plan that applies EU-wide versus the SIM-only plan that includes the customers own device and a price-plan that only works in United. All true of course … Why that should be more expensive to opt out of is a bit beyond me and why this should have an inflationary impact on the price-per-Byte … well a bit of a mystery as well.

At least there is no (statistical) difference in the variable price of a Giga Byte whether the customer chooses to pay of her device over the 24 month contract period or pay (most of) it upfront.

For AA it doesn’t seem to be of concern! …. As 88% would come back for more (according with their web site).

Obviously this whole analysis above make the big assumption that the data-centric price plans are somewhat rationally derived … this might not be the case!

and it assumes that rationally & transparently derived price plans are the best for the consumer …

and it assumes what is good for the consumer is also good for the company …

Is AA different in this respect to that of other Operators around the world …

No! AA is not different from any other incumbent operator coming from a mobile voice centric domain!

Acknowledgement

I greatly acknowledge my wife Eva Varadi for her support, patience and understanding during the creative process of creating this Blog.

Postscript – The way I like to look at (rational … what ever that means) data-centric pricing.

Firstly, it would appear that AA’s pricing philosophy follows the industry standard of pricing mobile services and in particular mobile data-centric services by the data volume allowance. Non-data services are added to the data-centric price plan and in all effect make up for the most part of the price-plan even at relative higher data allowances;

standard pricing philosophy in mobile domain

  • Figure above: illustrates the typical approach to price plan design in the Telecom’s industry. Note while not per se wrong it often overweight’s the volume element of pricing and often results in sub-optimizing the Quality and Product aspects . Source: Dr. Kim K Larsen’s Mind Share contribution at Informa’s LTE World Summit May 2012; “Right pricing LTE and mobile broadband in general (a Technologist’ Observations)”.

Unlimited Voice and SMS in AA’s standard data-centric plans clearly should mitigate possible loss or migration away from old fashion voice (i.e., circuit switched) and SMS. However both the estimated allowances for unlimited voice (6.5) and SMS (2.5) appear to be a lot lower than their classical standalone ARPUs for the postpaid category. This certainly could explain that this market (as many others in Western Europe) have lost massive amount of voice revenues over the last 5 years. In other words re-capturing or re-balancing legacy service revenues into data-centric plans still have some way to go in order to be truly effective (if at all possible which is highly questionable at this time and age).

pricing_fundamentals

As a Technologist, I am particular interested in how the technology cost and benefits are being considered in data-centric price plans.

The big challenge for the pricing expert who focus too much on volume is that the same volume can result from vastly different network qualities and speed. The customers handset will drive the experience of quality and certainly consumption. By that differences in network load and thus technology cost. A customer with a iPhone 6 Plus is likely to load the mobile data network more (and thus incur higher cost) than a customer with a normal screen smartphone of 1 or 2 generations removed from iPhone 6 Plus. It is even conceivable that a user with iPhone 6 Plus will load the network more than a customer with a normal iPhone 6 (independent of the iOS). This is very very different for Voice and SMS volumetric considerations in legacy price plans, where handset had little (or no) impact on network load relative to the usage.

For data-centric price plans to be consistent with the technology cost incurred one should consider;

  • Higher “guarantied” Quality, typically speed or latency, should be priced higher per Byte than lower quality plans (or at the very least not lower).
  • Higher Volumetric Allowances should be priced per Byte higher than Lower Volumetric Allowance (or at the very least not lower).
  • Offering unlimited Voice & SMS in data-centric plans (as well as other bundled goodies) should be carefully re-balanced to re-capture some of lost legacy revenues.

That AA’s data-centric plans for double speed appears to be cheaper than their plans at a lower data delivery quality level is not consistent with costing. Of course, AA cannot really guaranty that the customer will get double 4G speed everywhere and as such it may not be fair to charge substantially more than for single speed. However, this is of course not what appear to happen here.

AA’s lowest data unit price (in per Giga Byte) is around 0.6 – 0.7 (or 0.06 – 0.07 Cent per Mega Byte). That price is very low and in all likelihood lower than their actual production cost of a GB or MB.

However, one may argue that as long as the Total Service Revenue gained by a data-centric price plan recover the production cost, as well as providing a healthy margin then whether the applied data unit-price is designed to recover the data production cost is maybe less of an issue.

In other words, data profitability may not matter as much as overall profitability. This said it remains in my opinion in-excusable for a mobile operator not to understand its main (data) cost drivers and ensure it is recovered in their overall pricing strategies.

Surely! You may say? … “Surely Mobile Operators know their cost structure and respective cost drivers and their price plans reflects this knowledge?”

It is my observation that most price plans (data-centric or not) are developed primarily in response to competition (which of course is an important pricing element as well) rather than firmly anchored in Cost, Value & Profit considerations. Do Operators really & deeply know their own cost structure and cost drivers? … Ahhh … In my opinion few really appear to do!

The Economics of the Thousand Times Challenge: Spectrum, Efficiency and Small Cells

By now the biggest challenge of the “1,000x challenge” is to read yet another story about the “1,000x challenge”.

This said, Qualcomm has made many beautiful presentations on The Challenge. It leaves the reader with an impression that it is much less of a real challenge, as there is a solution for everything and then some.

So bear with me while we take a look at the Economics and in particular the Economical Boundaries around the Thousand Times “Challenge” of providing (1) More spectrum, (2) Better efficiency and last but not least (3) Many more Small Cells.

THE MISSING LINK

While (almost) every technical challenge is solvable by clever engineering (i.e., something Qualcomm obviously have in abundance), it is not following naturally that such solutions are also feasible within the economical framework imposed by real world economics. At the very least, any technical solution should also be reasonable within the world of economics (and of course within a practical time-frame) or it becomes a clever solution but irrelevant to a real world business.

A  Business will (maybe should is more in line with reality) care about customer happiness. However a business needs to do that within healthy financial boundaries of margin, cash and shareholder value. Not only should the customer be happy, but the happiness should extend to investors and shareholders that have trusted the Business with their livelihood.

While technically, and almost mathematically, it follows that massive network densification would be required in the next 10 years IF WE KEEP FEEDING CUSTOMER DEMAND it might not be very economical to do so or at the very least such densification only make sense within a reasonable financial envelope.

Its obvious that massive network densification, by means of macro-cellular expansion, is unrealistic, impractically as well as uneconomically. Thus Small Cell concepts including WiFi has been brought to the Telecoms Scene as an alternative and credible solution. While Small Cells are much more practical, the question whether they addresses sufficiently the economical boundaries, the Telecommunications Industry is facing, remains pretty much unanswered.

PRE-AMP

The Thousand Times Challenge, as it has been PR’ed by Qualcomm, states that the cellular capacity required in 2020 will be at least 1,000 times that of “today”. Actually, the 1,000 times challenge is referenced to the cellular demand & supply in 2010, so doing the math

the 1,000x might “only” be a 100 times challenge between now and 2020 in the world of Qualcomm’s and alike. Not that it matters! … We still talk about the same demand, just referenced to a later (and maybe less “sexy” year).

In my previous Blogs, I have accounted for the dubious affair (and non-nonsensical discussion) of over-emphasizing cellular data growth rates (see “The Thousand Times Challenge: The answer to everything about mobile data”) as well as the much more intelligent discussion about how the Mobile Industry provides for more cellular data capacity starting with the existing mobile networks (see “The Thousand Time Challenge: How to provide cellular data capacity?”).

As it turns out  Cellular Network Capacity C can be described by 3 major components; (1) available bandwidth B, (2) (effective) spectral efficiency E and (3) number of cells deployed N.

The SUPPLIED NETWORK CAPACITY in Mbps (i.e., C) is equal to  the AMOUNT OF SPECTRUM, i.e., available bandwidth, in MHz (i..e, B) multiplied with the SPECTRAL EFFICIENCY PER CELL in Mbps/MHz (i.e., E) multiplied by the NUMBER OF CELLS (i.e., N). For more details on how and when to apply the Cellular Network Capacity Equation read my previous Blog on “How to provide Cellular Data Capacity?”).

SK Telekom (SK Telekom’s presentation at the 3GPP workshop on “Future Radio in 3GPP” is worth a careful study) , Mallinson (@WiseHarbor) and Qualcomm (@Qualcomm_tech, and many others as of late) have used the above capacity equation to impose a Target amount of cellular network capacity a mobile network should be able to supply by 2020: Realistic or Not, this target comes to a 1,000 times the supplied capacity level in 2010 (i.e., I assume that 2010 – 2020 sounds nicer than 2012 – 2022 … although the later would have been a lot more logical to aim for if one really would like to look at 10 years … of course that might not give 1,000 times which might ruin the marketing message?).

So we have the following 2020 Cellular Network Capacity Challenge:

Thus a cellular network in 2020 should have 3 times more spectral bandwidth B available (that’s fairly easy!), 6 times higher spectral efficiency E (so so … but not impossible, particular compared with 2010) and 56 times higher cell site density N (this one might  be a “real killer challenge” in more than one way), compared to 2010!.

Personally I would not get too hanged up about whether its 3 x 6 x 56 or 6 x 3 x 56 or some other “multiplicators” resulting in a 1,000 times gain (though some combinations might be a lot more feasible than others!)

Obviously we do NOT need a lot of insights to see that the 1,000x challenge is a

Rally call for Small & then Smaller Cell Deployment!

Also we do not need to be particular visionary (or have visited a Dutch Coffee Shop) to predict that by 2020 (aka The Future) compared to today (i.e., October 2012)?

Data demand from mobile devices will be a lot higher in 2020!

Cellular Networks have to (and will!) supply a lot more data capacity in 2020!

Footnote: the observant reader will have seen that I am not making the claim that there will be hugely more data traffic on the cellular network in comparison to today. The WiFi path might (and most likely will) take a lot of the traffic growth away from the cellular network.

BUT

how economical will this journey be for the Mobile Network Operator?

THE ECONOMICS OF THE THOUSAND TIMES CHALLENGE

Mobile Network Operators (MNOs) will not have the luxury of getting the Cellular Data Supply and Demand Equation Wrong.

The MNO will need to balance network investments with pricing strategies, churn & customer experience management as well as overall profitability and corporate financial well being:

Growth, if not manage, will lead to capacity & cash crunch and destruction of share holder value!

So for the Thousand Times Challenge, we need to look at the Total Cost of Ownership (TCO) or Total Investment required to get to a cellular network with 1,000 times more network capacity than today. We need to look at:

Investment I(B) in additional bandwidth B, which would include (a) the price of spectral re-farming (i.e., re-purposing legacy spectrum to a new and more efficient technology), (b) technology migration (e.g., moving customers off 2G and onto 3G or LTE or both) and (c) possible acquisition of new spectrum (i..e, via auction, beauty contests, or M&As).

Improving a cellular networks spectral efficiency I(E) is also likely to result in additional investments. In order to get an improved effective spectral efficiency, an operator would be required to (a) modernize its infrastructure, (b) invest into better antenna technologies, and (c) ensure that customer migration from older spectral in-efficient technologies into more spectral efficient technologies occurs at an appropriate pace.

Last but NOT Least the investment in cell density I(N):

Needing 56 times additional cell density is most likely NOT going to be FREE,

even with clever small cell deployment strategies.

Though I am pretty sure that some will make a very positive business case, out there in the Operator space, (note: the difference between Pest & Cholera might come out in favor of Cholera … though we would rather avoid both of them) comparing a macro-cellular expansion to Small Cell deployment, avoiding massive churn in case of outrageous cell congestion, rather than focusing on managing growth before such an event would occur.

The Real “1,000x” Challenge will be Economical in nature and will relate to the following considerations:

tco 2020

In other words:

Mobile Networks required to supply a 1,000 times present day cellular capacity are also required to provide that capacity gain at substantially less ABSOLUTE Total Cost of Ownership.

I emphasize the ABSOLUTE aspects of the Total Cost of Ownership (TCO), as I have too many times seen our Mobile Industry providing financial benefits in relative terms (i.e., relative to a given quality improvement) and then fail to mention that in absolute cost the industry will incur increased Opex (compared to pre-improvement situation). Thus a margin decline (i.e., unless proportional revenue is gained … and how likely is that?) as well as negative cash impact due to increased investments to gain the improvements (i.e., again assuming that proportional revenue gain remains wishful thinking).

Never Trust relative financial improvements! Absolutes don’t Lie!

THE ECONOMICS OF SPECTRUM.

Spectrum economics can be captured by three major themes: (A) ACQUISITION, (B) RETENTION and (C) PERFECTION. These 3 major themes should be well considered in any credible business plan: Short, Medium and Long-term.

It is fairly clear that there will not be a lot new lower frequency (defined here as <2.5GHz) spectrum available in the next 10+ years (unless we get a real breakthrough in white-space). The biggest relative increase in cellular bandwidth dedicated to mobile data services will come from re-purposing (i.e., perfecting) existing legacy spectrum (i.e., by re-farming). Acquisition of some new bandwidth in the low frequency range (<800MHz), which per definition will not be a lot of bandwidth and will take time to become available. There are opportunities in the very high frequency range (>3GHz) which contains a lot of bandwidth. However this is only interesting for Small Cell and Femto Cell like deployments (feeding frenzy for small cells!).

As many European Countries re-auction existing legacy spectrum after the set expiration period (typical 10 -15 years), it is paramount for a mobile operator to retain as much as possible of its existing legacy spectrum. Not only is current traffic tied up in the legacy bands, but future growth of mobile data will critical depend on its availability. Retention of existing spectrum position should be a very important element of an Operators  business plan and strategy.

Most real-world mobile network operators that I have looked at can expect by acquisition & perfection to gain between 3 to 8 times spectral bandwidth for cellular data compared to today’s situation.

For example, a typical Western European MNO have

  1. Max. 2x10MHz @ 900MHz primarily used for GSM. Though some operators are having UMTS 900 in operation or plans to re-farm to UMTS pending regulatory approval.
  2. 2×20 MHz @ 1800MHz, though here the variation tend to be fairly large in the MNO spectrum landscape, i.e., between 2x30MHz down-to 2x5MHz. Today this is exclusively in use for GSM. This is going to be a key LTE band in Europe and already supported in iPhone 5 for LTE.
  3. 2×10 – 15 MHz @ 2100MHz is the main 3G-band (UMTS/HSPA+) in Europe and is expected to remain so for at least the next 10 years.
  4. 2×10 @ 800 MHz per operator and typically distributed across 3 operator and dedicated to LTE. In countries with more than 3 operators typically some MNOs will have no position in this band.
  5. 40 MHz @ 2.6 GHz per operator and dedicated to LTE (FDD and/or TDD). From a coverage perspective this spectrum would in general be earmarked for capacity enhancements rather than coverage.

Note that most European mobile operators did not have 800MHz and/or 2.6GHz in their spectrum portfolios prior to 2011. The above list has been visualized in the Figure below (though only for FDD and showing the single side of the frequency duplex).

spectrum_details

The 700MHz will eventually become available in Europe (already in use for LTE in USA via AT&T and VRZ) for LTE advanced. Though the time frame for 700MHz cellular deployment in Europe is still expected take maybe up to 8 years (or more) to get it fully cleared and perfected.

Today (as of 2012) a typical European MNO would have approximately (a) 60 MHz (i.e., DL+UL) for GSM, (b) 20 – 30 MHz for UMTS and (c) between 40MHz – 60MHz for LTE (note that in 2010 this would have been 0MHz for most operators!). By 2020 it would be fair to assume that same MNO could have (d) 40 – 50 MHz for UMTS/HSPA+ and (e) 80MHz – 100MHz for LTE. Of course it is likely that mobile operators still would have a thin GSM layer to support roaming traffic and extreme laggards (this is however likely to be a shared resource among several operators). If by 2020 10MHz to 20MHz would be required to support voice capacity, then the MNO would have at least 100MHz and up-to 130MHz for data.

Note if we Fast-Backward to 2010, assume that no 2.6GHz or 800MHz auction had happened and that only 2×10 – 15 MHz @ 2.1GHz provided for cellular data capacity, then we easily get a factor 3 to 5 boost in spectral capacity for data over the period. This just to illustrate the meaningless of relativizing the challenge of providing network capacity.

So what’s the economical aspects of spectrum? Well show me the money!

Spectrum:

  1. needs to be Acquired (including re-acquired = Retention) via (a) Auction, (b) Beauty contest or (c) Private transaction if allowed by the regulatory authorities (i.e., spectrum trading); Usually spectrum (in Europe at least) will be time-limited right-to-use! (e.g., 10 – 15 years) => Capital investments to (re)purchase spectrum.
  2. might need to be Perfected & Re-farmed to another more spectral efficient technology => new infrastructure investments & customer migration cost (incl. acquisition, retention & churn).
  3. new deployment with coverage & service obligations => new capital investments and associated operational cost.
  4. demand could result in joint ventures or mergers to acquire sufficient spectrum for growth.
  5. often has a re-occurring usage fee associate with its deployment => Operational expense burden.

First 3 bullet points can be attributed mainly to Capital expenditures and point 5. would typically be an Operational expense. As we have seen in US with the failed AT&T – T-Mobile US merger, bullet point 4. can result in very high cost of spectrum acquisition. Though usually a merger brings with it many beneficial synergies, other than spectrum, that justifies such a merger.

spectrum_cost

Above Figure provides a historical view on spectrum pricing in US$ per MHz-pop. As we can see, not all spectrum have been borne equal and depending on timing of acquisition, premium might have been paid for some spectrum (e.g., Western European UMTS hyper pricing of 2000 – 2001).

Some general spectrum acquisition heuristics can be derived by above historical overview (see my presentation “Techno-Economical Aspects of Mobile Broadband from 800MHz to 2.6GHz” on @slideshare for more in depth analysis).

spectrum_heuristics

Most of the operator cost associated with Spectrum Acquisition, Spectrum Retention and Spectrum Perfection should be more or less included in a Mobile Network Operators Business Plans. Though the demand for more spectrum can be accelerated (1) in highly competitive markets, (2) spectrum starved operations, and/or (3) if customer demand is being poorly managed within the spectral resources available to the MNO.

WiFi, or in general any open radio-access technology operating in ISM bands (i.e., freely available frequency bands such as 2.4GHz, 5.8GHz), can be a source of mitigating costly controlled-spectrum resources by stimulating higher usage of such open-technologies and open-bands.

The cash prevention or cash optimization from open-access technologies and frequency bands should not be under-estimated or forgotten. Even if such open-access deployment models does not make standalone economical sense, is likely to make good sense to use as an integral part for the Next Generation Mobile Data Network perfecting & optimizing open- & controlled radio-access technologies.

The Economics of Spectrum Acquisition, Spectrum Retention & Spectrum Perfection is of such tremendous benefits that it should be on any Operators business plans: short, medium and long-term.

THE ECONOMICS OF SPECTRAL EFFICIENCY

The relative gain in spectral efficiency (as well as other radio performance metrics) with new 3GPP releases has been amazing between R99 and recent HSDPA releases. Lots of progress have been booked on the account of increased receiver and antenna sophistication.

spectral_efficiency_gain_per_technology

If we compare HSDPA 3.6Mbps (see above Figure) with the first Release of LTE, the spectral efficiency has been improved with a factor 4. Combined with more available bandwidth for LTE, provides an even larger relative boost of supplied bandwidth for increased capacity and customer quality. Do note above relative representation of spectral efficiency gain largely takes away the usual (almost religious) discussions of what is the right spectral efficiency and at what load. The effective (what that may be in your network) spectral efficiency gain moving from one radio-access release or generation to the next would be represented by the above Figure.

Theoretically this is all great! However,

Having the radio-access infrastructure supporting the most spectral efficient technology is the easy part (i.e., thousands of radio nodes), getting your customer base migrated to the most spectral efficient technology is where the challenge starts (i.e., millions of devices).

In other words, to get maximum benefits of a given 3GPP Release gains, an operator needs to migrate his customer-base terminal equipment to that more Efficient Release. This will take time and might be costly, particular if accelerated. Irrespective, migrating a customer base from radio-access A (e.g., GSM) to radio-access B (e.g., LTE), will take time and adhere to normal market dynamics of churn, retention, replacement factors, and gross-adds. The migration to a better radio-access technology can be stimulated by above-market-average acquisition & retention investments and higher-than-market-average terminal equipment subsidies. In the end competitors market reactions to your market actions, will influence the migration time scale very substantially (this is typically under-estimate as competitive driving forces are ignored in most analysis of this problem).

The typical radio-access network modernization cycle has so-far been around 5 years. Modernization is mainly driven by hardware obsolescence and need for more capacity per unit area than older (first & second) generation equipment could provide. The most recent and ongoing modernization cycle combines the need for LTE introduction with 2G and possibly 3G modernization. In some instances retiring relative modern 3G equipment on the expense of getting the latest multi-mode, so-called Single-RAN equipment, deployed, has been assessed to be worth the financial cost of write-off.  This new cycle of infrastructure improvements will in relative terms far exceed past upgrades. Software Definable Radios (SDR) with multi-mode (i.e., 2G, 3G, LTE) capabilities are being deployed in one integrated hardware platform, instead of the older generations that were separated with the associated floor space penalty and operational complexity. In theory only Software Maintenance & simple HW upgrades (i.e., CPU, memory, etc..) would be required to migrate from one radio-access technology to another. Have we seen the last HW modernization cycle? … I doubt it very much! (i.e., we still have Cloud and Virtualization concepts going out to the radio node blurring out the need for own core network).

Multi-mode SDRs should in principle provide a more graceful software-dominated radio-evolution to increasingly more efficient radio access; as cellular networks and customers migrate from HSPA to HSPA+ to LTE and to LTE-advanced. However, in order to enable those spectral-efficient superior radio-access technologies, a Mobile Network Operator will have to follow through with high investments (or incur high incremental operational cost) into vastly improved backhaul-solutions and new antenna capabilities than the past access technologies required.

Whilst the radio access network infrastructure has gotten a lot more efficient from a cash perspective, the peripheral supporting parts (i.e., antenna, backhaul, etc..) has gotten a lot more costly in absolute terms (irrespective of relative cost per Byte might be perfectly OKAY).

Thus most of the economics of spectral efficiency can and will be captured within the modernization cycles and new software releases without much ado. However, backhaul and antenna technology investments and increased operational cost is likely to burden cash in the peak of new equipment (including modernization) deployment. Margin pressure is therefor likely if the Opex of supporting the increased performance is not well managed.

To recapture the most important issues of Spectrum Efficiency Economics:

  • network infrastructure upgrades, from a hardware as well as software perspective, are required => capital investments, though typically result in better Operational cost.
  • optimal customer migration to better and more efficient radio-access technologies => market invest and terminal subsidies.

Boosting spectrum much beyond 6 times today’s mobile data dedicated spectrum position is unlikely to happen within a foreseeable time frame. It is also unlikely to happen in bands that would be very interesting for both providing both excellent depth of coverage and at the same time depth of capacity (i.e., lower frequency bands with lots of bandwidth available). Spectral efficiency will improve with both next generation HSPA+ as well as with LTE and its evolutionary path. However, depending on how we count the relative improvement, it is not going to be sufficient to substantially boost capacity and performance to the level a “1,000 times challenge” would require.

This brings us to the topic of vastly increased cell site density and of course Small Cell Economics.

THE ECONOMICS OF INCREASED CELL SITE DENSITY

It is fairly clear that there will not be a lot new spectrum available in the next 10+ years. The relative increase in cellular bandwidth will come from re-purposing & perfecting existing legacy spectrum (i.e., by re-farming) and acquiring some new bandwidth in the low frequency range (<800MHz) which per definition is not going to provide a lot of bandwidth.  The very high-frequency range (>3GHz) will contain a lot of bandwidth, but is only interesting for Small Cell and Femto-cell like deployments (feeding frenzy for Small Cells).

Financially Mobile Operators in mature markets, such as Western Europe, will be lucky to keep their earning and margins stable over the next 8 – 10 years. Mobile revenues are likely to stagnate and possible even decline. Opex pressure will continue to increase (e.g., just simply from inflationary pressures alone). MNOs are unlikely to increase cell site density, if it leads to incremental cost & cash pressure that cannot be recovered by proportional Topline increases. Therefor it should be clear that adding many more cell sites (being it Macro, Pico, Nano or Femto) to meet increasing (often un-managed & unprofitable) cellular demand is economically unwise and unlikely to happen unless followed by Topline benefits.

Increasing cell density dramatically (i.e., 56 times is dramatic!) to meet cellular data demand will only happen if it can be done with little incremental cost & cash pressure.

I have no doubt that distributing mobile data traffic over more and smaller nodes (i.e., decrease traffic per node) and utilize open-access technologies to manage data traffic loads are likely to mitigate some of the cash and margin pressure from supporting the higher performance radio-access technologies.

So let me emphasize that there will always be situations and geographical localized areas where cell site density will be increased disregarding the economics, in order to increase urgent capacity needs or to provide specialized-coverage needs. If an operator has substantially less spectral overhead (e.g., AT&T) than a competitor (e.g., T-Mobile US), the spectrum-starved operator might decide to densify with Small Cells and/or Distributed Antenna Systems (DAS) to be able to continue providing a competitive level of service (e.g., AT&T’s situation in many of its top markets). Such a spectrum starved operator might even have to rely on massive WiFi deployments to continue to provide a decent level of customer service in extreme hot traffic zones (e.g., Times Square in NYC) and remain competitive as well as having a credible future growth story to tell shareholders.

Spectrum-starved mobile operators will move faster and more aggressively to Small Cell Network solutions including advanced (and not-so-advanced) WiFi solutions. This fast learning-curve might in the longer term make up for a poorer spectrum position.

In the following I will consider Small Cells in the widest sense, including solutions based both on controlled frequency spectrum (e.g., HSPA+, LTE bands) as well in the ISM frequency bands (i.e., 2.4GHz and 5.8GHz). The differences between the various Small Cell options will in general translate into more or less cells due to radio-access link-budget differences.

As I have been involved in many projects over the last couple of years looking at WiFi & Small Cell substitution for macro-cellular coverage, I would like to make clear that in my opinion:

A Small Cells Network is not a good technical (or economical viable) solution for substituting macro-cellular coverage for a mobile network operator.

However, Small Cells however are Great for

  • Specialized coverage solutions difficult to reach & capture with standard macro-cellular means.
  • Localized capacity addition in hot traffic zones.
  • Coverage & capacity underlay when macro-cellular cell split options have been exhausted.

The last point in particular becomes important when mobile traffic exceeds the means for macro-cellular expansion possibilities, i.e., typically urban & dense-urban macro-cellular ranges below 200 meters and in some instances maybe below 500 meters pending on the radio-access choice of the Small Cell solution.

Interference concerns will limit the transmit power and coverage range. However our focus are small localized and tailor-made coverage-capacity solutions, not a substituting macro-cellular coverage, range limitation is of lesser concern.

For great accounts of Small Cell network designs please check out Iris Barcia (@IBTwi) & Simon Chapman (@simonchapman) both from Keima Wireless. I recommend the very insightful presentation from Iris “Radio Challenges and Opportunities for Large Scale Small Cell Deployments” which you can find at “3G & 4G Wireless Blog” by Zahid Ghadialy (@zahidtg, a solid telecom knowledge source for our Industry).

When considering small cell deployment it makes good sense to understand the traffic behavior of your customer base. The Figure below illustrates a typical daily data and voice traffic profile across a (mature) cellular network:

a_typical_traffic_day_in_europe

  • up-to 80% of cellular data traffic happens either at home or at work.+

Currently there is an important trend, indicating that the evening cellular-data peak is disappearing coinciding with the WiFi-peak usage taking over the previous cellular peak hour.

A great source of WiFi behavioral data, as it relates to Smartphone usage, you will find in Thomas Wehmeier’s (Principal Analyst, Informa: @Twehmeier) two pivotal white papers on  “Understanding Today’s Smatphone User” Part I and Part II.

The above daily cellular-traffic profile combined with the below Figure on cellular-data usage per customer distributed across network cells

traffic_over_network_distribution

shows us something important when it comes to small cells:

  • Most cellular data traffic (per user) is limited to very few cells.
  • 80% (50%) of the cellular data traffic (per user) is limited to 3 (1) main cells.
  • The higher the cellular data usage (per user) the fewer cells are being used.

It is not only important to understand how data traffic (on a per user) behaves across the cellular network. It is likewise very important to understand how the cellular-data traffic multiplex or aggregate across the cells in the mobile network.

We find in most Western European Mature 3G networks the following trend:

traffic_over_cell_distribution

  • 20% of the 3G Cells carries 60+% of the 3G data traffic.
  • 50% of the 3G Cells carriers 95% or more of the 3G data traffic.

Thus relative few cells carries the bulk of the cellular data traffic. Not surprising really as this trend was even more skewed for GSM voice.

The above trends are all good news for Small Cell deployment. It provides confidence that small cells can be effective means to taking traffic away from macro-cellular areas, where there is no longer an option for conventional capacity expansions (i.e., sectorization, additional carrier or conventional cell splits).

For the Mobile Network Operator, Small Cell Economics is a Total Cost of Ownership exercise comparing Small Cell Network Deployment  to other means of adding capacity to the existing mobile network.

The Small Cell Network needs (at least) to be compared to the following alternatives;

  1. Greenfield Macro-cellular solutions (assuming this is feasible).
  2. Overlay (co-locate) on existing network grid.
  3. Sectorization of an existing site solution (i.e., moving from 3 sectors to 3 + n on same site).

Obviously, in the “extreme” cellular-demand limit where non of the above conventional means of providing additional cellular capacity are feasible, Small Cell deployment is the only alternative (besides doing nothing and letting the customer suffer). Irrespective we still need to understand how the economics will work out, as there might be instances where the most reasonable strategy is to let your customer “suffer” best-effort services. This would in particular be the case if there is no real competitive and incremental Topline incentive by adding more capacity.

However,

Competitive circumstances could force some spectrum-starved operators to deploy small cells irrespective of it being financially unfavorable to do so.

Lets begin with the cost structure of a macro-cellular 3G Greenfield Rooftop Site Solution. We take the relevant cost structure of a configuration that we would be most likely to encounter in a Hot Traffic Zone / Metropolitan high-population density area which also is likely to be a candidate area for Small Cell deployment. The Figure below shows the Total Cost of Ownership, broken down in Annualized Capex and Annual Opex, for a Metropolitan 3G macro-cellular rooftop solution:

tco_greenfield_rooftop_site

Note 1: The annualized Capex has been estimated assuming 5 years for RAN Infra, Backaul & Core, and 10 years for Build. It is further assumed that the site is supported by leased-fiber backhaul. Opex is the annual operational expense for maintaining the site solution.

Note 2: Operations Opex category covers Maintenance, Field-Services, Staff cost for Ops, Planning & optimization. The RAN infra Capex category covers: electronics, aggregation, antenna, cabling, installation & commissioning, etc..

Note 3: The above illustrated cost structure reflects what one should expect from a typical European operation. North American or APAC operators will have different cost distributions. Though it is not expected to change conclusions substantially (just redo the math).

When we discuss Small Cell deployment, particular as it relates to WiFi-based small cell deployment, with Infrastructure Suppliers as well as Chip Manufacturers you will get the impression that Small Cell deployment is Almost Free of Capex and Opex; i.e., hardly any build cost, free backhaul and extremely cheap infrastructure supported by no site rental, little maintenance and ultra-low energy consumption.

Obviously if Small Cells cost almost nothing, increasing cell site density with 56 times or more becomes very interesting economics … Unfortunately such ideas are wishful thinking.

For Small Cells not to substantially pressure margins and cash, Small Cell Cost Scaling needs to be very aggressive. If we talk about a 56x increase in cell site density the incremental total cost of ownership should at least be 56 times better than to deploy a macro-cellular expansion. Though let’s not fool ourselves!

No mobile operator would densify their macro cellular network 56 times if absolute cost would proportionally increase!

No Mobile operator would upsize their cellular network in any way unless it is at least margin, cost & cash neutral.

(I have no doubt that out there some are making relative business cases for small cells comparing an equivalent macro-cellular expansion versus deploying Small Cells and coming up with great cases … This would be silly of course, not that this have ever prevented such cases to be made and presented to Boards and CxOs).

The most problematic cost areas from a scaling perspective (relative to a macro-cellular Greenfield Site) are (a) Site Rental (lamp posts, shopping malls,), (b) Backhaul Cost (if relying on Cable, xDSL or Fiber connectivity), (c) Operational Cost (complexity in numbers, safety & security) and (d) Site Build Cost (legal requirements, safety & security,..).

In most realistic cases (I have seen) we will find a 1:12 to 1:20 Total Cost of Ownership difference between a Small Cell unit cost and that of a Macro-Cellular Rooftop’s unit cost. While unit Capex can be reduced very substantially, the Operational Expense scaling is a lot harder to get down to the level required for very extensive Small Cell deployments.

EXAMPLE:

For a typical metropolitan rooftop (in Western Europe) we have the annualized capital expense (Capex) of ca. 15,000 Euro and operational expenses (Opex) in the order of 30,000 Euro per annum. The site-related Opex distribution would look something like this;

  • Macro-cellular Rooftop 3G Site Unit Annual Opex:
  • Site lease would be ca. 10,500EUR.
  • Backhaul would be ca. 9,000EUR.
  • Energy would be ca. 3,000EUR.
  • Operations would be ca. 7,500EUR.
  • i.e., total unit Opex of 30,000EUR (for average major metropolitan area)

Assuming that all cost categories could be scaled back with a factor 56 (note: very big assumption that all cost elements can be scaled back with same factor!)

  • Target Unit Annual Opex cost for a Small Cell:
  • Site lease should be less than 200EUR (lamp post leases substantially higher)
  • Backhaul should be  less than 150EUR (doable though not for carrier grade QoS).
  • Energy should be less than 50EUR (very challenging for todays electronics)
  • Operations should be less than 150EUR (ca. 1 hour FTE per year … challenging).
  • Annual unit Opex should be less than 550EUR (not very likely to be realizable).

Similar for the Small Cell unit Capital expense (Capex) would need to be done for less than 270EUR to be fully scalable with a macro-cellular rooftop (i.e., based on 56 times scaling).

  • Target Unit Annualized Capex cost for a Small Cell:
  • RAN Infra should be less than 100EUR (Simple WiFi maybe doable, Cellular challenging)
  • Backhaul would be less than 50EUR (simple router/switch/microwave maybe doable).
  • Build would be less than 100EUR (very challenging even to cover labor).
  • Core would be less than 20EUR (doable at scale).
  • Annualized Capex should be less than 270EUR (very challenging to meet this target)
  • Note: annualization factor: 5 years for all including Build.

So we have a Total Cost of Ownership TARGET for a Small Cell of ca. 800EUR

Inspecting the various capital as well as operational expense categories illustrates the huge challenge to be TCO comparable to a macro-cellular urban/dense-urban 3G-site configuration.

Massive Small Cell Deployment needs to be almost without incremental cost to the Mobile Network Operator to be a reasonable scenario for the 1,000 times challenge.

Most the analysis I have seen, as well as carried out myself, on real cost structure and aggressive pricing & solution designs shows that the if the Small Cell Network can be kept between 12 to 20 Cells (or Nodes) the TCO compares favorably to (i.e., beating) an equivalent macro-cellular solution. If the Mobile Operator is also a Fixed Broadband Operator (or have favorable partnership with one) there are in general better cost scaling possible than above would assume (e.g., another AT&T advantage in their DAS / Small Cell strategy).

In realistic costing scenarios so far, Small Cell economical boundaries are given by the Figure below:

Let me emphasize that above obviously assumes that an operator have a choice between deploying a Small Cell Network and conventional Cell Split, Nodal Overlay (or co-location on existing cellular site) or Sectorization (if spectral capacity allows). In the Future and in Hot Traffic Zones this might not be the case. Leaving Small Cell Network deployment or letting the customers “suffer” poorer QoS be the only options left to the mobile network operator.

So how can we (i.e., the Mobile Operator) improve the Economics of Small Cell deployment?

Having access fixed broadband such as fiber or high-quality cable infrastructure would make the backhaul scaling a lot better. Being a mobile and fixed broadband provider does become very advantageous for Small Cell Network Economics. However, the site lease (and maintenance) scaling remains a problem as lampposts or other interesting Small Cell locations might not scale very aggressively (e.g., there are examples of lamppost leases being as expensive as regular rooftop locations). From a capital investment point of view, I have my doubts whether the price will scale downwards as favorable as they would need to be. Much of the capacity gain comes from very sophisticated antenna configurations that is difficult to see being extremely cheap:

Small Cell Equipment Suppliers would need to provide a Carrier-grade solution priced at  maximum 1,000EUR all included! to have a fighting chance of making massive small cell network deployment really economical.

We could assume that most of the “Small Cells” are in fact customers existing private access points (or our customers employers access points) and simply push (almost) all cellular data traffic onto those whenever a customer is in vicinity of such. All those existing and future private access points are (at least in Western Europe) connected to at least fairly good quality fixed backhaul in the form of VDSL, Cable (DOCSIS3), and eventually Fiber. This would obviously improve the TCO of “Small Cells” tremendously … Right?

Well it would reduce the MNOs TCO (as it shift the cost burden to the operator’s customer or employers of those customers) …Well … This picture also would  not really be Small Cells in the sense of proper designed and integrated cells in the Cellular sense of the word, providing the operator end-2-end control of his customers service experience. In fact taking the above scenario to the extreme we might not need Small Cells at all, in the Cellular sense, or at least dramatically less than using the standard cellular capacity formula above.

In Qualcomm (as well as many infrastructure suppliers) ultimate vision the 1,000x challenge is solved by moving towards a super-heterogeneous network that consist of everything from Cellular Small Cells, Public & Private WiFi access points as well as Femto cells thrown into the equation as well.

Such an ultimate picture might indeed make the Small Cell challenge economically feasible. However, it does very fundamentally change the current operational MNO business model and it is not clear that transition comes without cost and only benefits.

Last but not least it is pretty clear than instead of 3 – 5 MNOs all going out plastering walls and lampposts with Small Cell Nodes & Antennas sharing might be an incredible clever idea. In fact I would not be altogether surprised if we will see new independent business models providing Shared Small Cell solutions for incumbent Mobile Network Operators.

Before closing the Blog, I do find it instructive to pause and reflect on lessons from Japan’s massive WiFi deployment. It might serves as a lesson to massive Small Cell Network deployment as well and an indication that collaboration might be a lot smarter than competition when it comes to such deployment:

softband_wifi_deployment